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Fear is a critical emotion in everyday life as it permeates many of our minor and major 
decisions. Explicitly or implicitly, fear is one of the emotions that most strongly shape 
human life. In this thesis fear and its philosophical remedies will be analysed through the 
work of western philosophers and thinkers selected  based on their overall contributions in 
conceptualizing fear and suggesting therapies for reducing its more damaging effects. 
  The study will show how Epicurus, Cicero and Seneca considered fear as the main 
obstacle in achieving peace of mind, and their ethical systems were primarily focused on 
dealing with this emotion by proposing eclectic philosophical therapies. Montaigne 
presented a humanist therapy of fear instrumented as a critical self-analysis.  
 In contrast, a reductionist trend in thinking about fear emerged during the 17th 
century with the growth of materialistic philosophy. Thomas Hobbes reduced fear into a 
necessary tool for social control, whereas René Descartes demoted fear to a secondary 
emotion enacted by a dualist mechanism. This trend continued with William James’s 
conception of fear as a sensory-somatic reflex, and with Sigmund Freud’s hypothesis of a 
neurotic fear resulting from universal unconscious laws.  
 I will also discuss how current neuroscience has reduced fear to decontextualized 
neural changes, and how the dominant trend in psychiatry has reified anxiety into arbitrary 
nomenclatures of unclear validity. On a completely different tack Ludwig Wittgenstein 
provided a broad ‘perspicuous presentation’ of fear, but his nuanced analysis has been 
largely ignored in philosophical studies.  
 Overall it can be seen that, in keeping with the scientific revolution, the influential 
perspectives throughout the philosophical history of fear change from understandings that 
philosophy itself and reason are the best therapies for fear towards the medicalization of 
fear that is dominant today. By following these specific and diverse historical 
convergences, however, their criss-crossing insights and oversights, the thesis aims to 
enhance the conceptual understanding of fear and the variety of perspectives and therapies 
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Empty is the argument of the philosopher by which no human disease is healed;  
for just as there is no benefit in medicine if it does not drive out bodily diseases,  
so there is no benefit in philosophy if it does not drive out the disease of the soul  
Porphyry, To Marcella, (Inwood & Gerson, 1994, p. 82). 
 
[philosophy] is a physician of souls, takes away the load of empty troubles,  
sets us free from diseases and banishes fear 
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 2.11 
 
 
 Fear is one of the most significant emotions in shaping human life. Fear permeates 
many of our minor and major decisions, and explicitly or implicitly influences our choices 
and behaviour. We fear events, such as making mistakes at work, and we fear real objects, 
such as snakes and spiders, fictional objects, such as running into ghosts in the dark, or 
non-material objects, such as the uncertainty of the future. Fear sometimes protects us from 
short- and long-term dangers, but it may also be a source of severe distress. We may 
appreciate this distinction in the life of Pyrrho of Ellis (c.360 BCE – c.270 BCE), one of the 
most fearless philosophers of Antiquity. His ethics of suspension of judgment included a 
remarkable impassivity in daily life events. Diogenes Laertius describes Pyrrho as “taking 
no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what 
not…he was kept out of harm’s way by his friends who…used to follow close after him” 
(Diogenes Laertius, 1925; 9.61).1 Pyrrho lived in a state of extraordinary tranquillity and 
emotional indifference. It was his friends who suffered the fear Pyrrho seems to have 
lacked. 
 
 Fear has been relatively neglected as an object for philosophical study in proportion 
to its importance. In its more detrimental severity, fear has been addressed by sociologists 
                                                 
1 Reference to Diogenes Laertius is provided as year of publication, followed by volume and section 
numbers. 
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writing on the concept of ‘risk society’ (Adam, Beck, & Van Loon, 2004, p. 88),2 as well as 
historians and psychologists conceptualising the 20th century as the ‘age of anxiety’ 
(Dunant & Porter, 1996).3 During the 20th century severe manifestations of fear, such as 
anxiety, panic and phobias have been increasingly managed by psychiatrists and 
psychologists.  A personal anecdote related to this trend illustrates one of the main reasons 
that I have chosen fear and its therapies as the object for this dissertation. 
 
 While working as a practicing psychiatrist in an anxiety clinic, I began studies on 
Epicurean and Stoic philosophy and became markedly impressed by the relevance of fear in 
Hellenistic texts, and especially by the variety of remedies recommended by these 
philosophical schools. I then assembled a short pamphlet that included brief remarks from 
Epicurus, Cicero and Seneca with advice on managing fear, for patients to read in the 
waiting area. To my surprise, that little pamphlet was strongly demanded and ran through 
several reprints including expansions and revisions. Furthermore, a sizeable number of 
patients reported feeling better after reading the short text. This personal experience kindled 
my interest in providing a conceptual analysis of fear and its therapies as proposed by 
philosophers and major thinkers.  
 
 It is necessary at this stage to provide more clarification of the object of this 
dissertation. I shall examine the concept and therapies of fear, where I take fear to include 
several semantically-related emotional conditions, such as anxiety, phobias, dread, panic, 
and anguish. The reason for this broad take on fear is justified by a brief lexical analysis 
presented below which shows that these terms have crisscrossing uses and intertwined 
histories that do not allow for exhaustive distinctions between them and the phenomena 
they denote.  
                                                 
2 ‘Risk society’ (Adam et al., 2004, p. 5) is conceptualised as a social condition produced by 
specific economic, political and cultural variables, and is characterised by a pervasive increase in 
uncertainty influencing social structures. 
3 In their text entitled The Age of Anxiety Dinant and Porter (p. xvi) describe the 20th century as an 
age of expanding choices but limited by a decrease in the sense of social control and an increase of 
fear of the future. In a comic vein, they consider that the new millennia placed humans at a 
crossroad, where “one path leads to despair and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction. Let 
us pray that we have the wisdom to choose correctly” (p. xviii). 
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1.1. A lexical introduction to the concept of fear 
 In the secular Old Greek lexicon, phobos had the meaning of “someone or 
something that is to be feared,” of terror (usually when referring to a single individual), or 
panic (when referring to a group) (Liddell & Scott, 1996, p. 1947).4 In Homer, phobos was 
used to denote panic or flight (Konstan, 2006a); Herodotus used it as generic fear or terror; 
Hippocrates used phobos in the milder sense of doubt or scruple; and it also had the 
theological connotation of awe and reverence for a divine being, as well as meaning dread 
and the act of, or the object for, striking terror into someone (Liddell & Scott, 1996, p. 
1947). The Old Greek also included the noun alusmos to denote the somatic aspects of fear 
(e.g. restlessness, palpitations, sweating, tremor) (Liddell & Scott, 1996, p. 74). The root 
aluo had the meaning of wandering restlessly and being uneasy, whereas alusmos meant 
“anguish, inquietude, uneasiness, being troubled,” as well as “tossing about” in the specific 
case of the sick. The derivation alusis had the meaning of distress and anguish, and in the 
colloquial Greek, the adjective lusiteles meant “unprofitable”, whereas in medicine it was 
used to mean “unfavourable prognosis” (Liddell & Scott, 1996, p. 74). Other derivatives of 
alusmos were used as medical terms only. For instance, in the Hippocratic corpus the 
adjective allusmotes was used to denote states of feeling uneasy or troubled (Liddell & 
Scott, 1996, p. 74).5  
 
Despite these relevant semantic differences, recent texts on the philosophy of 
emotions define ‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’ in rather idiosyncratic ways, and a few words on the 
current technical use of these words is in order. In her translation of Cicero’s Tusculan 
Disputations Graver (Graver, 2002) takes the Latin noun aegritudo to denote mental pain at 
present and metus for mental pain in the future. However, this categorical distinction is 
                                                 
4 In this section I am drawing heavily on Liddell and Scott’s lexical work on Greek-English, along 
with Konstan’s thorough discussion of fear in his book The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks 
(Konstan, 2006a). 
5 Konstan has drawn attention to the important work of Robert Zaborowski, who catalogued all the 
words related to the concept of fear in the Homeric epics. Zaborowski considers that the emotions 
of fear and courage are indispensable for the description of the human condition (Zaborowski, 
2002). According to this author, his lexicographical description is based on a contextual analysis of 
the texts, as well as on analyses of metaphors and specific behaviours. Zaborowski remarks on the 
importance of analysing the cause of the emotion, its object, its results, and its relation with other 
psychological forces for a deeper semantic understanding (Zaborowski, 2002, p. 325). 
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rendered more equivocal by the fact that aegritudo derives from aeger, an adjective 
denoting sickness from both body and mind. In the latter case (“aeger animus”), this term 
not only has the connotation of pain but also of “any agitation of the passions or feelings, of 
love, hope, fear, anxiety, sorrow” as well as being “troubled, anxious, dejected, sad, 
sorrowful” (Lewis & Short, 1891, p. 53) (my italics). Moreover, the early use of aegritudo 
only had the connotation of illnesses of the body (“of men and brutes”), and it was Cicero 
who began using aegritudo in the psychological sense of mental grief and sorrow (Lewis & 
Short, 1891, p. 84). Another important difference in translation is Graver’s rendering of the 
Latin passio as ‘emotion’. Graver acknowledges the different etymologies of these terms, 
but based on an analysis of Stoic fragments and current use, she considers it is more 
reasonable to use ‘emotion’ rather than the old ‘passion’ (Graver, 2002, pp. 2-3).6 While 
this is a debatable decision, these lexical dilemmas show the difficulty of rendering, 
psychological terms used many centuries ago in a non-anachronistic way. In this 
dissertation, I have also used ‘emotion’ to render the Latin passio, except when the text 
being analysed requires using the original term, for example when addressing Descartes’s 
The Passions of the Soul, where he uses the terms passion and emotion with different 
technical connotations (see Chapter six). 
 
This brief lexical description of Old Greek and Latin terms demonstrates that even 
in antiquity the noun ‘fear’ had a rich semantic network and its meanings acquired 
specificity when analysed in their proper contexts. As argued by Dixon, coining new words 
or endowing old ones with new meanings “can create new concepts, and even new 
worldviews, which may strongly influence people’s capacity to understand the world and 
themselves” (Dixon, 2012, p. 338). Some philosophers addressed in this dissertation used 
the noun ‘passion’, a term largely replaced around the middle of the 19th century in both the 
philosophical and medical literature by ‘emotion’ (Dixon, 2003). However, whereas 
‘passion’ has the connotation of passivity and disease, ‘emotion’ has been used since the 
early 19th century with the connotation of a vivid feeling, usually detached from 
pathological considerations (Dixon, 2003). It is also the case that the same word may 
remain in use in different historical times, but gain different connotations with each 
                                                 
6 Graver also remarks that some current uses of ‘emotion’ do not fall within the extension of the 
ancient passio (Graver, 2002, pp. 2-3). 
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successive period. An example of such a lexical rejuvenation is provided by the noun 
‘anxiety’, which was rarely used in its current psychological meaning in the psychiatric or 
philosophical literature before the late 19th century (Berrios, 1999), but became of common 
technical and vernacular use after Freud described the syndrome of ‘anxiety neurosis’ in 
1895 (see Chapter eight). Other terms conceptually related to fear such as ‘phobia’ and 
‘panic’ acquired a strong medical connotation during the 20th century, and have acted as a 
linchpin for the medicalization of fear (see Chapter nine). In contemporary colloquial use 
the sense of fear is implicit whenever using semantically related words such as ‘fright’, 
‘dread’, ‘terror’, ‘horror’, ‘panic’, ‘alarm’, ‘dismay’, ‘consternation’, ‘trepidation’, 
‘apprehension’, ‘anxiety’ and ‘timidity’, and the selection of which term is used is 
influenced by a host of variables, such as the acuteness and severity of the event producing 
the emotion, the presence of people, the age and social status of the agent, the possibility of 
escape, and other contextual factors (Hollander, 2004). 
 
Finally, it is important to remark that there is no single concept of fear, given that 
this emotion may be analysed from the different perspectives of philosophy, theology, 
psychology, sociology, psychiatry, the neurosciences, the history of emotions and lexical 
uses. Nevertheless, some philosophers consider it is possible to provide categorical 
definitions to fear-related terms. For instance, the philosopher Jesse Prinz suggests that the 
“folk” category of fear consists of two different states, which he termed panic and anxiety 
(Prinz, 2004, p. 152). ‘Panic’ is defined as a response to an immediate physical threat 
which is behaviourally related to a flight response, whereas ‘anxiety’ is defined as a 
response to impending danger which is behaviourally related to freezing (p. 153). The main 
problem with this classification is the attempted reduction of these terms to concepts 
defined in purely behavioural terms (e.g. flight or freezing responses), which may allow for 
ease in studying fear in laboratory settings, but may not reflect other technical or colloquial 
uses. For instance, Prinz’s concept of anxiety is no more than one among many alternative 
definitions. He could have referred to Boissier du Sauvage’s use of the term in the early 
medical nosologies when ‘anxiety’ had both psychological and somatic connotations 
(Boissier de Sauvages, 1772), or to Freud’s concept of anxiety which has a purely 
psychological connotation (see Chapter eight), or the complex spiritual connotation of 
anxiety in Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anxiety (see Chapter nine), or the current psychiatric 
 6 
conceptualisation of anxiety as a mental disorder (see Chapter nine), where anxiety is 
defined as including restlessness rather than Prinz’s freezing.7  
 
To conclude, the object of this dissertation is the emotion of fear, with the important 
clarifications that first, the term ‘fear’ includes a variety of semantically-related terms 
united by ‘family resemblances’ but with fuzzy boundaries, and second, that fear-related 
terms have not ‘crystallised’ in time, but have evolved with changes in their colloquial and 
technical meanings. After this necessary discussion and clarification of the object of this 
dissertation, I shall now address the meaning of ‘conceptual analysis’ of emotions 
 
1.2. The conceptual analysis of fear 
 In his well-known text Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology, the 
philosopher Robert Roberts has defined the conceptual analysis of emotions as “an 
approach to the investigation of emotions that takes major clues about them from the ways 
people talk about the emotions in the contexts of their life,” and from examining examples 
of a given emotion as it occurs in specific narrative contexts (R. C. Roberts, 2003, p. 4). 
Roberts proposes a “common-sense realism” type of conceptual analysis given that, in his 
opinion, people from any historical period are able to be roused by fear and provide reasons 
for this emotional state (R. C. Roberts, 2003, p. 11).8 Roberts also considers that 
observation of emotional features is more relevant for conceptual analysis than 
philosophical theories, given that, in his view, the emotional display used for conceptual 
analysis has remained relatively stable in the history of humanity. For example, the 
progression from Aristotelian pathe to Stoic passions deals with the same “old familiar 
facts of anger, fear, joy and hope” (R. C. Roberts, 2003, p. 13). Roberts wants to avoid the 
                                                 
7 Other philosophers who wrote extensively on the philosophy emotions provide very different 
classifications of fear. Solomon, for instance, divides fears into the categories of “rational and 
reasonable” and “irrational and unreasonable” depending on the response (adequate or exaggerated) 
to a given object (Solomon, 2007, p. 36). Against Prinz’s theory, Solomon considers that physical 
symptoms should not be confused with the emotion of fear which, in his opinion, is the act of 
recognizing a danger (p. 37). 
8 As Roberts acknowledges, this ‘folk’ or ‘common-sense’ approach to the concept of emotions was 
criticised by Amelié Rorty (Rorty, 1984), who suggested that an adequate concept of emotions 
requires consideration of the philosophical background from which the concept originated, as well 
as a historical and lexical approach.  
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extremes of conceptualising emotions as the exclusive result of neurophysiological or 
sociocultural processes. In his own words “an imperialistically social constructivist account 
of emotions is as far from the truth about [the concept of emotions] as a purely neurological 
account” (R. C. Roberts, 2003, p. 13). Finally, Roberts considers that for a conceptual 
analysis of emotions a lexical-historical approach is “useful but not necessary” (italics in 
the original) (R. C. Roberts, 2003, p. 10).  
 
 For this dissertation, I have selected the philosophical strategy of conceptual 
analysis given that, as I shall discuss, this is a powerful technique not only for clarifying the 
concept of fear, but also to help in understanding the best therapeutic approaches.9 The 
selection of different Western philosophers and thinkers from different periods is relevant 
for providing perspicuous views and didactic differences that would not be otherwise 
obtained by analysing a single philosopher or period. In other words, rather than trying to 
arrive at a synthesis, I will follow the Wittgenstenian tradition of enriching and illuminating 
differences on the concept and therapy of fear that only an eclectic selection of thinkers can 
provide.10 This is the reason this dissertation not only includes perspectives from different 
Western philosophical traditions, but also draws on concepts of fear from psychoanalysis, 
psychiatry, sociology and the neurosciences. 
 
 Some differences between the investigation in this dissertation and Roberts’s 
conceptual analysis technique should be mentioned. A solely philosophical form of 
argumentation may be sufficient for Roberts’s analytical purposes, but for the present 
                                                 
9 Daniel Hutto has argued against the type of conceptual analysis that defines its object in terms of 
‘necessary and sufficient’ conditions (Hutto, 2009, p. 196). Hutto remarks that the “correctness” of 
conceptual analysis requires a standard against which this activity is evaluated, but given the lack of 
such standards of general agreement, concepts are idiosyncratic rather than “stable and 
unambiguous” constructs (p. 201). Concepts are not only unstable, but their existence depends on 
current uses. Therefore, any conceptual analysis is restricted to the time at which it is carried out. 
Given that no philosophical conclusions can be assessed as final, concepts have no immutable 
“essences,” and as Hutto proposes, concepts can be refined or replaced with alternative ones (p. 
202). I agree with Hutto’s criticism of the futility of searching for “essential” concepts, and in this 
dissertation, there is an explicit rejection of pursuing a ‘definite’ concept of fear. In fact, one of the 
main aims of this dissertation is addressing the major differences in the concept of fear among 
philosophers from different traditions and other thinkers and scientists selected for analysis. 
10 I will justify below the reasons behind the selection of particular thinkers. 
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dissertation, which spans several millennia, a historical approach, with consideration of 
biographical aspects and important idiosyncrasies in lexical use should be employed. I am 
not arguing that a conceptual analysis of fear should follow a strict chronological trajectory, 
or that a detailed lexical analysis is sufficient in illuminating the concept of fear of the 
ancients, but I consider that historical and lexical aspects cannot be ignored. As I shall 
discuss, historical factors are important for understanding the Hellenistic search for 
therapies of fear (Konstan, 2006a), as well as for understanding Hobbes’s political concept 
of fear. The brief lexical analysis above is an important reminder that a generic concept of 
fear will only result in limited concepts and therapies if lexical richness and the historical 
background are ignored. The philosopher Sellars rightly remarks that biographies were 
regarded by the ancients as relevant for the understanding of philosophical texts, as 
philosophy was considered a practice rather than an activity limited to textual analysis 
(Sellars, 2003). According to Sellars, biographical information may clarify the congruency 
(or lack thereof) between the philosophers’ doctrines and their way of life. In this 
dissertation, biographical information will be provided whenever necessary for a better 
understanding of the argument under discussion. I shall examine several examples where 
biographical aspects and the context in which philosophers lived are relevant for 
understanding their conceptualization of fear. Such is the case of Cicero and Seneca 
(discussed in Chapter two), Montaigne (Chapter three), Hobbes (Chapter four), and 
Descartes (Chapter five). 
 
1.3. The philosophical therapy of fear 
 Fear is an emotion with a wide spectrum of intensities, ranging from everyday fears 
of minor relevance, to severe fears expressed in marked psychomotor reactions. Fear is also 
an emotional disposition, with some individuals having the habit of constantly worrying 
about any minor foreseeable danger, and on occasions, even feeling paralysed and unable to 
engage in their daily activities. For these individuals, fears may become a mental torment, 
which may motivate the affected person to seek professional help. It is this understanding 
of fear as constitutively requiring some sort of therapeutic treatment that is the other 
principal focus of this dissertation, and investigating the therapy of fear in these terms has 
required drawing from philosophical, psychological, neuroscientific, psychoanalytic, 
psychiatric and sociological sources. Roberts has made the interesting comment that in the 
past 25 years “the crop” of philosophers interested in the field of emotions have preferred 
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to focus on understanding ethical rather than functional underpinnings, such as the subtlety 
and unpredictability of emotions, aspects that are strongly related to language and best 
understood by conceptual analysis (R. C. Roberts, 2003, p. 37). Martha Nussbaum is one of 
the few contemporary philosophers with an interest in the philosophical therapy of 
emotions.11 To my knowledge, the concept of fear and its therapies has never been the 
exclusive focus of philosophical analysis.12 
 
The roots of philosophical therapy have been thoroughly examined by the 
philosopher and psychiatrist Pedro Laín Entralgo, who stressed the early split between 
physicians, using the healing power of herbs by the mutas artes (mute arts), and Cicero’s 
philosophical medicina mentis (medicine of the mind) (Laín Entralgo, 1970, p. 71). 
According to Laín Entralgo, in the Athens of the 5th century BCE an important 
philosophical dilemma arose concerning the question as to whether the passions might be 
diseases sensu stricto (in a strict sense), and whether the use of words could be developed 
into a therapeutical technique.13 This important question is addressed in Chapters two and 
three, which discuss the Epicurean and Stoic remedies for healing the distress caused by 
fear. Focusing on these Hellenistic schools, the philosopher Pierre Hadot stressed the role 
of philosophy, not only as providing a therapy for the passions, but also as bestowing 
ethical principles for pursuing a philosophical way of life, such as concern for one’s destiny 
and spiritual progress, assessing moral needs, and seeking peace of mind (Hadot, 1995, p. 
88). This way of life included a corpus of techniques that were used as remedies for the 
                                                 
11 See principally her The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (M. C. 
Nussbaum, 1994).  
12 I should nevertheless point to important chapters on fear by Konstan (Konstan, 2006b), Tappolet 
(Tappolet, 2010), and Canfield (Canfield, 2007, 2009). 
13 Already the Greek sophist Gorgias (c.485 – c.380 BCE) remarked on the power of words as 
remedies for the soul. In his Encomium of Helen, Gorgias writes that “Speech is a powerful ruler. Its 
substance is minute and invisible, but its achievements are superhuman; for it is able to stop fear 
and to remove sorrow and to create joy and to augment pity” (Gorgias, 2005, p. 23). He also 
compares words with drugs (“pharmakon”), stating that “the power of speech bears the same 
relation to the ordering of the mind as the ordering of drugs bears to the constitution of bodies. Just 
as different drugs expel different humours from the body, and some stop it from being ill but others 
stop it from living, so too some speeches cause sorrow, some cause pleasure, some cause fear, some 
give the hearers confidence, some drug and bewitch the mind with an evil persuasion” (Gorgias, 
2005, p. 25). 
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passions (see Chapters two and three), such as living in the present and ceasing to worry, 
the Cyrenaic premeditatio malorum (meditation about potential misfortunes), and the 
Epicurean detachment from the future in the search for relaxation and serenity (Hadot, 
1995, p. 88). Hadot also remarks on the relevance of the philosopher as a therapist adapting 
the use of words or logotherapy to the listener's needs with the aim of bringing a cure for 
the passions. The legacy of the Ancients, Hadot considers, “has never been surpassed” 
(Hadot, 1995, p. 69),14 and this legacy constitutes the starting point for the analysis of the 
therapies of fear in this dissertation. 
 
1.4. Aims and methodological challenges 
To sum up, I believe there is an important gap in the philosophical literature 
concerning the concept of fear and its remedies, and this dissertation has been designed to 
examine different concepts of fear that inform its therapy. This aim has guided the selection 
of the philosophers and thinkers included for discussion, allowing for a comparison of 
concepts and therapies. As discussed above, while the dissertation is structured as a 
historical-philosophical investigation of the concept of fear, it is not a purely historical 
rendition of fear, nor does it present an ‘anatomy of fear’ which includes all philosophical 
writings on this subject. Instead it provides a broad brushwork rendition of the main 
concepts of fear as presented by selected philosophers and thinkers, and how they have 
approached its therapy.  
 
Any work that takes a historical approach to its subject manner must be selective. 
The history of thinking about fear is no exception as the large number of philosophers and 
scholars who have discussed this emotion reflects its pervasive influence in human life. In a 
dissertation of limited length that aims at providing the benefits of a conceptual overview, 
deciding which philosophers and thinkers to include, and what works of those thinkers will 
best represent their views is a complex and fraught task. The philosophers and thinkers 
discussed in the following chapters were selected based on their overall contribution to the 
conceptualisation of fear and their suggestion of therapies for reducing its more damaging 
                                                 
14 Hadot contrasts the therapeutic preoccupations of the Ancients with those of contemporary 
philosophy, stating that “philosophical discourse now tends to have as its object nothing but more 
philosophical discourse” (Hadot, 1995, p. 76). 
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effects. While many scholars have discussed fear in different ways my focus here is 
specifically on works that are concerned with the type of problems that fear presents in our 
lives and the ways in which those difficulties might be alleviated. Some examples may help 
to clarify this important issue.15  
 
It might be asked why, for example, Epicurus’s concept of fear and the Epicurean 
therapies have been selected over the work of Aristotle. The principal reason here is that, in 
my opinion, Epicurus’s concept of anxiety is closer to human daily concerns and it lends to 
a readier translation into therapy compared with that of Aristotle. While there is room for 
debate over this, of course, Konstan’s chapter on fear in Aristotle’s work provides a useful 
lead (Konstan, 2006a). Konstan discusses Aristotle’s concept of fear, which in the 
Rhetoric16 is defined as a pain in relation to a future evil, with the qualification that the pain 
has to be “great” and its object relatively close in time (Konstan, 2006a, p. 130). Konstan 
concludes that for Aristotle the fear of death does not exist because it is far in the future. I 
want to argue that this definition of fear limits the concept of this emotion to rather 
exceptional events, and denies one of the main fears of humankind. Moreover, this concept 
does not render fear of death amenable to therapy, let alone a discussion of fear of death as 
one of the main human emotional concerns. On the other hand, for Epicurus an essential 
step for achieving ataraxia was that death should not be feared, tacitly admitting that fear 
of death is a strong human emotion in need of treatment.17 Furthermore, as argued by 
                                                 
15 I will argue that that the concept of fear has evolved in divergent directions. Whereas Hellenistic 
and Roman philosophers used a wide scope for fear, and this trend continued with thinkers of the 
Renaissance humanism such as Michel de Montaigne, this conceptual approach changed with the 
rise of materialism and the desire for social control in the 18th century. This is manifested by the 
political and dualist reductionism of Hobbes and Descartes, respectively, continued with the 
psychobiological perspective of William James, and brought into contemporary times with the 
medicalization of fear by Sigmund Freud and the current neuro-biological trend in psychiatry. 
Against the latter context of a narrow concept of fear due to multiple reductions, the philosophies of 
Soren Kierkegaard and Ludwig Wittgenstein generated an important challenge, although their 
conceptual efforts are rarely discussed in current philosophical texts (see for instance Goldie’s 
recent Handbook on the Philosophy of Emotions (Goldie, 2010)). 
16 “Let fear be a kind of pain or disturbance deriving from an impression of a future evil that is 
destructive or painful; for not all evils are feared…but as many as are productive of great pain or 
destruction, and these if they are not distant but rather seem near so as to impend. For things that are 
remote are not greatly feared” (Konstan, 2006a, p. 130). 
17 See discussion on the tetrapharmakos in chapter two. 
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Konstan, it was Epicurus who stressed that the fear of death underlies many human 
irrational fears and desires (Konstan 2006, p. 149), and it was the Epicurean school that 
accepted fears with and without concrete objects as relevant emotions, a concept rejected 
by Aristotle for whom fear always requires an object.18 
 
 A similar question may arise as to why Descartes’s concept of fear has been given 
preference over Spinoza’s. I want to argue that Descartes’s Passions of the Soul (Descartes, 
2015) provides a concept of fear that opens a new perspective by using a mechanistic 
approach that has witnessed several iterations until current times (see the mechanism 
proposed by Damasio as discussed in Chapter seven). Furthermore, Descartes’s text was 
born from an epistolary exchange between the philosopher and Princess Elizabeth of 
Bohemia, who at the time was suffering from fears and distress. These letters present 
Descartes not only as a philosopher and mathematician, but also as a physician of the soul, 
advising on various philosophical remedies to heal Elizabeth’s emotional ailments. This 
material provides an illuminating and didactic counterpoint between theory and practice 
which is missing in Spinoza. 
 
 For some readers, too, it may be surprising that no chapter is devoted to 
existentialist philosophers, although specific reference is made to Kierkegaard’s Concept of 
Anxiety in Chapter nine. Instead, I have prioritised a discussion of Freud’s concept of 
anxiety, given that it is the father of psychoanalysis who began the process of 
medicalization of fear, turning anxiety into a specific psychological pathology. While the 
concept of Angst developed by Heidegger provides a significant but complex perspective 
(Mulhall, 2005), in practical terms during the 20th century it has been the field of 
neurosciences and psychiatry that have elaborated the main conceptual material that 





                                                 
18 See Konstan, p. 150 (Konstan, 2006a). 
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1.5. A summary of the chapters 
Epicurus was among the first philosophers to recognise the negative impact of fear 
and anxiety upon peace of mind. 19 I will argue in Chapter two that the Epicurean telos of 
ataraxia was only to be achieved after a systematic therapy of fear, and above all by 
fighting the fear of death. Whereas Epicureanism had a strong social acceptance, it was the 
Greek Stoic school which provided the first systematic conceptualisation of emotions. In 
Chapter three I shall first discuss Cicero’s concept and therapy of fear and distress. While 
not a Stoic, his Tusculan Disputations are strongly influenced by Stoicism. Chapter three 
also examines Seneca’s concept of fear and his therapeutic recommendations. While 
belonging to the Stoic school, Seneca used an eclectic approach to conceptualise and treat 
fear. An original aspect of his therapy is that his recommendations were delivered in an 
epistolary style, but related to the reader in the shape of a therapeutic manual. The 
connection with the reader is even stronger in Montaigne’s Essays, which also provide a 
broad narrative of fears (Chapter four). These are conveyed by describing a full palette of 
fear-related emotions, from individual doubts and avoidance, to terror and generalised 
panic. 
 
 The search for therapies of fear, from Hellenistic times onwards, and the 
significance of this emotion for human life underwent a major change with the reductionist 
stance that began with the philosophical materialism of the 17th century. Thomas Hobbes 
conceptualised fear as a powerful tool for social control. He used the biblical figure of 
Leviathan as a symbol of a powerful sovereign capable of enforcing a strong political 
system by using the fear of punishment. Hobbes’s important insight is that fear underlies 
human curiosity, prudence and foresight, an idea which is addressed by recounting the 
myth of Prometheus, as I discuss in Chapter five. René Descartes performed a different 
reduction, by conceiving of emotions as based on a hydraulic mechanism. In The Passions 
                                                 
19 The noun anxiety has been used to translate fragments from the Epicurean school (see Long & 
Sedley’s The Hellenistic Philosophers, volume 2, pages 116, 128, 144 and 158 (Long & Sedley, 
1987b), and the Preface in Inwood and Hutchinson (Inwood & Gerson, 1994)). Striker (Striker, 
1990) uses anxiety to translate the Greek noun tarache present in Epicurean texts. Fear and anxiety 
are semantically related terms, but providing an in-depth philological and historical analysis of this 
relation exceeds the aims of this dissertation. As Everts and Jackson have discussed, semantic 
similarities and differences between these terms have been the focus of lengthy debates (P. Jackson 
& Everts, 2010).  
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of the Soul, his main treatise on the passions, Descartes investigates the passions from the 
perspective of a physiologist rather than a philosopher. Conceptually, Descartes’s approach 
is a strong departure from the humanist concept of emotions, employing as it does a 
physiological strategy consisting of the separation of soul and body as different ontological 
entities in constant interaction.  
 
 By the end of the 19th century, the philosopher and physician William James 
suggested that the emotions result from the perception of somatic changes, thus implying 
that fear does not depend on an appraisal of danger, being instead the result of a complex 
neural reflex. As discussed in Chapter seven, James’s theory was the departing point for the 
neurobiological paradigm of fear, which flourished in the second half of the 20th century. I 
shall also discuss how Ludwig Wittgenstein warned against the dangers of reductionism 
and provided thoughtful remarks towards a broad concept of fear, stating that emotions are 
nuanced feelings and behaviours evolving in a specific context. Wittgenstein 
conceptualised emotions in terms of his metaphor of ‘language games’, where ‘language’ 
refers to both verbal and non-verbal behaviours. Thus, in the case of fear, mastering its 
language game implies using the appropriate verbal expression or non-verbal behaviours 
interpreted against a distinct backdrop. Wittgenstein also provided arguments to support his 
contention that the complex human manifestations of fear cannot be exclusively construed 
as activity in putative neural circuits. However, these warnings have largely been ignored 
and the reduction of fear to specific neural mechanisms, as extensively described by the 
neurologist Antonio Damasio, is the current dominant scientific paradigm.20  
 
 Another major shift in the concept of fear occurred in 1895 when Sigmund Freud 
separated out from the syndrome of ‘neurasthenia’21 a specific entity he termed ‘Neurosis 
                                                 
20 This is the reason for having included Damasio, rather anachronistically, in this chapter. 
21 Neurasthenia is a medical syndrome, coined in 1869 by the American neurologist George Miller 
Beard, that includes a variety of somatic and psychological symptoms such as headaches, dizziness, 
fatigue after mental effort, muscle tension, poor concentration, anxiety and depressed mood, among 
others (Beard, 1881). This nosological construct is still extant in the International Classification of 
Diseases (10th version) of the World Health Organization (World Health Organization, 1993). 
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Anxiety.’22 This conceptual demarcation had major consequences for the nosology of fear 
and anxiety, and most importantly, Freud’s delimitation of pathological anxiety resulted in 
the description of a specific pathogenesis and the creation of a therapy, both instrumental in 
medicalising fear. Chapter eight thus provides a critical analysis of Freud’s construction of 
normal and pathological fear and anxiety, and the conceptual problems arising from this 
psychophysical reductionism. 
 
 Both, Freudian theories and treatment of anxiety were replaced during the second 
half of the 20th century with theories based on empirical findings in the field of biological 
psychiatry along with the revolutionary discovery of medications able to provide dramatic 
relief to anxious people. The 21st century is rich in nosological systems and 
phenomenological descriptions of anxiety. However, as I argue in Chapter nine, the 
problem of what counts as abnormal is not empirical but conceptual, and has not yet been 
satisfactorily addressed, let alone resolved. 
 
 To conclude, this dissertation will provide a historical-conceptual analysis of fear 
based on the writings of Western philosophers and thinkers who have examined this 
emotion in innovative ways, and who have also extended their interest into the care for 
unhealthy fears. Conceptual problems still plague the wide topic of fear and related 
emotions, and it is my hope that this dissertation will help by illuminating conceptual 
riddles and by providing philosophical leads to help with future studies in the field. 
                                                 
22 The original German term is Angstneurose, and translating the German Angst with the English 






The Epicurean concept of fear and the road to ataraxia 
 
‘What produces unsurpassed jubilation is the contrast of the great evil escaped:  
and this is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly 
 and then stand firm and do not stroll about’ 
Saying of Epicurus in Plutarch’s Moralia,  
A Pleasant Life Impossible (1086) (Plutarch, 1927) 
 
‘The fool’s life is empty of gratitude and full of fears;  
its course lies wholly toward the future’. 




 Fear of death, fear of the gods, fear of poverty, and fear of pain have been the most 
relevant fears of humankind. These fears figure prominently already in the Book of Job as 
well as in the Homeric texts, and it is appropriate for this thesis to begin by analysing these 
fears, considered by the Hellenistic philosopher Epicurus as the main obstacle to achieving 
peace of mind, or ataraxia.23 
                                                 
23 Like many Greek philosophical terms, ataraxia has several connotations. Epicurus used ataraxia 
as a noun to denote “impassiveness” and “calmness;” as a verbal derivative to denote “to keep 
calm” and “to act with perfect composure;” and as the adverbial form “calmly” (Liddell & Scott, 
1996, p. 268). Atarbes is a lexically-related adjective meaning “fearless” and “not dreaded,” and has 
a verbal derivative meaning “causing no fear” (Liddell & Scott, 1996, p. 268). Diogenes Laertius 
conveyed ataraxia as “neither suffering pain nor anxious fear” (Diogenes Laertius, 1925; 10.128). It 
is important to note that the concept of ataraxia had precursors in Greek philosophy, and was not an 
Epicurean creation. Democritus used the term athambia (defined by Cicero as “id est animum 
terrore liberum” (“freedom from alarm”) (Cicero, 1914; 5.87-8) to refer to the state of human 
happiness in which the soul is “disturbed by no fear” (Sedley, 2009, p. 39). Anaxarchus, a follower 
of Democritus, left a few fragments that are mostly related to the influence of fear upon human 
behaviour. For Anaxarchus much learning can cause “distress and misfortune” (Warren, 2002, p. 
83). Nausiphanes of Teos, Epicurus’ teacher, described the aim of life as akataplexia, “a correct 
attitude to things which normally cause fear or astonishment” (Warren, 2002, p. 165). Nevertheless, 
akataplexia is not synonymous with ataraxia, since the latter not only includes the indifference to 
fearful events, but also the rejection of unnatural and unnecessary desires (Warren, 2002, p. 166). 
The terms “happiness,” “ataraxia” and “peace of mind” are used interchangeably by Inwood and 
Gerson (Inwood & Gerson, 1994, pp. 32-36). 
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 Epicurus, born in the Greek island of Samos in 341 BCE, was one of the most 
influential Hellenistic philosophers, and Epicureanism remained an active school of 
philosophy for centuries. Epicurus began teaching philosophy at the Greek city of Mytilene 
and a few years later at Lampsacus, and finally set up his school in Athens in 306 BCE. He 
bought a house named Ho Kepos (‘The Garden’), where he established his school, at a time 
when Athenian philosophy was dominated by Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’s Lyceum 
(Grant, 1990, pp. 239-244). At the Garden, Epicurus provided philosophical teachings 
aimed towards helping his students in achieving ataraxia. Life at the Garden was frugal, 
with water and barley bread as the main staple, and simple shelter for men and women alike 
(Clay, 2009, pp. 9-28). Epicurus was a prolific writer, but little of this material was 
preserved, and extant writings are found mostly in letters to his friends and the maxims 
produced for his students to memorise. For Epicurus, pleasure was the state of mind that 
resulted from removing pain in the body (aponia) and fear in the soul (ataraxia) (Warren, 
2002, p. 166), and, as I shall argue, removing fear was the principal goal of Epicurean 
ethics.  
 
 In this chapter, I shall examine the Epicurean concept and philosophical treatment 
of fear. After a short discussion on the historical context of Epicureanism, I shall examine 
the relevance of fear for Epicurus’s ethical system by describing the main objects of fear, 
their relevance for the Epicurean way of life, and the different ‘remedies’ proposed by 
Epicurus and his followers to manage fear.24 
 
2.2. The historical context of Hellenistic philosophical schools  
 A notable introspective turn in the human condition started with the fall of Athens 
under Alexander the Great (Grant, 1990, p. 214). For several centuries before the 
Macedonian invasion, the city-state of Athens enjoyed a democracy in which Athenian 
citizens participated actively. The mind-set of the Athenians was mostly focused 
‘outwards’, that is, on participating in political, cultural or other civic events. With 
Alexander’s invasion, the golden times of the city-state were gone, as Athens became part 
                                                 
24 All the references to Epicurus extant remains correspond to the translation by Inwood and Gerson 
unless explicitly stated (Inwood & Gerson, 1994). The numeral next to the text reference 
corresponds to Usener’s notation system. 
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of the Macedonian empire. According to Michael Grant this period is considered the origin 
of Hellenistic “individuality” (Grant, 1990, p. 214). With the demise of Athens as a city-
state, the busy political life came to an end and Athenians no longer participated in the 
decision-making process of the city. This was a dramatic change in the political system 
since the future of Athens was no longer in their hands, and it also generated great 
uncertainty about citizens’ personal futures, leading to fear and anxiety (Grant, 1990, p. 
214). Accordingly, this community shift resulted in a personal shift, since the Athenians 
become more introspective, increasingly concerned about their present and future 
condition.25 In other words, with the collapse of the city-state emerged the fear of what the 
new political system would bring. This mixture of increasing uncertainty and distrust 
generated a need for a better understanding of fear and effective management of it. 
According to Gordon and Suits (Gordon & Suits, 2004, pp. 5-16) there were three main 
ways of addressing the uncertainties of fortune: first, astrology, as this practice could 
provide advice relevant to how to control and plan one’s life; second, the mystery cults of 
Greek religion to seek protection from the Olympian gods; and third, Epicurean philosophy. 
Tarn and Griffith (Tarn & Griffith, 1952, pp. 327-328) suggest that the political changes in 
Athens influenced some individuals in such a way that their feelings of social belonging 
drove them into Stoic philosophy, whereas others, affected by the oppression of fear and a 
wish to escape, selected Epicureanism.26 
 
                                                 
25 More specifically, as Grant remarks, “tens of thousands of people were gripped by an 
unreasonable, dismal, desperate conviction that everything in the world was controlled by Tyche” 
(i.e. the goddess of fortune) (Grant, 1990, p. 214). Life was beyond human control and hazards were 
everywhere. 
26 Other historians and philosophers of the Hellenistic period offer a more nuanced view of the 
religious and social changes. Graham Shipley considers that the cult of Tyche should not be 
elevated into a paradigm of Hellenistic religion” (Shipley, 2014, p. 175), and that interpreting the 
fear of Hellenistic Greeks as due to social changes may be anachronistic (Shipley, 2014, p. 190). 
Robert Sharples considers that the concern of Hellenistic philosophies on how best to live one’s life 
was related to the fact that “the certainties of the city-state had been swept away,” as well as to the 
disruption of “traditional cultural roots” caused by the expansion of Alexander’s empire (Sharples, 
2006, p. 223). According to Jonathan Barnes, life in Hellenistic Greece “was no more upsetting, no 
more at the mercy of fickle fortune or malign foes, than it had been in an earlier era” (Barnes, 2001, 
p. 427). Nevertheless, he points to a change in philosophical aims during the Hellenistic period, 
which moved away from scientific endeavours and became more interested in discovering “the 
‘best life’, to teach it, and to live it” (Barnes, 2001, p. 421). 
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 Epicurus’ philosophy is considered ‘hedonistic’ given that its main goal is achieving 
a state of physical and mental pleasure. As I shall now discuss, the state of mental pleasure 
or ataraxia could only be achieved after major fears were removed. In fact, many of the 
extant Epicurean fragments are orientated towards discussing the objects of fear, providing 
advice on how to obtain protection from social danger. 
 
2.3. The Epicurean concept of fear 
 The most recent translation of Epicurus’ extant works starts its Introduction with a 
bold statement: “The fundamental obstacle to happiness says Epicurus, is anxiety” (Inwood 
& Gerson, 1994, p. i).27 Epicurean fragments are rife with references to fear and anxiety, 
although they do not include a conceptual analysis of these emotions28. Rather, Epicurus 
provided numerous examples of fear and worries from everyday life, discussed in a didactic 
fashion. An Epicurean follower, Diogenes of Oenoanda, distinguished two types of fear. 
The first corresponds to the ordinary concept of fear, such as avoiding dangerous objects 
(Konstan, 2008, p. 48). The second belongs to a more indefinite category of fear, which 
Konstan considers corresponds to the current concept of anxiety: “the fear lies hidden 
within us, and we cannot simply escape the danger” (Konstan, 2008, p. 48). It is the second 
type of fear that most often impedes achieving ataraxia given that it is difficult to track 
down.29  
 
 The goal of Epicurean ethics, as already noted, was achieving ataraxia, “for we do 
everything for the sake of being neither in pain nor in terror” (Letter to Menoeceus, 128).30 
                                                 
27 A paragraph in the Letter to Menoeceus (128) is translated by Warren as “For it is for the sake of 
ataraxia that we do everything—so that we may feel neither pain nor anxiety” (Warren, 2002, p. 3), 
whereas Inwood and Gerson translate this paragraph as follows: “For we do everything for the sake 
of being neither in pain nor in terror” (p. 29) (my italics). This discrepancy shows the difficulty of 
translating ancient into current emotional terms. 
28 As compared, for instance, with the detailed analysis of fear in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the 
Nichomachean Ethics (M. C. Nussbaum, 1994, p. 117). 
29 Warren (Warren, 2004, p. 11) provides a different explanation for the two types of fear described 
by Diogenes of Oenoanda. He considers that the fear that is manifest and clear is the fear of death, 
whereas the fear ‘creeping into our nature’ is the fear of pain. 
30 One major influence in Epicurean ethics and physics was Democritus of Abdera (Warren, 2002, 
p. 36). Diogenes Laertius wrote, “[Democritus] says that euthymia is the goal of life—which is not 
cont. next page 
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Pleasure is nothing more than having no pain in the body and no fear in the soul (Letter to 
Menoeceus, 131), and this will become the main Epicurean mantra, one of those maxims to 
be memorised and rehearsed by his followers.31 This modest concept of pleasure led to a 
frugal lifestyle, avoiding any excess that could result in bodily pain through sickness. 
Epicurus was also concerned about the anxiety of losing those pleasures to which many 
people were habituated, given that the impact of this anxiety could be greater than the 
potential pleasure. Therefore, although the Epicurean philosophy is considered “hedonistic” 
we may agree with Marcuse that it is a “negative hedonism” since pleasure is achieved by 
avoiding the ordinary fears of life rather than actively seeking pleasure (Marcuse, 1967).  
  
 Epicurus placed great importance on obtaining assurance about preserving ataraxia 
in the future.32 While Epicurus stated that the satisfaction of simple desires such as food 
and shelter is sufficient for a happy life, he also claimed that happiness depends on the 
confidence that what is necessary will be always available.33 There is here a subtle tension 
between the concept of ataraxia as a state of mind based on the present condition, and 
ataraxia as a mental state greatly dependent on the potential outcome of future events. As 
Plutarch rightly pointed out in his criticism of Epicurus, the body will sooner or later 
become sick or injured, and consequently, humans “cannot but suffer constant dismay and 
anguish for the body in facing the future.”34 Thus, ataraxia is a delicate state of mind, 
                                                                                                                                                    
identical with pleasure as some have mistakenly understood, but is the state in which the soul 
proceeds peacefully and well settled, disturbed by no fear or superstition…” (Diogenes Laertius, 
1925 9.61). Warren suggests that Democritus’ concept of euthymia (the precursor of Epicurus’ 
ataraxia) as the removal of fear influenced the Epicurean tetrapharmakos (see below) (Warren, 
2002, p. 36). 
31 “Practise these and the related precepts day and night, by yourself and with a like-minded friend, 
and you will never be disturbed either when awake or in sleep, and you will live as a god among 
men” (Letter to Menoeceus, 135). 
32 The relevance of a safe future was also stressed by Epicurus’ followers such as Porphyry, who 
stated that “It is better for you to have confidence [about the future] while lying on a cheap bed than 
to be disturbed while possessing a golden couch and extravagant table” (Inwood & Gerson, 1994, p. 
81). 
33 “The cry of the flesh: not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold. For if someone has these 
things and is confident of having them in the future, he might contend even with Zeus for 
happiness” (my italics) (Vatican Sayings, 31). 
34 Plutarch, A pleasant life, (Plutarch, 1927 1090b). 
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feeding in the present moment, but greatly dependent on the future. This dependency on 
future events is expressed in the Epicurean recommendation to enjoy the present without 
delay for fear of future misfortunes,35 and explains the central role of safety (asphaleia) in 
the Epicurean ethical system, as I describe below.  
 
2.4. The role of fear and safety in Epicurean ethics  
 An analysis of extant Epicurean maxims and fragments shows that avoiding fear 
and anxiety is critical to achieving ataraxia. The relevance of fear for Epicurean ethics is 
manifested by the fact that 20 of the 40 aphorisms in the Kuriai Doxai (or ‘Key 
Doctrines’)36 are directly related to fear. The words fear, terror and alarm (as translated by 
Inwood and Gerson from the original Greek) appear in seven of them,37 fear-related themes 
are addressed in another eight aphorisms38, and five are related to security and safety.39,40  
 
 The Kuriai Doxai also addresses other frequent topics of Hellenistic ethics, such as 
virtue, prudence, and the role of knowledge, justice and friendship for a happy life. For ease 
of explanation, I have divided the aphorisms into the following categories:41 (i) principal 
                                                 
35  “Life is ruined by delay and each and every one of us dies without enjoying leisure” (Vatican 
Sayings, 14) (see also footnote 19). 
36 The Kuriai Doxai is a collection of brief quotes preserved by Diogenes Laertius (Diogenes 
Laertius, 1925) which present a very abridged version of the main tenets of Epicurean ethics, for 
quick consultation or memorization. 
37 #10-12, 18, 20, 34, and 39. 
38 #2, 16, 22, 28, 31-33, and 35. 
39 #6-7, 13-14, and 40. 
40 Another collection of Epicurean maxims, the Vatican Sayings, includes many aphorisms dealing 
with fear and related themes, such as safety, fortune, danger, procrastination about the future, 
confidence, hope and distrust. 
41 The aphorisms in the Kuriai Doxai have been divided into subgroups based on various criteria by 
different authors. The Spanish philosopher Garcia Gual (García Gual, 2001, p. 134) divided the 
Kuriai Doxai into fragments dealing with the “tetrapharmakos” (1-4), followed by the conditions 
for a happy life and the relationship between pleasures and virtues (5-21), the criteria for knowledge 
and moral action (22-26), the relevance of friendship, a classification of desires (27-30), and social 
justice and its relationship to the life of the wise man (31-40). Long (Long & Sedley, 1987a, pp. 
102-157) classified the fragments into aphorisms about fear and virtue, aphorisms about fear and 
science, and aphorisms about fear and social life. 
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causes of fear42, (ii) pain and fear,43 (iii) safety,44 (iv) knowledge and fear,45 (v) friendship 
and safety,46 and (vi) ethics and fear.47 A conceptual analysis of these groupings is 
provided below. 
 
2.4.1. The principal causes of fear 
 The main causes of human fear, which are described in the first four aphorisms of 
the Kuriai Doxai, were briefly summarised by Epicurus’ follower Philodemus in the 
famous tetrapharmakos or the four-fold remedy (Erler & Schofield, 1999)48: “Don’t fear 
god, Don’t worry about death; What is good is easy to get, and What is terrible is easy to 
endure.” The tetrapharmakos is structured in a hierarchy that facilitates a philosophical 
treatment of fears. The first step is to eliminate the fear of the afterlife, which should allow 
an easier removal of the fear of death. Once this step is achieved, the remaining fears can 
be diminished or removed by following the Epicurean ethics of a frugal life and Epicurus’ 
maxims regarding fear and safety (see below). I shall now analyse the tetrapharmakos in its 
four individual components. 
 
2.4.2. Don’t fear God 
 During the Hellenistic period, as already noted, there was a widespread belief that 
human life was in the control of Tyche, the goddess of fortune. Religion became one 
alternative to escape from the grasp of an uncertain destiny, although imparting its own 
fears. For example, individuals could ask the gods for protection, but at the same time had 
to seek protection from the gods’ anger. Gordon (Gordon & Suits, 2004, pp. 5-16) 
                                                 
42#1, 2, 1 5, 21 and 26. 
43 #3, 4, 8, 9, 19, and 30. 
44 #6, 7, 10, 14, 16 and 17. 
45 #11, 12, 13, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 29 and 38. 
46 #27, 28 and 39. 
47 #31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40. 
48 Philodemus Ad Contubernales (To His Companions) (PHerc 1005, col. 4.9-14) (Erler & 
Schofield, 1999). Long considers that the tetrapharmakos encapsulates “Epicurus’ entire 
philosophy” (Long, 2006, p. 178). 
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considers this ambivalent status of the Hellenistic gods as the origin of the human fear of 
the divine. Dickinson (Dickinson, 1911, p. 8) suggested that in the Hellenistic era the 
Greeks were terrified by the powers of nature, which became impersonated in spiritual 
beings. Later, these beliefs crystallised in a religious system that made the gods more 
familiar and natural phenomena less frightening. The Greek gods acquired a human form 
and could interfere with human affairs in both positive and negative ways. According to 
Epicurus, fear of the gods is readily dispatched once it is recognised that the gods are 
disinterested in human affairs.  The first aphorism in the Kuriai Doxai states that the gods 
cause no trouble, given that they are devoid of passions in their "blessed and immortal 
nature."49 Epicurus’ gods live in their own Garden, aloof from human life. Because the 
gods have no passions and therefore no anger towards humans, they do not represent a 
danger. Once this is understood, humans are released from fears of the supernatural and the 
afterlife. 
 
2.4.3. Don’t worry about death 
 The second aphorism of the Kuriai Doxai states that "death is nothing to us" given 
that, for the materialistic Epicurean ontology, death is no more than the dissolution of the 
human being (body and soul) into its constituent atoms.50 According to Epicurus, whatever 
is good or bad is provided by sense-experience, and given that death is the privation of 
sensation, nothing good or bad is lost. The understanding that death is not to be feared also 
removes the quest for immortality. These arguments suggest (as Martha Nussbaum argues 
in Therapy of Desire) (M. C. Nussbaum, 1994, p. 124) that for Epicurus whether one is 
alive or dead was a matter of indifference.51 However, Epicurus explicitly considered life 
                                                 
49 “What is blessed and indestructible has no troubles itself, nor does it give trouble to anyone else, 
so that it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. For all such things are a sign of weakness” 
(Kuriai Doxai, 1). 
50 “Death is nothing to us. For what has been dissolved has no sense-experience, and what has no 
sense-experience is nothing to us” This concept of death is also alluded to in another fragment: “So 
death, the most frightening of bad things, is nothing to us; since when we exist, death is not yet 
present, and when death is present, then we do not exist. Therefore, it is relevant neither to the 
living nor to the dead, since it does not affect the former, and the latter do not exist” (Letter to 
Menoeceus, 125). 
51 Warren has addressed relevant inconsistencies in the Epicurean account of death, but discussing 
his provocative arguments are beyond the scope of this thesis (Warren, 2009). 
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desirable even for an “old man” (Letter to Menoeceus, 126), and the desire to die foolish. 
Epicurus’ main argument for appreciating life is the variety of pleasures available to the 
Epicurean, such as the ‘katastematic’ or passive pleasure of being in the state of ataraxia 
and aponia, and the ‘kinetic’ or active pleasures of enjoying friendship.52  
 
 One conceptual limitation of the Epicurean maxim on not fearing death is that it 
does not consider the instinct of self-preservation, the well-established phenomenon that a 
living entity will remove itself from any situation that may pose a danger to its life. Thus, 
Nussbaum considers this Epicurean maxim as “inhuman,” given that this goal is beyond 
human emotional capacity. This instinctive fear, usually expressed by typical physiological 
changes53 and automatic behavioural responses such as flight will occur regardless of any 
rational argument about the relevance of death. On the other hand, humans have the 
capacity of creating habits from strong beliefs, which may reduce or even remove the fear 
of death. This is the case for Buddhists believing in reincarnation, and Christians and 
Muslims believing in the possibility of a heavenly life. In other words, some individuals 
with strong religious faith are not afraid of death, and some may even seek it intentionally. 
 
 Epicurus was well aware that for most individuals removing the fear of death is a 
difficult achievement. As he acknowledged, “One can attain security against other things, 
but when it comes to death all men live in a city without walls” (Vatican Sayings, 31). 
Humans are constantly exposed to the fear of death, and therefore, to tame or remove this 
fear, they have to continually remind themselves that death is not to be feared. Thus, 
Epicurus urges Menoeceus to “become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us” 
(my italics).54 Epicurus strongly advocated for the need to remove the fear of death since 
this fear is the foundation and origin of most human fears (Warren, 2004, p. 12). For the 
                                                 
52 Epicurus, in his On Choices, said: “For freedom from disturbance and freedom from suffering are 
katastematic pleasures; and joy and delight are viewed as kinetic and active” (Diogenes Laertius 
10.136-138, in Inwood & Gerson (Inwood & Gerson, 1994). 
53 For instance, the presence of palpitations, nausea, tremor and dizziness when exposed to a serious 
threat to our lives. 
54 “But the wise man neither rejects life nor fears death. For living does not offend him, nor does he 
believes not living to be something bad” (Letter to Menoeceus, 126).  
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Epicureans, fear of death was the main underlying cause of violence and greed, in so far as 
power and wealth are means of avoiding death (Segal, 1990, p. 15). The Epicurean poet 
Lucretius described how fear of death feeds “avarice and the blind lust of distinction,” 
sometimes “transgressing the bounds of law” (Lucretius, 1924; 3.59-70). Rather than 
enjoying a stable life, Lucretius considered that humans live in a chronic state of fear, and 
in their quest for escaping death they “amass wealth by civil bloodshed…piling murder 
upon murder; cruelly they rejoice at the mournful death of a brother, they hate and they fear 
a kinsman’s hospitality” (Lucretius, 1924; 3.59-74). In other words, fear of death not only 
explains many human vices but also social phenomena such as war, the end of friendships, 
and the lack of trust. 
 
 In conclusion, the fear of death has a central role in Epicurean ethics, as it shapes 
the mental conditions of the human way of life. It is only after removing this fear that 
people can attain a tranquil life and achieve ataraxia.  
 
2.4.4. What is good is easy to get 
 After dealing with the two most important human fears, namely the gods’ anger and 
death, Epicurus addressed the third main source of fear, which is poverty. Epicurus 
considered this fear to be strongly related to the quality and quantity of desires. Thus, in 
Kuriai Doxai-29 Epicurus articulated his well-known aphorism: "Of desires, some are 
natural and necessary, some natural and not necessary, and some neither natural nor 
necessary but occurring as a result of a groundless opinion.”55 Desires that are both natural 
and necessary are those for food, clothing and shelter. These are natural because seeking 
nourishment and protection against inclement weather and wild animals are basic 
behaviours shared with non-human animals. These desires are also necessary because 
without them life is short. Examples of natural but unnecessary desires are those for 
sophisticated foods and clothing, which Epicurus urged should be avoided. He suggested 
that unnecessary desires are recognised by the fact that not satisfying them does not result 
                                                 
55 This idea is more extensively deployed in Letter to Menoeceus, 127: “One must reckon that of 
desires some are natural, some groundless; and of the natural desires some are necessary and some 
merely natural; and of the necessary, some are necessary for happiness and some for freeing the 
body from troubles and some for life itself.” 
 27 
in pain (Kuriai Doxai, 30).56 Most often, Epicurus argued, pursuing these desires may 
result in harm.57 Finally, desires that are neither natural nor necessary are wealth and 
honours, and these should also be avoided since “groundless opinions extend without 
limit,”58 and the continuous search for wealth and glory makes human life miserable. 
Konstan suggests that there is a vicious circle between fear and desires, where fear of death 
brings about limitless desires, and in turn, excessive desires result in anxiety (Konstan, 
2008). He also argues that for Epicurus, excessive desire is the cause of irrational fear, and 
the deep insight and sophistication of Epicurean ethical philosophy is the discovery of the 
strong bond between fear and desire. 
 
 An important aspect of Epicurean ethics, namely its almost systematic ambiguity, 
needs discussion. In the extant material, Epicurus provides strong advice in some maxims, 
and in others, he provides divergent suggestions on the same subject. For instance, in 
Kuriai Doxai-2 Epicurus suggests that we should procure only what is natural and 
necessary for a tranquil life, whereas in Kuriai Doxai-7 he remarks that there is nothing 
intrinsically bad in achieving wealth and fame, as long as their acquisition produces no fear 
or anxiety. Epicurus also speculated about the use of an algebraic equation to make 
decisions, for instance, accepting some pain in the present when this could result in a future 
pleasure.59 These inconsistencies may suggest a lack of coherence of Epicurean ethics, but 
                                                 
56 “Among natural desires, those which do not lead to a feeling of pain if not fulfilled and about 
which there is an intense effort, these are produced by a groundless opinion and they fail to be 
dissolved not because of their own nature but because of the groundless opinions of mankind” 
(Kuriai Doxai, 30). 
57 “The desires which do not bring a feeling of pain when not fulfilled are not necessary; but the 
desire for them is easy to dispel when they seem to be hard to achieve or to produce harm” (Kuriai 
Doxai, 26). 
58  “The stomach is not insatiable, as the many say, but rather the opinion that the stomach requires 
an unlimited amount of filling is false” (Vatican Sayings, 59), and “Nothing is enough to someone 
for whom enough is little” (Vatican Sayings, 68).  
59 “…we do not choose every pleasure; but sometimes we pass up many pleasures when we get a 
larger amount of what is uncongenial from them. And we believe many pains to be better than 
pleasures when a greater pleasure follows for a long while if we endure the pains. So every pleasure 
is a good thing, since it has a nature congenial [to us], but not everyone is to be chosen. Just as 
every pain too is a bad thing, but not everyone is such as to be always avoided” (Letter to 
Menoeceus, 129). 
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the explanation I will defend is that these maxims were devised for use by Epicurean 
followers as a guide in life, but not to be applied in a dogmatic fashion. We shall see 
similarly ambiguous remarks when discussing the Epicurean concept of justice, safety and 
friendship. 
 
2.4.5. What is terrible is easy to endure 
 This section brings the analysis of the tetrapharmakos to its conclusion. The 
previous three components addressed fears produced by mistaken beliefs (e.g. that the gods 
mingle with human affairs, that death is terrible, that many objects of desire are 
overvalued). The final aphorism of the tetrapharmakos is the only one not dealing with 
false beliefs, as it refers to physical pain. For Epicurus, bodily pain is a great evil, since it 
invariably results in mental pain. His therapeutic advice was rather simplistic, suggesting 
that pain should not be feared since a pain that is acute and severe indicates that the end is 
close, whereas a chronic pain is mild and even pleasurable.60 The weakness of this 
argument is that severe pains may not be necessarily short-lasting (as Epicurus would know 
himself, after suffering from kidney stones for several years). Nor is it true that chronic 
pains, even mild ones, are not burdensome. Epicurus considered that it was the role of the 
philosopher to teach how to overcome the most severe pains by increasing mental pleasure. 
For this purpose, he used the strategy of recalling sweet memories, such as conversations 
with friends, to appease the severity of bodily pain (Tsouna, 2009, p. 251). This was an 
important training for Epicureans, since pleasant memories were frequently available to 
those living in the Garden (O'Keefe, 2001, p. 133). This technique was used by Epicurus 
himself while he was dying with kidney stones.61 Another Epicurean strategy to minimise 
the impact of bodily pain was to argue that physical pain is felt in the present only, whereas 
mental pain is felt in the present but has roots in the past and projects into the future 
                                                 
60 “The feeling of pain does not linger continuously in the flesh; rather, the sharpest is present for 
the shortest time, while what merely exceeds the feeling of pleasure in the flesh lasts only a few 
days. And diseases which last a long time involve feelings of pleasure which exceed feelings of 
pain” (Kuriai Doxai, 4). Also in Vatican Sayings, 4: “Every pain is easy to despise. For [pains] 
which produce great distress are short in duration; and those which last for a long time in the flesh 
cause only mild distress.” 
61 When near his end, Epicurus wrote the following paragraph (Letter to Idomeneus): “On this blissful 
day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and 
dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but over against them all I set gladness of 
mind at the remembrance of our past conversations.” 
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(Diogenes Laertius, 1925; 10.137). This argument is also weak, since suffering pain almost 
always raises the question of its duration, about how one’s future will be affected by pain, 
and it may even raise the fear of oncoming death. This argument further illustrates the 
difficulty of separating bodily from mental pain, thus challenging Epicurus’ categorical 
separation of aponia and ataraxia. In other words, bodily pain often results in mental 
suffering, whereas the latter usually has somatic concomitants. The Roman Epicurean poet 
Lucretius argued that in the case of “vehement fear” we should be able to see the spirit 
through the perspicuous bodily changes: “sweatings and pallor hence arise over the whole 
body, the speech falters, the voice dies away, blackness comes before the eyes, a sounding 
is in the ears, the limbs give way beneath…” (Lucretius, 1924; 3.155-158). 
 
 In conclusion, the tetrapharmakos is not only considered “the basis of the Epicurean 
moral system” (Bailey, 1970, p. 347), but it also provides, in a condensed manner, the first 
specific philosophical medicine against fear and anxiety. The four maxims may be 
considered as harsh therapy, since the beliefs to be modified are part of entrenched 
instinctive and cultural behaviours that are very difficult to modify using the technique of 
changing beliefs. A less radical reading may consider the tetrapharmakos as a compass, 
guiding the student towards a life with less fear but without necessarily meeting the 
stringent criteria of the four-fold remedy. Epicurus himself recognised that against death we 
live in a city without walls, meaning that fear of death is difficult to remove. He also 
accepted that humans will always pursue empty (that is, unnecessary) desires, with the fear 
of not obtaining the desired object or of being unable to keep it. The tetrapharmakos is a 
medicine to be swallowed slowly. The benefits will only appear after arduous practice, and 
it is not suited to everybody. 
  
 The remaining aphorisms about fear in Kuriai Doxai and in the Vatican Sayings 
provide gentler advice than the tetrapharmakos, and constitute the backbone of the 
Epicurean ethical system which is discussed below. 
 
2.5. Epicurean ethics and the road to ataraxia 
 Most Epicurean followers lived in the Garden, and this living arrangement was 
replicated in other Greek cities (Grant, 1990, p. 236). The Garden provided shelter to 
Epicurean followers by securing them with food and a place to live, but there also were 
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Epicurean followers living in cities who were unable to enjoy the ‘safety net’ provided by 
the Garden. Nevertheless, these individuals could always benefit from the Epicurean ethical 
doctrine that could be studied and practiced outside the Garden.  
 
2.5.1. Living unnoticed 
 One example of Epicurean ethical advice is the famous lathe biosas, or ‘live 
unnoticed’ (Roskam, 2007). The concept of living unnoticed meant to refrain from 
occupying prominent positions in the political or social system. Epicurean followers living 
in the city were supposed to carry out their professions with a low social profile, looking at 
city life as from a balcony, without mingling with those pursuing empty desires.62 
Nevertheless, this ethical advice should not be considered as promoting a ‘monastic rule’, 
since Epicurus approved of political participation as long as this activity is practiced safely. 
Furthermore, he encouraged participating in politics whenever the individual feels that not 
participating is more painful than potential suffering in the future.63 This not only 
demonstrates the eclecticism of the Epicurean ethical system, but also suggests that the 
accusation, discussed below, that Epicureanism fostered an egotistic lifestyle should be 
strongly moderated (M. C. Nussbaum, 1994, p. 139). The concept of ‘living unnoticed’ also 
implied living a frugal life, without extravagances that could place the Epicurean at the 
mercy of financial misfortunes. Thus, the Epicurean follower was guided towards self-
sufficiency to minimise dependency on others and reduce the concomitant anxieties that 
this dependency could bring.64 For Epicurus living wisely was living prudently, and making 
                                                 
62 “From this vantage point alone may one look down in safety upon the restless and futile activity 
of men who stray and wander…to the service of empty and limited desire” (Konstan, 1973, p. 8). 
63 “Epicurus believes that men who are eager for honour and glory should lead an inactive life, but 
that they should fulfil their natures by engaging in politics and entering public life, on the ground 
that, because of their natural dispositions, they are more likely to be disturbed and harmed by 
inactivity if they do not obtain what they desire” (Plutarch, On Tranquillity of Mind, 337: 173) 
(Plutarch, 1927). 
64 “The disturbance of the soul will not be dissolved nor will considerable joy be produced by the 
presence of the greatest wealth, nor by honour and admiration among the many, nor by anything 
which is a result of indefinite causes” (Vatican Sayings, 81). 
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the right choices after careful analysis of risks and benefits.65 Another essential element for 
a life free of fears was asphaleia or safety, which I discuss in the next section.  
 
2.5.2. Living safely 
 Epicurus considers that obtaining security from natural disasters and from fellow 
humans is an "instinct from nature,"66 and this is the central theme of six aphorisms in the 
Kuriai Doxai. For Epicurus, obtaining safety from being harmed by others is so relevant 
that any means to remove this fear was considered a "natural good."67 In other words, if the 
individual is in danger, the Epicurean maxim that empty desires should be avoided is 
revoked. Thus, Epicurus tolerates the pursuit of wealth and fame as long as these non-
essential elements provide safety to the individual. In a radically pragmatic fashion, 
Epicurus conceded that even a dissolute life ("the pleasures of profligates") is acceptable if 
it helps to remove fear and anxiety.68 
  
 In conclusion, the Epicurean ethical system was pragmatic and flexible, adapting to 
specific situations. Epicurean ethical advice ranges from a rigid practice of frugality and 
self-effacement to the engagement in an antithetical behaviour whenever personal safety is 
at stake. This malleability of Epicurean ethics is strongly related to minimising the anxiety 
produced by living in a community with limited capacity to provide the necessary safety to 
                                                 
65 “For it is not drinking bouts and continuous partying and enjoying boys and women, or 
consuming fish and the other dainties of an extravagant table, which produce the pleasant life, but 
sober calculation which searches out the reasons for every choice and avoidance and drives out the 
opinions which are the source of the greatest turmoil for men’s souls” (Letter to Menoeceus, 132). 
Long (Long, 2006, p. 9) considers that Epicurean prudence is a “mental disposition” and a “rational 
outlook on life” which examines the cause of choices and removes confusing opinions. 
66 “Some men want to become famous and respected, believing that this is the way to acquire 
security against [other] men. Thus if the life of such men is secure, they acquire the natural good; 
but if it is not secure, they do not have that for the sake of which they strove from the beginning 
according to what is naturally congenial” (Kuriai Doxai, 7). 
67 “The natural good of public office and kingship is for the sake of getting confidence from [other] 
men, [at least] from those from whom one is able to provide this” (Kuriai Doxai, 6). 
68 “If the things which produce the pleasures of profligate men dissolved the intellect’s fears about 
the phenomena of the heavens and about death and pains and, moreover, if they taught us the limit 
of our desires, then we would not have reason to criticize them, since they would be filled with 
pleasures from every source and would contain no feeling of pain or distress from any source” 
(Kuriai Doxai, 10). 
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achieve tranquillity of mind. The strong association between safety and ataraxia also 
underlines the relevance of retributive justice for Epicurean ethics. According to Epicurus, 
justice originated from a natural pact between people not to harm each another,69  and from 
the fear of retaliation.70 In other words, for Epicurus the concept of justice was not 
dogmatic but relative. A human act is considered ‘unjust’ only when the agent is afraid of 
being punished. But the wrongful act comes at a price, since Epicurus considered that fear 
will always follow the offender, even if "he escapes detection ten thousand times." In 
conclusion, the Epicurean ethical system was in large part based on defensive practices 
generated by fear.71 
  
 An important caveat to the Epicurean system of justice, however, is his view that 
pacts forged out of fear do not last indefinitely. Life circumstances frequently change, and 
the usefulness of pacts depends on the safety they provide to both parties at a given time in 
a given context. Another problem is that the concept of justice and vice based on fear of 
punishment and the struggle for security creates significant tensions within the Epicurean 
ethical system. On the one hand, Epicurus considered that a virtuous life was generally 
better than a life with vices, as the wise and virtuous person, that is, the one that follows the 
Epicurean precepts, will obtain continuous safety against adverse fortune, whereas the 
"unjust" will live in the greatest disquietude. 72 On the other hand, like a Machiavelli avant 
                                                 
69 “The justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, [i.e.,] neither to harm one another nor 
be harmed” (Kuriai Doxai, 31); and “Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men 
with one another in any place whatever and at any time it is a kind of compact not to harm or be 
harmed;” (Kuriai Doxai, 33) and “All those who had the power to acquire the greatest confidence 
from [the threats posed by] their neighbours also thereby lived together most pleasantly with the 
surest guarantee …” (Kuriai Doxai, 40). 
70 “Injustice is not a bad thing in its own right, but [only] because of the fear produced by the 
suspicion that one will not escape the notice of those assigned to punish such actions” (Kuriai 
Doxai, 34). 
71 “Let nothing be done in your life, which will cause you to fear if it is discovered by your 
neighbour” (Vatican Sayings, 70). 
72 “The just life is most free from disturbance, but the unjust life is full of the greatest disturbance” 
(Kuriai Doxai, 17). In Kuriai Doxai-14 Epicurus remarks that whereas fame and wealth may 
provide security against other men, a quiet and secluded life brings greater safety (“The purest 
security is that which comes from a quiet life and withdrawal from the many, although a certain 
degree of security from other men does come by means of the power to repel [attacks] and by 
means of prosperity”). 
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la lettre, Epicurus considered that any means of procuring safety is a natural end, thus 
ethically justified.73 This ethical conflict may lead to untoward consequences, since 
individuals are entitled to defend themselves against others, which may end in a state of 
war.74 Thrasher (Thrasher, 2013, pp. 423-436) has recently commented on the 
incompatibility of pursuing ataraxia while simultaneously complying with the 
requirements of justice.75 He observes a similar inconsistency in the Epicurean concept of 
friendship, especially with Epicurus’ remark that “Every friendship is worth choosing for 
its own sake, though it takes its origin from the benefits [it confers on us]” (Vatican 
Sayings, 23). This remark suggests that friendship is a good in itself, but that its origin is 
instrumental. I shall now analyse the Epicurean concept of friendship in more detail, given 
its relevance for the concept of fear. 
 
2.5.3. The benefits of friendship 
 In keeping with other ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristotle, Epicurus 
regarded friendship as one of the greatest assets of social life and highly significant for a 
life without fear.76 Nevertheless, Epicurean friendship is not of the type idealised by 
Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics; rather Epicurus’ conception was mainly 
instrumental, that is, based on the security that friendship may provide. Thus, immediately 
                                                 
73 “Of actions believed to be just, that whose usefulness in circumstances of mutual associations is 
supported by the testimony [of experience] has the attribute of serving as just whether it is the same 
for everyone or not. And if someone passes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what 
is useful in mutual associations, this no longer possesses the nature of justice” (Kuriai Doxai, 37). 
74 Vander Waerdt (Vander Waerdt, 1987, p. 402) has a different view, and considers that wise 
individuals will not commit injustice given that this is against their self-interest. Their aim is 
ataraxia and they will therefore avoid any wrong-doing because of fear of punishment. In this case, 
the fear is instrumental to achieving ataraxia. Therefore, Epicurus states that the wise person has to 
live justly in order to live pleasantly (“It is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, 
honourably, and justly and impossible to live prudently, honourably, and justly without living 
pleasantly. And whoever lacks this cannot live pleasantly” (Kuriai Doxai, 5). See Julia Annas 
(Annas, 1987) for a similar account of instrumental virtue. 
75 Thrasher (Thrasher, 2013, p. 424) concludes that the Epicurean concept of justice is both possible 
and necessary once the Epicurean social arrangement is understood to reconcile justice and 
pleasure. Discussion of this suggestion is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
76 “For since a solitary life without friends is full of dangerous traps and fear, reason herself advises 
us to get some friends; and when we do so our mind is reassured and becomes indissolubly linked to 
the expectation that pleasures will thereby be acquired” (Cicero, On Goals; 1.66) (Inwood & 
Gerson, 1994). 
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after an aphorism stating that friendship is the most blessed human possession,77 friendship 
is considered valuable for the protection it brings against life's adversities, present and 
future.78 The concept of friendship is another example of Epicurean ethical ambivalence. 
Friendship has instrumental value, for the protection it provides to those in the relationship, 
while simultaneously being a source of happiness unmixed with fears.79 Thus, not 
everything is instrumental in Epicurean friendship. The Epicurean Philodemus 
(Philodemus, 1998; fr. 28), while discussing friendship, considered that “there is nothing so 
grand as having one to whom one will say what is in one’s heart and who will listen when 
one speaks.” Furthermore, Epicurus felt unselfish gratitude towards friends,80 and suggests 
that we should run risks or even die for the sake of a friendship.81 Eventually, Epicurus 
seemed to prefer friends with a moderate self-interest, rejecting those that mostly expect 
benefits from the relation as well as those who are indifferent to gains and unhelpful in case 
of future need.82  
 
 The answer to these ethical ambiguities regarding justice and friendship may lie in a 
dual concept of happiness, briefly mentioned by Diogenes Laertius and rarely discussed in 
philosophical texts. Whereas the pinnacle of Epicurean happiness is ataraxia, a mental state 
                                                 
77 “Of the things which wisdom provides for the blessedness of one’s whole life, by far the greatest 
is the possession of friendship” (Kuriai Doxai, 27). 
78 “The same understanding produces confidence about there being nothing terrible which is eternal 
or [even] long-lasting and has also realized that security amid even these limited [bad things] is 
most easily achieved through friendship;” (Kuriai Doxai, 28) and “We do not need utility from our 
friends so much as we need confidence concerning that utility” (Vatican Sayings,  34); and 
“...friendship is prompted by our needs” (Diogenes Laertius, 1925; 10.121). 
79 “One of the friends, however, must make the first advances (just as we have to cast seed into the 
earth), but it is maintained by a partnership in the enjoyment of life’s pleasures” (Diogenes Laertius, 
1925; 10.120). 
80 “The wise man…will feel gratitude towards friends, present and absent alike, and show it by 
work and deed” (Diogenes Laertius, 1925; 10.118). 
81 “One must not approve of those who are excessively eager for friendship, nor those who are 
reluctant. But one must be willing to run some risks for the sake of friendship;” (Vatican Sayings, 
28) and “And he will on occasion die for a friend” (Diogenes Laertius, 1925; 10.120). 
82 “The constant friend is neither he who always searches for utility, nor he who never links 
[friendship to utility]. For the former makes gratitude a matter for commercial transaction, while the 
latter kills off good hope for the future” (Vatican Sayings, 39). 
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that cannot be increased by any pleasure, this is not the only state of happiness accessible to 
humans. Diogenes Laertius cites this comment from Epicurus, “Two sorts of happiness can 
be conceived, the one the highest possible [ataraxia]”, but there is another “admitting 
addition and subtraction of pleasures,” (Diogenes Laertius, 1925; 10.121) which is much 
closer to the common concept of happiness. This duality is also present in the Epicurean 
concept of friendship, which oscillates between moments of instrumental speculation and 
moments of mutual enjoyment. 
 
 In conclusion, friendship was for Epicurus, an oscillating relationship, originating in 
the fear of future misfortunes and the need of protection, evolving into a relation of 
disinterested pleasure, and ending in a solid bond where fear no longer had a relevant role. 
We shall now examine the impact of fear on learning and knowledge, where the 
instrumental role of these activities is also evident. 
 
2.5.4. The benefits of qualified knowledge 
 Epicurus despised all knowledge that was not instrumental for achieving ataraxia, 
and his theory of nature was shaped in a way that justified and promoted a tranquil way of 
life.83 Thus, if fear of gods was an obstacle to ataraxia, the gods were conceptualised as 
beings that are disinterested in human affairs. Another example is the false belief that the 
gods cause frightening natural phenomena.84 In this context, the study of atmospheric 
phenomena is relevant to dispel false beliefs. 85 For instance, geological phenomena such as 
                                                 
83 “Natural philosophy does not create boastful men nor chatterboxes nor men who show off the 
‘culture’ which the many quarrel over, but rather strong and self-sufficient men, who pride 
themselves on their own personal goods, not those of external circumstances;” (Vatican Sayings, 
45) and “In the first place, remember that, like everything else, knowledge of celestial phenomena, 
whether taken along with other things or in isolation, has no other end in view than peace of mind 
and firm conviction” (Diogenes Laertius, 1925; 10.85). There was a philosophical tradition, starting 
with Democritus of Abdera, of rejecting any learning not necessary for a tranquil life. Warren 
(Warren, 2002, p. 83) cites fragments by Anaxarchus stating, for instance that “much learning can 
especially benefit, and especially harm him who has it.” 
84 “The greatest anxiety of the human mind arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are 
blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality 
inconsistent with this belief” (Diogenes Laertius, 1925; 10.81). 
85 “I recommend constant activity in the study of nature, and with this sort of activity more than any 
other I bring calm to my life” (Letter to Herodotus, 37). 
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earthquakes may create great fears, but once they are properly understood as the expression 
of physical forces and not due to the wrath of the gods, natural events no longer become a 
source of mental unrest. Similarly, if the fear of death destroys peace of mind, death 
becomes a mere physical event characterised by the dissolution of atoms.86 It is for the 
purpose of tranquillity that Epicureans require the study of natural phenomena, since 
without “the study of nature there is no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures.”87 Thus, in the 
Letter to Pythocles (87) Epicurus remarks that the benefit of studying physics lies entirely 
in obtaining “freedom from disturbance” and avoiding “irrationally and groundless 
opinion” (Letter to Pythocles, 87).88 
 
 For Epicurus, the study of philosophy only had instrumental value, and his own 
philosophy was the only one that he considered able to provide the necessary and sufficient 
knowledge to achieve ataraxia (Pascual, 2011, p. 54). Epicurus is proposing a 
philosophical system that is not to be defended by argument but, rather, one to be 
memorised and practised.89 As already mentioned, the most important task of Epicurean 
philosophy was to bring reason to bear on the passions as they relate to vain desires and 
bodily pleasures, to stress that fear is based on false beliefs, and to highlight the relevance 
of setting a limit to seeking pleasures and gain.90 According to Epicurus, the value of his 
                                                 
86 “Hence, we must attend to present feelings and sense perceptions, whether those of mankind in 
general or those peculiar to the individual, and also attend to all the clear evidence available, as 
given by each of the standards of truth. For by studying them we shall rightly trace to its cause and 
banish the source of disturbance and dread, accounting for celestial phenomena and for all other 
things which from time to time befall us and cause the utmost alarm to the rest of mankind” 
(Diogenes Laertius, 1925; 10.82). It is interesting to note the use of different words in sections 81 
and 82 pertaining to the ‘language game’ of fear. Thus, Epicurus’ translators use ‘anxiety’, ‘evil’, 
‘dread’, ‘terror’, and ‘alarm’ to denote the same emotional state. 
87 As I shall discuss in Chapter 4, Montaigne was in agreement with the subordination of knowledge 
to maintaining peace of mind, stating that “some sects have rather followed truth, others utility, 
whereby the latter have gained credit” (M. d. Montaigne, 1991, p. 380). 
88 “First of all, do not believe that there is any other goal to be achieved by the knowledge of 
meteorological phenomena, whether they are discussed in conjunction with [physics in general] or 
on their own, than freedom from disturbance and a secure conviction…” (Letter to Pythocles, 85). 
89 “Do and practise what I constantly told you to do, believing these to be the elements of living 
well” (Letter to Pythocles, 123). 
90 “Poverty, if measured by the goal of nature, is great wealth; and wealth, if limits are not set for it, 
is great poverty” (Vatican Sayings, 25). 
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philosophy was in providing the rationale for ataraxia as the best mental state, as well as 
teaching how to reach it. In his view, any other philosophical system providing much 
knowledge about the world but ignoring both the importance of, and the road to, ataraxia 
could result in even more fear.91 Therefore, Epicurus recommended moderation in learning 
and qualified knowledge, sufficient to dispel fears and anxieties.92 His advice is not without 
contemporary interest, since we live in an age where an excess of information may increase 
fear and anxiety at individual and social levels. The relevant question as to how to fight fear 
using Epicurean remedies is examined in the next section. 
 
2.6. The Epicurean therapy of fear 
 Epicurean therapy was strongly influenced by Democritus, whom Warren considers 
to be the pioneer on the therapeutic arguments employed by Hellenistic schools (Warren, 
2002, p. 47). Democritus suggested examining the lives of those in pain and assessing one’s 
own situation “…so that you will not suffer psychic distress through desire for more” 
(Warren, 2002, p. 47). This self-examination should allow taming our desires, and realising 
that wealth and fame are unnecessary, if not damaging. Excessive desire leads to an 
unstable an anxious life, the antithesis of Democritus’ euthymia. According to Democritus, 
euthymia was not mere mental tranquillity, but also included pleasant experiences in the 
context of symmetria, or a balance between excessive and deficient states (Warren, 2002, p. 
55). Democritus also suggested valuing the present moment and whatever is sufficient for a 
tranquil life, rather than relying on an uncertain future, since “the desire for more destroys 
what is present” (Warren, 2002, p. 55). He further considered that “only fools disregard the 
                                                 
91 “People who know about these things, if they are ignorant of what the natures [in question] are 
and what the most important causes are, have fears just the same as if they did not have this special 
knowledge— and perhaps even more fears, since the wonderment which comes from the prior 
consideration of these phenomena cannot discover a resolution or the orderly management of the 
most important factors” (Letter to Herodotus, 79). 
92 “…if men do not set bounds to their terror, they endure as much or even more intense anxiety than 
the man whose views on these matters are quite vague. But mental tranquillity means being released 
from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important 
truths” (Diogenes Laertius, 1925; 10.81). 
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security of the present” (p.55), striving for uncertain goods while making themselves 
vulnerable to external contingencies.93 
 
 Epicurus continued the therapeutic work of Democritus’ by stressing the relevance 
of fighting fear by increasing one’s own safety and by taming empty desires.94 The strong 
therapeutic attribute of the Epicurean philosophy is forcefully conveyed by the Epicurean 
Porphyry, who claimed: “Empty is the argument of the philosopher by which no human 
disease is healed; for just as there is no benefit in medicine if it does not drive out bodily 
diseases, so there is no benefit in philosophy if it does not drive out the disease of the soul” 
(Inwood & Gerson, 1994) (Porphyry, To Marcella, 31). Thus, Epicurean therapy was to the 
soul what medicine was to the body, and this philosophical therapy followed a medical 
model. Given the complexity and the difficulty of healing emotional problems, the 
Epicurean treatment included a variety of therapeutic methods, such as the already 
discussed tetrapharmakos (Tsouna, 2009, pp. 263-265). Epicurean therapy catered for all 
ages, young or old. The old may benefit from practised gratitude for the good things 
received, whereas the young will benefit from “lack of fear of what is to come” (Letter to 
Menoeceus, 122).95  
 
                                                 
93 As already discussed, Epicurus’ concepts oscillated between those related to the perfect emotional 
state of ataraxia and the mundane state of human happiness. Epicurus mostly followed Democritus 
in recommending living in the present as a remedy for anxiety, although in one fragment he states 
that “For the stable condition of the flesh and the reliable expectation concerning this contains the 
highest and most secure joy…” (Plutarch, 1927) (Plutarch, A Pleasant Life; 1089d) (my italics).  
94 Segal (Segal, 1990, p. 19) has suggested that the Epicurean therapy may be relevant to our times, 
since in his opinion Hellenistic therapy is similar to modern psychotherapy (for instance, in its focus 
on false beliefs), and also because “the needs of the soul have changed relatively little over the last 
two millennia”. This is a questionable remark, but discussing the risks of anachronism is beyond the 
possibilities of this dissertation. 
95 “One must practise the things which produce happiness, since if that is present we have 
everything and if it is absent we do everything in order to have it…Do and practise what I 
constantly told you to do, believing these to be the elements of living well” (Letter to Menoeceus, 
122), and “Practise these and the related precepts day and night, by yourself and with a like-minded 
friend, and you will never be disturbed either when awake or in sleep, and you will live as a god 
among men” (Letter to Menoeceus, 135). 
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 Porphyry warned against the hazards of living with fear, as this type of life may 
itself result in dangers that were meant to be avoided.96 This is an important concept that 
requires further discussion. Fear is usually conceptualised as a ‘protective’ emotion,97 as it 
preserves humans from danger. However, excessive fear may be paralysing, preventing the 
affected person from making rational decisions. Long (Long, 2006, p. 187) considers that 
irrational fears and empty desires are the two main internal (that is, context-independent) 
impediments to ataraxia, and that both can be removed by using Epicurean prudence.98 To 
protect oneself from excessive fear, Epicurus advised living prudently, a way of life that he 
considered “a more valuable thing than philosophy” (Letter to Menoeceus, 132) (Bergsma, 
Poot, & Liefbroer, 2008, p. 404).  
 
 The Epicurean treatment of fear of death deserves specific attention, given that 
treating this fear is an essential step towards ataraxia (Warren, 2004, pp. 154-159). For the 
Epicureans, fear included cognitive and non-cognitive components,99 and the therapeutic 
approach has to cater for both. For Epicurus, a sort of ‘cognitive’ therapy was the most 
relevant method, consisting in the removal of false beliefs. Thus, fear of death is eliminated 
by purging the desire for immortality and by being mindful of the present, keeping away 
the distress caused by anticipation.100 This therapy also included techniques of persuasion 
and intellectual advice (Tsouna, 2009, p. 263). For instance, Epicurean students had to be 
convinced that life is valuable for the pleasure it brings and not for its duration, and they 
had to understand that philosophical practice “produces a good life and a good death" 
                                                 
96 “Most men are afraid of parsimony in their life-style and because of this fear, proceed to actions 
which are most likely to produce it” (Inwood & Gerson, 1994) (Porphyry, To Marcella, 28). 
97 See discussion in the next section on Nussbaum’s interpretation of Epicurean therapy. 
98 (Inwood & Gerson, 1994) (Porphyry To Marcella, 29) “For a man is unhappy either because of 
fear or because of unlimited and groundless desire; and by reining these in, he can produce for 
himself the reasoning [which leads to] blessedness.” 
99 The cognitive component of fear is the value judgment of impending harm, whereas the non-
cognitive components are the physiological concomitants, as described by Lucretius (Lucretius, 
1924). 
100 “Thus, he is a fool who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when present but 
because it is painful when it is still to come. For that which while present causes no distress causes 
unnecessary pain when merely anticipated” (Letter to Menoeceus, 125).  
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(Letter to Menoeceus, 126). This is a slow therapy, as Epicurus advised to “accustom 
ourselves” (Letter to Menoeceus, 124) to putting his precepts into practice. As Warren 
suggests (Warren, 2009, p. 235), this idea cannot be rapidly incorporated into our belief 
system, as it requires consideration of personal attitudes towards life and the context in 
which we live, as well as generating new habits. Warren (Warren, 2004, p. 15) is also 
sceptical about the power of persuasion or similar psychological techniques in convincing 
an individual that death is not to be feared, and suggests that “fearing death is simply part 
of what it is to be human, like the feelings of hunger or thirst”. Warren considers fear of 
death to be a deep-rooted instinct, a type of fear not amenable to removal by psychological 
intervention. It could be argued, however, that Epicurus was pointing to a type of fear of 
death that is conscious and feels oppressive, generating greed for power and wealth. This 
type of fear of death could be amenable to Epicurean cognitive therapy. This view is in line 
with Warren’s suggestion (Warren, 2004, p. 16) that there is no single concept of fear of 
death, but a family of related concepts more or less amenable to Epicurean treatment. It is 
the conscious fear of death that, as Warren suggests, has a strong influence on how we 
conduct ourselves in life, especially in terms of having excessive desires and greed. For 
Epicurus, an important cause of “the anxious dread of fear of death” was attaining safety 
(Konstan, 2008, p. 54). Konstan argues that material safety is unable to provide the 
necessary security to remove the fear of death, and as a result people who fear death tend to 
engage in building “ever higher bastions of wealth and power,” regardless of justice and 
with the selfish intention of protecting oneself “from an anxiety that dwells within” (p. 54). 
This anxiety was to be treated by removing the fear of death and the quest for unnecessary 
objects. 
 
 Epicurean therapy also included behavioural techniques, such as getting used to a 
frugal life; drawing on memory, such as reflecting on good past moments when in mental 
pain; and the use of imagination, such as thinking about what Epicurus would say and do in 
a fearful situation. The most famous Epicurean behavioural technique was the lathe biosas 
or ‘living unnoticed’ (Roskam, 2007), already discussed. This way of life allows 
individuals freedom from chasing fame or seeking unnecessary goods, allowing them to 
enjoy the present moment. On the other hand, the Epicurean concept of asphaleia implied 
that a political position could be pursued if such activity would increase one’s level of 
security. This illustrates what Roskam (Roskam, 2007, p. 35) terms the Epicurean 
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philosophy of “conditional qualifications,” which considered power and fame as having a 
neutral value, intrinsically, which could change depending on whether obtaining political 
power may increase one’s security or not. I believe it is more accurate to state that for 
Epicurus fame and power have an a priori negative value, although his ethical system 
provided enough latitude to change this value for the positive in exceptional 
circumstances.101 
 
 Parrhesia, or frank speech, was another Epicurean therapeutic method (Tsouna, 
2009, p. 252). In the introduction to Philodemus’ On Frank Criticism, David Konstan  
considers that the technique of conversation and reasoning was essential to Epicurean 
therapy, with the aim of forming character and mitigating the fears “that destroy human 
happiness” (Philodemus, 1998, p. 8). This technique was a form of confession during which 
Epicurean friends had the opportunity to express their fears for open criticism, and for 
correction and emotional improvement. Parrhesia also consists in providing therapeutic 
advice on moral aspects of life to Epicurean students, advice which was adapted to the 
interlocutor’s state of mind and personality. Teachers were also scrutinized for their moral 
and intellectual attributes, and were advised to recognise the different needs of the students, 
as well as when they should refrain from using this technique. Philodemus recommended a 
gentle and empathic approach, avoiding the use of harsh speech. Thus, depending on the 
student’s personality the cure could use ‘drugs’ (mild words) for those that adapted well to 
treatment, or use the ‘scalpel’ for those recalcitrant students in need of a ‘surgical 
approach’ consisting of sharp speech.102 The Epicurean admonishment could be “caring” or 
it could be “an irony that pleases but pretty much stings everyone” (Philodemus, 1998, p. 
43).  
 
                                                 
101 “The purest security is that which comes from a quiet life and withdrawal from the many, 
although a certain degree of security from other men does come by means of the power to repel 
[attacks] and by means of prosperity” (Vatican Sayings, 14). 
102 “…and having accomplished nothing he will again employ frankness toward the same man. If, 
although he has erred, he did not heed the frank criticism, the teacher will criticise frankly again. 
For although a doctor in the case of the same disease had accomplished nothing through a clyster, 
he would again purge…” (Philodemus, 1998, p. 71). 
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Another method of Epicurean therapy is self-reflection, which included reading 
Epicurean texts (a Hellenistic version of ‘self-help’ literature). Reading was considered by 
the Epicureans to be a powerful remedy (Tsouna, 2009, p. 254), as it was accessible to 
anybody at any time. As mentioned before, repetition and memorization of Epicurean 
maxims was another therapeutic method, aiming at creating a habit of “moral reflexes” 
(Tsouna, 2009, p. 255), as well as being mindful of the present, since fear is removed when 
we switch our attention from future dangers into the present time. This therapy can be 
modified whenever anticipated pleasures are significant and properly considered. 
Importantly, for all these therapies, the active participation of the student is necessary. 
Epicurean therapy was not a mere ‘recipe’ for removing fears but it provided 
comprehensive methods for a way of life conducive to ataraxia (Striker, 1990, pp. 97-
110).103 
 
 The Epicurean therapy has been thoughtfully analysed and criticised by Martha 
Nussbaum in her book, Therapy of Desire (M. C. Nussbaum, 1994, pp. 102-139).104 Given 
the influence of this work, I will discuss it at some length in what follows. Nussbaum 
begins her analysis by citing two fragments she considers of great relevance: “Empty is the 
philosopher’s argument by which no human suffering is therapeutically treated” (from 
Porphyry, To Marcella, 116), and “what produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the contrast of 
the great evil escaped” (Plutarch, 1927; 428:47). The first remark stresses the importance 
that philosophical therapy had for Epicurus, whereas the second suggests that fear should 
be the main aim of philosophical therapy. Nussbaum highlights the Epicurean concept of 
the irrational society, where people fall victim to false beliefs and social manipulation, 
rushing “frenetically” to procure wealth, luxuries, and power. She agrees with Epicurus that 
anxiety is pervasive due to an ever-increasing desire for wealth and fame, and the 
consequent fear of losing them (p. 103). She also agrees that fear of death may be the cause 
of the social “frenetic activity” and of chasing material wealth. Once the irrational way of 
                                                 
103 Tsuona mentions additional Epicurean techniques, such as developing an “impartial 
perspective”, which enables individuals to separate themselves from the ordinary valuation of 
objects; and applying a right view about past and future events (Tsouna, 2009, p. 259). 
104 This text includes an in-depth analysis of other relevant Epicurean sources, such as Lucretius and 
Philodemus, which are not fully addressed in my criticism below. 
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life is acknowledged, the Epicurean therapy begins by undoing empty desires. The desire 
for wealth is the product of believing that money will protect people from life’s evils, and 
beliefs like this can be the origin of fear and anxiety. Uprooting false beliefs will allow 
people to achieve “the unimpeded functioning of the whole creature” (p. 109). Following 
the medical model, Nussbaum suggests that the therapy will consist of remedies of different 
intensity. The first step in Epicurean therapy consists in diagnosing false beliefs. A second 
step consists in modifying the false beliefs with the appropriate cognitive remedies to 
dissolve them. Finally, the third step consists in changing empty desires for those that are 
natural and necessary. 
 
Finally, Nussbaum argues that the Epicurean therapy had “value-relativity,” in other 
words, this therapy had the practical goal of achieving ataraxia. Given that desires are 
value laden; those based on false beliefs require treatment by the philosopher cum 
physician using different strategies according to the situation. These “medications” range 
from mild remedies for those already convinced of the need of removing false beliefs to 
strong “purgatives” providing a “devastating attack” to those living under the delusion of 
false beliefs (p. 125). The therapy is adjusted depending on whether students are able to 
find the road to ataraxia on their own, or whether they have to be guided or driven. 
 
 In summary, Nussbaum provides a faithful account of the main aspects of the 
Epicurean philosophical therapy for the removal of fear. She emphasises the importance 
that Epicurus placed on changing false beliefs and modifying the quality of desires, and 
provides a thorough account of the most frequent ‘remedies’ used by the Epicurean school. 
However, Nussbaum feels “unease” about the medical approach of Epicurean therapy, and 
wonders whether “digesting and memorizing maxims” should be called true philosophy (p. 
129). She objects to the asymmetry between the commanding position of the 
philosopher/physician compared with that of the student. According to Nussbaum, this 
asymmetry is an impediment to dialectical discussion in the Aristotelian fashion. This 
‘medicalization of philosophy’, she argues, not only forcefully indoctrinated Epicurus’ 
followers, but also blunted their argumentative capacities.105 Students at the Garden were 
                                                 
105 Limitations of Nussbaum’s medical metaphor are discussed by Jordan (Jordan, 1993, pp. 142-
143). 
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supposed not only to memorise the Epicurean maxims and worship the head of the School, 
but also to “confess” to the School master their beliefs, actions, thoughts, and even their 
dreams. Nussbaum concludes that in the Garden reasoning was biased by a rigorous 
practice of maxims and precepts in a context of exhortations to follow the Epicurean ethical 
system without much arguing. She illustrates her conclusion by referring to Arcesilaus’ 
response to the question as to why people were leaving philosophical schools for that of 
Epicurus, but never that of Epicurus for another (Diogenes Laertius, 1925; 4.43). 
Arcesilaus’ answer was that “If one is a man, one can become a eunuch, but if one is a 
eunuch, one cannot become a man”. Nussbaum considers that the Epicurean ‘mental 
emasculation’ resulted from providing students with ‘ready-made’ ethical conclusions 
without learning the process of reasoning leading to those conclusions. In other words, 
Nussbaum agrees with Arcesilaus that the ‘brain-washing’ methodology of the Epicurean 
school spoiled the philosophical capacities of those going to the Garden. Nussbaum (and 
Arcesilaus) makes fun of and underestimates those people flocking to the Garden, but 
without discussing why the Garden was such an attractive place.106 And yet the answer may 
be very simple. The Garden was providing people with the peace of mind they were 
seeking and which they were unable to obtain in other philosophical schools.  
 
 Another criticism of Epicurean therapy raised by Nussbaum is its instrumental 
quality. This applies, in her opinion, to the Epicurean concepts of friendship and justice, 
since for the Epicureans both human virtues only had the value of providing safety for the 
present and future. In contrast to the Epicurean school, Nussbaum considers the Aristotelian 
therapy of fear to be clearly superior.107 In her view, Aristotle’s philosophy is far more 
modest than Epicurus’, given that the Aristotelian philosopher will accept the independent 
contribution and arguments of the students and foster independent reasoning. Nussbaum 
                                                 
106 “Aristotelians that we are, we would shrink back in distaste from giving one of our philosophy 
students such a summary of doctrine” (p. 129). 
107 In support of the benefits of the Lyceum over the Garden, Nussbaum added “Had Nikidion [a 
fictional character] gone to Aristotle’s school, she would have been exposed to a number of 
alternative positions and taught to examine their merits sympathetically, using her critical faculties” 
(p. 129). I find this statement both misleading and anachronistic. There is no way to know whether 
teachers at the Lyceum were more sympathetic than those at the Garden. Epicurus was a prolific 
writer but almost all his work is lost. Nevertheless, as Long suggests (Long, 2006, p. 185), the 
Garden may have given ample opportunity for the students to use their critical faculties. 
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criticises Epicurus’ “callous” and narrow approach to philosophy by comparison with the 
Aristotelian dialectics of emotions which may enable a broader approach to philosophical 
therapy (p. 138).108 
 
 Unlike Epicurus, Nussbaum considers fear of death as essential for self-preservation 
and for fostering, for the sake of self-protection, familial bonds and community values. 
Nussbaum argues that the search for immortality encourages having children and 
promoting better social policies. She disagrees with the relinquishing of non-essential 
goods required by the Epicurean way of life, since she considers pleasures to be important 
components of a fulfilling human life. Epicurean philosophy is for Nussbaum not only 
inhuman in despising death but also incoherent, since there is no rationality in seeking 
safety when death is not to be feared. Further, she considers that the Epicurean strategy of 
removing fears will result in a less pleasurable and more selfish life, with little regard for 
participation in community affairs. Nussbaum’s main criticism of Epicurean philosophy, 
however, is its treatment of “the human world and its accidents” (p. 237), accusing the 
Epicureans of being unconcerned with “alleviating the sufferings of others” (p. 237). This 
argument relates to the values and structures of desire. She claims that Epicureans fail to 
lead worthy lives given that their negative hedonism requires them to relinquish their 
pleasures and desires “in an anxious search for an end to fear” (p. 233), and concludes that 
the student’s life is devalued by Epicurean philosophy. In essence, Nussbaum’s main 
argument against Epicurean philosophy is aimed against the strong individualist strands of 
this therapy, focusing as it does on individual ataraxia rather than fostering communal 
bonds. Nussbaum claims that communal life should be an end in itself rather than simply 
instrumental to individual well-being. Moreover, there was, in fact, no benefit at the 
                                                 
108 Nussbaum praises the Aristotelian dialectical philosophy as providing “a distinct sort of practical 
benefit” (p. 138), where public life is guided by social justice and informs the political system, 
which can use Aristotelian philosophy for improving social policies. She complains that “Epicurus 
should not have neglected this possibility…[as]…he seems to have sold both philosophy and 
society short, for the sake of saving ataraxia for a small group of individuals” (p. 138). She accepts 
that Epicurus’ maxim of living unnoticed may have evolved from witnessing a corrupt political 
system and the fact that politicians may not have held philosophy as a heuristic tool in high regard, 
but she believes that Epicurus never demonstrated that philosophy had no impact on the political 
system and considers that the effort of trying to do so was worthwhile. This interesting point of 
view cannot be discussed further here, but it should be mentioned that Aristotle himself had to flee 
Athens to avoid being condemned to death. 
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individual level, as the Epicurean philosophy lacked a structured system for teaching social 
virtues, and forced the student to despise what is valuable in human life. 
 
 There is an element of circularity in Nussbaum’s argumentation, since without 
peace of mind at the individual level it may be difficult to achieve the fruitful social role 
that Nussbaum envisages. In other words, if individuals live in fear and anxiety, they will 
naturally enforce behaviours and laws to protect themselves, which, as Nussbaum 
acknowledges, will result in greed and frenetic activity. The Garden, in contrast, was a 
small community; the lifestyle was one of friendship, confidence, and exercise in frugal 
habits, providing a good example to the community at large of how to live a fulfilled life.109 
Long (Long, 2006, p. 184) argues against the notion that Epicurean ethics is socially 
irresponsible and suggests, instead, that Epicurean ethics fostered peaceful cooperation110. 
It also seems that Nussbaum’s remarks on the Epicurean asymmetry between master and 
student, and the blunting of students’ dialectical capacities are exaggerated. I have already 
discussed the ways in which Epicurean therapy included a wide variety of techniques 
depending on the student’s emotional and intellectual capacities, and the fact that the 
teacher was also scrutinized.111 On the other hand, the Aristotelian concept of community 
which Nussbaum values excluded women and slaves, people who were openly received in 
the Garden (Hibler, 1984, p. 47).  
 
 In conclusion, and against Nussbaum’s reservations about Epicurean philosophical 
therapy, the Garden was not constituted by a small group of hedonistic and egotistic 
individuals. On the contrary, there were thousands of Epicureans living in communities in 
the main cities of the ancient world, sharing a cooperative lifestyle that lasted for centuries 
                                                 
109 Nussbaum considers the Garden to be divorced from the community, but she does not develop 
her own concept of community. It is unclear whether she considers the city-state of Athens, the 
whole of Greece, or the whole of humankind to be the favoured model.  
110 Long (Long, 2006, p. 195) is critical about the lack of security in contemporary societies 
resulting from poverty, poor education, political ambitions, and religious fears, and stresses the 
philanthropic values of the Epicurean community to be used as a model of human culture. 
111 Philodemus remarked that when moved by a sad event “the man of understanding” will produce 
“a flow of tears” in front of his student, thus “admitting his own vulnerability” (Gordon & Suits, 
2004, p. 31). 
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(Bergsma et al., 2008; Sedley, 2009, pp. 29-45). In the Garden, Epicurus promoted 
cooperation with the legal system, a philanthropic cultivation of friendship, and a model of 
human culture (Long, 2006, p. 185). This may explain why his therapeutic system remained 
essentially unchanged for centuries.112  
 
 What Epicurus brings to the world, despite the potential political and analytical 
shortcomings noted by Nussbaum, is a strong commitment to alleviating human fears and 
anxiety, his solidarity with any individual coming to the Garden for help or study, and a 
vivid example of how philosophy can be understood as a contented way of life. What is 
missing in Nussbaum’s otherwise thorough analysis is the richness and engaged 
understanding of Epicurus’ remarks on emotions in general and fear in particular. While 
Epicurus states that fear is based on false beliefs, his interest is not epistemological but 
therapeutic. In other words, he is not interested in understanding the mechanism of fear per 
se, but on whether the false belief can be removed by using his therapy. Epicurus’ take on 
fear may lack some of the finesse of Aristotle’s treatment of this emotion,113 but it is 
Epicurus who provides a philosophical therapy of fear, something not found in Aristotelian 
ethics. It is because of the negative impact of fear that humans live in an anxious state, 
pursuing empty desires, and forgetting to live in the present. It was Epicurus, and not 
Aristotle, who discussed the main causes of fear in humans, and whose epistemological 




                                                 
112 Roskam states that “the same irrational fears and vain desires always require the same healing 
method,” a method which was as relevant in Athens 300 BC as in the late Roman republic.” 
Roskam further suggests that the idea that the Epicureans lived a reclusive life in successive 
Gardens is erroneous, given the political involvement of many of the Epicurean leaders (Roskam, 
2007, p. 151). 
113 As featured in Nussbaum’s text, “there are some things that one must fear, that it is noble to fear, 
and not to do so is shameful” (Aristotle, 1984; 1115a 12-13); the brave person fears death, but “in 
the appropriate way, and as reasoning instructs, he will stand his ground for the sake of the fine” 
(1115b 1-13); a person will be “more pained at the prospect of death the more he has complete 
virtue…for he will be aware that he is being deprived of the greatest goods, and this is painful” 
(1117b 10-13). It is of great interest to compare the concept of fear in Aristotle and Epicurus, but 
unfortunately, this is beyond the present dissertation. 
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2.7. Conclusion 
Epicurus emphasized in his philosophy the role of fear in shaping the human way of 
life: humans should not live with fear, but they cannot live without fear. Epicurus accepted 
this limitation and provided for the first time in the history of philosophy a systematic 
therapy of fear. His philosophical therapy was directed towards bringing humans to a 
peaceful end of life: “We should try to make the later stretch of the road more important 
than the earlier one, as long as we are on the road; and when we get to the end of the road, 






Roman fears: Cicero’s and Seneca’s remedies 
 
 Should I have died less cheerfully before having read the Tusculans?  
I think not. And now that I find myself closer to death,  
I feel that my tongue has grown richer,  
My courage not at all. 




Montaigne’s irony shows scepticism about his success in fighting the fear of death 
using Cicero’s advice. Nevertheless, Montaigne’s remark illustrates the widespread 
significance that the Tusculan Disputations (Tusculans)114 acquired over the centuries not 
only as a philosophical treatise on the passions, but as a therapeutical ‘manual’ as well. In 
this chapter I shall examine the concept and philosophical therapy of fear at the time of the 
Roman Empire, roughly the period from 27 BCE to 395 CE, as propounded by Marcus 
Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE) and Lucius Annaeus Seneca (1-65 CE), two of the foremost 
Roman philosophers and followers of the “medical model” of treating passions (M. C. 
Nussbaum, 1994). Both produced an abundance of texts, but Cicero’s Tusculans and 
Seneca’s Letters on Ethics115 (Letters) have been selected for discussion because they 
                                                 
114 The Tusculans was written in the year 45 BCE, and the name originates from Cicero’s villa at 
Tusculum. The text is set in the form of dialogues intermixed with long expositions. The Tusculans 
brings together philosophical material from Epicurean, Cyrenaic and Stoic schools for use as 
‘remedies’ against distress and fear (Cicero, 1927, p. xi). I have used the recent translation of Books 
3 and 4 by Margaret Graver (Graver, 2002) , which provides a modern translation with a focus on 
the emotional concomitants of the text. As noted in Chapter one, Graver translates the Latin term 
passio as “emotion” rather than “passion” given that in her opinion, it would be anachronistic to 
label experiences such as fear, anxiety, anger and desire as “passions” since the latter currently have 
the connotation of extreme emotions (Graver, p.3). For Books 1 and 2 I have used the Loeb 
translation (Cicero, 1927). 
115 The Letters is a collection of 142 letters written by Seneca during his retirement. This text 
provides an eclectic collection of Stoic ethics, although Epicurean ethics are also addressed. Many 
of the letters focused on the cause and management of fear and anxiety. I have used the recent 
translation by Margaret Graver and A. A. Long (Seneca, 2015a). 
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provide in-depth discussion of the mechanism and philosophical therapy for distress, fear 
and anxiety.116  
 
Before discussing the texts, I shall briefly provide their philosophical background. 
In Cicero’s time, around 100 BCE, the Epicurean and Stoic schools had the highest number 
of followers in Rome (Cicero, 1927, p. xxiv). For the Stoics, the main aim in life was to 
acquire virtue through reason; whereas, as we have seen in the previous chapter, for the 
Epicureans their telos was the frugal pleasure of ataraxia. The Stoics considered health, 
power and wealth as ‘indifferent’ for human life, that is, as objects that did not produce 
desire or aversion. This had a major impact on the Stoic system of the emotions, as I 
discuss below.  
 
Cicero rejected both Epicureans and Stoics alike, as he considered that the former 
led to a dissipated life, whereas the latter showed contempt and a pedantic attitude towards 
ordinary human feelings. Cicero was a follower of Plato’s Academy, which in Roman times 
had sceptical influences. This sceptical stance required the philosopher to study ethical 
concepts from other schools before arriving to the most plausible solution to a 
philosophical dilemma. Nevertheless, Cicero’s main ethical work, the Tusculans, despite 
his explicit rejection of the Stoics was mostly influenced by this school.  
 
During Seneca’s time, about a century later, Stoicism was still a dominant school. 
Seneca studied philosophy with Attalus the Stoic, and while himself a Stoic, Seneca was 
also influenced by other schools such as Epicureanism and the Peripatetics. Since the 
immediate historical/political context also had a strong influence on both Cicero’s and 
Seneca’s ethical writings, I shall now provide a sketch of this aspect of their lives. Both 
philosophers were deeply involved in politics at a time when the Roman rulers were 
ruthless with anybody considered as an enemy, becoming almost paranoid about those 
close to them, such as Cicero and Seneca. 
 
 
                                                 
116 Unfortunately, there is not enough space for discussion of other seminal texts of Stoic ethical 
philosophy, such as those of the later Stoics Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.  
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3.2. Fear in Roman times 
To understand Cicero and Seneca in their historical context, it is important to 
discuss the role of chance in the life of Romans, and its relevance for the emotions of fear 
and distress. The goddess Fortuna was one of the few deities who was extremely popular 
during the Roman Empire and survived well into the middle ages (Patch, 1974, pp. 12-14). 
According to Patch, the goddess Fortuna grew in Roman times in parallel with the Greek 
goddess Tyche (mentioned in the previous chapter), and both symbolised the external forces 
that control human destiny. Fortuna was revered during the Roman Empire, being 
“enormously popular” (p. 12) and becoming the patron goddess of several emperors. This 
period was one of Roman expansion towards the unknown and its potential dangers. Patch 
views the Roman Empire as a period of social unfairness, when many people were at the 
mercy of chance. In this context, worship of the goddess Fortuna was an attempt to limit 
the unpredictability of life.117 Another way of reducing the power of chance is living the 
rational and virtuous life of the philosopher, which the goddess Fortuna cannot harm. Thus, 
the Stoics rejected the concept of fortune as they considered that humans are fully able to 
direct their lives successfully using their rational capacities. In other words, the Stoics 
considered that humans have the capacity to choose and direct their lives based on 
following moral rules. The Stoic concept of fate entailed that human life is pre-ordained by 
“Divine Reason” rather than chance, and therefore life has to be conducted following the 
program of nature (Grant, 1990, p. 219). For instance, the Stoics thought it irrational to fear 
death given that dying is part of a natural process, and mortality is a necessary attribute of 
being human. The Stoic concept of humans, as by nature rational beings explains why their 
ethical system was directed against irrational emotions, such as the fear of death, and why 
the Stoic way to happiness was to follow reason, since it is a vigilant use of reason that will 
protect humans from external dangers. As clearly expressed by Veyne (Veyne, 2003, p. 
73): “The Stoic is like a driver who must never take his eyes off the road for a single instant 
because at any moment a signal may appear or an accident may occur endangering his 
safety.” 
                                                 
117 Seneca writes in Letter 4 that “For he who regards other things [besides virtue] is dominated by 
Fortune and subject to another’s whim; he who limits goodness to what is honourable is happy 
within himself” (Letters 74.1). 
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In summary, there were two main competing ways to confront the fear of human 
destiny and the frightening power of fortune in Roman times. One, adopted by the majority 
of Romans, consisted in a religious conviction that fortune was a fickle deity. The second 
was the philosophical way dominated by Epicureans and Stoics. These external factors, as 
well as personal calamities, explain why Cicero and Seneca were both concerned with the 
problem of fear and related emotions, such as distress and anxiety, for the achievement of a 
fulfilled life. 
 
I begin with an analysis of Cicero’s Tusculans, focusing on Cicero’s discussion of 
human emotions, and on distress and fear in particular. The chapter continues with an 
examination of Seneca’s Letters, a text that provides a variety of philosophical therapies for 
confronting fear and anxiety.  
 
3.3. Distress, fear and anxiety in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations 
Cicero was a Roman lawyer, orator and philosopher with a busy political career. He 
was strongly influenced by Greek culture, and was the first educated Roman known to have 
an interest in philosophy (Striker, 1995). Cicero was a student of the Platonist, Antiochus, 
and the Sceptic, Philo. Antiochus endorsed both Platonic and Aristotelian ethics, proposing 
that the human good lay in the practice of virtue combined with moderate goods. These 
understandings, combined with Philo’s anti-dogmatic philosophical ideas may explain 
Cicero’s eclectic philosophical position (Striker, 1995, pp. 53-61). Cicero had a strong 
interest in ethics and his detailed account of the classification, mechanism and treatment of 
the emotions is the earliest that is extant. His principal concern was to examine the emotion 
of distress,118 and the main aim of the Tusculans was to advance recommendations as to 
how to assuage this emotion. Cicero also remarked on the conceptual link between distress 
and fear, suggesting that the therapy should be the same for both emotions. Striker observes 
that major tragedies in Cicero’s private and public life provide the immediate context for 
his strong interest in analysing distress in the Tusculans. In the space of a few months, 
                                                 
118 Graver translates the Latin ‘aegritudo’ with the unavoidably anachronistic “distress,” and the 
same translation is provided in the Loeb Collection. 
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Cicero suffered serious misfortunes and these events influenced his philosophical interest in 
providing ethical advice on how to manage the emotions for daily life.119 
 
 Thus, Cicero was subjected to fear and distress for prolonged periods during his life. 
According to Sellars (Sellars, 2014, pp. 107-109), the way of life of a philosopher in later 
antiquity was critical in providing a tangible context for the ethical doctrines of their 
school, as well as serving as a paradigm for the implementation of ethical advice. The 
dialogues and arguments that constitute the Tusculans took place during Cicero’s 
retirement to his villa at Tusculum and at this stage of his life, rather than developing new 
ethical theories, he was interested in providing “psychological guidance and moral 
education” (Striker, 1995, p. 57). 
 
The text is subdivided into five books: “On despising death” (Book I); “On 
enduring pain” (Book II), “On the alleviation of distress” (Book III), “On the remaining 
disorders of the soul” (Book IV); and “On virtue as sufficient for leading a fulfilled life” 
(Book V). A unifying theme running across all five books is how to relieve humans from 
fear and distress. Like Epicurus centuries before, Cicero considered fear of death to be the 
main obstacle for the achievement of peace of mind.120 Therefore, several sections of the 
Tusculans are specifically aimed at providing therapeutic advice for this type of fear.  
 
To facilitate understanding of Cicero’s remarks on distress and fear, I shall first 
present an outline of the Stoic framework for the emotions, as it is so relevant to Cicero’s 
work. I shall draw on the work of Brennan (Brennan, 2005), who provides a concise but 
thorough account of the Stoic system of emotions. The first important Stoic concept, as 
already noted, is that objects or life events are all considered to be “indifferents.” In other 
                                                 
119 In the Introduction to the Tusculan Disputations, the translator J.E. King notes that “…The study 
of philosophy was, he found, his only comfort in distress. He had suffered cruelly in his family life. 
He had quarrelled with and divorced his wife Terentia, his second marriage was a failure, and in 
Feb. 45 BCE his beloved daughter Tullia had died. The public life in which he still longed to play 
his part was no longer open to a man of his convictions. The days were evil. There was nothing, he 
felt, for him to do in the Senate or the courts of law. Since the glories of his consulship in 63 BCE 
his political life had been one long disappointment” (Cicero, 1927, pp. xii-xii). 
120 “…for the man who is afraid of the inevitable can by no manner of means live with a soul at 
peace…” (Tusculans 2.2). 
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words, a dramatic event such as the death of a friend, or objects such as wealth and power 
lose their value; they are considered to be neither good nor bad. Nevertheless, among the 
indifferents, some, such as health and shelter, are “preferred” or “promoted” (Brennan, 
2005, p. 38), and others, such as illness and poverty, are “non-preferred” or “demoted”. 
Even death is considered as indifferent. Stoics may pursue the preferred indifferents, but 
without desire; and may avoid the non-preferred indifferents with caution but without fear. 
Thus, rather than desire and fear, the Stoics use the terms “selection” and “deselection” 
(Brennan, 2005, p. 38).  
 
The question arises as to how this ethical system works in practice. Brennan 
suggests (p. 52) that the “linchpin” of the Stoic system of emotions is the act of assenting. 
According to the Stoics, humans assent to external “impressions” arising from the senses, 
or internal impressions arising from memory, thoughts or beliefs. All impressions include a 
proposition that generates a behavioural response. For example, assenting to the visual 
impression of a bear close to me generates the proposition that bears are dangerous, and 
motivates the response of running away. Thus, once an impression is assented to, an 
impulse for action follows. Graver (Graver, 2007, p. 91) suggests that the act of assenting is 
already an impulsion to act or feel, and in the case of fear, an impulsion to feel mental pain. 
For Inwood (Inwood, 1985, p. 72) assent and impulse are both mental events, assent 
causing a related impulse. This is the basis for Inwood’s significant remark that the 
importance of Stoic assent is that it becomes the “locus of moral responsibility” (p. 72), 
given that assent is under voluntary control and rational beings are responsible for the 
consequences of their decisions. Thus, in the case of emotions, the associated impulses are 
towards what is judged to be good or bad (Brennan, 2003, pp. 265-269). The emotions are 
therefore, a specific type of belief, for instance the belief that a given impression is good, 
which results in intentional actions. In other words, an assent has “evaluative content” 
(Brennan, 2005, p. 94) (that is, an evaluation is made as to whether a given object is good 
or bad), followed by an impulse to act or refrain from acting (for instance, reaching out in 
the case of desire or avoiding the object in the case of fear).  
 
Sorabji (Sorabji, 2000, p. 3) suggests that the Stoic mechanism of emotions involves 
two judgments, not just one: first the judgment that a given object has negative or positive 
attributes; and second, that it is appropriate to behave accordingly (e.g. moving towards the 
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positive object or away from the negative one). This is illustrated by Cicero’s concept of 
‘distress’ in the Tusculans when he says: “But when our belief in the seriousness of our 
misfortune is combined with the further belief that it is right, and an appropriate and proper 
thing, to be upset by what has happened, then, and not before, there comes about that deep 
emotion which is distress” (Tusculans 3.61). However, for the Stoics, emotions are always 
irrational, either because assent is given to an inappropriate impression (for instance, that 
illness is to be feared), or because the individual gives assent due to his “weak and unstable 
disposition” (Brennan, 2005, p. 95). The Stoics classified emotions based on their value 
(positive or negative), and their timing (present or future). This results in four types of 
emotion, namely, pleasure (good at present), desire (good in the future), pain (bad in the 
present), and fear121 (bad in the future).122  
 
In contrast to the notion that emotions are always irrational, the wise Stoic always 
makes rational judgements, and assents provide the impulses of eupatheia, or rational 
emotions, which are volition (a rational desire), caution (a rational fear), and joy (a rational 
good). Pain is absent since this is an emotion the wise Stoic never feels.123 A third set of 
impulses in the Stoic ethical system is referred to as “selections” or “deselections”.  These 
impulses occur when assent is given to objects considered to be ‘genuine’ indifferents and 
that reaching or avoiding them is regarded to be a rational action, such as reaching for 
                                                 
121 The Stoics sub-classified emotions into sub-species. Thus hesitation, panic, terror, superstition 
and several others derive from fear (Brennan, 2005, p. 95).  
122 Thus “desire is the opinion that some future thing is a good of such a sort that we should reach 
out for it; fear is the opinion that some future object is an evil of such a sort that we should avoid it; 
pleasure is the opinion that some present thing is a good of such a sort that we should be elated 
about it; whereas pain is the opinion that some present thing is an evil of such a sort that we should 
be depressed about it” (Brennan, 2005, p. 95). 
123 “Volition is the knowledge that some future thing is a good of such a sort that we should reach 
out for it; caution is the knowledge that some future thing is a bad thing of such a sort that we 
should avoid it; and joy is the knowledge that some present thing is a good of such a sort that we 
should be elated at it” (Brennan, 2005, p. 95) . 
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food.124 Using the rational emotions of eupatheia, the Stoic sage reaches the ideal of 
apatheia, a state free of emotions (Sorabji, 2000, pp. 194-196).125   
 
In the Tusculans Cicero criticised the ethical systems of Aristotle and Epicurus, and 
strongly defended the Stoic concept of emotions. Following the Stoic tradition, he 
considered that both distress and fear are based on the false belief that there is evil at 
present or in the future, respectively.126 Thus emotions are for Cicero mental disturbances 
disrupting peace of mind, “for they bring distress, anxious and bitter, and crush and weaken 
the mind with fear" (Tusculans 4.34). 
 
3.3.1. The nosology of distress, fear and anxiety in the Tusculans 
The Tusculans brought together a wide range of emotions under the genera of 
distress and fear. As already noted, Cicero remarked on the conceptual relation between 
distress and fear, and suggested that the treatment should be the same for both 
                                                 
124 “Selection is the belief that some future thing is an indifferent of such a sort that we should reach 
out for it. Deselection is the belief that some future thing is an indifferent of such a sort that we 
should avoid it” (Brennan, 2005, p. 97). 
125 The concept of ataraxia was discussed in the previous chapter, and a brief discussion of the 
concept of apatheia is in place. The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary (Urmson, 1990) defines 
apatheia as a state of insensibility for people or objects (p. 26). Epicurus used apatheia to denote 
absence of emotions, and the Stoics used this term to denote freedom from emotion. Similarly, 
Liddell’s dictionary renders apatheia as impassibility or insensitivity regarding persons, and in the 
more restricted Stoic sense as “freedom from emotion” (Liddell & Scott, 1996, pp. 174-175). Gisela 
Striker remarks that the Epicurean concept of ataraxia is the pleasure of mental tranquillity, 
although the individual in this state is still amenable to be disturbed by external events (Striker, 
1990, p. 100). On the other hand, the Stoic concept of apatheia has the meaning of “complete 
indifference to everything bodily or external,” with the consequent freedom from emotion (Striker, 
1990, p. 101). Thus, whereas ataraxia is reached by balancing external problems with pleasant 
memories and the anticipation of pleasures, apatheia is reached by following a value-system based 
on making correct judgments (Striker, 1990). 
126 “…fear and distress are caused by beliefs about what is bad. Fear is a belief that some serious 
evil is impending, distress a belief that a serious evil is present” (Tusculans 3.24); “…for as distress 
is due to present evil, so fear is due to coming evil, and consequently some said that fear was a 
special branch of distress…” (Tusculans 4.64); and “Anyone who is subject to distress is also 
subject to fear since the things we are distressed at when they are present are the very things we fear 
when they are impending” (Tusculans 3.14). 
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conditions.127 Cicero defined distress as “mental pain” (Tusculans 3.23), the product of the 
false belief that ‘bad’ is present. He considered distress as the worst of all passions, “a very 
torture chamber” (Tusculans 3.27). Distress is worse than fear, given that the latter 
“degrades us”, whilst the former produces “gauntness, pain, depression, disfigurement…It 
eats away at the mind and, in a word, destroys it” (Tusculans 3.27). Nevertheless, distress 
and fear cannot be categorically separated in the Stoic fashion, as having fear is usually 
thought as distressing, whereas suffering distress raises the fear of its continuation into the 
future. Cicero included in the genus of distress the species of envy, rivalry, jealousy, 
compassion, anxiety, mourning, sadness, trouble, grief, lamenting, depression, vexation, 
pining, and despondency.128 The inclusion of anxiety under ‘distress’ is explained by the 
fact that the term ‘anxiety’ was used in ancient times and up to the 19th century (Berrios, 
1999) as primarily a somatic symptom of distress and fear.129  
 
Cicero defined fear as “an opinion that an evil is impending which one thinks 
intolerable” (Tusculans 4.14). It is "a species" of distress similar "in wretchedness" 
(Tusculans 4.64), and consists of being "petrified with anxiety... [by the] ...approaching 
evil" (Tusculans 4.37).130 For all the "foolish" (i.e. those not educated in philosophy), fear 
is a "punishment" consisting in living in chronic terror (Tusculans 4.37). Cicero included in 
the class of fear the species of indolence, shame, terror, fright, panic, petrifaction, agitation, 
and dread, and described these emotional expressions as being mental, physical or mixed. 
Thus “shame” is “accompanied by blushing,” and “terror” by “paleness, trembling and 
chattering of teeth,” and are both examples of types of fear associated with bodily 
                                                 
127 This association was noted by Cicero in Tusculans 3.22 where he states that distress is used to 
denote “sorrow, worry, or anxiety in mind”, whereas fear “is clearly related to distress” (Tusculans 
3.23). 
128 The Loeb edition of the Tusculans differs in the translation of several terms from Graver’s 
translation. Loeb's "mourning" is translated as "grief" by Graver, “sadness” as “sorrow”, “grief” as 
“anguish”, “vexation” as “sadness”, and “worry” as “depression”, respectively. These interesting 
differences illustrate the strong semantic association between these terms.  
129 Anxiety (angor, in Loeb’s edition (Tusculans 4.28) is defined by Cicero as “oppressive distress” 
whereas “worry” is defined as “distress accompanied by thinking” (Tusculans 4.28).  
130 We may observe here how 'anxiety,' a species within the class of distress, was also used by 
Cicero as a symptom of fear. 
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symptoms. Others are purely mental, such as “fright” which is the “fear of imminent evil”; 
“panic”, a “fear which upsets the mind”; “agitation”, a “fear which scatters one’s thought;” 
and “dread,” “a long-lasting fear” (Tusculans 4.19). Cicero also made the important 
nosological distinction between feeling anxious and suffering from anxiety, the former 
being a transient emotional state and the latter a full-blown sickness (Tusculans 4.27).131 
Thus, the treatment of fear depends on whether individuals suffers anxiety only 
occasionally, or whether they are constantly tormented by this emotional state (Tusculans 
4.27), and it is the latter that will be the main target of Cicero’s philosophical therapy. This 
temporal differentiation is highly relevant as it provides a heuristic for when to intervene; 
but also, and perhaps more importantly, because it points to a question that is still 
significant in contemporary medicine (see chapter nine): when should an emotional state be 
considered a "sickness"? For Cicero, an emotion is a sickness whenever it produces mental 
or somatic symptoms. Thus, fear, anxiety and distress are all conceptually-related 
sicknesses. In some instances, being in distress may exaggerate or produce new fears, being 
in fear may produce the somatic concomitants of distress, and anxiety may result from 
either distress or fear.132  
 
Whereas distress and fear are major emotional upheavals in human life, Cicero 
describes the Stoic sage as living in consistent self-control, a person who "neither breaks 
down in adversity nor crumbles with fright" (Tusculans 4.37). However, a close reading of 
the text suggests that cultivating apatheia has a steep price, since the Stoic sage lives in 
what seems to be a paranoid state of constant vigilance of future dangers, perpetually 
looking for a place "without sorrow or anxiety" (Tusculans 4.38). So incessant is this 
vigilance that "nothing unforeseen can happen to him, nothing which he does not anticipate, 
nothing strange at all" (Tusculans 4.37). This state of unrelenting mental tension is 
                                                 
131 According to Cicero, a “sickness” occurs whenever “the simmering and agitation of mind 
becomes habitual,” and “cannot be removed” (Tusculans 4.23). Mental sickness has to be 
differentiated from an “infirmity of the mind”, which Cicero defines as a vigorous opinion, deeply 
attached and rooted, that some object is worthy of avoidance which is in fact not worthy of 
avoidance” (Tusculans 4.26). Finally, for Cicero “proclivities” refer to the proneness to contract 
certain sicknesses, for instance, that “some people are more prone to fear than other people” 
(Tusculans 4.28). 
132 "They are in anxiety either from the evils they undergo or from those they anticipate” (Tusculans 
3.33). 
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inconsistent with the Stoic concept of apatheia as the state of being free of emotions. 
Cicero’s Stoic sage is certainly not living "free of distress" (Tusculans 4.38) but rather is 
constantly oriented towards the future, living in anxious expectation.  
 
In conclusion, Cicero considered distress to be the worst human emotion, and fear 
to be a type of distress. These are both pernicious emotions given that once they have 
begun, humans are carried away by them (Tusculans 4.43). This explains Cicero’s 
objections to the Peripatetic therapy of taming these emotions (Tusculans 4.45). According 
to Cicero, both distress and fear have to be eliminated rather than tamed.  I shall now move 
on to describe his general approach to the treatment of emotions. 
 
3.3.2. "Let us therefore look to see what remedies philosophy has to offer for the 
sicknesses of the mind" (Tusculans 4.58) 
 The tradition of asserting parallels while distinguishing philosophy from medicine 
(one for the soul, the other for the body (Tusculans 3.5)), had in Cicero one of the strongest 
advocates.133 Specifically, he considered the sicknesses of the mind to be "more 
destructive" than those of the body (Tusculans 3.5). For Cicero, a proper discussion of the 
therapy of emotions using philosophical tools was of the upmost importance.134 Philosophy 
is “the medical science for the mind” (Tusculans 3.6), and different from the art of medical 
healing, as it requires the rational work of self-examination.135 As part of a tradition of 
contrasting and comparing philosophy with medicine that began, as we have seen, with 
ancient Greek philosophers,136 Cicero stated that philosophy “…is a physician of souls, 
                                                 
133 “Shall we say that infirmities of the mind are less harmful than those of the body? Or that bodies 
can be cured, but a medical science of the mind does not exist?" (Tusculans 3.4). 
134 “all that tends to alleviate distresses, terrors, lusts, [is important] for here is the richest fruit of the 
whole field of philosophy.” (Tusculans 1.119). 
135 “We must use our outmost endeavour…to have the power to be ourselves our own physicians” 
(“tute tibi imperes”) (Tusculans 2.47). 
136 Chrysippus, one of the fathers of the Stoic school remarked that “It is not the case that there is a 
method which we call “medical”, concerned with the disease of the body, but no method for the 
diseased soul. Nor does the latter method fall short of the former…Therefore, just as it is 
appropriate for the doctor concerned with the bodies to be inside the sickness which befall them and 
the proper cure for each, so also it falls to the doctor of the mind to be ‘inside’ both these things in 
the best way they can” (Chrysippus, On Emotion, book 4, cited in Graver (Graver, 2002, p. 210)). 
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takes away the load of empty troubles, sets us free from desires and banishes fear” 
(Tusculans 2.10-12). In the previous chapter I discussed Epicurus’ concept of philosophy as 
a healer of the soul, and here we see a similar therapeutic goal for the unorthodox Stoic 
position conveyed by Cicero and Seneca. In the Tusculans, Cicero proposed a set of 
remedies for most emotions, but mainly for distress and fear. His therapy encompassed a 
general approach as well as specific remedies for specific emotions (Tusculans 4.59). The 
first step is to identify those individuals amenable to philosophical treatment, as not every 
person is amenable to therapy. For successful results the sick person must have a wish for 
and the motivation to be cured (Tusculans 3.5),137 and this requires patients to have insight 
into their emotional disorder. Therefore, philosophical therapy is not suitable for those that 
are too insane (Tusculans 3.13). The second step for "curative measures" (Tusculans 4.59) 
is to identify the type of disturbing emotion, since the treatment is specific for each of them. 
In this stage the philosopher-therapist must decide whether to approach all emotional 
problems in a generic way, discussing their cause as rooted in irrational beliefs, and 
whether the emotion should be suffered or whether it is necessary to fully remove it.138 
 
Cicero was a partisan of the Stoic therapy of removing emotions rather than 
discussing whether an object should be feared or not. Those afflicted by fear must 
understand that emotions are based on erroneous beliefs which are under their voluntary 
control, and this therapy (as analysed in 3.3 below) requires adopting the Stoic way of life 
(Tusculans 3.24). However, Cicero made the important concession that the harsh Stoic 
therapy only works in "rare cases" and is not available to the "uneducated" (Tusculans 
4.60). According to Cicero, it is easier to convince people that a given object should not 
cause distress or fear, than to use the “specific and more reliable” Stoic treatment of 
removing the emotion by eliminating the false belief (Tusculans 4.60).139 On the other 
                                                 
137 "We will be healed, if we are willing to be" (Tusculans 3.13). Here Cicero seems to be invoking 
a rational volition rather than an irrational desire. 
138 “Should we be speaking in terms of "the spurning of reason" and "too-vigorous impulse," or in 
terms of fear, desire, and so on? And is it to appear that the object of one's distress is not a proper 
thing to be upset about, or that distress should be eliminated altogether?” (Tusculans 4.59) 
139 For instance, Cicero would argue that losing a job in a given context is not something to be 
feared, as there are other, and potentially even better, job options available for the person at risk. 
For Cicero, this may be more practical than arguing in the Stoic fashion that losing a job is a non-
preferred indifferent, since the main goal in life is to attain virtue. 
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hand, a successful result of the Stoic therapy is that it empowers people to master their 
emotions and engage in self-therapy (Tusculans 2.47). The question to address now is 
which type of therapy did Cicero recommend for use in distress and fear. Is the strong Stoic 
remedy the best option, or are there milder and more acceptable alternatives? 
 
3.3.3. Cicero’s therapy for distress and fear 
 
"[philosophy] is a physician of souls, takes away the load of empty troubles,  
sets us free from diseases and banishes fear" 
Cicero, Tusculans 2.11 
 
A central aspect of Cicero’s therapy is to clarify the varieties of “distress”, which, as 
mentioned before, include not only fear, but anxiety, worry, anguish and despair as well 
(Tusculans 3.83). These “root-fibres” have to be identified and uprooted, “so that none of 
them can ever rise again” (Tusculans 3.83).140 Having identified the specific variety of 
distress, the principal remedy that Cicero suggests for the treatment of distress and fear is to 
concentrate on the emotion itself and not on its object (Tusculans 4.62).141 To remove the 
emotions of distress and fear it is important to understand the limitations of human life, and 
that misfortunes are beyond human control (Tusculans 4.62). The philosopher-therapist has 
to analyse the concept of fear with the afflicted person in a “manly” way, specifically 
addressing pain and death, since “these are the two things people fear the most” (Tusculans 
4.64). This treatment may help in convincing the ‘patient’ that there is nothing major to 
endure. However, to fully remove the emotion patients have to understand that their 
emotions are under their voluntary control and that it is up to them to remove them 
completely.142 But in addition to this Stoic approach, Cicero also discussed a broad menu of 
additional remedies which is examined below. 
                                                 
140 “Yet how numerous are the roots of distress, and how bitter they are! The trunk itself may have 
been cast down, and still they must be pulled out, every one, by single disputations if need be” 
(Tusculans 3.83). 
141 “the methods which enable a person to bear present afflictions will also enable him to think little 
of those in prospect” (Tusculans 4.64). 
142 “The entire theory of emotion can be summed up in a single point: that they are all in our power, 
all experienced through judgment, all voluntary. It is this error, then, that must be removed, this 
belief that must be taken away” (Tusculans 4.65).  
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To be effective, the philosopher needs to determine which remedy to use. To this 
end, Cicero considered how rhetoric and dialectics could help. He made an analogy 
between philosophical therapy and his own profession as a lawyer. In court, lawyers do not 
always use the same discourse but change it depending on several variables, such as the 
context, the character of the client, the problem at hand, and the range of potential 
solutions. Similarly, the philosopher must have the knowledge and capacity to deliver 
soothing remedies, and the ability to implement the intervention at the proper time based on 
the patient’s emotional status.143 Thus, philosophical therapy is ‘tailor-made’, “…for not 
every distress is assuaged by one method” (Tusculans 4.59). Rhetoric and dialectic are non-
Stoic techniques of addressing the patient’s weaknesses and strengths, scolding in case of 
weak behaviour and praising in case of adequate emotional endurance (Tusculans 4.65). It 
is also explained to the patient that the misfortunes of life are common to humankind and 
regularly produce distress and fear. The patient is presented with examples (exempla) of 
others who have undergone similar misfortunes and is guided by the philosopher towards 
accepting these emotions as typical conditions of human life.  
 
A more philosophically ambitious remedy consists in meditation about one’s fears 
and their objects (Tusculans 4.64). Fear is presented to the patient as an emotion that 
signifies no real danger, and is described in a negative way, such as the result of being 
inconstant and feeble. Moreover, the object of fear is treated with scorn. This technique is 
used to guide people into a philosophical path of self-knowledge, as they learn to recognise 
their emotions as irrational, and of self-restraint, as they learn to despise the object of fear 
and better control this emotion. This therapy is especially useful for those with a "poor 
constitution" who are fearful "by nature" or have a proclivity for fear (Tusculans 4.80). 
 
While being critical of the Cyrenaics,144 Cicero fully embraced their pre-rehearsal 
technique, which is based on the concept that fear is triggered by the unexpectedness of an 
                                                 
143  “…but we adapt the line we take to the occasion, to the character of the dispute, to the 
personality of the litigant; we act similarly in the alleviation of distress, for we have to consider 
what method of treatment is admissible in each particular case” (Tusculans 3.79). 
144 The Cyrenaic school of philosophy was founded in the 4th century BCE and evolved from the 
Socratic tradition. The aim of this school was achieving sensual pleasure, which was considered to 
cont. next page 
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event. Pre-rehearsal therapy depends on the hypothesis that practice in anticipating future 
mishaps will decrease the severity of fear and anxiety. The practice involves imagining the 
worst outcome for a dreaded event, thinking over it repeatedly.145 Pre-rehearsal requires 
mental preparation for every circumstance in life that may pose a danger.146 For example, 
Cicero suggested thinking that one’s wife and children may be all dead when one returns 
from a trip: if this calamity does happen, one will be mentally ready and the magnitude of 
the blow will be diminished; but if the calamity does not take place, one should still 
consider the exercise a "gain" (Tusculans 3.30). Cicero's adaptation of Cyrenaic pre-
rehearsal consisted of regular meditation about the following possibilities: (1) that every 
misfortune will help getting stronger against future evils;  (2) that it is important to 
understand the limitations of the human condition, and that death is inexorable; (3) that the 
suffering produced by a foreseen misfortune will be diluted by long practice; and (4) that 
nobody should feel guilty about misfortunes that were properly rehearsed, when nothing 
can be done about them (Tusculans 4.34). Cicero concluded that by using pre-rehearsal 
nobody should feel distressed, as this technique encourages reviewing the nature of human 
life and thereby gaining in wisdom.  
 
Several conceptual and empirical limitations of the pre-rehearsal technique require 
discussion. First, pre-rehearsal may be conceptualised as an expression of fear, since by 
practicing this technique the individual is regularly thinking about future dangers. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Epicurus criticised this technique stating that regularly 
thinking about future calamities is already making the fear perpetual, and he considered it 
ridiculous to suffer over something that may never happen.147 Second, we may argue that 
                                                                                                                                                    
be more fulfilling than mental pleasures. This school provided an example of ‘positive hedonism’ in 
contrast of the ‘negative hedonism’ of the Epicureans (see previous chapter). 
145 "One looks far ahead to misfortunes that are to come, and this makes their arrival easier to bear" 
(Tusculans 3.29), and "Foresight and mental preparation can do a great deal to lessen the pain [by] 
rehearsing every event in human life" (Tusculans 3.30). 
146 "This indeed is wisdom in its noblest and most godlike form: to scrutinize human life and 
understand it deeply, not to be surprised by anything that happens; and never to think that 
something cannot happen merely because it has not happened yet" (Tusculans 3.30).  
147 As rendered by Cicero in the Tusculans, Epicurus remarked that "It is foolish to rehearse 
misfortunes which may not yet happened and may not happen at all...they are always in anxiety, 
either from the evils they undergo or from those they anticipate" (Tusculans 3.32). 
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accepting that tragedies are part of human life does not necessarily protect a person against 
suffering anxiety and fear. Finally, fearful individuals who are much given to worry, 
already practice a type of pre-rehearsal 'by default', since they are continuously thinking 
about the misfortune potentially awaiting them. For these individuals, pre-rehearsal, is a 
manifestation of worry that is in need of philosophical therapy.  
 
Cicero tried to neutralize Epicurus' criticism of the pre-rehearsal technique by 
underrating the magnitude of the future evil. Thus, an Epicurean "misfortune" becomes 
Cicero’s “regular restrictions under which we humans live", "the changefulness of life," and 
"the weakness of humankind" (Tusculans 3.34). Cicero concludes, perhaps unwisely, that 
by using pre-rehearsal we not only gain in wisdom, but "we are never sad at all" (Tusculans 
3.34). The Epicurean alternative to pre-rehearsal, he argues, is the therapy of 'evasion', 
which consists on focusing on past pleasures. Cicero considered this technique as no more 
than "womanish behaviour" (Tusculans 3.36) in comparison with the 'manly' Cyrenaic 
attitude of confronting the potential mishap, and he criticised ‘evasion’ on the basis that it is 
not always possible to wilfully choose the object of happy recollection.148 
 
Following the Stoics, Cicero also claimed that distress and fear are amenable to the 
"very effective" cure "of the passage of time” (Tusculans 3.35). He suggests that some 
beliefs may remain for a long time, but once the fear of a negative event is no longer ‘fresh’ 
in the mind its magnitude will decrease (Graver, 2007, p. 107). Accordingly, this remedy 
consists in convincing the patient that dread and fear will diminish with time, and that 
newer life events will help to remove the negative emotions (Tusculans 3.35).149 
 
Another remedy preferred by Cicero is the technique of “consolation,” which in the 
Tusculans refers to the understanding that misfortunes are part of human life. The 
consolation may be conveyed by a speech or by a written piece to soothe the pain of a 
                                                 
148 “For it is not within our power to forget or gloss over circumstances which we believe to be evil, 
at the very moment when they are piercing us. They tear at us, buffet us, goad us, scorch us, stifle 
us—and you tell us to forget about them? That is contrary to nature!” (Tusculans 3.35). 
149 “For the passage of time is itself a means of cure, a slow one to be sure, yet very effective” 
(Tusculans 3.35). 
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current misfortune,150 something Cicero did himself after the death of his daughter Tullia. 
The consolation technique consists in removing, restraining or at least diverting distress and 
fear. Accordingly, if the emotions cannot be removed, they can at least be dampened or 
restrained so that they do not increase or spread to other objects. The consolation combines 
remedies from different philosophical schools: the Peripatetic teaching that the misfortune 
is no great evil, the Epicurean diversion of attention towards good memories, and the Stoic 
maxim that everything happens according to nature.151 Comfort is provided by applying the 
proper words at the right time. The philosopher-therapist not only has to know the verbal 
'medicine' to be delivered, but also the appropriate moment of delivery (kairos) that will 
produce the greatest benefit.152 The expertise required for this philosophical therapy cannot 
be overemphasised. Therapists have to adapt their “speeches to the needs of the moment, 
the nature of the case, and the persons involved, so also in soothing distress we must 
consider what sort of cure each hearer is able to accept” (Tusculans 3.79).  
 
In conclusion, following Cicero’s understanding that emotions take place in specific 
contexts, and their expression depends on personality traits and life-long habits, the 
Tusculans champions flexible, particularistic philosophical treatments for the management 
of emotions, especially distress and fear, grounded in generic analyses of their causes. I 
have discussed how Cicero assembled his own ‘drugstore’ with remedies borrowed from 
Peripatetics, Cyrenaics and Stoics. Cicero was not an original thinker, but instead, he was a 
systematic therapist. He remarked on the importance of analysing, from a philosophical 
perspective, every “root” of distress to obtain a full understanding of its cause and best 
treatment. Cicero accepted the rigid Stoic remedy of removing the false belief at the root of 
fear, but had the flexibility to accommodate other therapies depending on the patient’s 
personality and emotional state. As an astute clinician and a great orator, Cicero 
                                                 
150 “And yet it is not the case that consolatory speeches of this kind have no value; indeed, they may 
well be the most valuable thing of all” (Tusculans 3.55). 
151 “In my Consolation, for instance, I combined virtually all these methods into a single speech of 
consolation. For my mind was swollen, and I was trying out every remedy I could” (Tusculans 
3.76). 
152 “But it is necessary, in dealing with diseases of the soul, just as much as in dealing with bodily 
diseases, to choose the proper time…” (Tusculans 3.76). 
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emphasised the importance of properly choosing the ‘verbal remedy’ to suit each patient, 
the means to convey the message, and the proper timing for applying the remedy. He 
stressed the importance of understanding that not everybody is amenable to philosophical 
therapy, and that for some a cure is impossible. Thus, whereas it is necessary for a 
successful therapy that patients accept the full extent of their problem, the philosopher-
therapist has also to accept the limitations of philosophical treatment.  
 
All things considered, Cicero’s therapeutic aim was to empower individuals to 
become their own therapists and to enable them to master their own emotions. His 
technique may seem to lack internal coherence, but it is because of this non-dogmatic 
approach and his ‘teaching differences’ that Cicero’s therapeutic advice in the Tusculans is 
so relevant and enduring. In the next section I shall go on to discuss the philosophical 
therapy of fear proposed by Seneca, another major philosopher of the Roman era, whose 
Letters on Ethics provide an in-depth analysis of fear and its treatment from an eclectic, but 
also mostly Stoic, perspective. Like Cicero a century before him, Seneca had a preference 
for Stoic remedies, but his discursive approach is quite different from Cicero’s. In the 
Tusculans Cicero addresses a general audience, whereas in the Letters Seneca begins a 
tradition of more personally directed, curative philosophical dialogues between philosopher 
and patient. This patient is Lucilius, Seneca’s friend to whom all the letters are directed, but 
the real patient, as I discuss below, is the reader.  
 
 
3.4. Fear in Seneca’s Letters 
 
Boys fear trifles, children fear shadows, we fear both 
Seneca, Letters 4.2 
 
We are frightened at uncertainties, just as if they were certain.  
We observe no moderation.  
The slightest thing turns the scales and throws us forthwith into panic. 
Seneca, Letters 13.14 
 
 As discussed in the previous section, Cicero was the first known Roman 
philosopher to strongly argue in favour of using philosophy as a therapeutic tool for 
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distress, fear and anxiety. About a century later, Seneca composed the Letters on Ethics,153 
one of the most significant texts ever written on the ethics of emotions, and in which fear is 
one of the main targets for analysis. One interesting aspect of this work is the freedom with 
which Seneca discusses his own fears and anxieties, as well as those of his interlocutor, 
Lucilius. In the Letters, Seneca not only shares his emotions, but he also provides a variety 
of remedies to achieve a tranquil life. I shall later discuss how this tradition of sharing the 
philosopher’s own fears and anxieties with the reader reaches a pinnacle with Michel de 
Montaigne and his Essays in the 16th century.  
 
3.4.1. Biographical notes and life context 
Seneca was a rich citizen from the imperial province of Andalusia, in Spain, who 
rose to the Senate and later to the Consulship of Rome (Veyne, 2003, pp. 24-26). 
Interestingly, both Cicero and Seneca had similar careers, both becoming intellectual 
celebrities. And while they had a major role in Roman culture and politics, both ended their 
careers in distress and fear for their own lives.  
 
Seneca travelled to Rome to learn the art of rhetoric and to gain a liberal education, 
but he was converted to the study of philosophy in his early youth, including training in 
Stoic ethics. Reading philosophy was a spiritual exercise which Seneca always practised 
(Veyne, 2003, p. 58). He was 40 years old when he composed the Consolation to Marcia 
(Seneca, 1932), a text written in the Stoic tradition, and he was by then considered one of 
the main Roman philosophers. It was at this age that Seneca joined the Senate and became 
a popular figure for his qualities as good orator and lawyer; and it was also at this time that 
his misfortunes began. Owing to his close connection with the circle of women of the 
imperial court during the reign of Caligula, he was sentenced to death for adultery. The 
sentence was subsequently commuted to exile resulting in Seneca spending a lonely eight 
years on the island of Corsica.154 Eventually, he was pardoned and returned to Rome. 
Seneca’s star rose with his support for the young emperor, Nero, and he rapidly became the 
                                                 
153 This is the title used in the latest translation by Margaret Graver and A. A. Long (Seneca, 
2015a), which I have used in this chapter. The text is also known as Letters to Lucilius or Moral 
Epistles. 
154 Veyne states that in Corsica Seneca “was slowly dying of solitude” (p. 7). 
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greatest intellectual figure in Roman circles, also amassing a fabulous fortune. It was 
certainly unusual for a philosopher who professed belonging to the Stoic school, to own 
one of the most important investment banks in Rome (Veyne, 2003, pp. 5-6). Some 
comments from contemporary philosophers, such as Plutarch, are scathing about the 
ambiguities both in Seneca’s political life and in his philosophical writings. Brennan 
considers Seneca as “moralizing, maxim mongering”, a “curious exponent of tranquillity”, 
and an “overheated advocate of cool” (Brennan, 2005, p. 14). Whatever Seneca’s 
misguided political actions, and the contrast between his lofty lifestyle and his 
philosophical preaching of frugality, he was above all a great writer, with a unique a 
personal style which never hides his own imperfections (Veyne, 2003, p. 29). In 62 AD, 
recognising the disasters of Nero’s policies, Seneca asked to be dismissed from his political 
duties, which Nero refused to do. Seneca then retired to a villa close to Rome, claiming 
poor health. It was at this time that he started writing the Letters, a text that makes quite 
explicit the reasons for his decision to retire from politics and to plunge into philosophical 
studies to strengthen his mind against future calamities. Consequently, he committed to a 
routine of daily self-training and self-restraint, in other words, a Stoic ascetic path to peace 
of mind (Veyne, 2003, p. 29). In 65 CE, Seneca was forced to commit suicide after being 
accused of participation in a plot to kill Nero. 
 
3.4.2. The Letters on Ethics 
As already noted, Seneca’s Letters on Ethics (Letters) (L. Annaei Senecae ad 
Lucilium Epistulae in the original Latin) were written to his friend Lucilius with the 
principal aim of addressing Lucilius’ (and the reader’s) anxieties and introducing him to 
Stoic philosophy.155 The Letters provide abundant material on the philosophical concept of 
fear, and illustrate Seneca’s unorthodox understanding of the Stoic approach to fear in 
general, and to the fear of death in particular. In fact, fear is the emotion most frequently 
discussed in the Letters, with explicit reference to fear or anxiety in 45 of the 124 letters. 
  
                                                 
155 Graver and Long state categorically that the Letters were not composed to suit a real person, but 
to convey Seneca’s ethical thoughts in a therapeutic way for the posterity. They remark that in 
Letter 8 (8.2) Seneca admits that “the work I am doing is for posterity: it is they who can benefit 
from what I write.” 
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In general terms Seneca posited that, as humans grow into adulthood, their mental 
life is shaped by numerous fears, both real and imaginary. Most humans are unable to 
mentally separate themselves from the objects of fear, and the mere idea that something bad 
may happen is frequently sufficient to plunge them into utmost despair. Stressing the 
significance of fear in human life and how difficult it is to fight it, Seneca claimed, against 
Stoic ethics that, people should try to avoid “whatever may cause fear” (Letters 98.7). His 
specific advice on how to fight fear, fluctuates between a staunch Stoic position and a more 
eclectic approach influenced by Epicureanism. His advice on the philosophical therapy of 
fear was presented in several of his works, but it is in the Letters where he examined fear 
from diverse perspectives, philosophical and personal, that he provides comprehensive and 
forceful therapeutic suggestions.  
 
3.4.3. The concept of fear in Seneca’s Letters 
Like Cicero, Seneca was not a systematic philosopher. His concept of fear has to be 
gleaned from different sections of the Letters, and interpreted in the context of his 
understanding of mental sickness. Seneca defines diseases of the mind as “a persistent 
perversion of the judgment so that things which are mildly desirable are thought to be 
highly desirable…” (Letters 75.11), and emotions as sudden, vehement and objectionable 
“impulses of the spirit” (Letters 75.11). When emotions are not examined and controlled, 
they may cause physical disease, “just as a catarrh…” (Letters 75.11). Seneca makes 
frequent reference to fear of illness, poverty and violence, and considered fear of death, fear 
of bodily pain, and fear of lacking pleasures as underlying the fear of aging. According to 
Seneca, severe worries, once they become chronic, lead to a tortured life.156 Similarly, 
repeated attacks of fear may result in a propensity to suffer these attacks following only 
minor stimuli, causing the affected individual to live in a chronic state of anxiety.157 
Therefore, controlling the inclination towards worrying is one of the biggest challenges to 
the tranquil life of Stoic apatheia.  
                                                 
156 “… life is not worth living, and there is no limit to our sorrows, if we indulge our fears to the 
greatest possible extent” (Letters 13.12). 
157 “Even in the midst of safety you will have no confidence if your mind has once been given a 
shock; once it has acquired the habit of blind panic, it is incapable of providing even for its own 
safety” (Letters 104.10). 
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The process by which Seneca became ‘enlightened’ about the human mechanism of 
fear is described in Letter 57. During a rough sea voyage Seneca underwent a 
"transformation" (Letters 57.7). In the midst of the storm he felt "a certain mental 
thrill...unaccompanied by fear" (Letters 52.3), and realised that in that unusual and 
dangerous context even the most fearless individuals showed changes in skin colour and 
complexion, accompanied by brow contraction, shudders, and dizziness. Seneca considered 
this sudden behavioural change as independent of courage or reason. For Seneca, such 
changes do not amount to fear, but are "a natural feeling that nature cannot rout" (Letters 
57.4). After the storm was over, Seneca also realised that human fears have specific causes, 
but the cause of the greatest fear is death. Seneca saw that it is the fear of death that has to 
be vanquished, and it is only then that other fears will become controllable. The corollary to 
these discoveries is that according to Seneca, emotions strictu sensu have to be 
distinguished from propatheia, those 'pre-emotions' already described by Cicero in the 
Tusculans as "bitings" and "contractions" that occur after a strong impression. "First 
movements" were for Seneca the immediate bodily responses that occur after a sudden 
dangerous event but before the intellect is able to make a judgment and provide assent.158 
This is the case with reflex responses such as a startle response to a loud noise or bodily 
feelings triggered by thunder. These behavioural responses are common to most animals, 
and there is no belief or assent to danger involved. Therefore, Seneca did not consider these 
responses as “true” fear, but only as “first movements,” that is, unconscious, involuntary 
and instinctive reactions that cannot be suppressed by training.159 
 
Seneca also analysed the phenomenon of fear at the social level. Thus, he 
considered that fears can be ‘propagated’ in a community. Rumours are easily spread 
                                                 
158 It is interesting to contrast Seneca’s ‘pre-emotions’ with William James’ concept of emotions. 
As I shall discuss in Chapter six, James defined emotions as the feeling of somatic changes. 
According to James, when we see a bear we feel fear because we run, and not because we believe or 
think that the bear is a dangerous animal. On the other hand, Seneca considered the behavioural 
reactions that precede the cognitive evaluation of the object as a mere pre-emotion, a first 
movement that does not qualify as a true emotion. 
159 “the steadiest speaker, when before the public, often breaks into a perspiration, …some tremble 
in the knees when they rise to speak; I know of some whose teeth chatter, whose tongues falter, 
whose lips quiver… nature exerts her own power and through such a weakness makes her presence 
known even to the strongest” (Letters 11.2). 
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among the population and may produce the uncontrollable behaviours of “Panic fear” 
(Letters 13.9), a generalized state of extreme fear that once released becomes difficult to 
control.160 Nevertheless, it is fear at the individual level that interests Seneca the most, and 
having reprised his concept of emotions, we are in a position to discuss his therapeutic 
approach. 
 
3.4.4. The therapy of fear in the Letters 
Despite his therapy being mostly based on Stoic methods, and like Cicero, Seneca’s 
conceptual and therapeutic approach to fear was heterogeneous. Unlike Cicero, however, 
Seneca borrowed extensively from Epicureanism,161 and although Seneca's therapeutic 
views are distributed in an unstructured way across many letters, it is possible to discern 
some systematic themes, provided it is remembered that Seneca was frequently inconsistent 
in his views and on occasion directly contradicted himself. Where Motto and Clark (Motto 
& Clark, 1968, p. 38) consider Seneca to be a non-sectarian philosopher, whose 
philosophical practice consisted in borrowing from different schools whatever he 
considered most appropriate to support his philosophical speculations, I believe a pattern 
may be discerned after analysing his writings. Due to Seneca’s high number of citations of 
Epicurus (64 references), Motto and Clarke also describe Seneca as “the Epicurean Stoic” 
(p. 41). Whatever his philosophical inclinations, Seneca offered numerous laudatory 
comments about Epicureanism and each of the first thirty letters finishes with an Epicurean 
maxim and a clear demonstration of how much Seneca valued Epicurus’ philosophical 
teachings. 
 
3.4.4.1. Seneca’s concept of fear during his Epicurean phase 
Although initially in the Letters, Seneca’s concept of the emotions might be 
described as diluted Stoicism he rapidly slips into a more accessible Epicurean mode. The 
first step in Seneca’s therapy is to clarify, in the Stoic manner, whether fear is caused by a 
real object, or whether the cause of fear is “empty”, that is, based on a false belief (Letters 
                                                 
160 Once an individual is “overwhelmed by the disaster, the rest are overwhelmed by fear, and the 
possibility that they may suffer makes them as downcast as the actual sufferer” (Letters 54.3). 
161 See especially the first 40 letters. 
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13.7).162 Next, he suggests, in an Epicurean fashion, considering whether our body is 
healthy or sick. If we are physically healthy, then fear “is not an issue” (Letters 13.7). Such 
a state corresponds to the Epicurean state of aponia or lack of bodily pain, which together 
with ataraxia or lack of mental pain, creates the maximum state of happiness. In contrast, 
as I discussed in the section on Cicero, a healthy body was for the Stoics nothing more than 
a ‘preferred indifferent’, that is, an object judged to be neither bad or evil but preferred, as 
being healthy is in accordance with nature. 
 
Seneca next introduces the Epicurean technique of focusing on the present, almost 
the opposite to the Cyrenaic technique of pre-rehearsal so much valued by Cicero. Seneca’s 
advice is not to be “miserable before it is time,”163 since feared misfortunes may never 
happen or at least have not yet happened.164 When Lucilius worries that misfortune “still is 
to come” (Letters 13.8), Seneca’s advice is to ascertain whether mischief is truly 
forthcoming, “for all too often we worry about what we merely suspect” (Letters 13.8).165 
In the initial letters, during this Epicurean phase, Seneca identifies fear of poverty, fear of 
disease, and fear of the powerful as the main human fears,166 and suggests humans should 
always try to stay away from the object of fear.167 Seneca considered poverty and sickness 
as "silent" fears (Letters 14.4), as these do not impact on the senses. On the other hand, the 
fear of the powerful is "terrifying" because it arrives “with a great deal of noise and 
                                                 
162 I used the term “diluted Stoicism” because, for the Stoic doctrine, fear is always the result of a 
false belief and cannot be rational by definition. 
163 “Some evil is probable for the future; it is not proven right off. How many unexpected things 
have come to pass! How many of our expectations never happen at all! Even if it is to come, what 
good does it do to anticipate your grief? You will grieve soon enough, when it comes; in the 
meantime, allow yourself something better” (Letters 13.4). 
164 Seneca’s remedy is fully Epicurean (compare with Chapter two): “Some things, then, torment us 
more than they should, some sooner than they should; and some torment us that should not do so at 
all: either we add to our pain, or we make it up, or we get ahead of it” (Letters.13.5). 
165 “Yes, dear Lucilius, we are too quick to give way to opinion. We do not demand evidence of the 
things that frighten us, or check them out carefully” (Letters 13.8).  
166 Fear of death is implicit in the above list of fears. 
167 “…let us avoid not only danger but also discomfort, as much as we can, and retreat into 
safety…” (Letters 14.3). 
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activity” (Letters 14.4). These are the fears of war, torture and prison, “and everything else 
that savagery has devised” (Letters 14.5).  
 
The question arises as to how to stay safe in a world full of political turmoil. 
Seneca’s answer is first to give no offense to “the populace”, the state, or the ruler (Letters 
14.7); and second, the well-known Epicurean advice of living unnoticed. The danger of the 
“common crowd” is best avoided by not desiring the same objects as others, thus shunning 
competition, hatred, envy, and contempt (Letters 14.9). And yet, regardless of how much 
we apply ourselves to allaying dangers by living unnoticed and giving no offense to the 
powerful, the outcome of our deeds will depend in great part on fortune alone.168 In other 
words, circumstances beyond our control will eventually decide the outcome of potential 
dangers. This important concept will be later adopted by the Stoic philosopher Epictetus 
who remarked that some things are up to us and we should work on these, but other things 
are not up to us and we have to accept that there is nothing to be done (Epictetus, 1928).  
 
While Seneca explained in several letters what he considered to be the necessary 
steps to achieve command over fears, he also acknowledges that personal attributes play an 
important role in how fear impacts upon the individual and how it can be managed. For 
instance, Seneca wrote that “great and unceasing application to study” (Letters 75.15) is 
important for the proper handling of emotions, but also that human constitutional attributes 
such as “good fortune with regard to natural gifts” (Letter 75.15),169 are necessary for 
setting limits to fear. In other words, to dispel the passion of fear it is not sufficient simply 
to understand that fears are produced by false beliefs, but having the “natural gifts” of a 
resilient personality is also required. 
 
                                                 
168 “The beginnings are in our power; the results are judged by fortune; to which I grant no 
jurisdiction over myself. But fortune will bring some trouble, some adversity” (Letters 14.16). 
169 "Whatever is assigned to us by the terms of our birth and the blend in our constitutions, will stick 
with us, no matter how hard or how long the soul may have tried to master itself" (Letters 11.6). 
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Seneca’s generic therapeutic approach, in line with the Epicureans, involves 
teaching limits to desires in order to prevent fear.170 Given that fear and hope are 
conceptually related, the therapist has to teach that “you will cease to fear…if you cease to 
hope” (Letters 5.7). According to Seneca the constant movement between hope and fear is a 
result of an incapacity to live in the present moment. Unlike Epicurus, who found solace in 
pleasant memories, following Seneca the therapist should stop the patient from dwelling in 
the past—since memory “recalls the stab of fear” —or thinking about objects far in the 
future (Letters 5.9).171 Foresight, the greatest attribute of the human condition can be used 
with great benefit to prevent dangers, but this ability "becomes perverted" (Letters 5.8) 
when it anticipates misfortunes that may never happen.172 To ‘live in the present’ it is 
necessary to cast away any potential pleasure that may bring anxiety, since it is in human 
nature to always want more.173 It is also of the essence to be contented with little, and to be 
weary of fortune, since ambitions lie “wholly toward the future” (Letters 15.9). 
 
In a more Stoic vein, Seneca suggested the daily exercise of meditation which he 
practiced himself every night. The main meditation consists of self-examination with the 
aim of recognizing and accepting one’s failures and progressing along the Stoic path to 
virtue. Seneca’s meditation is to be carried out with extreme honesty.  One should study 
oneself after removing all “ornaments” such as power and wealth (Letters 80.10), otherwise 
our self-concept may depend on what other people value in us, and their opinions are 
usually biased towards their interests. For Seneca, self-understanding is being conscious of 
                                                 
170 In Letters 14.9 Seneca follows the Epicurean precept of having few desires. Seneca remarks it is 
a big danger to desire the same objects as the “common crowd” (Letters 14.9) since this competition 
will only bring unsafety. Seneca cites Epicurus’ remark that “He enjoys riches most who has least 
need of riches” (Letters 14.17) also adding that “He who feels the need of wealth also fears for his 
wealth” (Letters 14.18). 
171 The main cause of fear is that “we do not adapt ourselves to the present but direct our thoughts 
toward things far in the future. Thus foresight, which is the greatest good belonging to the human 
condition, has become an evil” (Letters 5.9). 
172 "Beasts avoid the dangers which they see, and when they have escaped them are free from care; 
but we men torment ourselves over the future which is to come as well as over that which is past. 
Many of our blessings bring bane to us; for memory recalls the tortures of fear, while foresight 
anticipates them. The present alone can make no man wretched" (Letters 5.9). 
173 “The more you achieve, the more you will have to fear” (Letters 19.8). 
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one’s mortality, meditating on what is good or bad for us, and deciding on what is worth 
pursuing in a rational (that is, non-emotional) way (Letters 82.6). We should meditate on 
the fact that fear of death is worse than death itself, and that we are terrified by “phantoms” 
as well as “real dangers” (Letters 104.10). There is no peace of mind once we become 
accustomed to fearing everything. It is “the habit of thoughtless anxiety” that stops us from 
thinking in a rational way and being able to distinguish danger from safety and, as a result, 
we tend to escape from situations when it would be better for us to confront the problem at 
hand.174 Therefore, Seneca’s meditation practice is aimed at improving our mental strength 
and resilience rather than following intellectual pursuits. He warned about “tricks of logic” 
being used as a method of persuasion that death is not an evil (Letters 82.8), since in his 
opinion the practice of logic is not conducive to increasing mental strength.175 It is courage 
rather than mental exercises that will prepare us to confront fears. Simple soldiers do not 
need to understand syllogisms when they hear the final harangue from the Spartan 
Leonidas: “Eat your breakfast, fellow soldiers; dinner will be in Hades.” (Letters 82.21). 
Examples like this were also part of the therapeutic meditation on fear of death, which 
Seneca suggests is a good theme for the daily reflection. He writes on specific aspects of 
this fear, for instance, on wanting to live a long life, remarking that this grasping and 
holding onto life can only result in a chronic state of anxiety.176 The meditator also has to 
ponder the fact that living and dying are two faces of the same natural process, and that by 
fearing death we forget to live.177 Seneca also suggests other remedies, such as 
philosophical readings on how to manage fears and writing “healthy admonitions”. He 
                                                 
174 “It does not shun danger but rather takes flight, even though we are more exposed to dangers 
when we don’t face them” (Letters 104.10). 
175 “Zeno, of our school, offers the following syllogism: Nothing bad is glorious. But death is 
glorious. Therefore, death is not bad. Now, that was a big help! You have freed me from fear; after 
that, I won’t hesitate to offer my neck to the sword!” (Letters 82.8). 
176 “No one cares how well he lives but only how long— despite the fact that every one of us has 
the chance to live well, and no one can live long” (Letters 22.17). 
177 “These thoughts, and others like them, are what we must ponder if we want to be at peace as we 
await the final hour. For fear of that one makes all our other hours uneasy” (Letters 4.9). 
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states in Letter 8 that he is writing for posterity, but it is also likely he was putting to paper 
Epicurean maxims for his own philosophical benefit.178 
 
3.4.4.2. Seneca’s therapy in action: Letter 24 “Courage in a threatening situation” 
Letter 24 provides a good example of Seneca’s philosophical treatment of fear in 
action. Lucilius tells Seneca about his worries regarding the outcome of a lawsuit against 
him.179 Seneca begins the therapy by assessing his ‘patient’. Lucilius is a Roman knight and 
a writer, the governor of Sicily, and a clever interlocutor. In consequence, Seneca decides 
against applying the basic remedy of creating hope and providing “comforting 
expectations” (Letters 24.1). Lucilius is too knowing for this ‘mild’ remedy, and instead 
Seneca applies the Epicurean strategy of staying in the present moment. The message is 
that the feared mishap may never materialise, whereas the mental pain (or what Cicero 
called “distress”) is present.180 The remedy of ‘living in the present’ is not strong enough to 
soothe Lucilius, and Seneca turns a variation on the Epicurean tetrapharmakos (see Chapter 
two) where it is stated that pain is not to be feared because if severe, death is imminent and 
if it is light, pain may even be pleasurable. Seneca tells Lucilius that “You will soon realize 
that what your fear is either no great matter or not long lasting” (Letters 24.2). If this 
adaptation of the tetrapharmakos is still not successful, Seneca suggests the use of 
“examples to strengthen you with” (Letters 24.3). For instance, some people endure prison 
and exile courageously, “even gladly” (Letters 24.4) and some illiterate soldiers watch their 
hands “sizzling on the enemy’s brazier” without showing any emotion (Letters 24.5). 
Lucilius is still unmoved by stories full of heroism but unable to calm his mind. Seneca’s 
response is that the use of exempla is aimed at encouraging Lucilius to understand that he is 
not brave enough in confronting relatively harmless events. But after this strategy also fails, 
Seneca suggests to Lucilius that he stay calm since the outcome of dreaded events may be 
                                                 
178 In Letter 8 he states that “I am still plundering Epicurus, in whose work I today found this 
saying: You should become a slave to philosophy, that you may attain true liberty” (Letters 8.7), a 
good illustration of therapeutic reading and writing. 
179 It is likely, as Graver and Long suggest (Seneca, 2015a) (Introduction) that the lawsuit never 
happened, and the story is just a foil to introduce the subject Seneca wants to address. 
180 “…what need is there to take an advance on future troubles, ruining the present with fear of the 
future? When troubles come is time enough to bear them. Surely it is foolish to be miserable now 
just because you are going to be miserable later on!” (Letters 24.1). 
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decided by “external factors” not under Lucilius control (Letters 24.12), and to meditate on 
the maxim: “there is nothing to fear in your affairs but fear itself” (Letters 24.12).181 In this 
way Seneca stresses that like little children who are frightened by “masks,”182 adults also 
fear imaginary objects. Making a major turn in the treatment, Seneca’s next advice to 
Lucilius is to confront his fear directly and grasp the notion that “whatever can 
happen…will happen” (Letters 24.15) (italics in the original).183 This constitutes a radical 
strategic change in Seneca’s therapy, which began by urging Lucilius to stay in the present 
and to consider that what is feared may never happen and now changes to encouraging him 
to accept that the dreaded outcome will indeed happen. Seneca’s next advice is a 
heterogeneous remedy consisting of the Epicurean method of ‘diversion’, that is, thinking 
about “people in general”, but also that the body is mortal, that life is unpredictable, and 
that it is better to think that death is nothing to us (Letters 24.16).184 These are all exercises 
that will “strengthen” Lucilius’ mind to cope with daily fears, since what truly underlies all 
fears is the fear of death. Seneca’s treatment of Lucilius’ anxiety now enters its final stage, 
and consists in the analysis of the value of life in the context of great emotional turmoil. He 
warns Lucilius that committing suicide out of fear is always irrational, since all fears boil 
down to the greatest of all fears, the irrational fear of death.185 
 
In conclusion, Seneca’ therapy of fear in Epicurean fashion uses the important 
technique of adapting the remedies to the patient, as well as using a variety of methods, 
                                                 
181 A similar remark was made famous by Michel de Montaigne in his Essays, as I discuss in the 
next chapter. 
182 “You see with children how people they love and know, people they play with, frighten them 
terribly if they see them wearing masks: well, the same thing happens with us, who are just slightly 
bigger children” (Letters 24.13). 
183 “For the most shameful of the accusations against us is that we deal in the words of philosophy 
but not the actions” (Letters 24.15). 
184 “Turn your thoughts away from your personal situation and toward that of people in general. Tell 
yourself that this paltry body is mortal, and that it is frail” (Letters 24.16). 
185 Seneca proceeds to cite Epicurus in two remarks that are preserved in this text. Both remarks 
reject suicide as a product of fear of death: “What could be more absurd than to seek death when it 
is fear of death that has made your life unquiet?”, and “So great is the foolishness, no, the madness 
of human beings, that some are driven toward their death by fear of death” (Letters 24.23). Fear of 
death is specifically addressed below (section 4.5). 
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such as living in the present, using maxims and exempla, diversion of attention and regular 
meditation on the fear of death, at a midpoint between “excessive love of life and against 
excessive hatred of it” (Letters 24.24). It is interesting to contrast these techniques for 
addressing fear, with Seneca’s Stoic methods. Letter 74, which states that there is no peace 
of mind in a state of anxiety, and “a life amid anxieties is a life of misery” (Letters 74.5) 
shows Seneca using Stoic rather than Epicurean techniques.186 In this Letter he considers 
that the only medicine to end anxiety is to live a virtuous life based on honourable 
conduct.187 A life without virtue is worthless, since “every plan is adrift; no good fortune 
can satisfy us” (Letters 74.11). On the other hand, “Virtue rejoices in present goods; has no 
longing for what is absent; finds nothing meagre that will suffice” (Letters 74.12). In living 
a virtuous life, the Stoic sage shows consistency and harmony in behaviour and is 
emotionally unperturbed. The wise Stoic is not affected by the loss of children or friends, or 
by the prospect of death. Fear now becomes “dishonourable” (Letters 74.30)188 since the 
Stoic has no fear but only ‘first movements’.  
 
Nevertheless, Epicurean and Cyrenaic influences still creep in. Seneca admits that 
only the fool lives in fear, since “what it fears to endure, it endures already through fear” 
(Letters 74.32). Moreover, Seneca still remarks on the importance of living in the present 
(Letters 74.34), and borrows Cicero’s technique of ‘pre-rehearsal.’ Seneca uses the fire that 
destroyed the city of Lyon as a metaphor for tragedies whose magnitude are greater, the 
more unexpected they are. Thus, returning to the Stoic therapy, Seneca states that “…we 
should let nothing catch us unprepared. We should try to anticipate everything and reflect 
on what’s possible rather than what usually happens” (Letters 91.4). This can be achieved 
by being constantly alert even in times of joy and peace, given that even “when all is quite 
                                                 
186 Graver uses anxiety to translate the more generic Latin malum, but the Latin anxietas is not used 
here. As I mentioned earlier, anxietas had a much stronger somatic connotation than in our current 
use. 
187 “There is but one road that leads to safety: you must rise above external things and be content 
with what is honourable. For he who thinks there is something better than virtue, or that anything 
besides virtue is good at all, exposes his breast to everything fortune can throw at him and waits 
anxiously for the blows to land” (Letters 74.6). 
188 “All anxiety and worry is dishonourable, all reluctance to act; for honourable conduct is sure and 
unhampered, undismayed, ever standing at the ready” (Letters 74.30). 
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calm, terror emerges” (Letters 91.6). Our attitude towards life adopts a suspicious approach 
to everything and everybody, since “friends turn foes, allies into enemies” (Letters 91.5).  
 
With the aim of fighting fear by following the virtuous path of the Stoic sage, in 
Letter 75 Seneca presents three different stages of human emotional progress. The first and 
highest stage relates to individuals who are close to Stoic virtue and with no “infirmities of 
the mind” (Letter 75.10),189 in other words, individuals with no ingrained mistakes when it 
comes to judging the value of objects as purveyors of fear. These individuals practice 
diligent scrutiny and self-examination and only pursue what is worth pursuing, that is, Stoic 
virtue. They will not fear irrational objects, but they have yet to practice a virtuous life.190 
The second stage includes those that are able to control their emotions, although not in a 
steady manner. Finally, in the third stage, people are afflicted by “faults”, since they are 
unable to manage fear in a rational way. Accordingly, “they are unconcerned about death 
but still terrified with pain” (Letters 75.14). An individual who progresses from the third to 
the first Stoic stages, will reach a state of having neither desires nor fears; a state of 
“tranquil mind and independence” (Letters 75.11). Through criss-crossing paths, both 
Cicero and Seneca concluded that the person who is cured of fear will “have absolute 
power over [them]self” (Letter 75.18) and “be master of [them]self” (Tusculans 2.47). But 
to reach this state, it is necessary to cure the mother of all fears: the fear of death. 
 
3.4.5. Seneca’s treatment for fear of death 
For Seneca, fear of death is the greatest suffering of humankind.191 In his first 
letters, Seneca provides the Epicurean advice of ignoring death while we are alive (Letters 
                                                 
189 “an infirmity is a persistent judgment in a corrupted person that certain things are very much 
worth pursuing that in fact are only slightly worth pursuing” (Letters 75.11). 
190 “They do not know that they know” (Letters 75.9). 
191 “But of all the suffering crowds of humankind, the greatest is of those who are troubled by the 
thought of death. That thought meets them at every turn, for death may come from any direction. 
Like troops passing through enemy territory, they must be looking around all the time, turning their 
heads at every sound. Unless this fear is driven from the breast, we live with quaking hearts” 
(Letters 74.3). 
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4.2), or if death is close, to consider the duration of life as irrelevant.192 In this early stage 
of the Letters Seneca suggests that the therapy for the fear of death requires constant 
reflection, and he paraphrases Epicurus' maxim: "Rehearse for death" ("meditare mortem") 
(Letters 26.8). Appropriate reflection will teach us how to die without fear,193 which 
involves, first, accepting death as inevitable; and second, understanding that how and when 
to die is fully in human hands, and in the end, a matter of personal choice. Suicide was for 
Seneca the great escape in case of extreme distress and fears.194 He also remarks that 
extreme fear of death could paradoxically plunge some into suicide. This “craving for 
death” should be avoided as it is an affliction that is suffered by those that have too much 
hatred or too much love for life. For most people, for whom suicide is not an option, taming 
the fear of death requires "long practice" to learn a rational approach to this fear (Letters 
30.4).195 For Seneca, the fear of death is conceptually "foolish" (Letters 30.10), since fear 
implies a potential danger, whereas death is a certainty. Philosophy, he claims, will teach 
students how to "depart calmly" (Letters 30.4) by training them to speak openly about 
death, and by encouraging them to reflect on the idea that death is not painful and implies 
no suffering. This training includes the following exercises: (1) learning how to face 
incoming death, (2) building courage concerning what is inevitable, (3) understanding that 
the duration of life is irrelevant for living a virtuous life, and (4) accepting that death may 
happen at any time. Once this training is successfully completed, students should throw the 
ladder of their learning away and become their own masters. “The advice I give is a remedy 
not for this illness only, but for your whole life. It is this: despise death. Once we escape 
that fear, nothing is ever sad” (Letters 78.5). 
 
 
                                                 
192 “No man can have a peaceful life who thinks too much about lengthening it, or believes that 
living through many consulships is a great blessing” (Letters 4.4). 
193 Seneca stated that it is possible to “depart from life contentedly” but that most humans who “ebb 
and flow in wretchedness between the fear of death and the hardship of life; … are unwilling to 
live, and yet they do not know how to die” (Letters. 5.5). 
194 Death may be welcomed, and “even, if circumstances commend that course, to invite it. There is 
no difference whether death comes to us, or whether we go to death” (Letters 49.6). 
195 “…the soul must be hardened by long practice, so that it may learn to endure the sight and the 
approach of death” (Letters 82.15-16). 
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3.5. Conclusion 
Seneca's Letters is an invaluable document for understanding the philosophical 
therapy of fear and anxiety in the Roman Empire. But the range of fears and anxiety-
producing situations he described is still relevant today. Fear of poverty, fear of illness, fear 
of exile, and most of all, the fear of death is as important today as they were two millennia 
ago. As a result, there are important lessons in his texts for those who are fearful and 
anxious in current times. 
 
Seneca was principally a Stoic philosopher but his therapeutic approach to fear was 
eclectic. He mostly adopted the classical Stoic posture of treating any object of fear as an 
'indifferent,' and even fear of death was scorned and despised. However, and especially in 
his early Letters, Seneca considered fear to be an emotion that is impossible to ignore, and 
thus he also provided abundant therapeutic advice. This advice included Epicurean 
remedies such as living in the present and redirecting attention, but he also advocated the 
use of pre-rehearsal. Like Cicero a century before, Seneca remarked on the relevance of 
assessing the patient’s personality for the suitability of philosophical remedies. His broad 
approach to the treatment of fear, also like Cicero’s, consisted in teaching differences about 
the characteristics of the patient and the therapist, and about the treatment itself.  
 
The powerful philosophical and literary value of his Letters, with their remedies for 
fear and distress may relate, among other factors, to the fact that Seneca talks and argues 
with his friend and with himself, making his readers active students and participants in his 
own emotional dilemmas. The Letters are one of those pieces of antiquity with which we 
can converse because we may easily identify ourselves with many of the situations of fear 
and distress he so clearly describes, and find solace and useful advice in them. Seneca tells 
the reader about his daily emotional problems in a way that resonates with our lives. As 
Long points out (Long, 2006, p. 370) the Letters obtained immortality because the text 
departs in a humanistic way from tradition and context. The Letters do not constitute a 
consistent philosophical treatise on the concept of emotions, as it lacks coherent conceptual 
structure and has repetitions and contradictions. But these imperfections make the text 
much closer to life and to our feelings than is the Tusculans. Seneca is open to sharing with 
us his emotional road through life towards self-improvement. Thus, it comes as no surprise 
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that centuries later, Montaigne, the inventor of the auto-biographical essay genre, will 
consider Seneca as one of his major influences. 
 
According to Sellars the doctrine of oikeiosis is at the bases of the Stoic ethical 
system (Sellars, 2014, p. 108). Sellars defined oikeiosis as an instinct of self-preservation, 
with a predilection for what leads to self-preservation and rejection for what is damaging. 
Self-preservation is an encompassing concept, ranging from the instinct to stay alive shared 
with all animals to the uniquely human attribute of self-awareness, that is, being conscious 
about dangers to one’s life and about mortality. The emotion of fear is a manifestation of 
both the drive for self-preservation and the self-reflective attitudes of humans. In some 
instances, humans show a behavioural response to sudden danger which is non-reflective. 
These reflexive behaviours were labelled as ‘first movements’ by Seneca, who did not 
consider them as true fear. As we have seen, what both Cicero and Seneca were concerned 
about, and wrote about, are the universal fears of poverty, sickness, and death. Both Roman 
philosophers followed the Stoic dogma that fear, like all other emotions, is irrational and it 
has to be removed to achieve apatheia. Cicero’s treatment was primarily aimed at removing 
distress, but he pointed to the conceptual connections between distress and fear, making the 
treatment common to both emotions. Both Cicero and Seneca developed therapies of fear 
based on the use of words, and not surprisingly, both were excellent orators. Thus, they 
recommended choosing the right words and deliver the verbal therapy at the appropriate 
time to allay the distress and fear of the sick person. The power of words over human 
emotions was known since the time of the Greek Sophists. Thus, in his Encomium on 
Helen, the sophist Gorgias proposed that words have the capacity to take away fear, as they 
have a power comparable “to that possessed by well-compounded medicines to the body” 
(Gorgias, 1991). For Cicero, words had the potential for curing, or at least soothing, 
teaching and consoling. He created a Stoic-Platonic therapy consisting in a thorough 
investigation of the roots of fear, complemented by reading and listening to philosophical 
maxims, and applying the techniques of self-mastery, memorization and meditation. Seneca 
considered fear to be the greatest scourge of the human mind, with fear of death underlying 
all other fears. He proposed a broad range of remedies, from the Epicurean notion of living 
in the present, to Cyrenaic pre-rehearsal and Stoic cognitive removal of emotions. Neither 
Cicero nor Seneca introduced novel therapeutic techniques or modified the concept of 
emotions, which they borrowed from various philosophical schools, and yet the Tusculan 
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Disputations and the Letters on Ethics are enduring and universal texts. One explanation 
for this phenomenon is that both philosophers found a way of reaching into the emotions of 
the reader. We suffer with Cicero the loss of her daughter, and fully understand and identify 
with his distress. Cicero points, indirectly, to our own distress and suggests different ways 
to assuage this emotion. Distress is an emotional response to a current misfortune, as well 
as the pain we feel in respect to future misfortunes. Seneca’s Letters provide an even more 
engaging approach to the problem of fear. He preaches and admonishes his friend Lucilius 
like a harsh Stoic teacher, but simultaneously he relates to us his own fears, with which 
again we become identified. His advice is for both Lucilius and ourselves and his situation-
specific non-dogmatic approach to fear will suit most affected individuals. 
 
Conquering fear is for Cicero and Seneca the main path towards freedom and 
tranquillity of mind. As Seneca remarks at the end of Letter 75, “What is freedom, you ask? 
To fear no human being and no god, to want neither what is base nor what is excessive, to 








Montaigne’s Essays: a humanistic approach to fear 
 
“It is fear that I am most afraid of: In harshness it surpasses all other mischances” 
Michel de Montaigne, Essays, (Book I, “On fear”) (M. Montaigne, 2003) 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Michel de Montaigne, born in 1533 in the Aquitaine region of France, was a classic 
example of the Renaissance humanist thinker: an excellent rhetorician who mastered the 
use of the vernacular language as well as Latin, allowing him to study the classical sources 
of Roman philosophy and translations of Greek philosophers into Latin (Frame, 1984, pp. 
29-45). Montaigne became a famous writer as a result of a single work, the Essays, which 
contain more than one hundred pieces of differing lengths dealing with a variety of 
subjects, from a scholarly analysis of a theological work to advice on how to obtain the best 
breed of horses. The Essays are considered the most important work in French philosophy 
until the Enlightenment, almost 100 years later. The significance of this work lies in the 
fact that Montaigne experimented with a new way of writing, characterised by analysing a 
subject from different perspectives and at different times in life. Montaigne starts 
discussing a topic and may digress to something different, or he provides an opinion about, 
say, fear in the first set of essays, and then radically changes his opinion twenty years later. 
Since his initial point of view is not deleted, we have the opportunity to examine, directly, 
the progression of Montaigne’s thinking along the years.  
 
The Essays provide a vast amount of information regarding the culture and social 
habits in Renaissance France, as well as philosophical analysis of the most significant 
human afflictions. I will argue that fear is one of the most important subjects discussed in 
the Essays, as this emotion was strongly present in Montaigne’s life.196 I will also argue 
                                                 
196 It is difficult to introduce Montaigne as a philosopher, as he did not belong to the ‘establishment’ 
nor did he want to become a ‘professional’ philosopher. He was a ‘humanist’ in the sense of 
Petrarch and Erasmus, a man of letters, and a politician. Nevertheless, the Essays is the work of a 
profound philosopher, one of the most original thinkers of the Renaissance who understood the 
human soul as few before or after him. Julie Roberts (Robert, 2015, p. 246) considers the Essays as 
cont. next page 
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that it is Montaigne’s practical approach to living with fears and his attempt at dominating 
them that makes the Essays so attractive. His early life was spent tortured by different fears, 
which is reflected in many chapters of the Essays, and the ‘remedies’ used by Montaigne 
are highly instructive and inspiring. 
 
The Essays were written during a period of almost 20 years197 and reflect the early 
period of Stoicism, a middle period characterised by Epicureanism and Scepticism, and a 
final period when Montaigne released himself from established philosophical views and 
provided his own thoughts198. Bakewell (Bakewell, 2010, p. 303) has suggested that the 
Essays do not propose specific theories or grand metaphysical statements; the text is full of 
contradictory remarks due to Montaigne’s epistemological and personal changes over time. 
This is most evident in his treatment of fear, and Montaigne should figure prominently in 
any work discussing the philosophy of this emotion. First, even though the Essays is not an 
academic work on fear, it provides a unique discussion of how the therapies of fear 
proposed by the different Hellenistic Schools of philosophy were applied in the life of a 
prominent humanist at a time when there were obvious reasons for being in fear, such as 
the ravages of the Wars of Religion in France and the horrors of the plague, which 
                                                                                                                                                    
a “pathographically curative” text, with the effort to examine oneself as one of the main aspects of 
philosophical therapy. She connects Montaigne’s therapy with Foucault’s “care of the self” 
(Foucault, 1986). Rachel Starr (Starr, 2012, p. 436) considers the Essays as the pinnacle of 
“humanistic psychotherapy.” 
197 After publishing the first edition in 1580, Montaigne continued adding material, which creates 
some confusion, as he did not correct his previous concepts even when they were in contradiction 
with the new ones. The additions from 1580 to 1588 are marked with a “B”, whereas the additions 
from 1588-92 made in the 1588 ‘Bordeaux copy’ (first published in 1595) are marked with a “C”. I 
have used Screech’s translation (M. Montaigne, 2003), but also added material from Frame’s 
translation whenever I considered the concept to be more clearly conveyed (M. Montaigne, 1965). 
Reference to specific essays will be given to by volume and number, and page numbers within 
specific essays will be referred to by volume, essay, and page number. Letters A, B and C are used, 
when necessary, to indicate the different editions. 
198 The presence of clearly demarcated philosophical stages in Montaigne’s intellectual evolution 
has been contested by a number of authors, and is extensively discussed in Bermúdez (Bermúdez 
Vázquez, 2015, pp. 54-61). Frame (Frame, 1955, pp. 5-7) describes three periods in Montaigne’s 
philosophical development: the first one (“Stoic period”) extended from 1572 to 1574; the second 
one (“Sceptical period”) extended from 1575 to 1577, and the final period (“Epicurean period”) 
extended from 1578 until Montaigne’s death in 1592. 
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decimated entire populations. Montaigne himself was also on the brink of early death after 
suffering a serious concussion.  
 
Another unique attribute of the Essays regarding fear is that the text is written 
primarily about the author.199 Thus, the work could be considered as mere anecdotal 
evidence but Montaigne’s description of his own fear is used as a springboard to analyse 
the phenomenon of fear from different philosophical perspectives in a novel non-dogmatic 
style. Montaigne openly tells the reader about his main fears, especially poverty, pain and 
death, and the major impact this emotion had on him. We read of Montaigne’s fear of 
illnesses, which led to him being a valetudinarian, the miraculous’ cure of these fears after 
contracting a real and serious illness, his reaction to the terrors of the plague, his at times 
desperate search for a solution to his fears in philosophical writings, and finally, the 
creation of a unique type of therapy, free from conceptual restrictions; a therapy ‘all his 
own,’ which consisted of self-reflection, self-knowledge, and acceptance as the main 
attributes. 
 
4.2. The Essays as a narrative of fears 
It may seem paradoxical that a text that addresses fear as one of the main topics 
only includes the word “fear” in the title of one of its 106 essays. In several of the essays of 
Book I,200 Montaigne conveys fear indirectly through narrating heroic feats from Roman 
and Greek history. In these narrations, which aim at displaying the virtuosity of Antiquity, 
Montaigne depicts Greek and Roman soldiers as showing great contempt of death. These 
stories may be interpreted in different ways, such as presenting the Stoic perspective of the 
‘early’ Montaigne, and a contrast with the non-virtuous behaviour of his contemporaries in 
the wars of religion. Readers may feel dwarfed by these stories, and find it impossible not 
to compare their own relatively pedestrian fears with the heroic feats of the ancients. 
                                                 
199 This type of autobiographical writing was not new (Montaigne’s Essays was preceded by 
Augustine’s Confessions and Petrarch’s Secretum), but Montaigne’s text is unique in the frankness 
of personal descriptions, in which a reader of any place and period may be easily reflected. 
200 Fear is a main theme in I.6 “The hour of parley is dangerous”, I.11 “On prognostications”, I.16 
“On punishing cowardice”, I.19 “That we should not be deemed happy till after our death”, I.20 “To 
philosophise is to learn how to die”, I.21 “On the power of imagination”, I.33 “On fleeing from 
pleasures at the cost of one’s life”, I.39 “On solitude”, and I.57 “On the length of life”. 
 88 
Montaigne also tells narratives about individuals that were savagely tortured, and the detail 
he provides may produce a feeling of great fear and horror. We are time and again forced to 
a labour of self-reflection regarding our own capacity to face fear in similar 
circumstances.201 Thus, the therapeutic aspect of these early essays lies in contrasting our 
petty fears against the courageous behaviour of the heroes of antiquity, and they also 
provide a guide for those who have to face fear of death and may find Montaigne’s 
examples inspirational. However, as much as we would like to imitate them, the Essays use 
cases that are exceptional in the history of humanity (e.g., Alexander, Caesar, Socrates, and 
Solon). All these examples aim at the extirpation of fear, but this ‘remedy’ is not available 
to most mortals. It was also not available to Montaigne himself, who was at that time beset 
by all kinds of fears, as I shall discuss later. 
 
There is another indirect way in which fears are conveyed to the reader, and this is 
an original move on Montaigne’s part. Humbly initially, but with much more confidence in 
the later essays of Books II and III, we see Montaigne embarked on a major exercise of 
self-analysis, where he discloses his humours and his opinions, as well as his own fears and 
worries. Montaigne brought a great innovation to the understanding and mastery of fear, 
that is, his narration in the first person of his own pilgrimage to subdue his fears. Already in 
the note “To the Reader”, Montaigne states, with complete honesty, that he is not serving 
his own reputation as he presents himself with all his weaknesses for the benefit of “friends 
and kinsmen” (p. 1). Montaigne wants to be regarded “in [his] simple, natural, everyday 
fashion” 202 (p.1), with his virtues and weaknesses. And the benefit to the reader is certainly 
great, as Montaigne offers several useful remedies in his description of his own fight 
against fears and worries.  Although Montaigne’s fears are of course intrinsic to his life 
experience, his personal accounts often resonate with his reader’s experience, by way of 
identification or comparison, allowing the reader to acquire understanding, repose and 
                                                 
201 This sounds anachronistic, but the extrapolation of the Essays into contemporary life is 
commonly practiced and for good reasons (Lazar & Madden, 2015, pp. 1-2), as fear is one of the 
most primitive human emotions, the phenomenology in terms of feelings and behaviour has not 
changed in its conceptual essence, and the main causes of this emotion are perennial, such as the 
fear of death, poverty, sickness and wars. 
202 “For it is my own self I am painting” (p. 1). 
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companionship.203 We are not alone with our distressing fears, and Montaigne, so open to 
accepting differences, that is, without being dogmatic or doctrinaire, is one of our best 
guides. I shall next discuss Montaigne’s fears in more detail. 
 
4.3. Montaigne’s collection of fears 
Montaigne stated that what he feared most was fear itself (1.18.82). Such is the 
rather enigmatic and catching phrase inserted in the short essay appropriately entitled “On 
fear”. The brevity of this essay is puzzling, since, as I have discussed, fears had a 
significant role in Montaigne’s life; yet he does not provide, in this early essay a 
comprehensive discussion of his own fears and the methods he used to tame them during 
his life. On the contrary, the essays “On sadness” and “On fear” mostly provide a rather 
shallow discussion of the Stoic concept of fear (see previous chapter), providing examples 
of automatic behaviours after a great fright, such as physical paralysis, loss of basic 
instincts of self-preservation, and even suicide. Thus, the sudden announcement of bad 
news may cause one to be “struck with alarm” (1.3.8); people become paralysed, unable to 
respond, until they suddenly burst into “tears and lamentations” (1.3.8).204 In line with 
Seneca’s notion of ‘first movements’, Montaigne states that the first reaction to a sudden 
alarm is a reflex behaviour.205 The ‘Stoic sage’ becomes pale and tense following a sudden 
loud noise, although without assenting to this event as dangerous. After paying his respects 
to the Stoics whom he initially followed, Montaigne rebels against this school as being too 
dogmatic. The Stoic attitude and strategies to fight fears are for Montaigne impracticable 
and inhuman. Fear “penetrates through to the seat of reason…infecting and corrupting it”, 
and it is too strong to be dominated by the rational arguments of the Stoics (1.12.48). As 
discussed in Chapter three, Cicero made a similar criticism, and yet both Montaigne and 
Cicero were strongly influenced by Stoicism. Cicero’s remedies were mostly Stoic, 
whereas Montaigne was still providing Stoic advice during his most anti-dogmatic period. 
                                                 
203 Scholar (2010), remarks that the Essays “haunt its readers” by the free-thinking style of 
Montaigne’s writings. Montaigne was a scholar, but fiercely anti-dogmatic, anti-authoritarian, and 
able to make “all questions accessible to his readers” (Scholar, 2010, p. 7).  
204 Montaigne nominates this transient paralysis as “extreme sadness” (1.3.8). 
205 “When he is threatened with a blow nothing can stop a man closing his eyes, or trembling if you 
set him on the edge of a precipice…” (2.3.38). 
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A possible explanation for Montaigne’s association of fear with first and violent 
movements is that he used the French peur (the French title for this essay) with the 
connotation of extreme fear. Montaigne begins this essay by stressing he is not a “natural 
philosopher” (i.e. a physician), and therefore he is not interested in the biological 
mechanism of fear. Montaigne considers fear an “odd” emotion since it may drive a person 
insane: fear engenders “fits” of mad behaviour, and a “terrifying confusion” even in the 
steadiest of men. Captains in battle behave in a crazy way after being seized by the terror of 
a minor threat, some of them even dropping dead on the spot. Behavioural changes elicited 
by fear become unpredictable, with some people fleeing and others becoming unable to 
adopt behaviours of self-preservation. In another essay (“On coaches”), Montaigne divides 
fear into that caused by lack of judgment, as in first movements, and that caused by lack of 
courage and provides the example of his fleeing from battlefield, which he did with a 
rational fear, “without ecstatic terror” (3.6.1018). When faced with the fear of death, some 
people behave in the most heroic manner as if pushed by “some celestial impulsion” 
(1.18.83). These fears may also be contagious, taking hold of whole battalions or 
populations, a fear Montaigne terms “Panic terrors” (1.18.83). Whereas this is not the most 
interesting essay dealing with fear, we can already appreciate the variety of behaviours fear 
may produce among humans.  
 
A strong reason for Montaigne’s ‘fear of fear’ is that he was besieged by truly 
frightening events, as already mentioned, living amid the war of religions and the plague. 
But Montaigne’s anxiety is not only accounted for by the causes above. In “On coaches” he 
acknowledges that he lacked the strength to tolerate deep fear, stating that if he should be 
hit by such an emotion he would never recover from the experience. Montaigne was not so 
much concerned about negative events, but rather about the emotional impact these could 
have on him. This explains his statement that he liked the Spanish saying “God save me 
from myself” (3.13.1233), that is, from his tendency to catastrophize.206 Montaigne stated 
that his main fears were sickness, poverty and death, and these fears are addressed in 
                                                 
206 “Anyone who is afraid of suffering suffers already of being afraid” (3.13.1243). 
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different essays.207 Montaigne had a chronic fear of sickness, being convinced of suffering 
“rheums, fluxions of gout, diarrhoeas, coronary palpitations and migraines” (3.13.1235). 
His most dreaded fear was of having kidney stones, the disease that killed his father. 
Montaigne eventually did develop kidney stones, but even while suffering the extreme 
pains produced by this illness, he found the experience liberating. His fear of the illness and 
constant worrying was a permanent weight on his mind; after developing the illness the 
agonising uncertainty lifted and he was ‘free’ to face the consequences. Earlier, 
Montaigne’s fear of poverty tortured him at the time when his fortune was greatest. He 
tamed this fear when he decided to delegate the management of his finances to others. This 
was not a rational confrontation with this fear, but effective avoidance behaviour. Finally, 
his omnipresent fear of death diminished when he was very close to death after suffering a 
severe head injury. Montaigne had to ‘taste’ what it might be like to be dead to appease his 
fear of death. I shall now address in more detail the causes of fear as described in various 
essays, and prepare the ground for Montaigne’s therapeutic advice. 
 
4.4. The maddening thoughts of fear and the power of imagination 
Montaigne starts Essay 14 by paraphrasing Epictetus’ view that humans are 
“tormented not by things themselves”, which for the Stoics have no intrinsic value, “but by 
what they think about them”, that is, the value that is invested in a given object (1.4.52).208 
But even during his ‘dogmatic’ phase, Montaigne challenged this Stoic doctrine stating that 
emotional events may be too strong and unable to be intellectually manipulated.209 If, as the 
Stoics state, emotions are a matter of rational assent “why do we not act as their masters 
and accommodate them [i.e. the interpretations] to our advantage?” he asks (1.4.52). In 
another early essay, Montaigne disagrees with the Stoics that the technique of 
premeditation (see previous chapter) may help to allay fears. Montaigne considered that the 
anticipation of misfortune may produce fears which many times exceed the suffering 
                                                 
207 The main essays discussing the fear of death are “Constancy” (1.12), “That the taste of good and 
evil…” (1.14), “That to philosophise is to learn to die” (1.20), “Solitude” (1.39) and “The 
inconsistency of our own actions” (2.1). 
208 “That the taste of good and evil things depends in large part on the opinion we have of them” 
(1.14). 
209 They “lodge within us by its own authority” (1.14.52). 
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produced by the dreaded mishap, an effect which demonstrates the powerful influence of 
imagination on human emotions.210 
 
Among the intellectual powers, Montaigne considered a person’s imagination to be 
the strongest source of fears. He stressed that imagination may generate self-fulfilling 
prophecies: once the idea of a bad outcome comes to mind, the trouble will most probably 
happen. And Montaigne himself was a victim of his own extreme susceptibility to 
imagining all sorts of negative incidents, which produced in him great fear and anxiety.211 
He was convinced that a strong imagination could produce severe disease and sexual 
impotence.212 When Montaigne writes that one “fellow often has stone in the mind before 
stone in the kidney” (2.12.547), implying that it is enough to imagine suffering a disease to 
already feel it, he may well be referring to himself. In fact, as already noted, Montaigne 
feared distress and fear more than bodily problems.213 He complains about being unable to 
find peers with whom to have an interesting conversation, which he needed as a distraction. 
If left alone, he would fall into imagining maddening thoughts.214  
 
Imagination lured Montaigne into retirement and tortured him afterwards. He 
decided on an early retirement from a promising political life to spend more time alone. 
Montaigne was averse of taking any risks needed to foster his advancement, and curved all 
political ambitions.215  Instead he wanted to retire quietly and privately, living in idleness, 
to care for himself, to be concerned with himself, and to think about himself. He soon 
                                                 
210 The topic on the futility of premeditation is discussed in-depth in the penultimate essay “On 
physiognomy” (3.22). 
211 “I am one of those by whom the powerful blows of the imagination are felt most strongly. 
Everyone is hit by it, but some are bowled over” (1.21.109). 
212 “When I contemplate an illness I seize upon it and lodge it within myself” (1.21.109). 
213 “Once the pain has gone I am not much depressed by weakness or lassitude. I know of several 
bodily afflictions which are horrifying even to name but which I fear less than hundreds of current 
disturbances and distresses of the mind” (3.13.1245). 
214 “Then, there is no madness, no raving lunacy, which such agitations do not bring forth” (1.8.30). 
215 “I bind myself to what I can see and to what I can hold on to; and I scarcely venture far from the 
harbour” (2.17.731). 
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realised, however, that his idealised retreat was not heaven but a hell in which his 
imagination “bolted off like a runaway horse”, producing “chimeras and fantastic 
monstrosities, one after another, without order or fitness” (1.8.31). One of these “fantastic 
monstrosities”, as mentioned earlier, was his imaginings of being affected by all kinds of 
diseases. After hearing the story of a neighbour having consumption, Montaigne would 
start coughing. He was unable to tolerate the anxiety of waiting for the outcome of any 
feared event. He lived in anguished expectation, often “torn between fear and hope” 
(2.17.731). Doubt paralysed him and he was unable to make simple decisions.216 The 
torture of uncertainty was too unbearable, and Montaigne faced a present misfortune better 
than its anxious expectation.217  
 
This seems to be a portrait of a pathologically fearful person, and it is legitimate to 
wonder whether Montaigne is able to provide rational and sound advice on how to manage 
fear. Would it not be better to be guided by physicians, who especially since Galen, have 
been dealing with pathological emotions using their herbal remedies? I believe, for reasons 
I discuss below, that Montaigne was in a solid position to provide useful advice on how to 
deal with fear. First, because Montaigne suffered from a broad variety of fears, he had a 
first-hand understanding of how big a torture this emotion can be, and more importantly, he 
also found the way out of this excruciating pain (although with some relapses as I shall 
discuss later). During the ten years he lived self-confined to his tower, Montaigne 
conducted a rigorous self-analysis. He examined his fears with brutal honesty, as he hated 
lies, and especially lying about oneself. Montaigne examined his fears from different angles 
using tools of the different philosophical schools, and applied philosophical remedies to 
himself. This combination of deep self-examination and broad knowledge of the Hellenistic 
schools, Roman philosophers and poets, as well as a dedicated practice to philosophical 
therapy, placed Montaigne in a strong position to give advice on the therapy of fear, using 
himself as an example. 
                                                 
216 “resigned to any outcome whatsoever once the dice have been thrown” (2.17.731); and “Few 
emotions have ever disturbed my sleep, yet even the slightest need to decide anything can disturb it 
for me” (2.17.731). 
217 “In events I act like a man: in the conduct of events, like a boy. The dread of a tumble gives me 
more anguish than the fall” (2.17.732). 
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Regarding the role of medicine for treating human sickness, it is impossible, here, to 
exaggerate Montaigne’s contempt for doctors, which is so overtly expressed in several of 
the essays. The reason for this strong rejection is unclear, but it may be related to 
Montaigne’s own hypochondriasis and his fear of doctors. He hated the incumbent 
profession of medicine, and yet he had to accept contact with doctors because of his 
physical infirmities. 
 
4.5. Fearing doctors 
Montaigne considered successes in medical cures to be due to mere luck, given that 
in his opinion, the foundations of medicine were “too fragile” (1.24.143), and doctors too 
dogmatic. He “despised” medicine when in good health 218 and rejected it when ill,219 but 
this was in part due to fear of doctors, their medications, and their prognoses.220 Montaigne 
claims that contempt for medicine was a family trait, and that nobody in his family, from 
his grandfather onwards wanted any contact with physicians.221 His father was “horrified” 
by doctors, and the only one of his brothers who relied on medicine was the youngest to 
die. A more personal reason for his dislike of medicine was Montaigne’s hypochondriasis. 
He was aware this was a product of the imagination,222 and that doctors tricked people to 
produce their cures.223 In any case, and despite all the medical promises, he asserted that we 
are made for growing old and weaker, and falling ill (3.13.1236). 
                                                 
218 “…thank God we have nothing to do with each other” (1.24.143). 
219 “I tell those who urge me to take medicine at least to wait until I am well and have got my 
strength back in order to have the means of resisting the hazardous effects of their potions” 
(1.24.142). 
220 “Can I feel something disintegrating? Do not expect me to waste time having my pulse and urine 
checked so that anxious prognostics can be drawn from them: I will be in plenty of time to feel the 
anguish without prolonging things by an anguished fear” (3.13.1243). 
221 His father lived to 74 years, a grandfather to 69, and a great-grandfather to almost 80, “none 
having swallowed any kind of drug” (2.37.863).   
222 “How many men have been made ill by the sheer force of imagination? Is it not normal to see 
men bled, purged and swallowing medicines to cure ills which they feel only in their minds?” 
(2.12.545). 
223 “Why do doctors first work on the confidence of their patient with so many fake promises of a 
cure if not to allow the action of the imagination to make up for the trickery of their potions? They 
know that one of the masters of their craft told them in writing that there are men for whom it is 
cont. next page 
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This rejection and fear of doctors was not simply the result of Montaigne’s 
imagination, given that in 16th century France the practice of medicine was not legislated, 
and quacks and barbers were practicing as physicians (H. Roberts, 2009, p. 722). This was 
a time of radical changes in the training and practice of medicine (Justman, 2015, pp. 496-
498). The teaching of medicine was becoming institutionalised in universities, and 
physicians began to be accepted in new medical corporations in most major French cities 
(Brockliss & Jones, 1977). On the other hand, trained medical practitioners faced strong 
competition from unqualified healers, barbers and apothecaries, as well as students and 
itinerant quacks (Brockliss & Jones, 1977, p. 230). Whoever the provider happened to be, 
there was more luck than rational knowledge in the practice of medicine,224 and even those 
physicians trained at reputed universities were practicing on shaky theoretical grounds. 
Montaigne was aware of the rudimentary empirical basis of medical practice, which he 
strongly criticised.225  
 
Most of the population in rural and urban regions had scarce resources to pay the 
fees of trained physicians and had to resort to charlatans and quacks. Once in the hands of a 
physician of whatever type, the patient had to follow the prescribed regime, which included 
frequent visits to ensure the proper taking of medications, follow-up examinations, and 
changes to the treatment if necessary (Brockliss & Jones, 1977, p. 284). This interaction 
continued until the patient was cured or dead. Montaigne disliked what he considered a lack 
of moderation in medical practice, as well as what he perceived as efforts from physicians 
                                                                                                                                                    
enough merely to look at a medicine for it to prove effective” (1.21.116). Thus, the trickery of 
doctors consisted in using medications as strong placebos to cure imaginary illnesses, as well as 
convincing patients that their drugs were curing an otherwise irreversible condition (Justman, 
2015). 
224 “Doctors will have to concede that on my side there is either reason or luck. And with them luck 
is a more valuable commodity than reason…” (2.37.864). 
225 “And then the hesitation and ignorance of those who undertake to explain the principles by 
which Nature operates and her inner progressions (as well as the false prognoses of their Art) oblige 
us to recognize that she keeps her processes absolutely unknown. In her promises and threats there 
is great uncertainty, variability and obscurity. With the exception of old age (which is an undoubted 
prognostic of the approach of death), in all our other maladies I can find few prognostics of the 
future on which we should base our predictions” (3.13.1243). Robert (Robert, 2015, pp. 721-744) 
has analysed the subtle way in which Montaigne ridiculed both physicians and patients for engaging 
in fully unproven expensive treatments. 
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at bringing not only illnesses but also good health under their supervision. With interesting 
foresight, Montaigne asked the rhetorical question as to whether doctors themselves have 
long and happy lives that demonstrate the benefits of their own medicine (2.37.866).  
 
In conclusion, we can see in Montaigne’s contempt witness to the 
professionalization of medicine, with its increasing influence upon human life. Although 
the progress of medical treatment over subsequent centuries has undoubtedly had enormous 
benefits for humanity, Montaigne was astute enough to see this empowering of medicine as 
the beginning of the medicalization of human life, and how great a role fear played in its 
further development. On the other hand, Montaigne’s great foresight was one of his main 
sources of fear and suffering, as I shall now discuss.  
 
4.6. Fear, fortune and foresight  
In the third essay of Book I (“Our emotions get carried away beyond us”), 
Montaigne already argues against the human tendency to look forward into the future, 
oblivious of what is available at present. Fear, he says, is one of the main reasons that 
“impel us towards the future” (1.3.11).226 This may explain the human fondness for 
prognostication, the main subject of another early essay. Montaigne considers 
prognostication to be a “mad curiosity” (1.11.41), since many plans and projects, no matter 
how many precautions are taken, depend in great part on fortune.  
 
After his Stoic period, Montaigne became convinced that it is fortune rather than 
foresight that rules human destiny. Nevertheless, he considered that the force of habit could 
tame the negative impact of fortune. The technique of habit-creation was very important 
because as he claimed with typical flourish, proper habits are more necessary for a happy 
life than the “whole of philosophy” (1.23.129). This is because he thought that habits and 
customs, if properly developed, are able to reduce the severity of fear (see further 
discussion below). To support his view, Montaigne comments on Roman emperors who 
became accustomed to ignoring conspiracies against them rather than being enslaved by 
                                                 
226 “… they rob us of feelings and concern for what now is, in order to spend time over what will be 
– even when we ourselves shall be no more” (1.3.11). 
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fear.227 On the other hand, Montaigne considered that philosophical knowledge “is a 
dangerous sword” (1.25.158) which may wound the unprepared. Philosophical training is 
not for everybody and philosophical techniques against fear, such as pre-rehearsal, may 
help some people but hurt others.228 Montaigne admired those “souls” that were trained in 
good habits, with luck [having] nothing to do with the capacity of enjoying a life without 
fears, “calm, unruffled and contented” (1.42.290).229 Achieving this serenity is independent 
of social position, he thought, as even in the case of the king, “when surrounded by his 
armies, anxiety and fear can have him by the throat” (1.42.291). 
 
One’s social position does not spare one from disease, the pains of old age, or 
paralysing fear.230 As Montaigne grew older, he became used to planning for the short-term 
only, an Epicurean strategy against fear and worry.231 By not having great ambitions or 
long-term plans, he avoided the consequent anxiety of seeing them to fruition. Following 
this change of habits, Montaigne’s worrying diminished and he started coming to terms 
with the idea of dying.232 One objection to this rather selfish strategy to fight the fear of 
having one’s plans cut off by death is that it evades the possibility of strengthening oneself 
against the daily fears, a fearful ‘shrinking’ of the soul. In his late essays in Book III, and 
especially in “On physiognomy” Montaigne attacked the Stoic technique for fighting fears, 
preferring a more natural approach, such as the lifestyle of his farmers, who lived almost 
                                                 
227 “The continual suspicion, which leads a Prince to distrust everyone may torment him strangely” 
(1.24.145). 
228 “So vain and worthless is human wisdom: despite all our projects, counsels and precautions, the 
outcome remains in the possession of Fortune” (1.24.143). 
229 Being able to “face drawn swords with steady gaze…not [bothered by] whether she expires with 
a sigh or a slit throat” (1.42.289), and paraphrasing Horace, a “lord of himself, not terrified of death, 
poverty or shackles” (1.42.289), and following Lucretius, with a body free of pain and a mind 
“remote from fear and worry” (1.42.290). 
230 “The roof of his four-poster may be stuffed with gold and pearls but it has no virtue to assuage 
the anguished paroxysms of a lively attack of the stone” (1.42.291). 
231 “The longest of my projects are for less than a year; I think only of bringing things to a close; I 
free myself from all fresh hopes and achievements” (2.28.796). 
232 “my old age…deadens within me many of the desires and worries which trouble our lives: worry 
about the way the world is going; worry about money, honours, erudition, health… and me” 
(2.28.797). 
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indifferent to death even during the plague. Unfortunately for Montaigne, he did not have 
the farmers’ temperament, and his fear of poverty, pain and death remained with him for 
most of his life. 
 
4.7. “Our main enemies are held to be death, poverty and pain” 
 In the essay entitled “That the taste of good and evil things depends in large part on 
the opinion we have of them” (1.14) Montaigne provides a philosophical analysis of his 
main fears. He initially follows the Stoic stance that life events, even dying, have no 
intrinsic value, and any emotional attribution depends on our personal interpretation. After 
all, Montaigne says, whereas death is for some “the dreadest of all dreadful things,” for 
others it is “the only heaven from life’s torments” (1.14.53). In the same essay, Montaigne 
provides several examples of impressive fearlessness in the context of imminent violent 
death, and ends with the pleonasm that the number of individuals wishing for death (for 
various reasons) is so vast that “I would find it easier to list those who did fear death” 
(1.14.56). His own name would have certainly figured in the latter category. Even in the 
last (and emotionally steadiest) period of his life, worries weighed heavily on Montaigne, 
and a “thousand things” caused him “to hope or to fear” (3.9.1076). 233 Let us now examine 
these fears in more detail. 
 
4.7.1. Poverty 
 Once again, in fleshing out his account in light of his own experience, Montaigne 
relates three different stages in relation to his fear of poverty. During the first period, he 
depended on others for his income and spent money “easily and cheerfully” (1.14.66). His 
needs were frugal, but in case of need he could always borrow from friends. Montaigne 
admitted that “thrifty” people would never tolerate this state of financial uncertainty. In the 
second stage, after he had accumulated a good fortune, Montaigne admits that he became 
too “attached to it” (1.14.68). During this period, like many who value material wealth 
beyond other goods, he was tormented by the idea of poverty, fearing all kinds of events 
that would find him bereft of money. These fears plunged him into “painful anxiety” (“the 
heavier the money, the heavier my worries” (1.14.68)), and Montaigne tried to hide the 
                                                 
233 “Those everyday fissures eat into me” (3.9.1076). 
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extent of his wealth from others.234 He worried about being robbed when taking his safe-
box on a journey; but if the strong-box was left at home, he would suspect everyone in his 
château.235 He suffered when he had to spend, and became a miser. After several years of 
fearing poverty while he was earning a fortune, Montaigne entered his third and last stage 
during which he quietly, and without anxiety, tried to balance earnings with expenses.  
Bringing a more reflective perspective on his situation, Montaigne accepted that it was 
impossible to provide for all the negative events in life236 and that there was no guarantee 
he would live to spend the money he had accumulated. He accepted that exceptional life 
circumstances may happen, and lived without worries, “from day to day” (1.14.68).237 
 
4.7.2. Pain 
Fear of pain and disease also tormented Montaigne during most of his life. 
Montaigne considered pain as “the worst disaster that can befall our being” (1.14.59). He 
acknowledged his extreme fear of pain238 and was ambiguous about how much pain he 
could tolerate.239 Montaigne wanted to be “either totally well or totally ill” (3.9.1072), 
unable to endure uncertainty. “I am no [Stoic] philosopher” (3.9.1075) he stated in his last 
years, honestly accepting his low tolerance for pain.240 Montaigne never pretended, in Stoic 
fashion, that pain is an ‘indifferent’ when in fact it is cruel and that suffering, consequently, 
                                                 
234 “…like those rich who act poor and those poor who act rich…” (1.14.67). 
235 “There is more trouble in keeping money than in acquiring it” (1.14.68). 
236 “And it is madness to expect that Fortune will ever supply us with enough weapons to use 
against herself” (1.14.69). 
237 This statement has to be contrasted with Montaigne’s confession that peace of mind was 
achieved after delegating the management of his financial affairs to stay aloof of potential problems 
(see section 3). 
238 “I am the most ill-disposed toward pain” (1.14.69). 
239 “When my condition is bad I cling violently to my illness: I abandon myself to despair and let 
myself go towards catastrophe” (3.9.1072). 
240 “ills crush me in proportion to their weight, and they weigh as much by their manner as their 
matter, often more I know them better than ordinary people do and so bear them better; but in the 
end, though they do not wound me they do strike me…Life is a delicate thing, easy to disturb” 
(3.9.1075). 
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is unstoppable. Nevertheless, Montaigne follows the Stoics when accepting that it is up to 
the individual to confront pain with boldness, or if courage is not available, to exit life.241 
 
It may be argued that fear of illness, as a type of ‘natural’ premeditation technique, 
has the positive aspect of emotionally preparing a person to confront the worst outcome in 
the best way possible. Here we need to remind ourselves of the Epicurean criticism (see 
Chapter two) that it is irrational to suffer in the present about misfortunes that may never 
happen.  Fear of illness is not simply a matter of benign rehearsal but a source of great 
distress. During the past five centuries the objects of fear have certainly changed (kidney 
stones have quite an easy treatment currently), but fear of illness still affects many people 
(Barsky, 1988). As Montaigne states (3.9.1075) pain and disease were feared doubly for 
being indicators of impending death, and I shall now discuss Montaigne’s greatest fear. 
 
4.7.3. Death 
Fear of death oppressed Montaigne for most of his life. Bakewell (Bakewell, 2010) 
suggests that Montaigne’s obsession with death was due to reading about death from a 
young age, whereas Frame (Frame, 1984, pp. 20-21) suggests that Montaigne’s persistent 
preoccupation with death resulted from close and consecutive deaths. In a period of ten 
years Montaigne lost his beloved friend La Boetie, his father, an uncle, his youngest 
brother, and two daughters. But it is possible that Montaigne’s fear of death may have 
deeper roots. Even before those events he was obsessed with death as expressed in 
behaviours such as investigating the cause of death of different people (including 
philosophers), their facial expression, and their last words.242 He studied the death of 
prominent individuals from history books, and one of his literary wishes was to write “a 
compendium with commentaries of the various ways men have died” (1.20.99). 
Montaigne’s fear of death was already prominent during his early adulthood. Amidst happy 
times with friends, for example, he was struck by moments when he would be suddenly 
                                                 
241 “Death is the only guarantor of our freedom, the common and ready cure of our ills” (1.14.53). 
Montaigne acceptance of suicide is not explicitly stated in the text, perhaps due to fear of the 
Inquisition. 
242 “There is nothing I inquire about more readily than how men have died: what did they say? How 
did they look? What expression did they have? There are no passages in the history books which I 
note more attentively” (1.20.99). 
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absorbed by thinking that in similar situations, somebody like him died after a short fever. 
Montaigne denied being a melancholic but rather claimed he was just “an idle dreamer” 
(1.20.96). However, these dreams were rarely about the joys of life and mostly about 
death.243 Even when in good health244 Montaigne was terrorised by death and was 
convinced his life would be short.245 Yet he took some temporary comfort from the Stoic 
maxim that a good life is not measured by its length but by its good use.246 Montaigne 
considered that a good death consisted in no suffering, and he wished for a sudden death, as 
in this situation “we have no time to feel afraid” (1.20.100). On the other hand, reaching old 
age, he speculated, may lessen the fear of death, given that the loss of our youth is more 
grievous than death itself.247 Finding peace of mind was certainly not a minor challenge for 
Montaigne. 
 
In general terms, Montaigne considered that one of the main reasons for fearing 
death is that humans are unconvinced of their own mortality,248 believing themselves to be 
special creatures, the axis around which life events rotate.249 Therefore, death comes as a 
sudden surprise, as “a great event” in Montaigne words (1.13.685). In his opinion, this 
abrupt awareness of one’s own mortality is most commonly observed among scholars, who 
                                                 
243 “from the outset there was no topic I ever concerned myself with more than with thoughts about 
death – even in the most licentious period of my life” (1.20.96). 
244 “I find that a determination to die is harder to digest when I am in good health than when I am 
feverish, especially since I no longer hold so firmly to the pleasures of life once I begin to lose the 
use and enjoyment of them, and can look on death with a far less terrified gaze” (1.20.100). 
245 “for no man ever had less confidence than I did that he would go on living; and no man ever 
counted less on his life proving long” (1.20.96). 
246 “The usefulness of living lies not in duration but in what you make of it. Some have lived long 
and lived little. See to it while you are still here” (1.20.105). 
247 “Nature leads us by the hand down a gentle slope; little by little, step by step, she engulfs us in 
that pitiful state and breaks us in, so that we feel no jolt when youth dies in us, although in essence 
and in truth that is a harsher death than the total extinction of a languishing life as old age dies” 
(1.20.100). 
248 “dying is without doubt the most noteworthy action in a man’s life… it is hard for anyone to 
believe that he himself has reached that point” (1.13.684). 
249 “It appears to us that the whole universe in some way suffers when we are obliterated and that it 
feels compassion for our predicament” (1.13.684). 
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believe they are endowed with special mental capacities, as well as among the wealthy, 
who believe they are responsible for the lives of many people. Unfortunately, “None of us 
gives enough thought to his being only one” [italics in the original] (1.13.685), that is, just 
another individual among millions of mortals. Here, Montaigne’s writing is self-referential, 
being himself a scholar and wealthy. He is oblivious to the dispositions of the elderly, who 
after leading good lives, have to deal with their painful physical decay and increasing 
loneliness. For the elderly, rather than a sudden visitor, the process of dying is a faithful 
companion. 
 
Montaigne’s obsession with fear of death is also exemplified by his behaviour 
during the plague that desolated Bordeaux. He was ashamed by the way he waited in 
“ecstatic dread” for the evolution of “a slightly sore finger” into the initial symptom of the 
plague (3.12.1186), at a time when his farmers were preparing their own sepulchres with a 
natural acceptance of their destiny. Later in life Montaigne appreciated the greater courage 
of the “common people” (1.14.53), who would die peacefully while putting their affairs in 
order, preaching, conversing with friends and even joking. Dying is a short process, 
perhaps no more than “a quarter of an hour of pain” (3.12.1190), and yet the scholar’s 
preparation for dying is counted in years.250 Montaigne, the scholar, spent years preparing 
himself for death. He tried to obtain through bookish learning the courage that his poor 
farmers obtained spontaneously, accepting death as a fact of life. This remark educates the 
reader in understanding that fear of death is not necessarily tamed by erudition, or 
nowadays, by an increasing collection of psychotherapies, but by the unselfish “matter of 
fact” lifestyle of those that will never figure in prominent places. Friedrich (Friedrich, 1991, 
pp. 258-262) values Montaigne’s insight that it is nature rather than any ethical philosophy 
that can best master the fear of death. By accepting what is natural in life there is no need 
for Stoic straining. 
 
4.8. Montaigne’s therapy of fear 
Nobody should expect a scholarly exposition on the therapy of fear in a text so 
chaotically organized as the Essays, and it is necessary to examine each essay with care to 
                                                 
250 “Most of the teachings which schooling supplies us with to give us courage have more 
ostentation than fortitude and are cultivated more for decoration than for profit” (3.12.1187). 
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gather together Montaigne’s views and advice on how to best treat fear. It is also necessary 
to distinguish suggestions made in the different editions of the essays, as they run in 
parallel with major changes in his philosophical thinking. This complexity of interleaving 
time periods is also a bonus, because, as mentioned earlier, it provides explicit evidence of 
the philosophical evolution of Montaigne’s approach to fear, while at the same time alerting 
the reader to his desire not to erase earlier understandings.251 Because Montaigne went 
through different philosophical periods with influences from different philosophical 
schools, the remedies he suggested are diverse. In the end, his approach provides 
alternatives for people to choose the therapy that agrees best with their personality, an 
approach that thereby refuses dogmatic or one-size-fits-all cures. This is the humanistic 
preservation of the tradition started by Cicero and Seneca of adapting the philosophical 
treatment of fear and distress to each individual using specific remedies (see previous 
chapter). I shall discuss later (Chapter nine) the marked difference between this 
individualised technique and the current medicalised management of fear and anxiety, 
according to which therapies are chosen based on objective but generic psycho-
physiological facts. I shall now examine the main remedies suggested in the Essays. 
 
4.8.1. Premeditation 
In the early essays, Montaigne valued the Stoic exercises of premeditation of future 
misfortunes and of treating death with contempt. At this stage, Montaigne also devalued 
“ordinary people” (1.20.92) since, in his opinion, they were unable to meditate about 
death.252 These people, he thought, froze in panic as soon as the word ‘death’ was 
mentioned, and became irrational when stricken by the “pain and terror” of having been 
diagnosed with an incurable illness (1.20.92).253 Death cannot be ignored, as it may happen 
at any moment and in the most unthinkable ways. Montaigne’s youngest brother, after all, 
died after a blow from a tennis ball! And yet, when distress is absent, ‘ordinary’ people 
                                                 
251 It may also be the case that Montaigne had no firm opinion about the best ‘remedies’ for fear, 
and left different options open. 
252 “but what brutish insensitivity can produce so gross a blindness?” (1.20.92). 
253 This is, as already noted, Montaigne’s concept of the ‘common herd’ in his early essays. Later 
on, after he learned to appreciate the qualities and virtues of common people, Montaigne admired 
their courage and resilience. This transition is a sign of philosophical growth and moral progress. 
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“go…trot…and dance” (1.20.95) oblivious of the final human fate. But “it is madness to 
think that you can succeed [in mastering your fears] that way” (1.20.95) as death will 
eventually catch up with everyone, says Montaigne, plunging everyone into despair. 
Therefore, early in the Essays Montaigne suggests fighting the fear of death using the 
strategy of premeditation: “we must start by providing for [death] earlier” (1.20.95). 
Montaigne suggests getting used to death by constantly thinking about it in the Stoic 
fashion, even “in the midst of joy” (1.20.95).254 Any day could be the last one and we must 
be on guard, given that meditating upon death “beforehand [sic] confers great advantages.” 
255 It is therefore necessary to prepare for reversals of fortune, “practicing future ills in 
comfort” (1.30.272). Montaigne supported the Stoic doctrine that “to practice death is to 
practice freedom” (1.20.96), since only after conquering the fear of death we can live free 
of anxiety and anguish (1.20.101). Therefore, Montaigne practiced continually thinking 
about death, with the aim of “taming” his fears, and avoiding a life of “continual terror and 
frenzy” (1.20.96). He suggested befriending death to the extent of having nothing else in 
mind (1.20.95). Premeditation should not be constrained by too laborious exercise; rather, it 
has to flow naturally as a gentle and not a strenuous practice. Those who become anxious to 
do well will suffer more than they will benefit.256 Montaigne’s premeditation is an 
epiphany of heavenly thoughts. Unless the soul is trained for the moment of death, fear will 
allow no rest. But once the fear is conquered “it is impossible for anxiety, anguish, fear or 
even the slightest dissatisfaction to dwell within her” (1.20.100).  
 
But, personally, beyond advice on how to best conduct premeditation exercises, 
Montaigne himself was living in terror, to the point that he would not be “certain of getting 
back home” if he was just “one league” away (1.20.97).257 And after engaging in the  
                                                 
254 “let us have nothing more often in mind than death. At every instant let us evoke it in our 
imagination under all its aspects” (1.20.95). 
255 “we must therefore educate and train them for their encounter with that adversary, death; for the 
soul can find no rest while she remains afraid of him” (1.20.100). 
256 The anxiety to do well…puts the soul on the rack, break it, and make it impotent” (M. 
Montaigne, 1965 1.10.26, Frame’s translation).  
257 Bakewell states that premeditation did not liberate Montaigne from his fears, but actually served 
to imprison him (Bakewell, 2010, p. 3). 
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strenuous Stoic practice towards happiness, why was the beggar at his door merrier and 
healthier than he was (1.39.273)? In light of these contradictions, Bakewell suggests that 
Montaigne started using the Epicurean method of “diversion” (1.20.104). By means of 
diversion, a fear is re-fashioned into a positive emotion, such as thinking about a sweet past 
event. Bakewell further suggests that it was especially in old age that Montaigne used 
diversion against the fear of ageing and death.  
 
After all the years of reading the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, Montaigne’s 
discovery was that philosophical learning increased his knowledge but did not change his 
feelings and emotions. He could not find in philosophical books a remedy for his fears, a 
good reminder of Cicero’s remark that the philosophical therapy of fear and distress is not 
for every person (see Chapter three).258 Whereas philosophical learning should help in 
arming oneself against future dangers, it may “imprint on our thoughts” (3.12.1176) even 
more fear against which the “subtle arguments” aimed at protecting us are insufficient. As a 
result, Montaigne distanced himself from the Stoics and his earlier support for the method 
of premeditation259 and instead approached the Epicureans, affirming the view that 
“anticipating the injuries of Fortune, depriving ourselves of such good things as are still in 
our grasp” (1.39.272) is inappropriate therapy. At this stage, Montaigne rejected “that 
curious desire to anticipate…and prepare” for every misfortune, even those that “may never 
touch us” (3.12.1187).260 He discovered the importance of self-knowledge for mastering 
emotions, rejecting the “excessive concerns [and] useless thoughts” of philosophical 
maxims (1.3.11). Humans have a rich nature, and yet we have to go “borrowing and 
begging” (3.12.1174); we are greedy for excessive knowledge, which will “cost us dear” 
(3.12.1174), since some of this philosophical knowledge is not nourishment but poison. 
The first book of the Tusculans, devoted to the fear of death, did not help Montaigne face 
death more courageously, but on the contrary, imprinted this fear even deeper. Whereas 
Montaigne was unsuccessfully fighting his fear of death by the rehearsal of maxims and 
                                                 
258 “To produce a good mind you need only a few books” (3.12.1176); and “Books have been useful 
to me less for instruction than as training” (3.12.1176). 
259 “do we ask to be whipped right now…just because it may be that Fortune will, perhaps, make 
you suffer a whipping some day?” (3.12.1189). 
260 “we are hit not only by the bullet but by its bang and its wind!” (3.12.1189). 
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Stoic precepts, his farmers learned from life the courage to face death, from actions that 
“are purer and more unbending than those which we so carefully study in our schools” 
(3.12.1177). Montaigne discovers that philosophy has to imitate what he saw as the natural 
way of life, which will teach us “how we should live and die, manage our goods, love and 
educate our offspring and maintain justice” (3.12.1187). 
 
In conclusion, Montaigne wanted to free himself of fears and worries, and live the 
simple life of his farmers: “Death… [should]…find me planting my cabbages, neither 
worrying about it nor the unfinished gardening” (1.20.99). Montaigne was (apparently) 
ready to die without regrets.261 
 
4.8.2. Acceptance 
At this later stage, Montaigne also considered ‘acceptance’ of one’s own destiny an 
important remedy for fear. Bakewell (Bakewell, 2010, p. 102) suggests that the technique 
of acceptance has its origin in the Stoic ‘amor fati’ (love of fate), conceding to whatever 
destiny brings (1.20.101). To accept the dangers of life and not to resist them is one of the 
most effective protections against fear, and the most conducive attitude to achieve peace of 
mind. During the peak of the war of religions Montaigne’s neighbours fortified their houses 
with strong defences, out of fear of being invaded. This strategy backfired, as those 
fortified mansions became highly suspicious because they were thought to hide treasures. 
Montaigne did not improve his defences “fearing that its strength could be turned against 
me” (2.15.700).262 His château may have been less conspicuous, but was invaded 
nonetheless. With great sangre froid, Montaigne received his assailants without showing, 
he says, a hint of fear and accepting whatever the outcome should be. This made the 
invaders believe there was nothing of value there, and they left. A similar event took place 
when Montaigne was travelling on horseback and was assailed by robbers. He was left 
unscathed after showing a cool and fearless demeanour, simply resigned to his fate. 
 
                                                 
261 “No man has ever prepared to leave the world more simply nor more fully than I have. No one 
has more completely let go of everything than I try to do” (1.20.97) [my italics]. 
262 “The fact that so many protected houses have been lost while this house of mine goes on makes 
me suspect that they were lost precisely because they were protected” (2.15.700).  
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Acceptance of misfortunes and death is a natural condition of life, without the need 
for Cicero’s philosophical artifice of uprooting fears. This explains why Montaigne’s 
farmers died “with as much constancy as the philosopher” (3.12.1176). Montaigne suggests 
there is no great therapeutic value in Stoic exercise or even in learning Epicurean maxims 
(3.12.1177) if the habit of acceptance is not practiced. The best example is again found in 
the “simple people” (3.12.1177), those ignorant of philosophical discourse in whom 
acceptance comes as a natural attribute.263 As eloquently stated by Bakewell “philosophy 
looked more like a way of teaching people to unlearn the natural skill that every peasant 
had by birthright” (Bakewell, 2010, p. 10). After all, in keeping with the realities of the 
time peasants could not expect much from life, not even a long life, and someone in 
Montaigne’s aristocratic position could readily construe from this that they were contented 
with little.264 It is the philosopher, with all his ethical and moral dogmas, who 
paradoxically, it seems, most strongly resisted the idea of death and was in need of 
treatment. Montaigne considered that Seneca’s daily exercises, designed to fortify against 
the fear of death, were a manifestation of non-acceptance of death. In his final years, 
Montaigne welcomed death but without trying to bring it on. He was enjoying each day, 
living in the moment, as I discuss below. He finally accepted death and experienced some 
“pleasure” (3.9.1099) in exploring the ‘feelings’ of dying by letting himself fall into states 
of a “powerful sleep”, devoid of pain or suffering. He just wanted to find a place “entirely 
to my taste” (3.9.1111) where he could die a peaceful death.265  
 
The basis of Montaigne’s acceptance technique was Pyrrhonian scepticism, and the 
use of epokhé or suspension of judgment. According to this sceptical view, the outcomes of 
                                                 
263 “How many country-folk do I see ignoring poverty; how many yearning for death or meeting it 
without panic or distress? That man over there who is trenching my garden has, this morning, 
buried his father or his son” (3.12.1177). 
264 This description seems to idealise and romanticise the behaviour of the ‘lower classes’, but this 
is what Montaigne was contemplating, what he saw in his own estate. Although he cannot know 
what was going on in the minds of his peasants and he employs a clumsy generalisation I believe 
that this image can be read as being used to contrast different human responses to fear and to show 
that fear can be successfully dominated.  
265 “And although it all comes to the same, my imagination can feel a difference as great as life from 
death between jumping into a fiery furnace and into the stream of a smooth river – [C] so absurdly 
does our fear look more at the means than the result” (3.9.1111). 
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many events in life are difficult to foretell, and having fear or hope produces mental 
suffering. Therefore, the Pyrrhonian sceptic achieves ataraxia, or tranquillity, by 
suspending judgment about the eventual outcome of unpredictable events. Even a 
predictably bad outcome may turn out, on some occasions, to be a good. 
 
Montaigne’s famous motto “Que sçais je?” (“What do I know?”) is considered to be 
an expression of his Pyrrhonism (Frame, 1955, p. 75), but Bermúdez Vázquez (Bermúdez 
Vázquez, 2015, pp. 54-62) suggests that the motto implies a search for knowledge, closer to 
those of Socrates and Cicero, over the Pyrrhonian “inevitability of uncertainty” (1.3.13). 
This point is not a mere interpretive dispute, but has therapeutical implications. I believe 
Bermúdez Vázquez is wrong, and that the Essays have many examples where Montaigne 
does not want to commit himself to obtaining knowledge or passing judgment, such as on 
the questions: is it better to live longer? Should death be feared? Is poverty something to be 
shunned? Rather than embarking on a quest for knowledge, Montaigne’s motto is an 
expression of consent, a “why should I know?” that permits immediate acceptance and 
moving on with life. As Bermúdez Vázquez himself acknowledged, the quest for certainty 
produces anxiety, and conceptualizing things as good or bad produce disquietude. 
Montaigne does not want to know; he wants to live.266 
 
4.8.3. Living in the present 
In his early essays, Montaigne discussed the notion that fear and worrying are a 
worse torture than the dreaded misfortune. He begins the essay, appropriately entitled “Our 
emotions get carried away beyond us” (1.3.11), by praising those who criticise the tendency 
to “always gape towards the future” (1.3.11) without enjoying the present.267 He calls this 
                                                 
266 Hartle (Hartle, 2013, p. 17) also believes in a more opinionated than a non-judgmental 
Montaigne, stressing that throughout the Essays Montaigne constantly makes judgments of all sorts. 
This is certainly true, except for the questions that obsessed Montaigne the most: the fears of 
sickness poverty and death. When discussing Montaigne’s scepticism in relation to Sextus 
Empiricus, Bermúdez Vazquez remarks that “philosophical speculation leads only to confusion 
because of the inevitability of uncertainty. It produces anxiety rather than peace of mind” (p. 17). 
Similarly, Montaigne “presents a living philosophy for a living philosopher, an undogmatic an 
unsystematic philosophy” (p. 17). 
267 “Fear, desire, hope, impel us towards the future; they rob us of feelings and concern for what 
now is, in order to spend time over what will be – even when we ourselves shall be no more” 
(1.3.11). 
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tendency an “aberration”, but acknowledges that it is produced by “Nature herself” (1.3.11) 
on behalf of self-preservation. In later additions to this essay, Montaigne acknowledged that 
we have to fight this instinct by concentrating our attention in the present while ignoring 
past and future; otherwise “we are never ‘at home’: we are always outside ourselves” 
(1.3.11).268 The technique for living in the present requires first developing self-knowledge, 
that is, awareness of one’s emotions and the capacity to work on them, as well as the 
understanding that most external objects and events are not within our power. It also 
requires mastering one’s thoughts, focusing on the present and doing what is strictly 
necessary, whilst ignoring any superfluous projects. There is no dwelling in the past or 
worrying about the future, and, apparently neither guilt nor fear. 
 
Montaigne also considered that living in the present requires the capacity for caring 
for oneself. Living in a state of “anxiety about the future” (1.3.11) and having “excessive 
concerns” only increases our vulnerability in the present. Staying in the present also 
requires avoiding boredom, given that idleness leads to our concentration drifting into fears 
and preoccupations.269 In this situation Montaigne recommends writing down those 
grotesque imaginations that we think about when idle and bored. Thus, when we read them 
later, we feel ashamed of ourselves and our ridiculous fears. Furthermore, keeping a diary 
with our fears will teach us how many fears have no foundation and consistency and how 
much we have suffered in vain. Eventually, late in life, Montaigne learned how to be fully 
in the present, and he closes the Essays thus: “When I dance, I dance. When I sleep, I sleep; 
and when I am strolling alone through a beautiful orchard, although part of the time my 
thoughts are occupied by other things, for part of the time too I bring them back to the 
walk, to the orchard, to the delight in being alone there, and to me” (3.12.1258). 
 
  
                                                 
268 This has obvious Buddhist resonances, and may be related to Montaigne’s admiration of 
Pyrrhonism, which has many affinities with Eastern thought (Beckwith, 2015). Pyrrho’s main 
concepts as reported by Sextus Empiricus had been translated into French about 20 years before the 
first edition of the Essays (see (Calhoun, 2015). 
269 “If we do not keep [our mind] busy with some particular subject… [the thoughts will] …charge 
ungovernably about, ranging to and fro over the wastelands of our thoughts” (1.8.30). 
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4.8.4. The force of habits 
Montaigne wrote that one of the reasons the Spartans did not fear death was because 
they were used to it. The graveyards were outside the temples, so that children became 
accustomed to see the dead “without feeling terror” (1.20.98). He complains that in his time 
everything related to death was being concealed from the public, giving the impression that 
death was something unusual (1.20.99). Montaigne considered that creating the habit of 
accepting mortality and of facing fearful situations would be instrumental in reducing fear. 
For him, the remedy of habit creation is better than “the whole of philosophy” (1.23.129). 
On the other hand, and following Epictetus, Montaigne suggested that other habits are not 
so helpful, such as becoming too attached to family, property, and health. After reaching 
‘old’ age, Montaigne suggested that we seek a “room, just for ourselves” (1.39.269) where 
away from daily restrictions we can read and meditate about living in the present, in 
loneliness, “as though we had no wife, no children, no possessions, no followers, no 
menservants” (1.39.269).270 Showing some prejudices against the values of community 
engagement and solidarity, Montaigne’s withdrawn attitude strongly resonates with the 
Epicurean ‘living unnoticed’.271 Montaigne recommends that we must meditate on what is 
good for us, which requires “disentangling” (1.38.271) ourselves from demanding 
relationships. These are “violent traps” which do not allow reflection on what is truly good 
for us. It is only by meditating about our emotional weaknesses that we can provide 
ourselves with adequate medicines for our fears and worries.272 We should reflect on 
having an occupation “neither toilsome nor painful” (1.39.273) which depends on our 
capacity to work peacefully. Solitude will also allow us to search for faith in God, which 
will provide the best way of life.273 Thus, in case of misfortunes, we may always have the 
resources to find refuge in the strength of our inner life. This strategy is different from that 
                                                 
270 “old men withdraw from affairs, both civil and military, living as they please without being 
bound to any definite duties” (1.39.272).  
271 Montaigne’s purported unnoticed way of life was only partially true, since while trying to stay 
away from the daily nuisance at his chateau, he would eagerly seek the company of the few erudite 
Montaigne had in esteem to engage in conversation, and more reluctantly, work for the king on 
political missions. 
272 “if you know yourself subject to some grave affliction, equip yourself with medicines to benumb 
and deaden the part concerned” (1.39.273). 
273 “The greatest thing in the world is to know how to live to yourself” (1.39.273). 
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of the bookish scholar, who works continuously in isolation because he is unable to enjoy 
the present moment.274  
 
Montaigne said that he had a “hard skin”, or as contemporary parlance would have 
it, a thick skin, against violent emotions (1.2.10). However, it was by self-examination and 
meditation that he was able to achieve that strength. But how hard Montaigne’s skin 
actually was may be questionable, as he says that “the sight of another man’s suffering 
produces physical suffering in me…A persistent cough tickles my lungs and my 
throat…when I contemplate an illness I seize upon it and lodge it within myself” 
(1.21.109). 
 
The question remains as to how successful Montaigne was in taming his fears. Even 
in the last essays Montaigne was feeling distressed about minor mishaps; his mind stuck to 
the problem at hand. This led to a state of inertia that Montaigne was unable to control, in 
which his worries continued to grow.275 As discussed earlier, Montaigne was prone to 
catastrophizing, a manifestation of a personality that could not accept a minor setback. 
 
4.8.5. Self-examination 
Alone in his garret Montaigne embarked in an exercise of self-examination. He 
discovered how disturbed he was by his emotional instability (2.1.377), and the variability 
in his psychological attributes. He examined himself from different perspectives and found 
in himself “every sort of contradiction” (2.1.377). He felt either fearful or courageous, 
depending on the combination of his own personality and the context, and he made 
progress in discovering differences in the way he reacted to fearful situations: “the most 
universal article of my own logic is DISTINGUO”276 (capitals in the original) (2.1.377). 
                                                 
274 “And this man over here, rheumy, filthy and blear-eyed, whom you can see coming out of his 
work-room at midnight! Do you think he is looking in his books for ways to be better, happier, 
wiser? Not a bit. He will teach posterity how to scan a verse of Plautus and how to spell a Latin 
word, or else die in the attempt” (1.39.270). 
275 “once my face is turned towards chagrin, no matter how silly the cause which brought me to be 
so, I goad my humour in that direction. Thereafter it nourishes itself, provoking itself under its own 
impetus, drawing to itself and piling up matter upon matter on which to feed” (3.9.1076). 
276 This is clarified in a footnote by Screech (M. Montaigne, 2003) as “I make a distinction,” a term 
used in formal debates to reject or modify an opponent’s assertion. 
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This mental exercise of noting differences, rather than forcing oneself into a unique way of 
feeling emotions or responding to given situations, is very innovative and liberating. 
Unfortunately, Montaigne did not provide any more details about his DISTINGUO, except 
his confession that he accepted his virtues and defects after examining them in a very 
honest way. 
 
What is the role of philosophy in Montaigne’s self-examination, and how successful 
was philosophical analysis in taming his fears? Montaigne is sceptical that this technique 
can properly deal with emotional problems, stating that it may only be useful for those who 
are already “in control” of their souls (emotions and mind) (2.12.619). But even a 
philosopher may become a “madman” when afflicted by strong emotions, bodily injuries, 
and “gastric vapours” that confuse the soul. Montaigne’s progress in self-examination 
allowed him to accept that he was unable to control external events. He remarks that he is 
able to control his emotions, a doubtful confession given that he also admitted to being 
anguished by suspense, “torn between fear and hope” (2.17.731). Also, as already 
discussed, Montaigne was annoyed by minor upsets, and was unable to tolerate doubt and 
fear (2.17.732).  But this emotional instability was due to the mutability of contexts and 
personal events inherent to human life.277 Montaigne had varying views on himself, his 
soul twisting in different directions. Thus, “every sort of contradiction can be found in me” 
(2.1.377), including drastic changes in mood and behaviour. His DISTINGUO was a 
symbol of his attention to differences and changes in human emotions. 
 
4.9. Dying without fear 
Dying without fear was for Montaigne one of his major challenges for, as we have 
seen, he was obsessed with death. In his late essays, he stressed that an important mistake 
of philosophers is to confound death as the “End” of living, with death being simply the 
end of a biological cycle (3.12.1190). For Montaigne, “How to die” [italics in the original] 
is no more than a section of a bigger chapter on “How to Live” (3.12.1190). If we manage 
to learn how to live with equanimity and mental tranquillity, death will be peaceful. Against 
Cicero and the Platonic tradition, Montaigne eventually came to the view that a life tortured 
                                                 
277 “anyone who turns his prime attention on himself will hardly ever find himself in the same state 
twice” (2.1.377). 
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by premeditation cannot teach us how to die peacefully. The challenge is therefore, not how 
best to prepare for death, but how to live a more fulfilled life.278 Montaigne suggested a life 
with no sophistications, of always striving for simplicity and respecting different personal 
tastes and habits. People should be educated following “differing routes, to what is good for 
them, each according to their nature” (3.12.1190).  
 
But when life is unbearable and everything fails, suicide becomes an option. The 
Stoics accepted suicide in a few circumstances such as irreversible illness, extreme poverty, 
social degradation and ostracism. The option of suicide and having no fear about it, reduces 
the fear of suffering from those calamities. Montaigne, following the Stoic lead, condoned 
suicide, although his position seems at times contradictory. In the essay entitled “A custom 
of the Isle of Cea” Montaigne presented the Stoic doctrine on suicide with approval: “death 
[by suicide] is the prescription for all our ills” (2.3.393).279 Living in anguish is a sign of 
cowardice, and there is no difference between one’s life ending or ending one’s life 
(2.3.393). Even when “enjoying good fortune” (2.3.393), we are responsible for deciding 
when it is time for us to depart from life. This initial posture in favour of suicide seems to 
be rapidly dismissed by citing Christian texts condemning suicide. It is only up to God to 
decide about the end of life, and those who are stronger will fight adversity and misfortunes 
since “life is our being and our all” (2.3.396). But after this religious interlude Montaigne 
subtly returns to a defence of suicide, claiming that although it is uncertain what life events 
justify suicide, this is “a reasonable exodus” (2.3.397).  
 
Before concluding this section, I would like to take stock on Montaigne’s therapy of 
fear. Montaigne stated that everybody can see him reflected in his book as well as his book 
reflected in him. The meaning of this is that for Montaigne the writing of the Essays was a 
therapy which helped him mature as a scholar as well as a person. He grew with the book in 
difficult times of wars and the plague. The Essays discuss many fearful and 
                                                 
278 “Life must be its own objective, its own purpose. Its right concern is to rule itself, govern itself, 
put up with itself” (3.12.1190). 
279 “It comes to the same thing if a man makes an end to himself or passively accepts it; whether he 
runs to meet his last day or simply awaits it; wherever death comes from, it is always his death” 
(2.3.393). 
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horrific events, but also ‘showed the fly out of the bottle’, as Wittgenstein would later put it 
(Wittgenstein, 2001; 309),280 by providing examples of great courage, thus indirectly 
teaching how to face great fears and stressful life events. Moreover, Montaigne also 
discussed explicit therapies of fear as described above. But there is another dimension from 
which we can learn a great amount about how to deal with fear, and this is conveyed at a 
second level, in Montaigne’s own life. Montaigne, as we have seen, was haunted by fears 
of all sorts, to the extreme that the best therapy, which he followed until a few years before 
his death, was the remedy of ‘ignorance.’ Basically, he did not want to be told about any 
problems occurring in his household, not even minor ones. What is strange about this great 
difficulty in facing fear is that Montaigne was well trained in Stoicism, Scepticism and 
Epicureanism, but none of these Hellenistic philosophies was able to reduce his strong 
tendency to fear. He is certainly inconsistent in his narration of his own fears, with sections 
in which he recognizes all types of fears and how he is paralysed by them, and sections 
when he claims to be free of this malady. For his readers, this is therapeutic in itself, as we 
can reflect ourselves in the Essays. Our own fears, waxing and waning but never totally 
dominated, push us in pursue of any treatment available. Currently, we have an assortment 
of therapies for fears, from the orthodox psychotropic medication, to a rainbow of 
psychotherapies, alternative medicines, oriental philosophy and meditation, among others. 
In this context, it is not surprising to see the ‘self-help’ sections of bookstores being the 
most visited shelves. In other words, we may see ourselves reflected in Montaigne’s own 
fears, since he had so many of them. And we may also see ourselves, like Montaigne, in 
pursuit of a therapy that may be helpful, and varying with time and circumstances. We may 
certainly criticise the inconsistency of Montaigne’s approach, but many generations during 
five centuries since his Essays were published have been inspired by Montaigne’s text. He 
was able to find the appropriate way to talk to his readers, by conversing about himself, 
showing with brutal honesty not only his intimate fears and their embarrassing 
consequences, but sharing the variety of therapies he tried, and his fluctuating states 
between feeling fully healed and accepting that his fears had no ultimate solution. 
 
                                                 
280 The number following the year corresponds to the remark in Philosophical Investigations. 
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4.10. Conclusion 
Montaigne’s Essays is a work of major importance for the philosophy of fear. Fear 
was one of the main problems in the life of this great humanist and philosopher, and his 
analysis and treatment of the emotion is unique because he was among the first 
philosophers to openly discuss his own fears and the variety of philosophical therapies he 
used – sometimes successfully, sometimes not – to subdue them. The first step in the 
therapy resides in reading about these fears and understanding that we are not alone in this 
suffering, in the same way that Montaigne found therapeutic value in writing about his 
fears. Reading and writing have an important cathartic value. The second step of 
premeditation was initially considered by Montaigne as having great value. By constantly 
thinking about the worst outcome of a potential misfortune we believe we shall tame the 
impact of the mishap if this occurs. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
engaging in premeditation is nothing but a particular way of manifesting fear.  
 
Montaigne considered Epicurean therapy to be clearly more useful. Live with little, 
have few expectations and no ambitions, dwell in sweet memories in times of suffering, and 
above all ‘live unnoticed,’ as Montaigne tried to do by secluding himself in his garret. But 
this strategy did not work either, as during the long periods of reflection, he was invaded by 
all sorts of monstrous thoughts. Montaigne found a more viable alternative in the sceptical 
Pyrrhonian tradition. His dogmatic approach to life started to fade, and he found peace of 
mind in the alternative of remaining uncommitted to life events. Yes, things could look bad, 
but the outcome could be good. Death itself may not be so tragic an event as is experienced 
in his near-death experience and the sweetness of falling asleep after a tiring day. The 
Essays express an open-minded, particularistic and anti-dogmatic approach to life and that 
is a big part of the appeal of the text. ‘What do I know?’, his motto, reflects his open-
mindedness and receptiveness to improving his emotional well-being and increasing his 
knowledge and joy of life, by accepting his life as it enfolds. 
 
Less than fifty years later the humanist tradition lost most of its influence, unable to 
hold its own against the new science. The Cartesian revolution, its philosophical 
counterpart, will present emotions in a mostly mechanistic way, something predicted by 
Montaigne when he referred to “the chop-logic which has captured all the [philosophical] 
approaches” (1.26.179). Fear is reduced to interactions between soul and body, and mainly 
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explained in neuro-mechanical terms. This dramatic change in understandings of fear will 




Thomas Hobbes and fear: the political use of a human emotion 
 
 
  Of all passions, that which enclineth men least to break the Lawes, is fear.  
Nay...it is the onely thing… that makes men keep them.  
Leviathan, 2.27.464 (Hobbes, 1996) 
 
 The origin of all great and lasting societies lay not in mutual human benevolence but in 
men’s mutual fear” 




Montaigne masterfully described the diversity of human fears and their origin, and 
provided advice on how to deal with them based on his personal experience. Montaigne 
speaks to the individual, to the afflicted person, and only wrote about the connection 
between fears and society at large when discussing the ravages of war or the torturing of 
people in public, which he detested (see Chapter four). What is missing in Montaigne is a 
discussion of how social structures, such as absolutist governments and the whims of 
sovereigns silenced, by the use of force, any possibility of expression of civil discontent.281 
Montaigne’s world was one of inner analysis of how to come to terms with one’s fear of 
death, rarely discussing the types and causes of social fears.  Sixty years after the 
publication of Montaigne’s Essays, the English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes 
(1586-1679) published Leviathan,282 a work with important insights concerning the social 
                                                 
281 His city of Bordeaux was heavily punished by the king of France after the citizens revolted 
against an increase in the salt tax. 
282 In keeping with previous editions, the Oxford version used in this chapter (Hobbes, 1996) 
numbers each head paragraph with a new run of Arabic numerals for each chapter. Thus “1.15.34” 
means Part 1, chapter 15, head 34. 
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and political aspects of fear.283 Hobbes is not much interested in the details of individual 
fears, but rather in explaining fear as the crucial human emotion when it comes to 
understanding the origin of social institutions. Hobbes, like Montaigne, lived at a time of 
religious wars and was witness to major civil and religious turmoil. Hobbes’s reaction to 
social chaos was to propose a solid political system that would prevent social unrest, a 
system based on fear, and more specifically on the fear of violent death. Hobbes’s most 
influential work, Leviathan (published in 1651, when he was 63 years of age) discusses the 
organization of a civil state at a time when England was in the midst of a civil war and 
Hobbes, himself, was exiled in Paris. The main argument of the book is that without a 
government with the power to enforce a legal system, the life of the citizens will be sordid, 
full of fears of becoming victims of a violent death, and with no hope of developing science 
and culture. 
 
This chapter will examine the dynamic interaction between individual fear and 
social practices. I will first analyse how his understanding of individual fear of a violent 
death and anxiety about future misfortunes led Hobbes to propose a civil state ruled by a 
powerful sovereign, “a mortal God” (the Leviathan) with the capacity to decide on both 
civil and religious matters. Secondly, I will argue that a powerful state does not help to 
reduce human fears and anxieties; rather it only modifies the characteristics of fear, from 
those of an acute emotion related to the danger of imminent death, to a subtler one, a state 
of chronic anxiety related to the punishments that await those not abiding by the dictates of 
the sovereign. Thirdly, I will discuss Hobbes’s reference in Leviathan to the myth of 
Prometheus and to the Book of Job, the first as a metaphor about the sufferings of those 
who live focused on the future, and the second as an allegory for what awaits those who 
defy the power of the Leviathan. Finally, I will analyse the conflict between 
institutionalised religion and the Hobbesian commonwealth for a monopoly on one of the 
main societal pillars: the fear of death.284 
                                                 
283 In his book on fear, Corey Robin considers Hobbes as the philosopher who formulated the most 
coherent political account of fear, as well as a “great visionary” on the problem of social and 
political fear (Robin, 2004, p. 29). 
284 I have mainly examined Leviathan, but also made reference to other works from Hobbes 
whenever relevant for conceptual clarity. 
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5.2. Hobbes: a story of an anxious life 
This dissertation is not specifically about the influence of the personal life of 
philosophers in their works, but for Hobbes, like Cicero, Seneca and Montaigne before him, 
biographical details seem to have a large influence on his thought. It would be 
counterproductive to ignore the strong influence of political upheaval during Hobbes’s life, 
as well as what we know of his own personal characteristics in his political writings. 
Pointing wryly himself to this influence in his autobiographical poem, Hobbes noted that 
his life was marked by fear while still in utero. His mother was pregnant when the mighty 
Spanish Armada was on its way to England, spreading terror on the population. Thus: 
 
For fame had rumour’d, than Fleet at Sea, 
Wou’d cause our Nations Catastrophe; 
And hereupon it was my Mother Dear 
Did bring forth Twins at once, both Me, and Fear  
(Martinich, 1999, p. 2)  
 
Hobbes’s life was also marked by the fear of imprisonment, poverty, and 
assassination. He had to flee different countries on several occasions, and his books were 
burnt in public. He claims that he only found some solace at the end of his long life: 
 
I’ve now completed my Eighty four year, 
And Death approaching, prompts me not to fear. 
(Martinich, 1999, p. 356) 
 
Hobbes had a sad childhood, with a violent and alcoholic father who eventually 
abandoned his family in poverty. Hobbes was frightened by the plague that affected Oxford 
when he was studying there, and being of a weak constitution, he was the target of abuse by 
peers. Hobbes was also frightened by the religious wars that were ravaging Europe. In one 
of his earliest writings he warned Englishmen visiting Rome to pass unnoticed and to 
refrain from discussing religious matters or even speaking English to avoid the risk of 
being sent to the Inquisition (Martinich, 1999). In 1640 one of Hobbes’s early writings 
upset the English parliament, and fearing for his life, he fled England for the Continent. 




Both fear and power are the driving forces behind Hobbes’s politico-philosophical 
works, and fear had primacy over any other emotion in his writings (Pettit, 2008, p. 99). 
Hobbes wrote that fear was the origin of religions, and in Leviathan he defined religion as 
“Feare, of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed” 
(1.6.86). Given this and other anti-religious statements, it is not surprising that Hobbes was 
harshly criticised by Roman Catholics and Protestants alike—reason for further fear. In 
1683 copies of both De Cive and Leviathan were burnt by the public hangman in Oxford, as 
these works were considered heretical and blasphemous, and a danger to both church and 
state. Hobbes came under investigation by the English Parliament for atheism and was 
accused of treason by his former friends (Martinich, 1999). He lived under the fear of life 
imprisonment or exile until the end of his life (Martinich, 1999).  
 
Besides political dangers, Hobbes was obsessively concerned with his health to the 
point of becoming a valetudinarian (Mintz, 1970, p. 19). He was extremely methodical in 
his habits, exercising on a regular basis and singing popular songs with the idea of 
improving his lung capacity (Martinich, 1999, p. 294). As summarized by Martinich in his 
biography of Hobbes, “much of Hobbes’s life had been a struggle for survival...Much of 
what he did was motivated by fear” (p.357).  
 
5.3. Leviathan 
Leviathan is considered one of the most important texts ever written on political 
philosophy (Newey, 2014, p. 1). The main themes pertain to individual safety, political 
strife and social instability, and the role of religion in social life. Leviathan was written in 
the middle of the 17th century in the context of wars ravaging Europe. Several countries, 
such as Holland, experienced major civil conflicts which ended with the assassination of 
political leaders (Harrison, 2003, p. 9), and by the time Leviathan was published, Hobbes 
was in exile in Paris due to being on the ‘wrong’ side of the English civil war. After the 
English king was executed, “nothing was safe or certain” (Harrison, 2003, p. 10). As 
Harrison points out, Leviathan was written to answer the deep challenges of civil turmoil 
and war, and to provide a philosophical-political analysis of how individual and social fears 
are crucial elements for the constitution of strong civil regimes which Hobbes personified 
in the shape of the biblical monster, the Leviathan.  
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The “terrible” power of the Leviathan was already manifest in the frontispiece of 
the first edition of the book, which included a banner with a paragraph from Job 41:31-4: 
“There is no power over earth that compares to him”, the Leviathan, “a creature without 
fear...king over all the sons of pride”. The Leviathan is presented in the Introduction as a 
being created not in a natural way like humans, but artificially, as “the great LEVIATHAN 
called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE” (Leviathan pp. 12-13), aimed at protecting all 
citizens within the community. ‘Sovereignty’ is the “artificial soul” that gives life to the 
Leviathan, whose body is composed of magistrates working as “artificial joints”; the 
mechanism of providing rewards and punishments constitute the “nerves”; the strength of 
the monster is “wealth and riches”; the safety of the citizens is the Leviathan’s occupation; 
its “memory system” is in charge of providing counsel and advice, whereas its “reason and 
will” provide a legal system which determines health and death. The members of the 
Leviathan are fastened by contracts and covenants,285  
 
In Leviathan Hobbes speculated that human societies evolved from a primitive 
“state of nature”, in which humans lived devoid of laws and social organisation, pursuing a 
self-interested life while trying to avoid a violent death. Given the high risk of death in the 
hands of other fellow-humans, and motivated by fear, individuals organised themselves in a 
Commonwealth governed by a powerful and absolute ruler.286 Hobbes considered this 
political order as the only possibility for providing the necessary safety for scientific and 
social progress. The Leviathan (Commonwealth) will reciprocate for civil obedience by 
assuring the rights of property, of self-preservation, and by providing a more contented life. 
I will now discuss the elements central to the process of social organization described in 




                                                 
285 Contracts refer to the transfer of individual rights to the Leviathan, with the assumption that 
citizens will obtain safety in return. The promise of reciprocal benefits between citizens and state 
constitute a covenant (Hobbes, 1889) (Elements 1.8-9). 
286 As noted by Kavka (Kavka, 1986, p. 80) fear of death is a “vital premise” for Hobbes’s 
argumentation about anarchy and the state. 
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5.4. The state of nature: from individual to social fears 
Hobbes describes the state of nature as the condition in which humans live in a 
condition without laws or government, having to fight for survival (Newey, 2014, p. 1). 
Life in the state of nature is characterised by insecurity, where human behaviour is 
dominated by the instinct of self-preservation. Hobbes considered that mutual aggression 
among humans is the result of natural and insatiable appetites (Hobbes, 1889) (Elements 
I.14.11), and the emotion of irrational vanity, which he termed “vainglory.” The only 
defence available to an individual comes from that individual’s own powers, and scarcity of 
resources leads to war of all against all. In this context, when individuals are dominated by 
the need to defend themselves against others, there is no pleasure in life. There is also no 
culture, given that people are preoccupied with increasing their physical power and 
protecting their belongings. Life is short, there is no society that can protect the individual, 
and violent death is frequent as crime is rife.287 In this context, humans become acutely 
aware of their mortality which engenders a state of anxiety (Ahrensdorf, 2000, p. 580), a 
chronic suffering which can only be tamed by a powerful ruler. Other examples of the state 
of nature are not so gloomy, and propose a collective arrangement in which people could be 
in peace in the context of fewer fears, where people would help rather than attack each 
other.288  
 
Hobbes’s understanding of the state of nature was strongly criticised by 
contemporary critics, but according to Schochet (Schochet, 1967, p. 428) these critics were 
                                                 
287 In the state of nature people “avoid that which is hurtful; but most of all that terrible enemy of 
nature, death” (Elements I.14.6). It is interesting that here, Hobbes seems to consider any death as 
an enemy of nature, like a target to be vanquished, rather than a natural and irreversible event. This 
use of rhetoric, I believe, helps to construe fear of death as the most catastrophic event of human 
life. In other words, if death is rationally considered as the end of life, it can be accepted by some 
without much fear, such as in the case of the Stoics of antiquity. On the other hand, Hobbes 
considers death (or at least violent death) as an enemy to be avoided. 
288 Examples, proposing a mythical “golden age” of civilization abound in the works of many 
philosophers, from Seneca to Suarez (Zagorin, 2009). The Sophists considered the laws of nature as 
a remedy against a despotic ruler (Chroust, 1975). For them, the best justice was in accord to physis, 
or nature, as against nomos, or positive law. The Sophists criticised the use of positive law to the 
advantage of those in power. Antiphon the Orator (discourse On Concord) proposed a pact between 
warring factions based not on compulsion but on early training in social demeanour (Chroust, 
1975). Others, like Iamblichus, considered that a legal system is necessary to avoid tyranny and to 
reduce poverty, promote work and avoid wars (Chroust, 1975). Any later social contract 
philosophers, like Locke and Rousseau, had more benign understandings of the state of nature. 
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wrongly interpreting Hobbes’s state of nature as a real historical account when in fact it 
was just “a logical and reductionist device” to demonstrate the need for an absolute 
government. Hobbes suggested three arguments against the state of nature being a 
‘peaceful’ state. First, he considered that life has no final goal, and that the essence of life is 
being in constant motion towards different desires.289 There is no finis ultimus, and each 
individual moves and fights for their own aims and objectives, the main one being to 
preserve their own life. Second, Hobbes posited that living a fulfilled life not only implies 
enjoyment in the present, but also the certainty of having pleasure in the future.290 This 
creates anxiety, as in the state of nature nothing is assured when the only certainty is daily 
danger.291 This need for pleasure and safety generates a “restlesse desire of Power after 
power, that ceaseth onely in Death” (Leviathan 1.11.2).292 Third, humans are the result of 
their natural attributes and education. They have different personalities and intellectual 
capacities, resulting in different opinions and the concomitant risk of conflict. But what is 
common to humans is the desire for power and safety, and in the quest for these elements, 
physical, emotional and intellectual differences become balanced, as people are equal in the 
threat they pose to each other (Bagby, 2009, p. 103). For instance, not everybody is 
vainglorious, seeking wealth and honours, but in the state of nature the righteous are unable 
to live peacefully given their ignorance of the intentions of others in a context of scarcity, 
the state of nature becoming a state of constant war. Conflict is unavoidable and the only 
way of stopping the state of war is by the controlling power of a strong sovereign (Bagby, 
2009, p. 101). 
 
                                                 
289 "For there is no such Finis Ultimus (utmost aim) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest good) …Felicity 
is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another…” (Leviathan 1.11.2), "for as to 
have no desire, is to be dead" (Leviathan 1.8.35). 
290 “That the object of man’s desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for once instant of time; but to 
assure forever, the way of his future desire” (Leviathan 1.11.2). 
291 Hobbes’ concept of anxiety is of an indefinite worry for the future (the “Anxiety of the time to 
come” (Leviathan, Section 2, Religion, 52), whereas fear is defined as an “Aversion with opinion of 
Hurt from the object (Leviathan 1.6.25) (italics in the original). 
292 And the famous corollary, that in the state of nature the life of humans is "solitary, poore, nasty, 
brutish, and short" (Leviathan 1.13.62). 
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Hobbes suggested that all humans in the state of nature have equal capacities, 
although their attributes may differ. Thus, a physically weak person is compensated by a 
cleverer mind compared with that of a stronger person.293 In the state of nature humans are 
equal in their abilities, in needs and desires, and in fears and anxiety, as they desire the 
same objects and have similar capacities to obtain them (Mintz, 1970, p. 31). With 
resources being finite and scarce, there is constant competition for power, and the 
"contention, enmity and war" (Leviathan 1.11.3) is the expression of the fight to subdue 
one another. In this condition, the main fears are the fear of a violent death and the fear of 
being oppressed by others. These fears are the chief reason why people are willing to 
submit to a powerful ruler, a Leviathan, bringing order by way of its capacity to enforce 
protective laws. 
 
5.4.1. Criticism of Hobbes’s state of nature 
There are some obvious difficulties with Hobbes’s account of the state of nature. In 
the first place, he had no empirical evidence to propose a “nasty” and “brutish” state of 
nature.  However, he had a political reason, given the violent events of the English 
revolution and the need to put a limit on the chaos engendered by rebellion. If a warring 
state of nature never existed, it had to be invented to justify the construction of the 
Leviathan. Hobbes had to create the notion of a context of chronic fear of a violent death to 
make individuals’ submission to an all-powerful sovereign plausible. 
 
The arguments supporting a bleak state of nature are also questionable. We may 
accept that for the non-believer life may not have an ultimate goal, and that some people 
often seek assurances about the future, though the notion that these traits are common to all 
individuals is far from convincing. But the third argument concerning the inherent equality 
of individuals is even more questionable: what does it mean for humans to be “equal”? 
Hobbes himself stated in the Introduction to Leviathan that whereas humans have the same 
type of emotions, they differ in the objects that trigger these emotions. Some people have 
fear of death, whereas for the vainglorious, death is less relevant than achieving power and 
                                                 
293 “…there is no reason why any man, trusting to his own strength, should conceive himself made 
by nature above others. They are equals, who can do equal things one against the other” (Hobbes, 
1972) (De Cive 1.3). 
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honours. Hobbes suggested that the pattern of humans’ emotional responses depends on 
both intrinsic and extrinsic factors, such as the psychological constitution of the individual, 
their education, and their social context. In Elements (1.14.3) Hobbes stressed the “great 
difference” among humans in terms of their leading emotions, with some being “vainly 
glorious,” regardless of the strength of their objective powers, and others being “moderate” 
in their desires. Nevertheless, for the Hobbesian state of nature to function, all humans have 
to be similar in mind and body, since all have to develop a similarly intense fear of death 
(Gold & Pearce, 2015, p. 187).  
 
There is here another interesting contrast between Montaigne and Hobbes’s 
concepts of human nature. Montaigne’s Essays (M. Montaigne, 2003) provides examples of 
numerous psychological changes in different people, across different stages in life and 
under different circumstances, whereas Hobbes suggests a more mechanistic human whose 
behaviour and emotions are determined by universal scientific laws. The scientifically 
styled discourse of Hobbes, such as the regularity of putative laws, depends on regularities 
in human behavioural and emotional responses to contextual stimuli. This concept of 
homogeneity and regularity of human behaviour is a necessary factor for the plausibility of 
universal acceptance of living under the laws of a strong sovereign, which will in return 
remove the fear of living in social anarchy and of a violent death. This uniformity of human 
life, however, is apparently not available in the state of nature, since life in this state is 
complicated by the fact that, according to Hobbes, human behaviour can be difficult to 
predict.294 Quite often, human actions have inscrutable reasons, given the tendency to 
deceive, to rely too much on others, or to be frightened by multiple causes. To understand 
human reasons, says Hobbes, “is to decipher without a key" (Leviathan, Introduction, p.20). 
It is the complexity of human behaviour as a result of causes not always easy to understand 
that makes the state of nature so unpredictable and dangerous. This inscrutable human 
behaviour will complicate the maintenance of civil order under the Leviathan, since to rule 
a commonwealth effectively, the sovereign has to understand the actions of "not this, or 
                                                 
294 "the characters of man's heart, blotted and confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, 
counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are eligible onely to him that searcheth hearths" (Leviathan, 
Introduction, p.20). 
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that particular man; but Man-kind: which thought it be hard to do, harder than to learning 
any language, or Science" (Leviathan, Introduction, p.18). 
 
5.5. The rights of nature 
According to Hobbes, in the state of nature, humans have the right to defend 
themselves, and this right to preserve one’s life is the principal right of nature.  Hobbes 
based this right of self-preservation on empirical factors, such as the instinct for self-
preservation and fear of death.295 Other rights of nature are the rights to freedom and to 
social equality. Individuals have the right to be free from oppression and to defend their 
lives by killing if necessary.296 As Zagorin (Zagorin, 2009, p. 28) clearly states: “For 
Hobbes, natural rights are not the creation of natural law but a primordial entitlement 
grounded in the most basic instinct and reasonable desire of human nature, the passion and 
wish to go on living.” 
 
5.6. The laws of nature 
Hobbes defined a law of nature as “a Precept, or general rule, found out by Reason, 
by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the 
means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best 
preserved” (Leviathan 1.14.64). In other words, the rules of nature are rational rules of life 
with moral content that pre-exist civil legislation enacted by governments. As remarked by 
Hobbes, the laws of nature, rather than ‘laws’ in their judicial connotation, are “theorems” 
concerning self-preservation (Leviathan 1.15.80).  
 
According to Zagorin, Hobbes’s conception of the laws of nature should be 
understood against the Platonic and Sophist tradition of separating nature, which is 
universally normative and permanent, from nomos, which as already mentioned, is a set of 
customs that consist of what is variable and different in human legal practices (Zagorin, 
                                                 
295 The right of nature is “the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the 
preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of his own life, and consequently of doing anything 
which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto” 
(Hobbes, 1972) (De Cive 1.7). 
296 “Therefore the first foundation of natural Right is this, that every man as much as in him lies 
endeavour to protect his life and members” (De Cive 1.7). 
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2009, p. 5). In contrast, for Hobbes, the laws of nature operate like a covenant or contract 
arrived at by all humans due to the desire of self-preservation. It is the fear of death that 
will unite people in curbing their desires and accepting a common sovereign (Johnston, 
1986, p. 46). Hobbes proposed twenty laws of nature aimed at promoting safe and 
productive social practices, as well as harmonizing the individual interest for self-
preservation with the equivalent interests of other individuals. The principal law of nature is 
that humans have to pursue peace, but when conditions make this impossible to achieve, 
they should be ready for war.297 The second law of nature is to renounce our rights as much 
as others do for the sake of peace, and the third is that people should perform their 
covenants (Springborg, 2007, p. 225). 
 
The laws of nature are weak when it comes to enforcement, as they are controlled 
only by people’s mutual confidence in each other, which for Hobbes is no more than mere 
words, "too weak to bridle men's ambition" (Leviathan 1.14.68). These virtuous laws are 
ineffective "without the fear of some coercive power" to enforce them (Leviathan 1.14.68). 
Fear of a violent or early death, the need for enforceable laws, and hence the need for a 
political structure sufficiently powerful to compel compliance with these laws, underlie the 
creation of the Leviathan. Under the power of the Leviathan, humans will be disposed to 
obedience because of the threat of punishment.298 Hobbes's Commonwealth was not 
designed to suppress all freedom, but to curtail some liberties by the institution of a 
‘civilized’ fear. This is no longer the panic fear of the state of nature, but a fear shaped by 
the imposition of laws. The aim of the Leviathan is to produce a proper balance between 
bodily safety and the understanding of human frailty (Cooper, 2010, p. 3). Citizens are free 
to decide on their actions, although fear of punishment should convince them to live within 




                                                 
297 "...to seek peace and follow it."; otherwise, "By all means we can, to defend our selves." 
(Leviathan 1.14.64). 
298 Laws are "mere words", and "Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength 
to secure a man at all” (Leviathan 2.17.85). 
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5.7. Hobbes’s concept of human emotions 
For a better understanding of the conceptual position of fear in Hobbes’ political 
system, a brief discussion of his concept of emotions is in order. In resonance with Stoic 
accounts, Hobbes described emotions as “perturbations of the mind” given that they impede 
proper reasoning (Hobbes, 1972) (De Homine 12.1). Emotions push individuals towards 
short-term gains, whilst reason aims at long-term benefits.299 Hobbes considered that the 
best legal system should be based on reason and not be influenced by emotions, as only a 
rational system can guide humans into a state of peace and mutual defence (Elements 1.1). 
Nevertheless, “mental perturbations” are important in the construction of a powerful social 
system, as the government is primarily structured around the fear of punishment. Among 
human emotions, fear was for Hobbes the most relevant for enforcing a given social 
system. He describes fear as the state produced by impending evil, continually alternating 
with the emotion of hope (i.e. the state of avoiding evil). In De Cive, Hobbes stresses the 
important social role of fear, as being the only ‘antidote’ against vainglory and excessive 
ambition, and the fact that the political power of the sovereign is built on social fears rather 
than on mutual good will (De Cive 1.2).  
 
5.7.1 Hobbes’s concept of fear 
For Hobbes, as we have seen, the significance of fear is mainly related to its social 
role. In De Cive he provided the usual description of fear as the expectation of a future evil, 
but he elaborated on the conceptual association between fear and related behaviours and 
emotions that are relevant in social interaction. Thus, Hobbes described the emotions of 
distrust, suspicion, and “taking heed” as related to fear. Fear is an emotion pervasive in 
simple daily behaviours such as locking the door when leaving home, as well as in more 
complex state policies, such as patrolling the frontiers or training the police force. 
According to Hobbes all deliberation stops when safety is at stake, “for security is the end 
wherefore men submit themselves to others” (De Cive 5.3). Out of fear, most humans will 
abide by a strong ruler capable of protecting their goods and life. Those individuals who, on 
the other hand, are strongly motivated by natural pride and by a thirst for glory will be 
                                                 
299 “…appetite seizeth upon a present good without foreseeing the greater evils that necessarily 
attach to it” (De Homine 12.1).  
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subdued by the terror of the Leviathan. It is fear that creates the necessity for the Leviathan, 
and fear is what keeps it alive. 
 
5.7.2. Fear in the state of nature and fear under the Leviathan 
In the state of nature fear is rife as the risk of death is high given that the only 
protection from violence is one’s own power. The laws of nature provide implicit rules of 
behaviour with the aim of preventing individuals from injuring one another. For Hobbes, as 
already noted, one limitation of these laws is that they can only be imposed by the force of 
a “coercive power” (Leviathan 1.14.68) thus ending the omniscient fear of the state of 
nature. When the Leviathan assumes the shape of military dictatorships or totalitarian 
governments, the expression of fear ranges from that of minorities living in “panic terrors,” 
to whole societies living under the intense grip of this emotion. Hobbes himself fostered the 
role of fear under the Leviathan by strikingly suggesting that pacts arranged under the 
influence of fear, such as having to pay ransoms to thieves, have to be respected. There is 
only one exception to full obedience to the positive laws of the Leviathan, and this is when 
a person is physically threatened. In this situation, a person is permitted to commit acts that 
would otherwise be punished, such as killing in self-defence, if necessary. On the other 
hand, crimes committed due to ‘religious fear’ (e.g. due to superstition) should always be 
punished. I shall later describe the conflicting interaction between religious institutions and 
the government of the commonwealth. 
 
The question now arises as to whether the Leviathan provides peace of mind to the 
individual, or whether it only changes the cause and expression of fear without diminishing 
its strength. According to Hobbes, respect for laws and pacts of non-aggression allows 
individuals, and society at large, to divert their energies from protecting their lives and 
fighting wars to the healthier development of commercial, cultural and scientific activities. 
Nevertheless, as Hobbes admitted, even when abiding by the laws and covenants of the 
Leviathan, "The Passion to be reckoned upon is Fear" (Leviathan 1.14.70). In an organized 
society fear is still present, albeit in subtle ways since the prospect of suffering injuries or 
death is more predictable than in the state of nature. In De Cive (1.14.2) Hobbes remarks 
that a state of constant fear is unsustainable, as people would be unable to “endur’[d] each 
others looks,” making any civil transaction impossible. Nevertheless, he considered that 
being acutely scared, or “affrightened”, should be distinguished from fear where the latter 
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is understood under the wider concept of “a certain foresight of future evill” (De Cive 
1.14.2), that is, in terms of the variety of behaviours that may result from “rational” fears.  
 
In contemporary western life fear permeates human decision-making processes, 
from major life decisions (such as migrating due to lack of jobs, social corruption or 
political violence), to much subtler expressions of fear, such as bolting doors before going 
to sleep or placing valuables in safe boxes. Humans no longer live in the ‘fight or flight’ 
condition of the state of nature, but in a more complex society, practised in the arts of 
simulation and dissimulation (Bodei, 1995, p. 110). In modern western society, fear is 
expressed in the emotions and behaviours of distrust, suspicion, and careful attention, as 
humans not only want to avoid future dangers, but also the very emotion of fear.  
 
In Leviathan, Hobbes considered curiosity, prudence and foresight as relevant 
expressions of fear, deserving independent analysis. Showing how much he sees the world 
through the lens of fear, Hobbes claimed that far from a benign desire for knowledge, 
curiosity results from the “great anxiety about future time” (Leviathan 1.12.51) generated in 
the state of nature,300 and refers to the desire of understanding the causes of one’s own 
“good and evil fortune” (Leviathan 1.12.52). Prudence is, for Hobbes, a necessary 
condition for ruling families and kingdoms, and is essential to the preservation of one’s life, 
given that “human desires have no limits" (Leviathan 1.11.1).301 Due to the need for 
sustenance and protection, humans live in “a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come” 
(Leviathan 1.12.52). This is the origin of foresight, the capacity for proper planning, which 
in the state of nature is of critical value for the provision of food, shelter and safety against 
beasts and humans. But foresight is a double-edged sword, since this is the same human 
attribute that provokes anxiety about potential misfortunes, such as illness, poverty and 
death. Thus, prudence and foresight come at a price.  
                                                 
300 "Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to inquire into the cause of things: because the 
knowledge of them maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage" 
(Leviathan 1.11.51). 
301 “When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a multitude of things, 
observes how they conduce to that designe; or what designe they may conduce unto; of his 




In Chapter Twelve of Leviathan (“Of Religion”) Hobbes analysed the causes of fear 
and anxiety by comparing humans to lower animals. He noted that humans have the 
intellectual capacity and curiosity to search for the causes of life events, and consequently 
to make predictions. Because they lack foresight, “beasts” just enjoy the day, whilst 
humans, knowing the causes of events and having the capacity to formulate predictions, fall 
into a state of chronic anxiety when facing a future that appears bleak. For humans, it is not 
enough to feel safe, but to remove anxiety they also need to believe they will be safe in the 
future.302  
 
Recognising the fact that foresight is fallible303 as well as the impossibility of 
completely allaying the anxiety of future dangers, Hobbes states that humans fall “in an 
estate like to that of Prometheus” (Leviathan 1.12.52, italics in original), the Titan of the 
Greek mythology who forever enchained to Mount Caucasus, was left to predict his chronic 
evils. I shall discuss, below, the importance, according to Hobbes, that myths have in 
triggering human emotions. The myth of Prometheus is a clear allegory of the disadvantage 
of having ‘too much’ foresight, and given its prominent position in Leviathan, it deserves 
specific discussion. 
 
5.8. Prometheus: the negative consequence of challenging the sovereign 
Hobbes introduces the myth of Prometheus when discussing the human state of 
anxiety and the quest for safety.304 Reference to the myth is included in Chapter 12 of 
Leviathan, in the section entitled “The natural cause of religion, the anxiety of the time to 
come” in which Hobbes elaborates on the origins of religion, the causes of human anxiety, 
                                                 
302 Every human “...continually endeavoureth to secure himselfe against the evill he feares, and 
procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come” (Leviathan 
1.12.52). This explains why fortune was worshipped as a goddess in Hellenistic and Roman times 
(see Chapter three). Fear of future misfortunes was one of the main topics in Seneca’s Letters (see 
Chapter three). This is the same fear that tortured Montaigne (Chapter four) and made him envious 
of his farmers, poorer in foresight, but richer in peace of mind. 
303 That is, what we predict may not always happen, or may happen in an unpredicted fashion. 
304 “So that every man, especially those that are over provident, are in a state like that of 
Prometheus” (Leviathan 1.12.52) [my italics]. 
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and the importance of abiding by the laws of the Commonwealth. This short but significant 
section makes reference to the benefit that science may bring to humankind, but also the 
chronic anxiety that may result from excessive foresight. Furthermore, the myth of 
Prometheus also illustrates the ominous consequences that await those who defy the 
Leviathan. 
 
Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound305 is an allegory of human progress based on 
Prometheus’306 gift of fire to humans, fire which he stole from Zeus, the King of the Gods. 
With the benefit of fire, humans were able to develop technology and science, starting an 
age of progress. The myth begins with an act of transgression (stealing a treasure from the 
Olympian god) for which Prometheus was punished to suffer for life.307 He was bound to 
the Caucasus, and underwent the perpetual torture of having his liver repeatedly gnawed by 
an eagle during the day, and regenerating by night. Prometheus’ punishment went further 
than this, as he was left to eternally anticipate this terrible fate.308 Prometheus’ suffering 
was made more severe by the expectation of daily torture rather than by the pain inflicted 
by the eagle, an example of mental pain being greater that physical pain. In a similar vein, 
Hobbes states that a “man which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath 
his heart all the day long, gnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has 
no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep” (Leviathan 1.12.52).  As discussed in the 
previous chapters, a similar concept of the dangers of looking into the future is found in 
Epicurean ethics and in Seneca. 
 
Michaelis (Michaelis, 2007, pp. 115-123) has suggested that the inclusion of the 
myth of Prometheus in Leviathan highlights the state of chronic anxiety that humans suffer 
                                                 
305 The myth of Prometheus is described by various Greek poets and philosophers. I have decided to 
use Aeschylus’ version (Aeschylus, 1961) given that this is one of the most commonly associated 
with Hobbes’ Leviathan. 
306 The meaning of Prometheus in Greek is ‘fore thinker’. 
307 Prometheus is always looking to the future in a state of anguish “for pain present and pain to 
come”, “no torment will come unforeseen”, and “whatever comes, brings fear” (Aeschylus, 1961) 
(Prometheus 441,461). 
308 Kratos’ opening speech: “The gods named you “Forethought” falsely, for you yourself need 
forethought to find a way to escape...” (Aeschylus, 1961) (Prometheus 85-87). 
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due to their always uncertain future. Unlike Ahrensdorf (Ahrensdorf, 2000, p. 580), who 
considers ambition to be the major cause of civil strife, Michaelis suggests that the main 
source of social conflict lies in the constant need of safety. She bases her hypothesis on the 
fact that Hobbes’s account does not mention the stealing of fire from Zeus, an act of major 
defiance against the mighty ruler of Olympus. This is a striking omission, as the dire 
consequences of challenging the sovereign is a central theme of Leviathan. Michaelis 
suggests that by omitting discussion of the act of challenge Hobbes changed the focus of 
the myth towards the ominous consequences of always looking towards the future.309  
 
Vasalle suggests that the Promethean myth has been classically interpreted as a 
metaphor for the anxiety and anguish that humans suffer when exposed to dangerous life 
events, which increase their desire for greater foresight (Vasalle, 2010, p. 28). The quest 
for knowledge about the future turns into a vicious circle, since greater foresight exposes 
humans to a wider horizon of dangers that they are unable to dominate, which in turn 
results in more anxiety (Vasalle, 2010, p. 23). This is the fate of poor Prometheus after he 
has stolen fire, fully able to foretell his future but unable to change it. Similarly, among 
humans, anxiety is generated by the conflict between having a clear perception of the future 
and our limited capacity to avoid unwanted events (Vasalle, 2010, p. 30). Prometheus does 
no suffer from fear, which in Leviathan is conceptualised as the prediction of an objective 
evil, but from anguish, which is a state of paralysing anxiety due to the anticipation of 
undefined calamities (Vasalle, 2010, p. 30). This concept of anguish will be developed 
centuries later by Sigmund Freud under the syndrome of “neurosis anxiety” (Angstenurose) 
(see Chapter eight). 
 
In Aeschylus’ play, the Chorus asks Prometheus:  
 
Chorus: Did your offence perhaps go further than you said? 
Prometheus: Yes: I caused men no longer to foresee their death. 
Chorus: What cure did you discover for their misery? 
Prometheus: I planted firmly in their hearts blind hopefulness. 
Chorus: your gift brought them great blessing. 
                                                 
309 Similar to Hobbes’s state of nature, and prior to the Promethean gift, humans lived in a state 
when “Force ruled everything and reason and justice were unknown” (Aeschylus, 1961) 
(Prometheus 149). 
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Prometheus: I did more than that: I gave them fire...and with it they shall master many 
crafts. 
       (Aeschylus, 1961) 
 
It is interesting that in Aeschylus’ version of the myth, the gift of fire comes only in 
third place of significance, after the gifts of “blind hopes” and ignorance of death. That all 
three elements are of crucial importance for the political system proposed by Hobbes in 
Leviathan will be discussed below. It cannot be denied that technology and science are both 
relevant for improving humans’ standard of life, and both are missing in the state of nature. 
They also allow for making more accurate predictions about the future, with the 
concomitant anxiety if the prediction happens to be of negative events. In 17th century 
England, at the time when Leviathan was published, there was a major interest in medicine 
and surgery, with a high regard for medical care. Thomas Sydenham, the most prestigious 
physician of the century, was a pioneer in establishing medicine on a solid scientific basis 
(Merton, 1938, p. 24). Physicians became the objects of respect and fear, as they had the 
capacity not only to heal but also to diagnose incurable illnesses. Thus, science may be 
construed as a double-edged sword, providing humans with technological advances while 
simultaneously delivering more accurate predictions of the calamities awaiting them. It is in 
this context that Prometheus’ present to humans of “blind hopes” becomes valuable. For 
most mortals, Prometheus’ gift of blind hope is a fitting remedy for the fear and anxiety 
produced by foresight. Even the Olympian gods may benefit from blind hopes: “when Io, a 
goddess punished by Zeus, asked Prometheus when her curse would come to an end, he 
responded that “not to know this [i.e. her fate] is better for you to know” (Prometheus 834). 
Ignorance of the future to come is for Prometheus better than knowledge. A good 
illustration of Prometheus’ curse is provided by Montaigne and his fear of illness. 
Montaigne lived in a state of chronic anxiety about having kidney stones, the cause of his 
father’s death. He eventually did develop the disease, as already discussed in Chapter four, 
but discovered he was able to cope quite well with the illness, his previous dread being 
worse than his current sufferings.  
 
Montaigne’s experience and Prometheus’ myth expose the ethical and epistemic 
dilemma of how much knowledge is necessary for a life with (relative) tranquillity of mind. 
Hobbes denied that the peace of mind (the “Finis ultimus” or “Summum Bonum”) of the 
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“old Morall Philosophers”, in reference primarily to Epicureans and Stoics, is achievable 
(Leviathan 1.11.47). He inverts Stoic ethics, according to which reason subdues the 
passions, by making fear the main psychological condition for achieving a paradoxical 
‘tranquil’ life under the Leviathan. Hobbes also rejected the katastematic or static pleasures 
of the Epicureans, considering instead that human happiness resides not in enjoyment just 
“for one instant of time”, but in the future as well (Leviathan 1.11.47).310 
 
In Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, the main gift to humankind was suppression of 
the capacity to foretell death. Fear of death, the emotional axis of Leviathan, is a factor of 
chronic anxiety, because, as already noted, humans live in “a perpetuall solicitude of the 
time to come” (Leviathan 1.12.52).311 
 
Hobbes presents the reduction of fears as one of the major benefits of living under 
the Leviathan, but this seemingly straightforward conclusion needs unpacking. One of the 
problems of increasing one’s sense of safety is that this feeling may undermine the very 
usefulness of the fear of death as a bulwark against insurrection.312 Ahrensdorf 
(Ahrensdorf, 2000, p. 581) suggests that, ironically, providing too much safety empowers 
the individual to reflect on the inexorability of death, and rationally suppress the fear of 
death. Relieved of this fear, those individuals seeking glory may challenge the political 
                                                 
310 An example of how difficult it is to disentangle the problem of foresight and a contented life is 
provided by current ethical problems in medicine, when diseases that have a devastating prognosis 
can be diagnosed even years before their full expression, and while the affected person is still 
asymptomatic. The dilemma for the physician is whether to disclose the ominous diagnosis to the 
patient, and if the affirmative, how much to disclose. The American Medical Association (AMA) 
(Mentor, 2012) terms “therapeutic privilege” the practice of withholding a diagnosis from patients 
in the belief that disclosure is medically contraindicated. This, the AMA considers, creates a 
conflict between the physician’s obligation to promote the patient’s welfare and respect for the 
patient’s autonomy by communicating truthfully. The AMA states that withholding medical 
information is ethically unacceptable, setting a standard for medical practice. Beyond the legal fears 
of the medical corporation, the question to answer is whether disclosing information that is ominous 
in the long term will impact on the individual’s capacity to live a contented life at present. 
311 “Man is famished even by future hunger” (De Homine 10.3).  
312 Ahrensdorf even suggests that Hobbes tried to blur the fear of death to such an extent that death 
could be considered an almost avoidable event, a sickness to be cured by the Leviathan. Ahrensdorf 
makes reference to Hobbes’s statements such as death being “the chiefest of natural evils” (De Cive 
1.7), and “the terrible enemy of nature” (Hobbes, 1994) (De Corpore Politico 1.1.6). 
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system.313 As suggested by Strauss (Strauss, 1963, p. 17), the origins of law and the state 
are not found in a rational understanding of the human condition of death, but the “aversion 
from death”, a fear of a violent death, which, Strauss claims, is at the basis of morality. 
 
The striking Promethean gift becomes a poisoned apple for the Leviathan, as the 
man prepared to die will not be beaten cheaply, Montaigne (see Chapter four) dedicated a 
chapter of his Essays to warning against excessive severity in punishments, since those that 
have nothing to lose (or, in this case, to fear) pose the greatest danger to the government. 
On the other hand, Bagby suggests that for Hobbes, one of the main problems impacting on 
social life was not that humans are always fearful, but that by nature they are not fearful 
enough [italics in the original] (Bagby, 2009, p. 106). Hobbes considered fear of death the 
main deterrent for war, and therefore, lack of fear was for Hobbes one of the main causes 
underlying civil conflicts.  
 
Finally, we should not omit the by now obvious construction of the myth of 
Prometheus as a reminder for those who dare to defy the power of the Leviathan. 
Prometheus is described in Aeschylus’ myth as defiant, proud and imprudent, as well as 
lacking in self-control. He tricked Zeus, ruler of Olympus, and was heavily punished for his 
deed. Prometheus was sentenced to the eternal knowledge that “whatever comes, brings 
fear” (Prometheus 461). The same future awaits those who do not abide by the laws of the 
Commonwealth. In De Cive Hobbes states that societies are constituted either for gain or 
glory (De Cive 1.2). If it is for gain, a pact is necessary to avoid violent death and war. This 
may work for the fearful, but may be useless for the vainglorious, who are not frightened by 
death. It is “mutual fear” and not the good will of humans that will produce “great and 
lasting Societies” (De Cive 1.2).  
 
In conclusion, Hobbes’s Leviathan oscillates between the need to provide safety as 
a better alternative to the state of nature, and simultaneously, to keep a level of chronic fear 
(Ahrensdorf’s “subjective insecurity,” p. 30) high enough to maintain obedience to social 
                                                 
313 “…a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, 
that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is…because [man] cannot assure the power and 
means to live well…without the acquisition of more” (Leviathan 1.11.46). 
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pacts and covenants (Ahrensdorf’s “objective security,” p. 30)) but not so high as to incite 
defiance. Thus, for the ordinary individual, Hobbes provides a mixed bag of 
recommendations: being prudent but not over-prudent; having foresight, but not in excess; 
and enjoying life, with an adequate dose of fear, based on the security provided by the 
Leviathan. 
 
It is intriguing that in Leviathan, Hobbes makes reference to diametrically opposed 
characters, such as Prometheus and Job. Prometheus is antithetical to the citizen Hobbes 
desires for his commonwealth, since nobody should dare to defy the commands of the 
sovereign. On the other hand, the Book of Job is an important allegory of the life of those 
citizens, who regardless of how righteous their lives may be, are nevertheless at the mercy 
of the powerful ruler. 
 
5.9. The fears of Job 
The main emotions depicted in the Book of Job are fear and terror.314 There are 
many different interpretations of this text, but it is generally accepted that the Biblical story 
addresses the question of why the righteous suffer, and centres around Job, a pious man 
whose fear of God leads him to constantly worry about sins his family may commit. In the 
eyes of God Job is a man of full integrity and honesty, but the Accuser (Satan) objects that 
Job’s piety is no more than egotistic behaviour aimed at obtaining God's protection. Should 
God cease to protect him, Job’s piety would immediately vanish. God allows the Accuser 
to put Job to trial, a process which is carried out mercilessly. After the killing of his family 
and the loss of his wealth, his “worst fears have happened”, and Job falls in a state of terror 
and despair (Job 6.2): 
 
 If ever my grief were measured 
 or my sorrow put on a scale, 
 it would outweigh the sands of the ocean... 
 ...For God has ringed me with terrors, 
 and his arrows have pierced my heart. 
 ...all hope has been driven away. 
 
                                                 
314 I used Mitchell’s translation of The Book of Job (Mitchell, 1987). 
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With his family gone, his wealth lost, and his health dissipated, Job should have 
nothing to fear. And yet, even after these horrible sufferings Job maintained his submission 
to God. In response to one of his friends’ comments about how to show respect to God, Job 
states (9:3): 
 
 ...no man can argue with God 
 or answer even one of a thousand accusations. 
 However wise or powerful, who could oppose him and live? 
 ...He makes me gasp with terror; 
 He plunges me in despair 
 For in strength, He is far beyond me. 
 
Thus, there can be no rational arguing with God, and there is no rational explanation 
for Job’s suffering. In the context of Leviathan, the Book of Job provides a dramatic 
allegory about the brutal power of Hobbes’s sovereign. Hobbes refers to the Book of Job as 
a reminder that the problem of human vainglory threatening the state may be easily crushed 
by the sovereign, and Newey considers the whole of Leviathan as a “parody” of the Book of 
Job (Newey, 2014, p. 178). Cooper (Cooper, 2010, pp. 244-245) argues that the reference 
to Job is to illustrate God’s natural prerogatives over humans, since even the virtuous may 
suffer his omnipotence. Hobbes’s reference to Job is both a reminder of the limitations of 
human life as well as an extrapolation of the power of celestial God to the sovereign of the 
commonwealth as the mortal God on earth.315 There is no succour for the believer in God 
or the commonwealth from either of these “Gods”, as they are not bound by any promises 
(Newey, 2014). Disobedience will be punished, and obedience will be rewarded by 




                                                 
315 This is conveyed in Leviathan (2.31.188): “And Job, how earnestly does he expostulate with 
God, for the many Afflictions he suffered, notwithstanding his Righteousnesse? This question in the 
case of Job, is decided by God himselfe, not by arguments derived from Job’s Sinne, but his own 
Power.” In the biblical story, the Leviathan is described as a powerful beast, “Nothing on earth is 
his equal—a creature without fear. He looks down on all that are haughty; he is king over all that 
are proud” (Job 41:1-34). Hobbes construed the Leviathan as a monster subdued by God's 
omniscient power and transformed the Leviathan into a powerful ruler not to be understood, but to 
be feared and obeyed.  
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5.10. Civil versus religious fears 
The myth of Prometheus and the Book of Job refer to an essential theme in Hobbes’ 
political system, namely, the role of myths, superstition and the fear of death. As already 
mentioned, the construction of Hobbes’ social pact depends on keeping the fear of death as 
omnipresent. One of the problems of myths, superstition, and even of religion is that their 
roots extend deep enough to remove the fear of death and the instinct of self-preservation 
(Johnston, 1986, p. 108). According to Johnston, Hobbes proposed that there are two types 
of individuals, those with poor education who are easily influenced by superstition and 
those rational citizens whose religious beliefs concur with those of the state. This creates a 
contrast between the rational and irrational, between science and superstition, and between 
fear of the laws and fear of imaginary spirits (Johnston, 1986, p. 109).  
 
The problem for the sovereign is that according to Hobbes, most of the world is 
populated by irrational people, in whom the fear of death is not strong enough to subdue 
their behaviour. Therefore, it is necessary for the preservation of the commonwealth that all 
superstitions such as the belief in supernatural creatures be eliminated. In other words, the 
creation of angels and saints will undermine the terrestrial fear of death by pointing to a 
power greater than that of the sovereign of the commonwealth.316 As clearly rendered by 
Johnston (Johnston, 1986, p. 111), the fear of spirits as an expression of irrational myths 
and superstition (especially those of the Catholic Church) “destroys the ultimate basis of 
sovereign power…by virtue of his right to determine whether they [the citizens of the 
commonwealth] will live or die”.317 A religion that creates myths and superstitions, and 
fear for the afterlife, which is stronger than the terrestrial fear of death, provides a major 
challenge to the Leviathan. Peace under the ruler of the commonwealth will not be 
maintained if fear of death is replaced by fear of the irrational. If fear of death is removed, 
“the whole basis of sovereign power and civil peace is destroyed” (Johnston, 1986, p. 121). 
                                                 
316 “…the Canonization of Saints, and declaring who are Martyrs…induce simple men into an 
obstinacy against the Laws and Commands of the Civill Sovereaigns even to death…” (Leviathan 
2.47.383). 
317 “If this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it Prognostiques and Dreams, false 
Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which crafty ambitions persons abuse the 




It is fully consistent that the philosopher who despised the “Morall Philosophers” of 
antiquity would construe the fear of death as a necessary emotion for achieving social 
peace. From alternative perspectives, Epicurus attacked both the fear of superstition and the 
fear of death in his quest for ataraxia, Seneca fought against the fear of death with all the 
philosophical remedies available to him (whether Epicurean, Cyrenaic or Stoic), and 
Montaigne’s Essays provide a therapeutic narrative about his lifelong battle against the fear 
of death. But these philosophers were not Hobbes’s main target. Since in his view their 
moral philosophy had been long ago been replaced by institutionalised religion, it is 
religion independent of the civic rulers that receives the brunt of Hobbes’s attack. The main 
argument of the section in Leviathan, “Of a Christian Common-Wealth”, is that the Bible 
prepares people for becoming obedient to God (and the Book of Job is a good illustration of 
this), but the second principal argument is to show that individual salvation occurs through 
obedience to the earthly sovereign.  
 
Johnston (Johnston, 1986, p. 140) suggests that Hobbes’s reinterpretation of the 
Bible was based on his materialism and his mechanistic concept of the world.318 Hobbes’s 
adoption of materialism was in opposition to the more popular spiritualism, which accepted 
the reality of Angels and spirits as immaterial substances. Mintz asks (but does not answer) 
the important question: why did Hobbes reject spiritualism and adopt materialism at a time 
“when the notion of spirit as real held a firm grip on the mind of men”? (Mintz, 1970, p. 
66). I believe the answer to this question is found in the criticism to Hobbes’s materialism 
by Bishop Bramhall, cited by Mintz, who considered that by denying spiritual entities 
Hobbes “taketh away God himself…And to say that an Angel or Spirit is an incorporeal 
substance, is to say in effect, that there is no Angel or Spirit at all” (Mintz, 1970, p. 67). In 
other words, by denying the existence of Angels and Spirits, and even a veiled rejection of 
an immaterial God, Hobbes was simultaneously investing the sovereign of the 
commonwealth as the terrestrial God. Hobbes is thus removing a crucial problem for a 
                                                 
318 Hobbes’s materialism is thoroughly discussed in Mintz’s The Hunting of Leviathan (Mintz, 
1970, p. 63). Materialism is the theory that everything that exists in the world is body, and entities 
considered immaterial such as space and time are attributes or “phantasms” of the mind, itself a 
material phenomenon constituted by physical motion. 
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subdued commonwealth, that is, disobedience to the terrestrial laws created by the 
possibility of an eternal heavenly life.   
 
Surrendering the greater good of eternal life is for the religious majority far worse 
than giving up the lesser good of life on earth (Olsthoorn, 2014, pp. 150-151). Once the 
possibility of torments in hell or the benefit of a heavenly life is averted, the citizens of the 
commonwealth will be more interested in life on earth, and the fear of death, as a pervasive 
emotion, can be manipulated. This is clearly articulated in Leviathan (2.38.238): “It is 
impossible a Common-wealth should stand, where any other than the Sovereign, hath a 
power of giving greater rewards than Life; and of inflicting greater punishments, than 
Death.” The cause of ‘religious fears’ lies in people’s credulity: “So easie are men to be 
drawn to believe anything, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with 
gentlenesse, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance” (Leviathan 1.12.56). 
Hobbes not only rejects the irrationality of superstitious fears and miracles, angels and 
spirits, that are part of the common practice of Christianity, but also states that the only God 
to be obeyed is the Sovereign of the commonwealth.  
 
In summary, Hobbes’s materialism follows Epicurus’ efforts to explain religion as 
originating from ignorance of the causes of natural phenomena. Hobbes rejected the 
institution of religion given that it has the potential to undermine the role of the sovereign 
as all powerful ruler of the commonwealth. On the other hand, the rejection of religious 
fears is tamed by the fact that religion also provides relief to anguish as well as an increased 
sense of safety (Ginzburg, 2008, pp. 7-8; Vasalle, 2010, pp. 27-29). In the Hobbesian social 
system, the sovereign has the role of a mortal god and has the final decision even about 
religious policy.319 The sovereign exerts a tight control over religion by deciding on what 
constitutes a sin, how to interpret the Bible, and how to teach about the afterlife 
                                                 
319 “All Kings and supreme governors of any kind of state whatsoever bear the person of God, if 
they acknowledge God as a ruler…Therefore, according to the custom of men, God among all 
peoples hath as His possessions the lands, rights, and other goods especially consecrated to Him. 
But he doth not have these things unless it be so constituted by the state. God, since the will of God 
is not known save through the state, and since, moreover, it is required that the will of Him that is 
represented be the author of the actions performed by those who represent Him, it needs be that 
God’s person be created by the will of the state (De Homine 15.3). 
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(Ahrensdorf, 2000, pp. 580-583).320 With full control of secular and religious matters, the 
sovereign gains complete influence over the fears and anxieties of citizens.  
 
5.11. Conclusion: Hobbes’s therapy of fear 
Why discuss Hobbes, a political philosopher, in a thesis whose main focus is to 
provide a philosophical analysis of fear from a therapeutic perspective? The answer is quite 
simple. Humans live in social systems which greatly shape their aspirations, goals, and 
emotions (see Chapter nine for a discussion of the social construction of fear). Fear is not 
felt in a vacuum, but in the context of a complex pattern of life, produced by multiple 
causes, and expressed in a myriad of ways.321 The relevance of Leviathan is that this is 
among the first philosophical texts to provide a systematic argument concerning the crucial 
role of fear in shaping human social life, and how political and religious systems are 
designed to manipulate this emotion. 
 
By way of contrast, the philosophers I have so far discussed, namely Epicurus, 
Cicero, Seneca and Montaigne have a personal, individualised, approach to fear. Epicurus 
lives in the Garden in the outskirts of Athens, Cicero wrote the Tusculans in his villa while 
having philosophical discussions with friends, Seneca wrote his Letters as an epistolary 
exchange with a dear friend, and Montaigne composed the Essays while isolated in his 
chateau. In humans, fear is primarily a social emotion strongly dependent on the socio-
political context. It is because of the fear and anxieties that usually accompany a political 
life that Epicurus proposed his lathe biosas; Cicero considers the distress of a political life 
as one of the most damaging emotions; Seneca has to provide repeated therapeutic advice 
to Lucilius about retiring to avoid political misfortunes; and Montaigne, after being elected 
on two occasions as Mayor of Bordeaux, mostly wanted to “glide rather lightly over the 
surface of this world” (Essays 3.10.1135). The reductionist conception of fear as expressed 
in Hobbes’s laws of nature provides a stark contrast, a mere deterrent for a civil war based 
                                                 
320 These considerations are strongly related to the historical context during which the Leviathan 
was written, but such an analysis is beyond the focus of this chapter. 
321 Blits (Blits, 1989, p. 417) considers that “more than any philosopher, Thomas Hobbes 
emphasises the determining power of fear,” as it is “both the sole origin of civil society…and the 
only reliable means of its preservation.” 
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on allaying the fear of a violent death. Hobbes teaches how to fight vainglory with sword 
and fear, whereas Montaigne teaches how not to be vainglorious without the need of violent 
methods, in a truly humanistic way. Hobbes is not interested in discussing his own fears as 
Montaigne does,322 but in how fear, anxiety and terror create a modern absolutist political 
system, and how fear may be used politically to force obedience to the sovereign.323 
Hobbes reduces human life to a state of chronic fear and anxiety to avoid a violent death.324   
Hobbes’s work is significant and insightful for the way it shows up the role of fear 
in social life and how fear can be manipulated to shore up power (insights that many 
cotemporary rulers seem to use to their advantage). On the other hand, Hobbes’s remedy 
leaves much to be desired, since it basically consists on a strong state able to reduce anxiety 
to ‘tolerable’ levels, a society in which both life and death occur in a rather predictable 
way, and in which the ‘horizon of expectations’ is stabilised by fear. As a tool for social 
control, fear is applied in ‘appropriate’ doses under a system of rewards and punishments. 
In his Manichean approach to human life, Hobbes considers that tranquillity of mind is best 
provided by living in the relative peace of complete submission to the Leviathan. The price 
to be paid for living under this watchful monster, however, is chronic anxiety about being 
punished for transgressing its laws, a subtle but pervasive fear that has the potential to gnaw 
at human souls’ day and night. The Hellenistic high values of ataraxia and apatheia have 
no place in Hobbes’s absolutist system, and the therapies of Montaigne, as humane 
antidotes against fear, are ignored in the quest for building a strong social structure based 
on fear and terror.  
 
                                                 
322 Although it is quite evident that Hobbes’s exposure to many frightening situations, including 
forced migrations, threat of imprisonment and the burning of his books, had a strong influence on 
his desire for a strong and powerful sovereign to provide safety and protection. 
323 Guinzburg claims that this form of manipulation is rife in contemporary states: “We live in a 
world where states threaten terror, spread terror, are sometimes the target of terror. A world 
inhabited by those who try to steal the venerable, powerful weapons of religion, as well as by those 
who use religion as a weapon. A world in which huge Leviathans either move frantically or squat 
waiting. A world not too different from the one Hobbes imagined and dissected” (Ginzburg, 2008, 
p. 14). 
324 Blits (Blits, 1989, p. 429) considers Hobbesian chronic anxiety as similar to existential Angst 







Descartes and the mechanization of fear 
 
There is something surprising in misfortunes, even those that have been foreseen,  
of which I am mistress only after a certain time; my body becomes so strongly disordered  
that several months are necessary for me to restore it,  
and those months hardly pass without some new subject of trouble. 
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, “Letter to Rene Descartes”,  
22 June 1645; (Descartes, 2015; AT 4:233) 325 
 
 The greatest souls of which I speak draw a satisfaction in themselves from all the things 
that happen to them, even the most annoying and insupportable… 
just as the greatest prosperity of fortune never intoxicates them or makes them insolent,  
so too the greatest adversities are unable to defeat them or render them so sad that the body, to 
which they are joined, becomes sick. 
Rene Descartes, “Letter to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia”,  




Seven decades after the publication of Montaigne’s Essays, and following Hobbes’s 
focus on the political importance of emotions there was a major shift in the 
conceptualization and philosophical treatment of emotions. The French philosopher Rene 
Descartes revolutionised the established concept of body-soul interaction and inaugurated a 
tradition of reductionism in the conception of emotions based on psychophysical theories 
that are still extant in the current neurosciences (Gross, 2007). This change is evident in 
Descartes’s last work On the Passions of the Soul (PS) (Descartes, 2015), considered one of 
the major works on the epistemology of emotions in philosophical history (S. James, 
1999).326  
 
                                                 
325 I have used the recent translation by Michael Moriarty for the Oxford World’s Classics edition 
(Descartes, 2015). Numbering corresponds to the Adam and Tannery (AT) edition of Oeuvres.  
326 The 17th century was rich in treatises on theoretical aspects of emotions (Boros, 2006, p. 125). 
The ideal of modernity was the mechanical science, which greatly influenced medicine and 
philosophy. The latter is evident in the works of Hobbes and Descartes (see Hatfield, 2007, for a 
thoughtful discussion). 
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During the 17th century the philosophy of the passions was dominated by the 
Aristotelian scholasticism as revised by Aquinas (Hatfield, 2007, p. 6). The soul was 
considered to consist of ‘higher’ faculties, such as the intellect and volition, controlling the 
‘lower’ sensitive appetites, and moved by either ‘irascible’ passions (e.g. hope, despair, 
fear, courage, anger) or ‘concupiscible’ passions (e.g. love, hate, desire, aversion). In other 
words, external objects perceived by agents were assessed intellectually in terms of their 
value to the agent, which assessment may result in a passion.327 Passions were therefore 
defined as responses of the appetites to perceptions judged intellectually to be good or evil 
(Dixon, 2003, p. 54). The passions were not isolated from the body, but included in the 
sensitive soul as states of “the soul-body composite” (S. James, 1999, p. 65). Descartes was 
among the first philosophers to break with this scholastic concept of the passions by 
proposing that the passions are produced by bodily movements, but are unable to directly 
move the body (Hatfield, 2007, p. 11). This novel concept was based on Descartes’s 
hypothesis that the soul and body are independent ontological entities, rather than the soul 
being the form of a biological entity as in the Aristotelian tradition. The challenge for 
Descartes became how to explain the interaction between these ontologically different 
entities.  
 
A second major departure from the Aristotelian tradition was Descartes’s proposal 
of an undivided soul replacing the Aristotelian concept of a soul divided into nutritive, 
sensitive and intellectual parts. These are the philosophical bases of the Cartesian 
“revolutionary analysis of the activities of thinking” and a new conceptualization of the 
passions (S. James, 1999, p. 90). The Cartesian ‘revolution’ also implied a major break 
from the humanist tradition of Erasmus, Petrarch and Montaigne, with roots in Cicero and 
Seneca, which considered the passions as disorders to be treated by the philosopher as 
‘physician of the soul’. Descartes’s philosophy of the passions had a different aim, mostly 
focused on validating his dualistic328 approach to soul and body functions using the 
passions as a heuristic tool. Descartes understood non-human animals as essentially 
                                                 
327 In this chapter I use the term ‘passion’ rather than emotion given that Descartes uses ‘emotion’ 
in a technical way, different from passion.  
328 That is, soul and body are conceived of as different substances: the former as res cogitans and 
the latter as res extensa. 
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mechanical objects, whereas humans were considered to be constituted by both a body, 
working like clockwork, and an incorporeal soul. The passions, produced by bodily 
movements on the soul, are therefore, uniquely human. 
 
In this chapter I shall critically examine the new construct of the passions 
inaugurated by Descartes and its impact on the concept and treatment of fear.  I shall also 
discuss how Descartes’s treatment of the passions and fear in particular, fail on two 
grounds. First, his concept of the passions is flawed by conceptual limitations which extend 
beyond the well-known problems with dualism. Second, his therapy ‘in action’, specifically 
as it was delivered to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, was highly problematic. I shall 
discuss the therapeutic methods used by Descartes and the poor results of this intervention. 
This particular case is not merely anecdotal evidence against his view because Descartes’ 
work, the Passions of the Soul published in 1649, is in great part the result of his interaction 
with Princess Elisabeth who was an acute critic of his epistemology of the passions. I will 
also contrast Descartes’s mechanistic approach to fear with the Hellenistic and humanistic 
tradition discussed in Chapters two to four, and as a forerunner of the conceptualization of 
fear in biophysical terms. 
 
6.2. The Passions of the Soul: text and context 
As in the case of his near contemporaries, Montaigne (1533-1592) and Hobbes 
(1588-1679), events in the life of Descartes (1596-1650) had a strong influence upon his 
theory of the passions. His main work on the passions, The Passions of the Soul, was 
written at the request of Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia (1618-1680), with whom Descartes 
had frequent correspondence. His letters to Princess Elizabeth include important material 
for understanding his conception of the passions, and how this was put into practice. 
Additionally, they also provide relevant information on Descartes as a ‘therapist’, since he 
was the main advisor to the Princess on how to manage her distress and anxiety.329 
 
Princess Elisabeth was a precocious and gifted intellectual, with a strong interest in 
languages, theology, mathematics, philosophy, astronomy and physics (Gaukroger, 2002, p. 
                                                 
329 See the important book by Genevieve Lloyd (Lloyd, 2008) (which is discussed below) and an 
interesting analysis of Descartes as Elisabeth’s physician in Shapiro, 2011 (Shapiro, 2011). 
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385). On the other hand, she was not immune to the major upheavals that surrounded her 
life, and showed a personal proclivity to fear and distress. Elisabeth met Descartes when 
they were both living in the Low Countries, where she became very interested in Cartesian 
geometry and moral philosophy.330 She corresponded with Descartes until his death, and 
they exchanged impressions about different subjects, including her emotional problems 
(mostly anguish and worry caused by political and personal misfortunes).  
 
Descartes acted as Elisabeth’s ‘physician of the soul’, suggesting different remedies 
for her emotional disturbances, including her distress and fears, but as we shall see, with 
unclear success. In a letter dated 10 June 1643 (AT 3:683) Elisabeth complained about how 
impossible it was for her to develop the habit of meditation based on Descartes’s technique 
as described in his Meditations (Descartes, 1984). In the Introduction to this text Descartes 
suggests meditating on the subject at hand by withdrawing oneself from sensory 
stimulation and prior opinions. Two years later,331 Descartes explained to Elisabeth, who 
was suffering fever and exhaustion, that the main cause of her ailment was sadness 
provoked by major family setbacks. He suggested the remedy of bringing “contentment in 
your soul,” stressing he was not “one of those cruel philosophers” (a clear reference to the 
Stoics), for whom all passions should be eradicated. However, Descartes considered it 
typical of “vulgar souls” to surrender to the passions. In contrast, the virtuous soul may 
initially suffer passions but it will in the end master them using reason. Furthermore, 
virtuous people “steel themselves” to patiently bear bodily pain, and may even feel pleasure 
from having their courage tested. These are virtuous people who never show despair or 
depression even among the “greatest misfortunes”. Elisabeth tacitly accepted the Cartesian 
soul/body division, also stating that her body was imbued “with the weakness of my sex” 
(24 May 1645; AT 4:207). She struggled to control her anxiety and distress, as manifested 
by continuous worrying and somatic symptoms of anxiety.332 Elisabeth begged Descartes 
                                                 
330 In one of the first letters, Elisabeth asked Descartes to tell her “how the soul of a human 
being…can determine the bodily spirits and so bring about voluntary actions” (6 May 1643; AT 
3.660).   
331 Letter dated 18 May 1645 (AT 4:200).  
332 “This anxiety is no sooner calmed by reasoning than a new disaster produces another anxiety” 
(24 May 1645); AT 4:207) 
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for a remedy that would cure “my body along with my soul.” Eventually, this ‘remedy’ 
came in the shape of a treatise on the passions, the last work Descartes wrote in his life.333 
 
Descartes suggested to Princess Elisabeth that the best way to allay distress is to 
“turn [the] imagination” aside from the current problem and to forget about it unless 
“compelled by practical necessity”. This old Epicurean technique of distraction was further 
emphasised by Descartes’s suggestion to think only “about what could bring…contentment 
and joy” given that this habit would allow the person to judge life events “without passion”. 
He advised the Princess to get rid of sad thoughts by using reason only, and to avoid 
“serious meditation on intellectual matters.” Instead, Descartes suggested that she should 
“gaze at the green of a wood, the colours of a flower, the flight of a bird, and such things as 
require no attention…thinking of nothing” (May or June 1645; AT 4:218).  
 
Elisabeth was apparently pleased with this advice, initially finding in it an “antidote 
for my melancholy” (Letter 22 June 1645; AT 4:233). On the other hand, she was unable to 
follow the Cartesian “precepts” of vanquishing passions by the use of reason (see below), 
and the technique of distraction eventually failed.334 She could not separate her bodily 
symptoms from “the idea of a particular matter”. The technique of premeditation (see 
Chapter three) suggested by Descartes also failed to produce improvements. Even when 
able to foresee forthcoming misfortunes, Elisabeth was emotionally impacted by the effect 
of “surprise”, and only the passage of time soothed her despair. She conceded that she was 
not getting better, as she was unable to be as rational as Descartes (Letter 22 June 1645; AT 
4:233). As astutely stated by Nye (Nye, 1999, p. 47) “The context of Elisabeth’s virtue is 
life in time, life in history, a life from which Descartes has removed himself”.  
 
                                                 
333 Brown (Brown, 2006, p. 17) suggests that Descartes wrote PS in an effort to make dualism more 
convincing, especially for Elisabeth given her strong objections. 
334 “The slightest period of inactivity causes [my mind] to fall back on the reasons it has to feel 
distressed, and I am afraid that, if I do not keep it active while taking the Spa water, it will become 
more melancholy” (Letter 22 June 1645; AT 4:233). Elisabeth is speaking about her soul in the 
third person, as an entity she is unable to govern. 
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Descartes acknowledged that some passions cannot be avoided (Letter June 1645; 
AT 4:236),335 but suggested that a good sleep can restore “calm to our minds” and insisted 
that Elisabeth pursue the venerable exercise of diversion with more energy.336 A month 
later (Letter 21 July 1645; AT 4:251) Elisabeth was still ailing with fear and distress. Any 
letter received was a cause for anxiety, with great fear that it might contain “distressing 
news” (AT 4:251). Descartes suggested that responding with anxiety upon receiving bad 
news had become for her a habit.  
 
Descartes also suggested a therapy he would strongly reject a few years later, 
advising the Princess to read the ancient philosophers as a useful strategy against her 
distress. More specifically, he recommended that she read Seneca’s On the Happy Life, in 
which the Stoic philosopher explains that the pursuit of virtue through reason is the main 
path to happiness (AT 4:251).337 Elisabeth found Seneca’s book full of “fine sentences and 
maxims” on which to meditate, but in Cartesian fashion, she found the Stoic philosopher 
“without any method” in writing his ideas (Letter 16 August 1645; AT 2:268). 
Furthermore, she did not benefit from the Stoic approach of detachment from emotions. 
According to Descartes, Seneca should have discussed “the principal truths” for the 
practice of a virtuous life, regulating but not rejecting the passions (4 August 1645; AT 
4:263). Thus, after the failure of the Stoic literature strategy, Descartes insisted on using his 
“three rules of ethics” as described in the Discourse on the Method (Descartes, 1991) 
(Letter 4 August 1645; AT 4:263). These precepts consist in first, using reason in every 
situation and taking care in making sound judgments; second, avoiding “being led astray” 
by the passions, given that virtue consists of staying firm on consistent resolutions to do 
                                                 
335 “I know well that it is virtually impossible to withstand the initial turmoil that new misfortunes 
bring about in us, and indeed that it is normally the finest minds that have the most violent 
passions.” 
336 “This is done by concentrating on all the benefits we may derive from the thing that the day 
before we were treating as a great misfortune, and by diverting our minds from the evils we had 
imagined in it”. 
337 “One of these means, and among the most useful, it seems to me, is to examine the writings of 
the ancients on this subject, and to attempt to go beyond them by adding to their precepts; for in this 
way we can make their precepts fully our own, and prepare ourselves to put them into practice” 
(Letter 4 August 1645; AT 4:263). 
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what is rational; and third, being contented with one’s life, getting used to have fewer 
desires, and doing only what is in one’s power.338 
 
Elisabeth disagreed that happiness does not require anything beyond our control, as 
poor health clearly impacts the capacity to enjoy life (Letter 16 August 1645, AT 2:268). 
She implied that whereas the philosophers could ‘play’ Stoicism to their advantage, this 
was not available to the unsophisticated life “of a ruler, a commander, or courtier.” As for 
the Cartesian rules of ethics, the Princess conceded that it is best to know the real value of 
things before making decisions,339 but that this requires “perfect and infinite knowledge” 
which is not available “when we live the active life.”340 Elisabeth pre-empted a response by 
Descartes that if a mishap happens when we have taken all possible precautions we should 
still be happy, by flatly saying “that [being happy] never happens, when things do not work 
out.” She presented Descartes with a ‘real life’ dilemma about how to behave, when for 
instance, there is a danger and we have to decide on whether to save ourselves or others. 
Both behaviours could be equally defended as being rational, especially when the 
behaviour is innate. Furthermore, Elisabeth asked whether innate behaviours should be 
corrected, and if so, how. Finally, she was not convinced that passions are “disorders” of 
the soul, and challenged Descartes to justify his suggestion that all passions should be 
subject to reason. She demanded from Descartes a definition of the passions, since she was 
by then interested in pursuing the origin of her distress and wanted to better understand the 
mechanism of the passions.  
 
                                                 
338 Nye (Nye, 1999, p. 53) has rendered Descartes’ maxims in an eloquent way: “Happiness is 
contentment, contentment comes from being virtuous, and virtue is nothing but a firm will to carry 
out whatever one understands is best as long as one has used one’s reason to try to discover what is 
best.”  
339 “It is true that a habit of valuing goods in proportion to their capacity to contribute to our 
contentment, of measuring this contentment by the perfections that give rise to pleasures, and of 
judging these perfections and pleasures dispassionately will protect them from many mistakes” 
(Letter 16 August 1645; AT 2:268). 
340 Elisabeth (perhaps ironically) refers to living the life of a human engaged in court and household 
matters, with all its contingent problems, unlike the protected and semi-secluded life of a 
philosopher. 
 152 
In a letter dated 25 April 1646 (AT 4:403), Princess Elisabeth complained, again, 
about being unable to employ the Cartesian remedy of using reason to subdue her morbid 
passions. She was unable to manage her distress by using her will, and found no help in 
PS.341 In a letter dated November 1646 Descartes advised Elisabeth (in a rather circular 
way) that to achieve happiness it is necessary to “avoid all passions associated with those 
things that may upset us.” This was the last epistolary exchange about Elisabeth’s 
emotional problems. She might have felt frustrated by Descartes’s insistence in using 
reason to fight her emotional suffering, and the use of reason to subdue the passions 
remained one of the main themes in the last section of PS. 
 
In conclusion, the epistolary exchange between Princess Elisabeth and Descartes is 
essential to understanding the origins of PS as well as understanding Descartes’s 
philosophical therapy. Lloyd and Nye have both provided thoughtful analyses of this 
exchange, with emphasis on the different therapies Descartes recommended to Elisabeth. 
Nye stresses the ‘asymmetry’ between the philosopher and the Princess, with Descartes 
always trying to impress his ‘patient’ (Nye, 1999, p. 47). Lloyd points out that Descartes 
never acknowledged his failure to improve Elisabeth’s distress and anxieties, and rather 
than question his therapeutic advice, he maintained his basic concepts, writing a book on 
the passions (Lloyd, 2008, pp. 170-177). 
 
6.3. The relevance of The Passions of the Soul 
As discussed above, the seed for Descartes’s theory of the passions is found in the 
epistolary exchange with Elizabeth. In the very important letter dated 6 October 1645 (AT 
4:304) Descartes proposed the rudiments of a mechanism of the passions, which he later 
developed into Part One of The Passions of the Soul. Descartes suggests that impressions in 
the brain are formed by external or internal sensory stimuli, memory traces, “the agitation 
of the spirits coming from the heart”,342 or the agent’s behaviour. Descartes defined 
                                                 
341 “For how can we foresee all the accidents that can occur in life, when they are impossible to 
count? And how can we help ardently desiring things that necessarily tend to our preservation as 
human beings (such as health and the means of life) which, nonetheless, do not depend on our 
will?” (25 April 1646; AT 4:403).  
342 By “spirits” Descartes refers to tiny and fast-moving particles or wind flowing through the 
nerves into the brain, and out of the brain to the muscles to produce movement. The first comment 
cont. next page 
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“passion” as a thought produced by the agitation of the spirits in the soul.343 Passions are 
not ‘simple’ sensations (i.e. thoughts produced by any external or internal stimuli), but are 
produced “by a particular agitation of the spirits.” Descartes distinguished between passions 
“at random” from the passions produced in relation to a person’s “temperament”, which he 
illustrated with the example of inhabitants of a city who are told that the enemy is 
approaching. Descartes considered the “initial judgment about the evil that may befall 
them, as resulting from an action of their soul, not a passion.” Suffering a passion (e.g. 
feeling fear), on the other hand, depends on habit, as not all people are “equally disturbed 
by it [the approaching enemy] emotionally.” Furthermore, Descartes suggested that the 
production of passions is triggered by a judgment (e.g. the city will be destroyed), or by 
imagining the consequences of the event (e.g. producing brain “images” of slaughter and 
destruction).344  
 
Descartes finished with a brief explanation of the mechanism of the bodily 
manifestations of fear: “spirits” flow from the nerves to the muscles and heart, producing 
the somatic changes of fear (e.g. paleness), whereas further agitation of the spirits produces 
images in the brain that result in the passion of fear in the soul. Elisabeth was impressed by 
this explanation but asked Descartes for clarifications on the manner in which the agitation 
                                                                                                                                                    
on spirits is provided in PS 7: “The nerves are like little filaments or pipes all coming from the 
brain; and, like the brain, they contain a highly subtle air or wind known as the animal spirits.” 
Descartes compares the spirits to “a kind of fire kept going by the blood from the veins” this fire 
being “the bodily principle of the movement of all our limbs.” PS 10 is entitled “How the animal 
spirits are produced in the brain,” In this section, Descartes describes the spirits as “the swiftest and 
most subtle parts of the blood that have been rarefied in the heart,” and which “are constantly 
flooding into the cavities of the brain.” This is followed by the most comprehensive definition of 
“spirits”: “For what I call ‘spirits’ here are only bodies, and their only properties are that they are 
very small and fast-moving…As a result they are never stationary, but while some are flowing into 
the cavities of the brain, others are simultaneously flowing out through the pores of the substance of 
that organ. Through the pores they are conveyed into the nerves, and thence into the muscles, by 
means of which process they move the body in all the various ways it can be moved” (PS 10). 
343 Hassing (Hassing, 2015, p. 6) suggests that Descartes used the term “thought” in both a narrow 
and a broad sense. In a narrow sense a thought is a clear and distinct cognition or volition, whereas 
in the wide sense, thoughts are “obscure and confused” objects such as sense-perceptions, internal 
(bodily) sensations (e.g. pain), appetites (e.g. thirst), memories, imaginations, judgments and 
passions. 
344 In other words, judgment and imagination are sufficient to produce passions, but passions do not 
consist in judgments or imaginations. 
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of the spirits in the body produces passions in the soul (Letter 28 October 1645; AT 4:320). 
This was not explained in Descartes’s response (Letter 3 November 1645; AT 4:330). 
 
Several months later (Letter 25 April 1646; AT 4:403) Elisabeth, who by then had a 
copy of PS, insisted on a clearer explanation of the mechanism of the passions. Her main 
objection was about the mechanism by which the spirits produce “the five basic 
passions”345 given that passions are rarely ‘pure’ (e.g. hatred may be accompanied by 
anger) and also depend on the person’s temperament.346 Moreover, Elisabeth also wanted to 
know how passions can be distinguished from their physiological causes, and more 
importantly, given Descartes’s mechanistic explanation of the passions, how remedies can 
be effective in the context of a life that is both contingent and unpredictable (Brown, 2006, 
p. 23).  
 
While answers to these relevant questions are not to be found in PS, this important 
work marks the beginning of psychophysical reductionism, that is, the explanation of 
psychological phenomena as being produced solely by specific physiological mechanisms. 
For a fully reductionist account passions are understood as nothing but physiological 
events. PS provides a step in this direction due to its novel method of understanding the 
passions as able to be analysed in terms of their putative biophysical components.347 The 
humanistic treatment of fear is not only ignored by the new Cartesian philosophy, strongly 
rooted in the new science of Galileo and Harvey, but even treated with scorn. "I will treat 
the passions as a physicist" stated Descartes at the beginning of the treatise in order to 
separate his philosophy from the humanist and Aristotelian tradition. The break with 
Hellenistic philosophy is explicit in his remark that "there is nothing in which the 
                                                 
345 There are six basic passions listed in PS: wonder, hate, love, desire, joy and sadness. 
Interestingly, fear does not appear in this list. 
346 “For instance, love is always accompanied by desire and joy, or by desire and sadness… Indeed, 
the specific difference you find in each passion varies with individual temperaments” (Letter 25 
April 1646; AT 4:403). 
347 The reduction of psychological phenomena to physics is well rendered by Thomas Nagel (Nagel, 
2012). Reductionism of emotions does not start with Descartes (Nagel, 2012, p. 4), but his texts 
became extremely influential, and albeit with protestations (see Damasio, Chapter seven) still 
constitute the main framework for their analysis. 
 155 
shortcomings of the sciences we have inherited from the Ancients more clearly appear than 
in the writings on the passions" (PS 1).348 I will now discuss the novelty of the Cartesian 
proposal for the mechanism of the passions.  
 
6.4. Descartes’s philosophy of the passions 
Descartes was heavily influenced by the discovery of the system of the circulation 
of the blood by William Harvey in 1628 (less than 20 years before the publication of PS) 
(Harvey, 1628). Descartes was impressed by Harvey’s description of a circulatory system 
for nourishing the body, and he designed a mechanism for the passions that paralleled 
Harvey’s. Thus, Descartes’s system also has the heart as a central organ, providing 
‘nourishment’ for the soul based on the circulation of “animal spirits”. But before 
examining Descartes’s mechanism of the passions in more detail, several conceptual 
clarifications are in place. 
 
6.4.1. Descartes’s definition of the passions 
As previously mentioned, in the letters to Princess Elizabeth Descartes defines 
‘passion’ as a thought produced in the soul by the agitation of bodily spirits. He provides a 
more elaborated definition in PS, where he states that the passions of the soul are 
"perceptions, sensations, or emotions" caused, maintained and fortified by the movement of 
the spirits (PS 7). A ‘passion-perception’ is any thought that is not a volition (otherwise it 
will be an action rather than a passion), a ‘passion-sensation’ is a sensation “received in the 
soul”, such as feeling hungry; and a ‘passion-emotion’ is a thought that most strongly 
agitates the soul (S. James, 1999, p. 94). As already noted, Descartes postulated 
wonderment, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness as the six fundamental human passions 
(PS 53-57). He considered wonderment as the principal passion, produced by being 
exposed to a novel object. The (secondary) passions of fear, hope, jealousy and 
complacency were grouped together, given that hope and fear are produced "by a desire 
that is more or less likely to occur" (PS 58).349 Both jealousy and complacency were 
considered different types of fear. On the other hand, terror has an unclear position in 
                                                 
348 Remarks are cited as originally numbered in PS. 
349 Descartes used the French crainte to design the initial affective apprehension of danger, whereas 
peur was used to denote a sudden urge to flee (Descartes, 2015, p. 288). 
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Descartes’s system of the passions. He considers terror as an excess of fear and 
astonishment, and not a true passion (PS 176). Nevertheless, he also considered terror to be 
an exception to his position that all the passions are beneficial, as it produces a paralysis of 
the body, which becomes “powerless to resist the evils it thinks are imminent” (PS 174-
175). By this, Descartes implicitly admits terror as a type of passion. 
 
Descartes famously stated that the soul “has its main seat in the little [pineal] 
gland", through which the soul "radiates" spirits, nerves and blood to the rest of the body 
(PS 34). He proposed that the sole function of the soul is to produce thoughts, which can be 
of two types: actions which are always volitions;350 or passions, which are "kinds of 
perception or knowledge" (PS 17) produced in the soul by representations of internal or 
external stimuli. Hassing (Hassing, 2015, p. 7) terms the basic principle of Cartesian 
dualism as “motion-thought,” that is, motions in the pineal gland producing thoughts in the 
soul. This system replaces the Aristotelian hylomorphism, where form and matter are 
principles of a single substance not interacting with each other. The Cartesian “motion-
thought” is an innate and relatively rigid system activated by stimuli producing a unique 
movement in the pineal gland, which causes a single passion in the soul. These constrained 
definitions and concepts require careful unpacking for a proper understanding of the 
Cartesian mechanism of the passions in general, and fear in particular, and this is provided 
below. 
 
6.4.2. The machinery of the passions 
Descartes begins PS by describing the elements that constitute the ‘spiritual 
circulatory system'. The main components are the nerves ("little filaments or pipes" (PS 
10)) coming from the brain which contain the "animal spirits", in turn a "highly subtle air" 
arising from the blood after being "rarefied" in the heart (PS 10). Like the blood in 
Harvey’s circulatory system, the animal spirits are in constant motion, from the brain 
cavities to the rest of the body.351 The core of the Cartesian system is the mechanism of 
                                                 
350 "volition being the only or at least the principal action of the soul" (PS 13). 
351 Descartes used a rich metaphorical language, where the spirits are a "subtle air" coming from 
"rarefied" blood. The spirits are true matter, "very small and fast-moving" bodies (PS 10). 
Metaphors are frequently used in the PS to 'explain' physical phenomena linguistically in the 
absence of empirical information. 
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perception, by which stimuli external (e.g. light) or internal (e.g. hunger) to the body push 
the spirits inside the nerves towards the brain. From this organ, the spirits move in two 
directions: towards the soul by moving the pineal gland,352 or towards the muscles of the 
limbs through efferent nerves. The soul 'perceives' through the movements of the pineal 
gland, and these movements are produced either by the nerves or by the outflow of spirits 
from the pores of the brain (see Figure 1 below for a schematic representation of this 
mechanism). The next question to be addressed is how this whole system works. 
 
6.4.3. Descartes’s physiology of the passions  
Descartes suggests two mechanisms to produce the passions. The first, and simplest, 
is a ‘reflex’ mechanism in which a stimulus produces a motor response independent of the 
passion,353 and the second, a ‘complex’ mechanism, in which the motor response results 
from a passion. Both mechanisms are described below, and the implications for Descartes’s 
concept of fear will become clearer.  
 
The ‘reflex’ mechanism is discussed in Article 38 of PS entitled “An example of the 
movement of the body that accompany the passions and do not depend on the soul”. The 
system is activated by the sudden perception of an object (an animal in Descartes’s 
example),354 which imprints an image in the pineal gland. The perception of a frightful 
stimulus activates the legs for a flight response; and this motor act produces a movement of 
the spirits, and consequently of the pineal gland, “by means of which the soul feels and 
perceives this flight” (PS 38; see Figure 2 for a schematic representation of the reflex 
model).355 The example provided by Descartes is the response of closing our eyelids when 
                                                 
352 Descartes decided on the pineal gland as the brain structure 'communicating' stimuli to the soul 
given that this is the only brain midline structure. The mechanism by which the pineal gland 
interacts with the soul remains unexplained, and this is one of the major objections that Elisabeth 
posed to Descartes’s system of passions. 
353 Descartes considers sense-perception to be the most frequent stimulus producing passions. Other 
stimuli are thoughts produced by “bodily temperament” or by brain impressions (PS 51). 
354 Passions are only produced by specific representations (e.g. seeing a piece of paper only 
produces a visual representation simpliciter), whereas reading what is written in that piece of paper 
(e.g. a love letter) produces both a perception and a passion. 
355 A more complex schematic representation of Descartes’s machinery of the passions is presented 
by Hatfield (Hatfield, 2007, pp. 23-25). 
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a fist, even the fist of a friend, is suddenly aimed at our face. The soul is not involved in the 
motor response, as this reflex action cannot be inhibited by the will.  
 
What requires clarification now is how the simple movements of the pineal gland 
are able to produce all the different passions, a query raised by Princess Elisabeth. The 
response to this question is provided, rather confusingly, in Article 51, where Descartes 
describes the “ultimate causes of the passions,” which occur when the soul ‘thinks’ about a 
specific object (for instance, a frightening bear), as influenced by “bodily temperament”356 
(a typical innate way of responding with a specific passion), by “random impressions in the 
brain” such as feeling sad or happy for no apparent reason,357 but primarily, by the 
attributes of the objects “moving the senses.”358  
 
6.4.4. The purpose of the passions 
Descartes considered the principal function of the passions to be “to dispose the 
soul to will those things that…are [naturally] useful to us” (PS 52); in the same way, the 
animal spirits move the body towards a desired goal. An example may help to clarify this 
rather cryptic statement. The sense-perception of a bear may produce fear in the soul as the 
first passion. Depending on the individual’s “physical temperament”, “strength of mind,” 
and previous outcomes in similar situations, the movement of the pineal gland may 
generate either of the two opposite passions: boldness or terror359. For instance, an 
individual with a fearful temperament who has a history of bad outcomes develops a 
disposition to being fearful. In this case, the image of a dangerous object flows through a 
                                                 
356 This is a remnant in the Cartesian system of the passions of the Galenic humoral theory. Based 
on this theory, the individual’s humours influence the type of passion that results from the 
movement of the pineal gland. 
357 In this case, it is the mood of the individual that influences the production of a passion. For 
instance, an individual with a fearful brain ‘imprint’ will tend to produce the passion of fear. 
358 This is a tautological statement, where a frightening image will produce the passion of fear in the 
soul. But the key question is: what makes the image ‘frightening’? This relevant conceptual 
problem is discussed below. 
359 Levy (Levy, 2011, p. 342) suggests that most passions referred to in PS are “associative 
emotions” given that in Descartes’s system, passions such as fear or joy are the habitual bodily 
response to specific objects. In other words, the emotional response is associated, through habit, 
with specific triggering objects. 
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brain ‘primed’ by previous negative experiences, which innervates the muscles for a flight 
response. The heart is also stimulated to produce more animal spirits that flow to the brain 
to sustain and augment the passion of fear (this is the ‘complex’ mechanism illustrated in 
Figure 3). To the question, why is it that some people feel boldness and others terror, 
Descartes simply responds that since “our brains are not all disposed in the same way” (PS 
39), the same movement of the pineal gland produces different passions in different people. 
It is important to note that the passions are unable to directly produce or arrest bodily 
movements, but they are able to “incite and dispose” the soul “to will” the acts for which 
the body has been prepared by the spirits. 
 
Thus, for instance, “the sensation of terror encourages it [i.e. the body] to flee” (PS 
40). Once the soul “wills” an action, animal spirits move the pineal gland to enact the 
behaviour. Another indirect way of producing an action is to “consider the reasons, objects 
or examples” and “represent” the elements usually associated with the passion “we want to 
have” (PS 45). For instance, to switch from terror to boldness, it is not sufficient to will to 
do so, but we need to reason “and persuade [ourselves] that the danger is not all that 
great…that we can look forward to the glory and joy of victory” (PS 45). 
 
6.5. Conflicts between soul and body 
Since they are ontologically independent and both have the capacity to generate 
behaviours, soul and body can potentially generate opposite actions. In PS 47 Descartes 
depicts a scenario in which the soul by means of the will, and the body by means of the 
animal spirits, want to move the pineal gland in opposite directions.360 In Descartes’s 
system, the animal spirits can only move the pineal gland in two directions. The first 
movement is produced by external sense-perceptions or by internal brain “impressions” 
which “exert no pressure in the will” and is therefore independent of the soul (PS 47). The 
second type of movement produces passions in the soul and exerts “some pressure” on the 
will (PS 47). Only the second type of movement can generate a conflict between passions 
                                                 
360 In this same Article, Descartes criticised the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition by denying the 
presence of hierarchies in the soul and potential conflicts between the ‘higher’ rational part and the 
‘lower’ sensitive part, stressing the existence of a single and undivided soul (“one and the same soul 
is sensitive and rational, and all its appetites are acts of will” (PS 47)).  
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and volitions. For instance, seeing a bear produces a movement of the pineal gland that 
generates fear in the soul and a flight response. To oppose this behaviour, a flux of spirits is 
generated by ‘virtuous’ volitions in the soul, which moves the pineal gland in the contrary 
direction and generates the passion of courage and a fight response (Figure 3).  
 
At this point it is important to remember that Descartes considered that volitions 
cannot act directly on the passions but only indirectly, by moving the pineal gland and 
generating antagonistic behaviours. Thus, in the case of fear, this passion generated in the 
soul moves the pineal gland to generate a flight response, whereas the contrary movements 
produced by the will may move the pineal gland to produce a fight response. These series 
of pulls and pushes make the soul “almost simultaneously, to desire and not to desire one 
and the same thing” (PS 47).  
 
A second type of conflict occurs, when for example, a dangerous object produces 
terror in the soul while simultaneously the animal spirits activate a flight response without 
“the contribution” of the soul. The soul, which first produced the passion of terror, on 
perceiving a bodily movement of flight may will the individual to act courageously, thus 
stopping the flight response (PS 47). In this conflict between the soul and the body those 
with the strongest soul will be the ablest to control their bodily passions. According to 
Descartes the strongest souls are furnished with “firm and definite judgments concerning 
the difference between good and evil” (PS 48), while the weakest souls are “swept away by 
the passions of the moment, which…reduce the soul to the most deplorable possible state” 
(PS 48). But having a strong soul is not sufficient to produce virtuous behaviour, since 
“knowledge of the truth” is required to guide behaviour (PS 49). 
 
This is, in general terms, the rather convoluted and at times confusing Cartesian 
system of the passions. As stated by Hassing (Hassing, 2015, p. 55), “we begin to wonder if 
there is anything of our experience and behaviour for which Descartes could not make up a 
story in terms of pineal gland, animal spirits, thought-motion association, etc.” Descartes’ 
system of the passions seems to be infallible in being able to account for any contingency, 
but important conceptual knots in the system require specific discussion.  
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Figure 1. Descartes’s generic system of the passions 
This diagram depicts Descartes’s generic system for how the passion of fear arises in response to an 
external stimulus (e.g. a bear) or an internal stimulus (e.g. the idea of a future misfortune). The 
spirits transporting images produced in the brain by internal or external stimuli both move the 























Figure 2. Descartes’s ‘reflex’ mechanism of the passions 
This scheme depicts the mechanism by which a response to fear is enacted before feeling the 
passion of terror. In this schema, a given stimulus (usually external) prints an image of the fearful 
object in the pineal gland. This action moves the gland, and simultaneously a flux of spirits is 
generated towards the muscles for a flight response. In turn, these bodily movements generate a flux 





























Figure 3. Descartes’s ‘complex’ mechanism of the passions 
This scheme depicts Descartes’s ‘complex’ mechanism of the passions. Fear is generated in 
the soul based on external stimuli or memories of fearful events. The passion of fear thus generated 
interacts with memories of past outcomes (good or bad), which, together with the individual’s 
personality, result in the behaviours of courage (fight response) or terror (flight response). The 
behavioural response is sustained by a loop involving the heart, which sends additional spirits to the 
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6.6. Conceptual problems with Descartes’s mechanism of the passions 
Descartes’s proposal of a physiological (‘hydraulic’) mechanism for the passions 
has historical interest only and is irrelevant to discussions of his philosophical concept of 
the passions. Dualism has been debated as a plausible explanation for the mechanism of 
emotions well into the 20th century (Popper & Eccles, 1977), and is still a subject of debate 
in philosophy of mind. However, again, this is of no central relevance to this chapter, 
whose main aim is to discuss the philosophical concepts of fear and the therapeutic 
suggestions gleaned from such concepts. Cartesian dualism is certainly alive in 
contemporary neuroscience as I shall discuss in the next chapters.  
 
One of the main conceptual problems with Descartes’s apparatus of the passions is 
present in both the ‘reflex’ and ‘complex’ mechanisms described above. Briefly, Descartes 
suggests that fear is produced by two mechanisms depending on whether the soul is 
involved. The ‘reflex’ mechanism starts with the image of the dangerous object being 
associated with memories of similar events in the brain cavities, followed by the animal 
spirits flowing to the lower limbs to activate a flight response. This seemingly simple 
explanation includes several unsupported assumptions. The first question is what makes a 
particular image (e.g. of a bear) “very strange and very terrifying” (PS 36). Descartes’s 
simple answer is that fear is produced by the “close affinity” between the external image 
and memories of harmful events located in the brain cavities. Provided that images can be 
stored in the brain (a contentious topic discussed in the next chapter), we are still left with 
the problem of comparing images.  
 
Assuming that there is a brain structure capable of bringing memory images to the 
fore, these have to be compared with the image produced by sense-perception which 
requires a ‘comparator’ capable of judging similarities between the images. Such a 
judgment has to be validated against definite criteria, which can only be provided by a 
comparator having its own memory system, thus falling into a regress. The second problem 
is that Descartes did not define the meaning of “affinity.” If the meaning in the case of fear 
is the dangerousness of the object, the problem is how a value judgment is extracted from 
an image. In other words, what makes the image of a bear “dangerous”? Is the image of a 
bear always dangerous, even when it is printed in a picture book, or when the image is of a 
bear in a zoo? Brown (Brown, 2006, p. 46) has suggested a mechanism where “the danger 
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of the wolf” is “transmitted” to the soul in terms of its physical attributes (e.g. colour and 
shape) without the need of a special “apprehension” of danger. But this is different from 
Descartes’s proposal, which combines the image with a value judgment based on a putative 
affinity with memory images. More importantly, it does not explain how fear is produced 
based on physical qualities alone.  
 
Another significant problem stressed by Susan James (S. James, 1999, p. 105) is the 
lack of consideration of contextual factors in Descartes’s account. After all, the fearfulness 
of an object is not an intrinsic quality, but depends on several factors external to the object, 
such as the state of the agent (e.g. being sick or in good health), the place in which the 
encounter occurs, whether the agent is alone or in the company of individuals who can 
provide protection, and the experience of previous encounters. 
 
Two further problems were brought up by Princess Elisabeth. Descartes’s proposal 
is that fear in the soul is produced by a specific movement of the pineal gland but this 
interaction between the soul as res cogitans and the pineal gland as res extensa (the soul is 
effected by the body and produces somatic responses through the movements of the gland 
only) was incomprehensible to Elisabeth and one of her main criticisms of Descartes’s 
system—an early version of the classic attack against his dualism.361 In addition to this 
infamous ontological problem, Elizabeth also drew attention to the fact that passions are 
complex constructs and commonly occur in combination. Thus, it may be difficult to 
discriminate envy from ambition, or apprehension from fear.362  
 
The production of “volitions” is also an important conceptual knot requiring 
clarification. According to Descartes passions do not directly produce actions, but rather 
“incite and dispose the soul to will the acts…so that the sensation of terror encourages it 
[the soul] to wish to flee” (PS 40). Acts are produced by volitions of the soul, but how these 
volitions are generated is unclear. Descartes states that volitions are produced by the will, 
                                                 
361 This problem has been extensively debated and will not be further analysed here. 
362 PS 166 provides other examples: “when hope is…strong…it becomes complacency or 
confidence,” and “when fear is so extreme that it leaves no room at all for hope…it is transformed 
in despair.” 
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which is endowed with “its own weapons”, basically the capacity to make value-
judgements about what is good and what is evil (PS 48). The Cartesian (free) will also has 
several psychological attributes such as being weak or strong, making good or bad 
decisions, being susceptible to being pulled or pushed by the passions, or on the contrary, 
being capable of resisting the “pressure” of some passions. But these attributes of the will 
rely simply upon metaphors that cover for a lack of a proper explanation about how the 
passions generate specific cognitions and actions. For example, the passion of fear 
‘produces’ a given behaviour (for instance, a flight response), although the will may react 
to this response by ‘producing’ courageous behaviour instead (PS 47). Similar problems are 
found in current critical literature on PS. Thus Brown (Brown, 2006, p. 22) suggests that 
the passions are able to bring specific sensations “to the foreground of the mind’s 
attention,” holding them in working memory for the soul to make a rational decision. 
Brown is proposing a ‘Cartesian theatre’ where the passions can somehow set up images to 
be attended to and worked out by the soul. This goes back to the Aristotelian model of the 
mind (the soul having a vis estimativa) which Descartes wished to reject with his proposal 
of a unitary soul, both sensitive and rational (PS 47, 68). However, images can be 
ambiguous: the image of a physician, for example, could equally represent a feared 
sickness or the person who will protect against an illness. It might well be asked whether a 
hypochondriac with the image of a physician, conjures up a representation of health or 
death? 
 
Another conceptual problem is that behaviour and passion are not independent 
entities. Behaving in a fearful way is an essential part of the concept of fear and not just a 
post-effect of the passion. If someone says he is in terror but continues calmly playing cards 
with his partner, his statement will be understood as a joke or as irrational. If a child says he 
is scared but keeps playing in the sandpit, we would conclude he has not yet mastered the 
concept of being scared and is using the word incorrectly. On occasions, fear is manifested 
in a specific behaviour, without the agent being conscious of being afraid. This is the case 
when on my usual drive to work I avoid driving through dangerous neighbourhoods, or 
when I always use the train rather than planes due to my fear of flying. Moreover, to go 
back to the previous point, it is unclear which images could ‘represent’ the above types of 
fear-related behaviours. These difficulties lead to another conceptual problem which is 
rarely discussed, that is, that Descartes treats fear in the narrow sense of an individual being 
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exposed to a dangerous object.363 The examples of fear provided in PS (e.g. suddenly being 
exposed to an animal) relate to only a minor proportion of human fears. Fear should not be 
reduced to a feeling produced by sudden dangerous events, as people also fear life events 
that cannot be represented in a concrete way, such as the ominous impact of an economic 
recession on their jobs, discovering a lump in the body and worrying about having a fatal 
disease, and becoming concerned about the probable exposure of one’s adolescent children 
to alcohol and drugs.  
 
In the Cartesian model of passions, as already noted, memory plays an important 
role both in the production of passions and in the selection of behavioural responses. 
According to Descartes, remembering depends on the soul’s “wishes to remember” (PS 42), 
which move the pineal gland to send animal spirits to "different places of the brain" until 
those wishes find traces left by the object "we wish to remember" (PS 42). This is 
facilitated by the fact that the object to be remembered has produced repeated movements 
of the spirits, making the pores of the brain more susceptible to being reopened upon 
successive presentations of the same object. This habit assists the flow of spirits towards 
the pineal gland, "which represents the same objects to the soul, so that it realises that this 
is the thing it wanted to remember" (PS 40). It is obvious that this system is riddled with 
conceptual difficulties. I will briefly address the most prominent of them. Descartes’s 
system bestows the animal spirits with the capacity to remember, since they flow “through 
the different corners of the brain” (PS 42) in search of the memory image. Thus, the spirits 
already have a concept or an image of what they are looking for as well as the capacity to 
compare images, which implies they have their own memory system.364  
 
The conceptual objections to the Cartesian system of passions outlined above would 
be of historical relevance only if the concepts had been discarded together with the 
hydraulic mechanism. However, as I shall discuss in the next chapter, similar conceptual 
                                                 
363 As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the same reductionist concept of fear affects its treatment 
in current philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience. 
364 A similar problem lies with Descartes’s statement that a specific movement of the pineal gland 
"represents the same object to the soul, so that it realizes that this is the thing it wanted to 
remember" (PS 42).  
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flaws resurface in the work of William James, one of the most prominent philosophers and 
psychologists of the 19th century, as well as in recent trends in analysing human emotions 
in the growing field of the neurosciences. 
 
6.7. The Cartesian concept of fear 
Fear is not only excluded from the six principal passions proposed by Descartes, but 
it is not even discussed as an individual passion, unlike others that may have less impact on 
life, such as disdain (PS 163) or derision (PS 178). Furthermore, the concept of fear is not 
cohesively rendered in PS. For instance, in PS 36 Descartes uses fear to illustrate the 
automatic mechanism of passions (see Figure 1). Fear is described as a specific behavioural 
(flight) response after seeing a “frightful” object, but also defined as a passion instituted by 
nature to dispose the soul to produce volitions for the safety of the body. In the example, 
fear is already implied in providing value to the object, and the question again arises as to 
how the perception is qualified as frightful. The response is provided in PS 37, where 
Descartes states that the “terrifying” attribute of an object is based on shared similarities 
with memories of “harmful” objects. In PS 38 Descartes simply describes fear as a flight 
reaction, but a more elaborated definition of fear is provided in PS 165, where fear is 
described as “a disposition of the soul, which persuades it that the thing [in this case, what 
is desired] that will not come to pass”. This definition is provided as a counterpart to hope 
without description of an intervening mechanism. Part Three introduces “indecision” as a 
type of fear (PS 170), defined as the situation in which the soul is unable to decide between 
different courses of action. This state of uncertainty may be increased by the fear of making 
a bad decision. Descartes also provides definitions for some other passions related to fear. 
Thus, he defined “faint-heartedness” as a “lethargy” preventing the performance of a given 
action (PS 174). This passion is transformed into “terror or horror” when mixed with the 
passions of astonishment and fear (PS 176). Given the limited attention that Descartes gives 
to the passion of fear, it should not be surprising that his therapy of the passions should 
provide limited options for fear and related passions, and this is the focus of the next 
section. 
 
6.8. Descartes’s treatment of the passions 
I have already discussed Descartes’s therapies in the practical context of his advice 
to Princess Elisabeth. His more formal discussion of treatments for the disruptions of the 
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passions is mostly based on Neo-Stoic arguments and unrelated to the sophisticated 
mechanism proposed in the first two parts of PS. Most of Part Three deals with the proper 
management of the passions, and Descartes finishes the treatise with an article entitled “A 
universal remedy for the passions” (PS 211)365 in which he voices his well-known 
conclusion that “it is the passions alone that make for all that is good or bad in this life.” 
The “remedies” for the passions, claimed Descartes “would be sufficient if everyone took 
the trouble to apply them.” Thus, not only had Descartes clarified once and for all the 
mechanism of the passions in Part One of the PS, but in Part three he explains the definitive 
therapy. Let us then discuss Descartes’s remedies for the passions and their potential 
usefulness. 
 
Against the Stoic tradition, Descartes considered the passions to be positive guides 
for human life, and in need of control but not extirpation (PS 170). During the 17th century, 
most thinkers considered the passions to be helpful when they were properly directed, 
thereby producing positive habits to strengthen the moral virtues (Hatfield, 2007, p. 7). For 
instance, in the case of indecision, Descartes suggests developing the habit of forming 
“definite and determinate judgments about whatever things we are confronted with” (PS 
170), and to accept that we are doing our best when judging the most adequate way to act, 
even when it may end up being wrong. 
 
Perhaps the essential aspects of Descartes’s therapy of the passions are conveyed in 
PS 156, an article entitled “The properties of nobility of soul, and how it acts as a remedy 
for all the disorders of the passions”. In this article Descartes suggests that being virtuous 
is the best remedy for the passions. What is being virtuous for Descartes? It is being “most 
humble”, and having a natural capacity for doing “great things” while at the same time 
knowing the true extent of one’s capacities. Nobility of soul consists in having a “firm and 
constant resolution” to use one’s free will to undertake those actions considered to be the 
best using the force of understanding (PS 153). The Cartesian virtuous person is in full 
                                                 
365 This title illustrates important conceptual contradictions in PS, where passions are considered as 
always being good for the individual and yet some of them are in need of treatment due to 
becoming excessive (such as fear changing into terror) or inappropriate to the situation (such as a 
flight response triggered by fear when courage and a fight response would be more appropriate). 
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control of their passions, and “always perfectly courteous, affable, and helpful towards one 
and all”. Their desires are modest, since they do not esteem anything as having great value; 
they never hate since they “esteem all human beings”; and never have terror, being 
strengthened by the “confidence in their own virtue”. Finally, the Cartesian person of virtue 
is never angry given that they will never be upset by events outside their control, such as 
what their “enemies” may plot against them.  
 
In a letter to Princess Elisabeth (18 May 1645; AT 4:200) Descartes adds that the 
main difference between noble and vulgar souls is that the latter’s happiness depends 
totally on the facts of life, whereas noble souls, in possession of a strong and powerful 
mind, are able to use reason to control all passions, thus achieving “perfect felicity,” a 
heavenly happiness they can “enjoy already in this life.” The Stoic sage may pale in 
comparison with the Cartesian noble, and Elisabeth may have felt that Cartesian sainthood 
was an impossible goal. In the case that her cure depends on achieving the Cartesian 
virtuosity she will never be healed. 
 
Descartes also provided additional advice for treating excessive passions. A 
successful therapy of the passions requires self-examination to determine the “strength and 
weakness in a soul” (PS 48). For instance, some people are unable to make definite 
judgments about choosing virtuously and deciding on an appropriate course of action. Their 
souls are dominated by passions such as fear, reducing “the soul to the most deplorable 
possible state” of doubts, irresolution and inaction (PS 48). Regrettably, when a soul 
oscillates between fear and ambition it is condemned “to wretched slavery” (PS 48), and 
when under the passion of terror, the individual so affected will always have the desire to 
flee rather than honourably confront danger. The challenge for these weak souls is how to 
change the automatic movements of the pineal gland which produce fear and terror. To this 
end, Descartes recommends the technique of diversion, thus detaching the noxious 
movements of the gland created “by force of habit” and developing new healthier 
movements of the gland and spirits. He further considers this change may be achieved “by a 
single action”, similarly to the way dogs can be easily trained not to run after hearing a shot 
(PS 50). Descartes is confident that if animals can so easily change their hydraulic 
machinery, humans who are endowed with reason should certainly be even more 
successful: “even those who have the weakest souls could acquire a very absolute 
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command of all their passions, if one were to take the trouble to train them and guide them 
properly” (PS 50).366 I shall now describe Descartes’s method for producing this change. 
 
Descartes considered that passions cannot be controlled voluntarily given that they 
are independent from “acts of the will.” Therefore, he suggested an indirect method 
consisting in thinking about the passions one wants to obtain, which is contrary to the 
passion to be supressed. This requires several cognitive steps, such as, in the case of fear, 
examining the dangerousness of the object and considering reasons for ‘willing’ a specific 
response based on previous examples. Thus, one can convince oneself “that the danger is 
not at all great” and that by being courageous rather than fearful “we can look forward to 
the glory and joy of victory” rather than suffering the shame of fleeing (PS 45). Descartes 
further suggested that the activity of the soul can easily control “lesser passions” (PS 46) 
but not the most violent ones, given the great excitation with which they affect the heart 
and spirits. In this situation, his advice for overcoming the violent passions was to wait 
until after “the excitation of the blood and spirits had passed” (PS 46).   
 
6.8.1. Descartes’s treatment of fear 
Following the Stoic tradition relating to fear, Descartes accepts the inevitability of 
‘first movements’ (see Chapter three), but refers to them as affecting those who have a 
“strong natural propensity” to fear (PS 211). In such cases, a stimulus may produce a 
marked impact on the imagination and produce tremor as an expression of fear. While for 
Seneca first movements had no emotional value, Descartes considers them as useful, since 
“the blood stirred in this way” alerts a person to the fact that it is easy to be deceived by the 
imagination, and therefore, he recommends that it is better to wait before acting on the 
stimulus.367  
                                                 
366 In her detailed study of Descartes’s treatise, Brown (Brown, 2006, p. 7) suggests that the 
passions are the “lynch pins of mind-body unity”. This interpretation could be reversed. In his bold 
attempt at completing a definitive study of psycho-physical human attributes, Descartes, for whom, 
as he admitted, the passions play a central role, may be using the dualistic mechanism as the axis 
around which all human behaviour is explained.  
367 This has, again, strong Stoic resonance. Before acting based on a passion, the Stoic philosopher 
Epictetus recommends: “Wait a while for me, my impression, let me see what you are, and what 
you’re an impression of; let me test you out” (Epictetus, 1998) (Discourses 2.18.24). 
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For the treatment of fear Descartes’s advice is to aim at distracting oneself with 
other thoughts until time and tranquillity have altogether calmed the blood disturbance (PS 
46). In the case of terror, Descartes suggests using the ancient remedy of premeditation. He 
considers that thinking about negative outcomes in advance will allow the person to prepare 
“for all events the fear of which might give rise to it” (PS 176). Descartes explains the 
technique of premeditation in terms of his dualistic physiology as the activity of “separating 
within oneself the movements of the blood and the spirits from the thoughts to which they 
are habitually attached” (PS 176). Descartes did not elaborate on this mechanism, although 
he was aware of the complexity in the implementation of his advice, stating that “there are 
few people who are sufficiently prepared” for such a feat.368 When danger is imminent and 
one is seized by fear, there is no time for deliberation. Thoughts should then be displaced 
from the danger towards nobler notions, for instance, focusing “on the reasons why it is 
always much safer and more honourable to stand and fight than to flee” (PS 211). 
Nevertheless, Descartes seems to accept that some kind of deliberation is in place since he 
concedes that “if the odds are heavily against one, it is better to retreat honourably…than to 
expose oneself blindly to certain death” (PS 211). 
  
In conclusion, Descartes’s “universal remedy for the passions” is no more than a 
mixture of ancient philosophical techniques (mainly premeditation and distraction), 
combined with the Aristotelian advice on pursuing a virtuous life as the main source of 
happiness. The Passion of the Soul ends by stating, rather circularly, that mastering the 
passions is a sign of great wisdom, and that for the virtuous person even the evils caused by 
the passions can be a source of joy (PS 212). 
 
What was the impact of the treatise in real life? As for the therapeutic aspects of the 
text, little is known and it was soon forgotten. Nevertheless, we have in Princess Elisabeth 
an intelligent patient who provided revealing feedback on Descartes’s therapeutic 
technique. As discussed earlier in the chapter, Elisabeth told Descartes (Letter 10 June 
                                                 
368 “…the movements aroused in the blood by the objects of our passions follow so swiftly from 
mere impressions in the brain and the disposition of our organs, without any contribution from the 
soul, that there is no human wisdom capable of withstanding them if one is not sufficiently 
prepared” (PS 211). 
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1643; 3:683) about her limitations in meditating in accord with Cartesian rules, which 
basically consist of meditating on virtue by withdrawing oneself from sensory stimulation 
and all preconceptions.369 Elisabeth’s frustration is understandable as this advice is more 
relevant for philosophers investigating metaphysical matters whilst relieved from social 
duties than for a person hard-pressed by major life problems.370 The second remedy was to 
remind Elisabeth time and again that virtuous people are not enslaved by fears and can 
master them by the use of reason.371 This again proved to be of no benefit to Elisabeth who 
had “real reasons to be distressed” (Letter May or June 1645; AT 4:218). Descartes’s 
counsel was to use the Epicurean method of distraction:372 the distressing event had to be 
                                                 
369 “Indeed, I shall go so far as to say that I seek to be read by none, except those who will be able 
and willing to meditate seriously alongside me, and to withdraw their minds from the senses, and at 
the same time from all their preconceptions. Of these I well know already that there are very few” 
(Descartes, 1991; Introduction, p. 15). 
370 As already mentioned, Genevieve Lloyd (Lloyd, 2008) elaborated extensively on the therapeutic 
relationship between Descartes and Elisabeth. Since the Princess suffered from sadness, distress and 
anxiety, Lloyd's comments on Descartes’s therapy should be at least briefly mentioned. Like Nye 
(1999), she stresses the “asymmetry” (p.172) between the philosopher and his ‘patient’ and suggests 
that the notion of ‘providence’ underlies Descartes’s selection of Stoic remedies. By “asymmetry,” 
Lloyd means the gender hierarchy, as expressed in Descartes’s and Elisabeth’s different life-styles, 
social relations and daily problems, as well as their different approaches to self-knowledge. For 
instance, Elisabeth is unable to practice the meditation towards self-knowledge that Descartes 
recommends, but this is not due to any intrinsic limitations, but to gender differences in their 
opportunities and social roles. Descartes is unable to understand the reason why Elisabeth is not 
improved by his remedies, which are based on right reason and ultimately depend on God’s 
providence. The Princess writes to Descartes that she is enslaved by the physical weakness of her 
sex, although the implications of this statement, perhaps ironic, go beyond bodily differences and 
refer to a different embodiment in daily life practices (while the philosopher was able to practice the 
vita contemplativa, the Princess had to deal with actual misfortunes). In the end (Letter 18 May 
1645; AT 4:200) Descartes recommends the Princess to seek advice from true doctors. 
371 “…the difference there is between the greatest souls and those that are base and vulgar consists 
mainly in this, that vulgar souls give way to their passions, and are happy or unhappy only in so far 
as the things that happen to them are pleasant or unpleasant; whereas those of the other kind can 
reason so powerfully and convincingly that, although they too have passions, which are often 
indeed more vehement than those of common souls, their reason nonetheless remains in command, 
and ensures that even afflictions are of use to them, and contribute to the perfect happiness they 
enjoy even in this life” (Letter 18 May 1645; AT 4:200). 
372 “…if a person with any number of real reasons to be distressed applied himself so thoroughly to 
turning his imagination aside from them that he never thought of them, except when compelled by 
practical necessity, and devoted the rest of his time to thinking only about what could bring him 
contentment and joy, not only would this greatly help him to judge more wisely about matters of 
concern to him, because he would consider these without passion, I am certain that this alone would 
be capable of restoring him to health” (Letter May or June 1645; AT 4:218). 
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completely ignored and attention should be focused on cheerful subjects. Unfortunately, 
this strategy, as well as the use of premeditation and reading Stoic philosophers all failed. 
Elisabeth’s main problem was the impossibility of controlling her constant distress and 
worries about real life misfortunes even when considered irrational by Cartesian standards. 
Descartes believed that by rational thinking disturbing passions would be subdued, but this 
ignores the fact that a person in a state of distress and worry may be unable to think about 
lofty matters.373 
 
In contrast, Descartes’s conceptual approach to the passions, based on mind-body 
dualism had a very different fate. While his ideas were heavily criticised by renowned 
philosophers of his time, they survived in the “mechanical” school of medicine, which 
emerged in the 17th century with the aim of explaining medical phenomena in physiological 
terms. Descartes provided a basis for medicine to reduce mental phenomena to 
physiological changes.374 Ontologically and functionally, dualism could not be 
satisfactorily explained. Medicine eventually took over the treatment of fear from 
philosophers and the clergy, and the humanist tradition was lost. Descartes’s reduction of 
fear to the product of a hydraulic mechanism was perhaps unfortunate, as it re-oriented the 
understanding of this emotion away from philosophy, while still basing its treatment on a 





                                                 
373 Descartes himself could not help worrying about the risk of being condemned by the Calvinists 
in Leyden, and this fear was one of the main reasons he left the Low Countries for Sweden. 
374 Gaukroger (Gaukroger, 2002, p. 394) and other authors suggest caution when labelling the 
Cartesian system of the passion as ‘reductionist’. Part Three of PS, as already noted, is mostly about 
how to manage the passions using psychological tools, and Descartes’s approach to the passions is 
more holistic in this section of his work. But the aim here is not to blame Descartes for the problems 
of reductionism; I merely want to note the tremendous influence of dualism and reductionism that is 
present in current medicine, neurobiology, and even some trends in philosophy. This is discussed in 
the next chapters. 
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6.9. Humanism vs. Cartesianism375 
At this stage I should take stock and discuss some of the conclusions presented in 
this and the previous chapter. I have presented a rather benign picture of Hellenistic and 
Roman philosophy of fear, and also a positive analysis of Montaigne’s approach. Hobbes’s 
concept of fear has been considered as illuminating the use of this passion to cement human 
social organization, although the proposal of using fear as a tool for social control can only 
result in chronic anxiety. With Descartes, the overall conclusion regarding his 
conceptualization of fear appears to be negative, suggesting a conflict between humanism 
and Descartes’s concept and therapy of fear. It was Descartes himself who criticized the 
“Ancients” and in PS his aim was to treat the passions as a physiologist rather than a 
philosopher.  
 
My assessment of Descartes’s approach as being more negative than Montaigne’s is 
based on his less appealing and perhaps less fruitful approach to the therapy of fear. 
Montaigne teaches different types of fear, taking place in different times and contexts, and 
uses himself as a paragon of fear. In Seneca, we have a Stoic philosopher, but as I described 
in Chapter three, his approach to the treatment of fear is extremely eclectic, keeping his 
‘affiliation’ with Stoicism but using any remedy he considers adequate. Descartes’s concept 
and mechanism of the passions is very innovative, but in the end, incoherent. He applied 
the Galenic mechanical tradition to the field of the passions and opened a new way of 
looking into their physiology. He placed understanding of the passions on a scientific path, 
which offered the possibility of providing a better solution for the ravages of fear.376 But on 
the other hand, the therapy suggested by Descartes is not novel, and is mainly based on 
                                                 
375 The term ‘humanism’ derives from the Latin humanitas as used by Cicero, but it was only in the 
19th century that it became a noun standing for, among other things, a deep interest in the humane 
values in the literature and philosophy of ancient Greece and Rome (Kraye, 2010, p. 2). 
Renaissance humanism extended from the mid-14th century to the 17th century, and it is Descartes 
who develops a new philosophy that marks the end of humanism. Descartes’s advice on using 
ancient remedies in Part Three of PS could be considered as a return to humanist values, but as 
Lloyd remarks (Lloyd, 2008), Descartes main therapeutic concepts were drawn from ancient 
Stoicism and were based on ascetic detachment, reliance on ‘right reason,’ and faith in a 
providential God (p. 183). Descartes’s rigid Stoicism is very close to the one rejected by Montaigne 
and far removed from the nuanced Stoicism of Seneca. 
376 Discussing the transition of studying and treating passions from the philosophical to the 
scientific-medical domain will be the focus of the next chapters. 
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strict Stoic remedies. For Descartes, all passions have to be under rational control, and to 
this end, it is necessary to acquire a ‘nobility of soul’ manifested in virtuous actions. The 
Cartesian noble lives in perfect virtue, detached from the “vulgar,” and related to Divine 
providence. But most importantly, Descartes’s therapy does not follow from the mechanism 
of the passions that he attempted to describe with clockwork precision.  
 
On the other hand, Montaigne seems to only offer confusion. He was certainly not a 
systematic thinker, and yet reading the Essays is strongly therapeutic. Fear is prominent in 
his text, whilst it remains hidden in PS. Montaigne describes fear in himself, and teaches by 
example. He is able to adapt to the different circumstances in life, and mortality also 
becomes better accepted. In contrast, the Cartesian rules accept no bending, requiring clear 
and distinct ideas in the context of life events that are far from clear and distinct. They are 
fixed and enduring. Montaigne appreciated and valued human diversity, which stimulated 
the learning, understanding and acceptance of different life experiences, emotions, and 
ways of life, whereas Descartes saw diversity as an obstacle to his strategy of explaining 
the passions in terms of bodily machinery (De Marzio, 2010, p. 309).  
 
A few years before his death, Descartes wrote to a friend (Chanut, 15 June 1646 
(AT IV, 442) that he felt satisfied with his achievements in medicine “on which I have 
spent much more time” than on other scientific endeavours. Yet he acknowledged that 
“instead of finding ways to preserve life, I have found another, much easier and surer way, 
which is not to fear death.” Montaigne would have happily agreed with this conclusion, but 







James’s fears and Wittgenstein’s therapy 
 
Common-sense says…we meet a bear, are frightened and run…The hypothesis here to be defended 
says that this order of sequence is incorrect… 
[rather] we feel… afraid because we tremble 
William James, What is an Emotion? 1884, pp.247-248 
 
In the bear paragraph we find the roots of the oversimplified notion  
that emotion is nothing but physiological arousal 
Ellsworth, Williams James and Emotion, 1994, p.228 (Ellsworth, 1994)            
 
What is so frightful about fear? The trembling, the quick breathing, the feeling in the facial 
muscles? – When you say: “This fear, this uncertainty, is frightful!”  
– might you go on “If only I did not have this feeling in my stomach!”? 




 The last chapter examined the dawning of a new era in the concept of emotions 
brought by Descartes’s proposal of a mechanism for the passions couched in biological 
terms. From the perspective of the history this thesis traces, the Cartesian revolution relates 
not so much to the separation of soul and body, but to the advancement of a system for the 
emotions based on specific interactions between brain regions and motor effectors to 
produce behavioural responses. Descartes’s mechanistic tradition was mostly continued by 
physicians, such as the renowned Thomas Willis (1621-1675) (Willis, 1672), who ignored 
dualism but created a model of “human hydraulus” (Kassler, 1998), and physicians such as 
Franz Joseph Gall (Wickens, 2014, p. 134) who developed the theory of phrenology, where 
different mental functions have a precise localization in the brain cortex.377 
 
                                                 
377 Hobbes’s materialism (see Chapter five), which underlies his concept on the mechanism of 
passions, based on Harvey’s discovery of the blood circulatory system should also be recalled. 
Passions were for Hobbes no more than matter in motion, thus ‘aversion’ (his concept of fear) was 
defined together with ‘appetite’ as “the first endeavour of animal motion” (Hobbes, 1994) (De 
Corpore, chapter 25, 12-13). 
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 Many other theories of mind-brain interaction were advanced in the 17th and 18th 
centuries (S. James, 1999), but it was only by the end of the 19th century that the study of 
the mechanism of emotions was radically reformulated by the American philosopher, 
physician and psychologist William James (1842-1910) (Wassmann, 2014). James’s theory 
of emotions “became a landmark that physiologists, neuroscientists and historians alike 
refer to today” (Wassmann, 2014, p. 166), and it has also been highly influential in the 
fields of psychology and philosophy up to the present (Ellsworth, 1994; Reisenzein & 
Achim, 2014). One of the main reasons for a revival in the study of emotions in the 19th 
century was that the care of people with emotional problems progressed from being of 
interest to non-specialized medical practitioners in lunatic asylums, to become the specialty 
of psychiatry.378  
 
 During the 19th century there also was a growing interest in the study of brain 
functions and their relation to emotional and cognitive disturbances (Wassmann, 2014). By 
the end of the 19th century psychiatry became divided into a psychodynamic branch, led by 
Sigmund Freud in Vienna (see next chapter), and a biological branch lead by Emil 
Kraepelin in Munich (Berrios, 1996). Kraepelin pioneered the detailed examination of the 
brain to unravel the mechanism of emotional disorders, a tradition that is still current in the 
work of cognitive neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; 
Damasio & Carvalho, 2013). In parallel, during the first half of the 20th century, the 
Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein initiated one of the most significant 
philosophical movements of the century, with a strong interest in conceptual analysis which 
included profound reflections on the philosophy of emotions (Monk, 1991). In part 
Wittgenstein’s work responded to the way in which increasingly, especially during the 19th 
century, science made significant inroads into providing all-encompassing explanations of 
human psychology, a tendency known as ‘scientism’ (R. N. Williams & Robinson, 2014). 
Wittgenstein considered scientism as “a disease of the intellect” (Hacker, 2001, p. 272) to 
be extirpated by his new method of conceptual analysis. He was especially critical of 
James's theory of emotions, with its tendency towards reducing and explaining 
                                                 
378 The word ‘emotion’ was imported into English from the French through Florio’s translation of 
Montaigne’s Essays, with the connotation of “a physical disturbance and bodily movement” (Dixon, 
2012, p. 340). 
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psychological phenomena in physical terms. Despite Wittgenstein's criticism, however, it 
was James's concept of emotions that succeeded in influencing the novel and fast growing 
field of cognitive neurosciences, with a branch of philosophy actively collaborating in these 
endeavours.379  
 
 In this chapter I shall firstly discuss James’s influential theory of emotions, showing 
its origin in Descartes’s work on the passions and its further development by the so-called 
'Neo-Jamesians', a group of prominent philosophers and neuroscientists such as Damasio, 
who developed James's theory of emotions in different directions but shared the concept of 
reductionism and increasing physicalism. Second, I shall discuss the important criticism 
provided by Wittgenstein to James's theory, and how Wittgenstein’s conceptual analysis of 
emotions is still relevant to contemporary neurosciences. 
 
7.2. William James’s theory of emotions 
 Why was James so significant to the psychology and philosophy of emotions? A 
brief answer, according to Wassman, is that together with the German psychologist 
Wilhelm Wundt (Wundt, 2014), James stressed the importance of neurophysiology in the 
mechanism of emotions at a time when emotions were considered spiritual phenomena 
unrelated to bodily mechanisms (Wassmann, 2014). The second half of the 19th century was 
an exciting period for the young specialty of neurology, with the discovery of language 
centres in the brain and areas specialised in motor and sensory functions. It is in this 
context of the increasing relevance of neurophysiology that James’s theory of emotions 
developed. James’s best known text on emotions is What is an Emotion?, published in 1884 
(W. James, 1888), followed by a chapter (Chapter 25) in his Principles of Psychology 
                                                 
379 Among neuroscientists the most active in this field are Antonio Damasio (Damasio, 1994, 1999, 
2003; Damasio, 2010) (who considers James to be a referent for his synthesis of neuroscience with 
philosophy), Joseph LeDoux (Debiec & LeDoux, 2004; J.E. LeDoux, 2000, 2013; Schiller, Levy, 
Niv, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2008), a pioneer in studying the fear mechanism in rodents, and Jap 
Panksepp (Panksepp, 2004), a renowned neuroscientist interested in adopting a ‘non-reductionist’ 
approach to the study of emotions in humans and primates. Among philosophers perhaps most 
influential has been the work of Patricia Churchland (Churchland, 1989) to combine philosophy 
with the burgeoning field of cognitive neurosciences to form a new philosophical sub discipline 
termed ‘neurophilosophy.’   
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(1890) (W. James, 1890), and The Physical Basis of Emotion, James’s last work on this 
theme (1894) (W. James, 1994).380 
 
7.2.1. What is an emotion? 
 What is an Emotion? is the most often quoted text by James dealing with 
emotions.381 The main objective of the work was to propose a novel mechanism for the 
emotions by stressing the relevance of specific “processes” occurring in motor and sensory 
brain regions (W. James, 1888, p. 189). James’s theory is not based on empirical studies 
but, similar to Descartes in his Meditations, James’s idea “grew out of fragmentary 
introspective observations” (W. James, 1888, p. 189). Surprisingly, James opened What is 
an Emotion? with an empirical proposition: emotions are either “affected” (that is, related) 
to specific brain centres, or they are related to sensory-motor processes in a generic way 
(W. James, 1888, p. 188).382 Thus James couched the concept of emotions, much like 
Descartes, in neurophysiological terms. He further considered that emotions should be 
studied by experimental psychologists and neurophysiologists, no longer being the realm of 
the antiquated conceptual tools of philosophers. 
 
 In James’s theory of emotions, bodily or somatic changes, consisting of muscular, 
sensory and visceral activity, have a necessary role in the production of emotions. This 
important concept notwithstanding, his most puzzling proposal is the reversal of the so-
called common sense theory of emotions. According to James, ‘common sense’ suggests 
                                                 
380 Emotions were also discussed by James in other less significant texts but these will not be 
discussed here. 
381 The differences between James’s different texts are not minor. I will mention some of these 
discrepancies where they are relevant to the discussion. 
382 “Either separate and special centres, affected to them [i.e. the emotions] alone, are their 
brainseat, or else they correspond to processes occurring in the motor and sensory centres already 
assigned, or in others like them not yet mapped out” (W. James, 1888, p. 188). This statement is 
very unclear. The choice seems to be between specific centres allocated to each emotion, much like 
Paul Broca described for the production of speech (Wickens, 2014), or emotions are more diffusely 
represented in sensory-motor centres. The conclusion that can be drawn from this option is that the 
mechanism of emotions is to be found in brain centres of some sort.  
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that emotions start with a perception, for instance and most famously,383 the sight of a bear, 
triggering the emotion of fear after the appraisal that there is risk at hand, and finishing 
with a behavioural response, such as running away from danger. James’s perplexing 
proposal inverts the common-sense process, so that the perception of an object first 
produces bodily changes, and the emotion is limited to the perception of the bodily 
changes. In James’s own words:  
 
Common sense says…we meet a bear, are frightened and run…The hypothesis here to be 
defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that our mental state is not 
immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed 
between, and that the most rational statement is that we feel…afraid because we tremble, 
and not that we…tremble, because we are…fearful (W. James, 1888, p. 190). 
 
In Principles of Psychology James further clarified this novel concept of emotions 
remarking that: 
 
...bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and..... our feeling of 
the same changes as they occur IS the emotion...the one mental state is not immediately 
induced by the other, that the bodily manifestation must first be interposed between, and 
that the more rational statement is that we feel...afraid because we tremble” (W. James, 
1890; vol.2 pp. 449-50). 
 
 James’s definition of emotions in What is an Emotion? and in Principles of 
Psychology looks misleadingly simple, and requires detailed examination. First, what 
James is proposing is that emotions are produced by a reflex mechanism that excludes 
appraisals. Thus, the psychological scheme of the common-sense theory is converted into a 
neurophysiological one. In other words, James’s novel mechanism consists of an “exciting” 
stimulus which automatically produces a bodily response, independent of conscious 
awareness (W. James, 1888, p. 190).384 The challenge for James was how to explain a 
behavioural response occurring automatically in the absence of any appraisal. His reflex 
circuit (perception → behaviour) may work for innate responses such as a startle reaction to 
a loud noise or a similar sudden threat, but it is unclear how such a reflex system could 
                                                 
383 “Ask anyone about William James’s theory of emotion and you will almost certainly hear about 
the bear” (Ellsworth, 1994, p. 222). 
384 “My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the 
exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion” (W. James, 
1888, pp. 189-190) (italic and upper-case in the original). 
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produce a fear response to more complex “objects”, such as the fear of a financial crisis. 
James responded to this objection by referring to Darwinian evolutionary theory, where a 
system that is adequate to manage basic threats may adapt to manage novel and more 
sophisticated ones.385 James further suggested that the reflex system works as a neural 
“lock” which can only be started by predetermined stimuli, with no need for appraisals.386 
 
 According to James, somatic responses could range in intensity from very subtle, 
such as states of “inward tension” to states of gross behavioural turmoil. James concluded 
that no emotion is “without a [unique] bodily reverberation” and a particular “mental 
mood,” and suggested a one-to-one correspondence between stimulus and somatic change 
(W. James, 1888, p. 191). In the case of fear, James speculated that this emotion 
corresponds to “the feelings...of quickened heart-beats...shallow breathing...trembling 
lips...goose flesh [and]...visceral stirrings...” (W. James, 1888, pp. 193-194). Somatic 
changes are therefore the end point of James’s behavioural/neural reflex circuit, and are 
both sufficient and necessary to produce an emotion.387  
 
 What are these somatic changes and how are they generated? James’s emotional 
reflex includes the perception of an object by a given cortical region, or the stimulation of 
this cortex produces an “idea” of the object. “Quick as a flash” (W. James, 1888, p. 203) 
the brain stimulates the skin, muscle and viscera through specific neural channels. The 
effects of this stimulation are perceived in somatosensory regions of the brain, and when 
combined with the perception of the object “in consciousness”, the perception is 
transformed from “an object-simply-apprehended” into an “object-emotionally-felt”. In 
other words, the first perception is emotionally neutral, thus I see the bear but feel nothing, 
whereas the somatic perception of our legs moving or our viscera stirring, when combined 
                                                 
385 “We will only recall the well-known evolutionary principle that when a certain power has once 
been fixed in an animal by virtue of its utility in the presence of certain features of the environment, 
it may turn out to be useful in the presence of other features of the environment that had originally 
nothing to do with either producing or preserving it” (W. James, 1888, p. 195).  
386 “Every living creature is in fact a sort of lock, whose wards and springs presuppose special forms 
of key, - which keys however are not born attached to the locks, but are sure to be found in the 
world nearby as life goes on” (W. James, 1888, p. 191). 
387 James will later claim that visceral changes are necessary but not sufficient (see below). 
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with the image of the object, produces the emotion. It is after this second perception that the 
object is emotionally-laden. James adds that the number of potential somatic changes is 
“indefinitely numerous” as the whole organism works as a “sounding board” to produce 
feelings (W. James, 1890; vol.2  pp. 308). 
 
 James was adamant that his theory included no additional components 
“beyond…ordinary reflex circuits,” rejecting any process of “appraisal” taking place as part 
of the mechanism of emotions (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 324). Nevertheless, James was 
ambiguous about the role of contextual factors, implying appraisal in the production of 
emotions. For instance, he stated that “the most important part of the environment is my 
fellow-man”, who has the capacity to “unlock” our fears (W. James, 1888, p. 195). James 
also stated that fear may arise when one feels observed by another person, and has its 
extreme expression in “stage-fright” (W. James, 1888, p. 195). Given the sophistication of 
human emotions and the myriad of novel stimuli in modern society as compared to tribal 
ones, James had the challenge of explaining how a simple neural reflex is activated by 
complex social events. His answer was that this phylogenetically primitive mechanism 
works as well for the “civilised man” as for the “member of a tribe” (W. James, 1888, p. 
196). In other words, James suggested that the brain mechanisms he had described as part 
of the reflex system of emotions are flexible and adaptable enough to accommodate any 
stimuli, from simple events affecting human ancestors as well as the more complex and 
elaborated stimuli affecting contemporary humans. 
 
 Finally, to support his theory, James advanced his famous thought-experiment (“a 
vital point of this theory” (W. James, 1888, p. 193)), which consisted in imagining the 
subtraction from consciousness of all the feelings produced by the somatic changes 
associated with any particular emotion.388 According to James, this subtraction leaves no 
“mind-stuff” to create the emotion, and the person is left with a mere “cold and neutral” 
cognitive perception (W. James, 1888, p. 193).389  
                                                 
388 “If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the 
feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind…” (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 
309). 
389 “A purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity” (W. James, 1888, p. 194). 
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7.2.2. The conceptual position of fear in James’s system of emotions 
 James used fear as a paradigmatic emotion and, like Descartes before him, the well-
known example of running away from the perennial bear.390 In a state of fear, a person 
either runs or remains “semi-paralysed.”391 According to James, ‘instinct-like’ fear is a 
rather uncommon event in modern life due to the great progress of civilization and he adds 
the astonishing comment that some people may have never felt fear in their lives.392 This 
comment exemplifies the way that James narrowed the emotion of fear to an instinctual and 
extremely intense somatic reaction, a reductive approach that will find fertile soil a century 
later in the field of cognitive neuroscience. Nevertheless, in the Principles of Psychology 
the ontological status of fear became unclear, since James stated that fear is not only the 
feeling of somatic changes but also a “psychical state…consisting of mental 
representations” (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 327). This is certainly not a minor correction of 
his original hypothesis, and the rationale for this change unfortunately remained 
unexplained. 
 
While the ontological status of fear started to drift from the original proposal, James 
provided interesting but conceptually unclear descriptions of the phenomenology and 
nosology of this emotion. He refers to “pathological cases”, those instances when fear 
occurs in the absence of a triggering object, or when a fearful reaction is out of proportion 
to the danger posed by the object (for instance, the case of intense fear of insects). He 
suggests that “unmotivated fear” (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 313) results from a high 
                                                 
390 James’s longest discussion on fear is provided in the section on “Instincts” in The Principles of 
Psychology (W. James, 1890), rather than in the chapter on emotions (Chapter 24). James 
considered fear to be one of the emotions most closely related to the instincts, given that, in his 
opinion, fear, like the instincts, is expressed with the greatest expense of bodily energy: 
“Fear…stands, besides lust and anger, as one of the three most exciting emotions of which nature is 
susceptible” (W. James, 1890; vol.2, pp. 285). 
391 James made the interesting connection between this state of paralysis and the immobility of 
emotional pathology, such as in melancholy and in “general anxiety and fear of everything” (W. 
James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 285). 
392 “Many of us need an attack of mental disease to teach us the meaning of the word” (an 
interesting solipsistic remark; see below) (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 285). Moreover “…the horrors 
we hear of are but a sort of painted tapestry for the chambers in which we lie so comfortably at 
peace with ourselves and with the world” (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 286). 
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sensitivity of the “nervous machinery” in responding to somatic and visceral changes. Thus, 
if a person is unable to breathe deeply, has a flutter in the heart, and epigastric discomfort 
while sitting in a crouching attitude in the absence of a cause, the feeling of these somatic 
changes “is the emotion of dread” (italics in the original), a state James termed “morbid 
fear.” In these cases of severe fear, James stated that the individual “is not afraid of 
anything; he is simply afraid”, thus stressing that morbid fear has no object (W. James, 
1890; vol.2 pp. 314).393 James provided a clinical example demonstrating the interface 
between these clinical descriptions and his theory of emotions. He described the case of a 
friend who was affected with episodes of shortness of breath, palpitations, and epigastric 
pressure. The best treatment for his friend’s morbid fear, James claimed, was to breathe 
deeply and assume a supine position, and “the dread, ipso facto, seems to depart” (W. 
James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 314). This clinical anecdote illustrates the application of James’s 
theory of emotions to real life therapy, and reinforces his thesis that somatic changes are the 
cause of emotions.394  
                                                 
393 James described cases which in current nosology would fit the criteria for panic attacks. His 
descriptions, very similar to Freud’s contemporary writings, include “attacks of terror” coming 
“without warning or visible cause.” The attack starts with a “vague discomfort” followed by 
palpitations, painful “flashes of electrical discharges”, then “falling into the most intense fear. He is 
not afraid of anything; he is simply afraid…He looks for a cause of his wretched condition, but sees 
none” (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 314). 
394 James provided a concise but clinically relevant phenomenology of different types of fear. He 
considered terror, and not fear, as a frequent emotion in adult life.  Anxiety, he says, is felt 
especially at night, triggered by the hollowing sounds of a storm, a view probably linked to the fact 
that James himself fell into states of panic, staying awake at night because of “the wind outside” 
(W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 286). He considered fear to be an instinctive response, as mentioned 
earlier, which is manifested in unusual circumstances, such as when “strange men and strange 
animals” come running towards us in a threatening way (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 286). Humans 
also fear spiders and snakes; while “black things” such as dark places and caverns produce a 
“gruesome fear” (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 287). James explains instinctive fears in a Darwinian 
fashion, suggesting they have their origin in the threats confronted by primitive humans when 
facing beasts (“especially bears”) living in caverns: “The ordinary cock-sure evolutionist ought to 
have no difficulty in explaining these terrors, and the scenery that provokes them, as relapses into 
the consciousness of the cave-men, a consciousness usually overlaid in us by experiences of more 
recent date” (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 287). James also considered some fears, such as the fear of 
heights and insects, as irrational, given that these objects do not represent a danger to the individual, 
but are unable to be voluntarily controlled. James considered these fears “a mere incidental 
peculiarity of the nervous system” (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 288), and suggested they should be 
considered “pathological” supposing that they are not useful to human life. As he explains it, 
whereas “a certain amount of timidity” may be useful in life, “paroxysmal fear” such as the fear of 
insects, is clearly deleterious. For James, these irrational fears were the “accidental resurrection, 
through disease” of an instinct that was useful to primitive humans but not to moderns. James was 
cont. next page 
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 Although James reduced fear to a somatic response to a sudden threat,395 he could 
not ignore the evidence that in many cases fear occurs as the expectation of a bad outcome, 
with no somatic changes necessarily involved. For instance, this is the case in the anxious 
expectation of a potentially dreadful event, such as awaiting the results of a biopsy to 
determine whether one has cancer. James considered these fears as “ideal emotions” (W. 
James, 1888, p. 197), that is, an emotion that originates “internally,” from a 
“representation” of somatic changes, but without being actual bodily changes.396 
Regrettably, James did not comment on whether “ideal emotions” are exceptions to his rule 
that all emotions are feelings of somatic changes. James’s theory is further complicated by 
his suggestion that even when fearful ideation seems to produce an “immediate...emotional 
feeling”, further analysis suggests that “pure cerebral emotions” do not produce ‘true’ 
feelings unless these are related to “a bodily reverberation of some kind,” a mechanism 
revealed by “careful introspection” only (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 322). Unfortunately, 
James never described how ‘true’ feelings may be recognised by using introspection (see 
below).  
  
 James’s discussion of the therapy of fear was in line with this theory. In The 
Physical Basis of Emotion (1894) (W. James, 1994) he recommended that individuals with 
a “frightful disposition” should persistently practice those behaviours that are “contrary” to 
the undesirable behaviour produced by their emotions. Thus, in the case of fear, he 
surmises that the affected person should lift their head and look straight at the object of 
                                                                                                                                                    
also interested in supernatural phenomena, capable of producing “a peculiar kind of horror.” This 
emotion is produced by the imagination, since “science has not yet adopted ghosts” (W. James, 
1890; vol.2 pp. 288). The imagination works on a combination of fears, including the fear of 
loneliness, darkness, unusual sounds, and shadows to produce this “ghostly terror”. Finally, James 
considered “instinctive dread” as the type of fear triggered by finding a dead body and produced by 
“its Mysteriousness” (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 288). 
395 For an in-depth discussion of the reductionism of James’s theory of emotions see Dixon (Dixon, 
2012). 
396 This hypothesis will resurface in Damasio’s theory of emotions, with his proposal of “as-if 
systems”, a mechanism that reproduces somatic changes in the brain as if they were real somatic 
changes (see below). Damasio does not cite James’s almost identical proposal (Damasio & 
Carvalho, 2013). 
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fear, walking resolutely towards it with a stern facial expression to get rid of this 
emotion.397  
 
7.2.3. Challenges and further clarifications 
 Soon after being introduced, James’s theory of emotions was strongly challenged by 
his contemporaries (Canon, 1927). The first objection listed in the Principles of Psychology 
is the lack of evidence that stimuli produce somatic changes prior to becoming conscious. 
James answered this objection by referring to the startle response: he suggested that 
watching a dark object moving in the woods produces tachycardia and fast breathing before 
any conscious idea of danger emerges (W. James, 1890; vol.2 pp. 288).  
 
 The second objection was that for James’s theory to be correct, somatic changes 
should always produce an emotion. The objection was illustrated by the fact that actors can 
mimic emotional expressions such as crying, without feeling sad. James responded that his 
hypothesis cannot be empirically tested by voluntarily mimicking emotions, given that not 
all somatic changes can be voluntarily reproduced, such as visceral stirrings (W. James, 
1890; vol.2 pp. 316). Eventually, James’s theory of emotions continued to drift away from 
his original hypothesis, and in The Physical Basis of Emotion he accepted that in some 
instances somatic changes are not sufficient to produce emotions, given the inability of 
these changes to fully reproduce the feelings of a putative “emotional wave.”398 By 
switching the bodily response from muscular to visceral changes James placed his theory of 
emotions safely beyond empirical refutation.399 
                                                 
397 Whether such a strategy may be useful is an empirical question, although as stated by 
Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 2001) forcing oneself to smile while feeling sad may even increase 
rather than ameliorate the feeling of sadness. In any case, James’s therapeutic suggestion is of 
limited applicability, given that for common daily fears there are no somatic changes to be 
countered. For instance, the fear of becoming unemployed, of having a serious illness, or that the 
person we are anxiously expecting may not come, may not be associated with typical bodily 
changes.  
398 James never explained why visceral changes would be more important that voluntary muscular 
changes. 
399 As Averill remarks, James’s theory became irrefutable since the same emotion may be caused by 
a myriad of somatic, and especially visceral changes that are “invisible” to human scrutiny (Averill, 
1992, p. 519). 
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 The third objection was that the same emotions can be produced by different 
somatic changes. For instance, fear can result from running away or from freezing in a 
posture. This objection was dismissed by James with the unclear statement that the somatic 
changes that produce emotions occur “within limits” and that symptoms of fear can “still 
preserve enough functional resemblance” among different individuals, thereby allowing the 
use of “identical names” (W. James, 1994, p. 520). 
 
 Still, the main objection to James’s theory was the failure to include any cognitive 
appraisal of stimuli in the production of emotions.400 In The Physical Basis of Emotion, the 
final and definitive version of his theory of emotions, James addressed the objection that 
the idea of danger has to precede the motor response by suggesting that emotional objects 
produce a somatic change in the context of a “total situation” (W. James, 1994, p. 520), and 
added the critical remark that the emotion ensues “as soon as an object becomes …familiar 
and suggestive…” (W. James, 1994, p. 518).401  
 
 This is a major departure from his original theory and James can be seen to be 
conceding defeat, since by “total situation” he can only be taken to mean appraisal of the 
stimuli and context before the behavioural response. James even stated that the object 
“suggests” a total situation “on any theory of emotion.” In other words, we no longer 
automatically run after the appearance of the bear, since in the amended theory the object 
triggers a fight or flight reaction based on an “overpowering idea” (i.e. an appraisal) of 
what the best course of action should be. To repeat, James’s implicit admission that there is 
appraisal before the behavioural response is of critical importance since it shatters the heart 
of his theory.402 
                                                 
400 The unnamed critic had stated that we run from the bear because we may otherwise be eaten, but 
“…according to Professor James the reason we dislike to be eaten is because we run away” (W. 
James, 1994, p. 518).  
401 Ellsworth even states that James was “intrigued” by those situations in which emotions occurred 
without “corresponding cognitions” (Ellsworth, 1994, p. 224).   
402 In other words, James conceded that the emotional response is no longer a reflex act consisting 




 These major shifts in James’s theory of emotions were partially accepted by some 
“Neo-Jamesians” such as Ellsworth, who suggests that in The Physical Basis of Emotions 
James introduced a second theory of emotions where contextual appraisal does occur before 
the behavioural response (Ellsworth, 1994, p. 225).403 This second theory, according to 
Ellsworth, includes, as already mentioned, the proposal that visceral movements are critical 
to the mechanism of emotions, and stresses the relevance of discriminating between 
severities within the same emotion,404a implying that only the stronger feelings should be 
considered true emotions. In other words, to become an emotion, a feeling has to include “a 
very minimum of properly emotional excitement” (W. James, 1994, p. 519). According to 
James, if the intensity of the somatic changes is below this threshold, we no longer feel 
“fear” (italics in the original) but only an “unpleasant sensation” (W. James, 1994, p. 519). 
The true emotion of fear is “a general seizure of excitement” accompanied by subtler 
sensations “often hard to describe” (W. James, 1994, p. 523).  
 
 While this dissertation deals primarily with conceptual rather than empirical issues 
in relation to fear, I have dwelt at length on the empirical conundrums of James’s theory of 
emotions because these are the bases on which he builds his conceptual framework. 
Furthermore, we shall see similar problems with the interpretation of empirical studies as 
well as major conceptual quandaries resurfacing in the contemporary neurosciences of fear. 
James’s theory of emotions405 is still extant in contemporary cognitive neuroscience, but 
the conceptual problems are not so easily dismissed. Therefore, before moving on to 
contemporary elaborations of the Jamesian schema, I shall first introduce Wittgenstein’s 
illuminating criticism of James’s theory. 
 
                                                 
403 In Ellsworth’s opinion, for James, “…the interpretation of the situation was essential to the 
emotional experience” (Ellsworth, 1994, p. 225).  Nevertheless, later in the same work Ellsworth 
seems to minimise the relevance of appraisals, stating that situations in which appraisal precedes an 
emotion “may be rare” (Ellsworth, 1994, p. 228). 
404  “Fear of getting wet is not the same fear as fear of a bear” (W. James, 1890, p. 519). 
405 This theory is known as the ‘James-Lange theory’ as it was independently developed by James 
and the Danish physician Carl Lange. Like James, Lange considered that all emotions are caused by 
physiological phenomena (Dagleish, 2004). 
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7.2.4. Conceptual problems with James’s theory of emotions 
 
The best thing I can say…is that in writing it, I have almost persuaded myself it may be true. 
William James, What is an Emotion? (W. James, 1888, p. 205). 
 
To support the theory that emotions are feelings of somatic changes, James states that 
actors who play “with their heart” report that the emotion of the role they play “masters 
them whenever they play it well” (W. James, 1890, p. 317). In relation to this statement, 
Wittgenstein asks, rhetorically: 
 
  ...What is it that is so frightful about fear? The trembling, the quick breathing, the 
feeling in the facial muscles? – When you say: “This fear, this uncertainty, is frightful!” – 
must you go on “If only I did not have this feeling in my stomach”? (Wittgenstein, 1980c; 
728).406 
 
Thus, following Wittgenstein’s remark, should we treat our stomach whenever we 
feel anxious? This reductio ad absurdum should be sufficient to dismiss James’s theory 
without the need for empirical refutation. In Zettel, Wittgenstein posited that the descriptor 
“a horrible fear” does not mean that the feeling is horrible (Wittgenstein, 1967; 492,496). 
Similarly, awareness of the somatic concomitants of some fears (e.g. the fast breathing and 
the tension in the face) is not that these responses are themselves “frightful” feelings 
(Wittgenstein, 1967; 499). In response to James’s hypothesis that somatic and visceral 
changes cause emotions, Wittgenstein argues that the cause of fear is not in our body, but in 
the danger we are facing. Thus, when asked why we are scared “...we wouldn’t point to the 
stomach...rather, perhaps, at what gives us our fear” (Wittgenstein, 1980b; 729). Moreover, 
what is frightful is the object of fear (e.g. losing my job), and not the tension in my chest. 
This is not to dismiss the fact that somatic changes are typical concomitants of some 
emotions, but the relation between the emotion and somatic changes is contingent and not 
causal. One of James’s conceptual errors lies in this failure to distinguish between the cause 
of an emotion and its contingent concomitants  (Ter Hark, 2001, p. 215). 407 
 
                                                 
406 The numeral stands for the number of the remark in the text. 
407 As Wittgenstein puts it: “...Possibly one could be sad because he is crying, but of course one is 
not sad that he is crying...” (Wittgenstein, 1980c; 323). 
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An important distinction should be made between the object and the cause of an 
emotion. Most often what constitutes an object of emotion, that is, what the emotion is 
about is clear. The nature of the object may vary, from a tangible thing (e.g. James’s bear), 
to a specific natural or social context (e.g. the experience of imagination of height or giving 
public talks), or a future event (e.g. the possibility of a divorce). In rare circumstances, 
there is no immediately identifiable object of fear, and emotions are considered as 
‘objectless fear,’ or ‘free-floating anxiety.’408 What is the relevance of these different 
objects for James’s theory of emotions? As discussed earlier, James’s example of fear is the 
unexpected appearance of a bear, and running away from the animal is an obvious 
response. But it is unlikely that the fear of a financial crisis, for example, is accompanied 
by a behavioural change. I have already discussed that, for James, in the absence of a major 
behavioural upheaval, the emotion is not true fear. But the fear of being late to an 
appointment with my boss, worrying about my children being sick, how I will go in an 
examination and many other such examples are the most common fears in our daily lives. 
With or without a “minimum of excitement”, they are certainly much more relevant than 
the unlikely chance of meeting a bear in the street. 
 
What constitutes a cause of an emotion also deserves discussion given the different 
events that may fall into this category. For James, the cause of an emotion was the somatic 
change; but it seems clear that he was wrong, as, at least in contemporary colloquial 
usage,409 the cause of an emotion is its motive or reason. In other words, the cause of my 
fear is in the answer to the question: Why are you afraid? Thus, whereas the object of fear is 
my car making a strange noise, the cause of my fear is the possibility that the engine may 
fail. It may be argued that fear is caused by brain mechanisms which are necessary to 
produce emotions; but brain mechanisms are not sufficient to produce fear unless there is 
also a reason and an appropriate context. Episodes of sudden fear in the absence of a 
motive or reason are considered to be an expression of pathology, such as the fear produced 
                                                 
408 I shall discuss the source of ‘objectless anxiety’ in Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anxiety in Chapter 
nine. 
409 That is setting aside philosophical debates in action theory concerning the distinction between 
reasons and causes (Glock, 2014). Bennett and Hacker argue that the object of an emotion should be 
distinguished from the cause (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, p. 206) (also see Glock, 2014, for a 
discussion on differences between cause and reason). 
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by some types of seizures. Kenny suggests that in some instances the object and the cause 
of an emotion coincide (Kenny, 2003, p. 25). For instance, a sick man’s frailty may be both 
the cause and the object of his fear. Nevertheless, it may be argued that the cause of fear in 
this example is not (only) being frail, but a host of other factors relating to the meaning of 
frailty, such as fear of death, fear of leaving a widow, etc. 
 
To conclude, James’s theory results in a double reduction of emotions, one 
conceptual and the other empirical. Empirically, James reduces the concept of fear to a rare 
and violent emotion, a limitation that makes the emotion more amenable to empirical 
examination, but at the same time, drastically reducing its human relevance. The second 
reduction occurs when fear is explained conceptually in neurophysiological terms. The 
upshot is that, using relatively simple concepts, James is able to divorce fear and other 
emotions from philosophical analysis, and establish them as objects of physiological 
experimentation. 
 
7.2.5. Neo-Jamesians to the rescue 
James’s theory of emotions is still defended fully or in part, by a number of 
neuroscientists, philosophers and psychologists. Thus Laird contends that “creating facial 
expressions increases emotional feelings, and preventing expressions reduces feelings” 
(Laird & Lacasse, 2014, p. 29).410 Some Neo-Jamesians admit a step of stimulus appraisal 
as part of James’s theory. For example, Laird (Laird & Lacasse, 2014) again, while 
regarding James’s reflex theory as correct, also accepts that appraisal of the social context 
is necessary for the production of emotions. Similarly, Barbalet (Barbalet, 1999, p. 288) 
states that the object of an emotion “will necessarily vary with social experience” (my 
italics). Ellsworth (Ellsworth, 1994, p. 222) suggests that whereas somatic changes are 
necessary for the production of emotions, emotions are not limited to the feeling of those 
changes. Quite strikingly, Ellsworth admits that the restriction of emotion in James’s theory 
to the perception of somatic changes “seriously impeded the study of emotions” (Ellsworth, 
                                                 
410 “When someone feels angry, the experience is constructed from facial expressions like a frown, 
postures like leaning forward with contracted muscles, and actions like punching someone” (Laird 
& Lacasse, 2014, p. 32). 
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1994, p. 223).411 In her view, it is the somatic change in combination with the appraisal that 
produces the emotion.412 Ellsworth states that ever since James’s theory of object → 
somatic/visceral change → feeling, psychologists have tried to rearrange these elements as 
these would be ‘real’ entities rather than psychological constructs.413 These concepts have 
been used “like billiard balls” (Ellsworth, 1994, p. 227) one pushing the other in sequence, 
when in fact these events do not occur in a time-locked manner (see also Dixon’s criticism 
(Dixon, 2012) 414) 415  
 
The current field of the neuroscience of emotions goes beyond James’s use of 
introspection to access bodily changes by using, instead, sophisticated machinery to study 
brain activity. Thus, James’s “bodily-sounding board” has been turned into brain circuits 
able to register every somatic change. Where James suggested that the human cortex has 
specific centres activated by changes in sensory terminals, which form a “representation” of 
emotional processes, many years later Damasio has resurrected the theory in the form of 
neural representation of somatic changes to explain the mechanism of both emotions and 
feelings (see below). The current cultural zeitgeist that affirms science as the most 
authoritative source of truth, adds strength to this move that largely restricts understandings 
of fear as well as the best methods to manage it to the scientific field of the cognitive 
                                                 
411 According to Ellsworth, James’s suggestion that emotions start with the perception of the 
“exciting fact” indicates that the object is first appraised. 
412 Surprisingly, Ellsworth does not discuss the fact that accepting appraisal as a necessary condition 
to produce emotions, puts to rest James’s main theoretical innovation. 
413 Ellsworth adds that “Of course the message does not go straight from the retina to the viscera; of 
course, the situation typically has to be interpreted. The role of interpretation…in emotion is so 
obvious that it needs no special emphasis” (Ellsworth, 1994, p. 223). 
414 Dixon considers that James’s last version of his theory in The Physical Basis of Emotion 
“included so many concessions and qualifications as to amount virtually to a retraction of his own 
theory” (Dixon, 2012, p. 342). 
415 Other Neo-Jamesians such as the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio have a different view. 
Damasio considers James’s theory to be adequate to account for basic mechanisms of emotions, 
without the need for appraisals, such as the “innate” emotion of fear when confronting a snake 
(Damasio, 1994, p. 133). Laird and Lacasse fully support James’s theory, citing empirical studies 
that demonstrate what “James predicted: creating facial expressions increases emotional feelings, 
and preventing expressions reduce feelings” (Laird & Lacasse, 2014, p. 29). They further suggest 
that some individuals generate emotions based on “personal cues from their own bodily states and 
behaviours,” whereas others rely more on the influence of social contexts.  
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neurosciences. Further consolidating this form of explanation and therapy, conceptually, 
the field of ‘neurophilosophy’ has emerged mostly among Anglo-American philosophers 
(Churchland, 1989; Northoff, 2016) with the aim of collaborating with neuroscientists in 
their research endeavours.  It is against this context, and considering his major influence on 
the neurosciences and neurophilosophy, that the next section discusses the work of 
Damasio on emotion. 
 
7.3. The neuroscience of fear: Damasio 
By the mid-20th century, and with the advent of sophisticated tools to image the 
brain, there was a renewed interest in studying mental functions (Wickens, 2014). Initial 
research focused on language and memory, and investigations into the neural mechanism of 
emotions did not begin in earnest until the last decades of the 20th century. Damasio has 
been at the forefront of both empirical studies and conceptual work in the neurosciences of 
emotion.416 His research program has mostly focused on the neural systems underlying 
emotions, since “neurological disease provides a unique entry into the fortified citadel of 
the human brain and mind” (Damasio, 2003, p. 5). I will discuss the conceptual continuity 
between James and Damasio, the increasing role of neurosciences in providing explanations 
for emotions that go far beyond what empirical findings suggest, and the relevance of 
philosophical discussion in the context of the massive influence of neuroscience on the 
epistemology of emotions. 
 
7.3.1. “The strange case of William James” 
The heading above is the title of one of the sections in Damasio’s The Feeling of 
What Happens (Damasio, 1999).417 Damasio considers that the relevance of James’s 
                                                 
416 Of course, Damasio is not the only scientist with a rich research program in the neuroscience of 
emotions (e.g. see the seminal work of Joseph LeDoux (J.E. LeDoux, 2000, 2013) and Jak 
Panksepp (Panksepp, 2004) on emotions). However, Damasio has produced the most elaborated 
system in the neuroscience of human emotions. For the past thirty years, Joseph LeDoux has 
produced an extensive body of research specifically on the mechanism of fear. My focus on 
Damasio here, rather than on LeDoux, is due to the fact that Damasio has presented a provocative 
conceptual analysis of emotions in humans, whereas LeDoux has mostly discussed empirical 
findings in rodents.  
417 His other books are Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (Damasio, 1994), 
Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (Damasio, 2003), and Self Comes to 
Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (Damasio, 2010). 
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reversal of the common-sense concept of emotion “cannot be overemphasised… [and] 
…modern research entirely supports it” (Damasio, 2010, p. 123).418 Nevertheless, Damasio 
points to major problems with James’s theory of emotions. First, against James’s 
(ambiguous) rejection of appraisals in the mechanism of emotions, Damasio explicitly 
accepts this cognitive step (Damasio, 2010, p. 123).419 Above all, the critical break with 
James is Damasio’s rejection of James’s dictum that emotions are feelings of bodily 
changes, proposing instead, and even more reductively, that emotions are bodily changes 
and not feelings, thus separating emotions from feelings and creating the new concept of 
the “feeling of emotion”, which I discuss below.  
 
Damasio separated emotions from feelings since, he believes, they have different 
“essences” (Damasio, 2010, p. 117). Accordingly, emotions are automated programs of 
bodily actions, either “external” such as changes in facial expression, or “internal” such as 
visceral and hormonal changes, which are triggered by an “emotional competent object”. 
According to Damasio, the emotional programs are unlearned, automated and predictable, 
and originate in genetics and in Darwinian natural selection (Damasio, 2010, p. 131). 
 
In Descartes’ Error and Looking for Spinoza Damasio defines “feelings of 
emotions” as the mental process of mapping a particular bodily state (Damasio, 2003, p. 
88), expressed as “mental images” (Damasio, 1994, p. 186). Thus, feelings of emotions are 
“always hidden” (Damasio, 2003, p. 5).420 A more succinct definition is provided in The 
Feeling of What Happens, where feelings of emotions are defined as mental images 
produced by neural representations (Damasio, 1999, p. 282).421 As hinted by these 
                                                 
418 “James’s insights on the human mind have been rivalled only by Shakespeare’s and Freud’s” 
(Damasio, 1994, p. 129). 
419 “James emotion hypothesis works well for primitive, but not for more elaborated emotions due 
to lack of evaluation of the cause of the emotion” (Damasio, 1994, p. 129). 
420 Damasio claims that emotions are “public” and “play in the theatre of the body” (Damasio, 2003, 
p. 6) although emotions also include visceral and hormonal changes. On the other hand, feelings are 
“private” and “play in the theatre of the mind” (Damasio, 2003, p. 6). Damasio’s texts are replete 
with these metaphors which in this case demonstrate a clear Cartesian divide. 
421 Damasio defines the essence of feelings as “the process of continuing monitoring, that 
experience of what your body is doing while thoughts about specific contents role by” (italics in the 
original) (Damasio, 1994, p. 145). He further defines “the essence of feeling an emotion” as “the 
cont. next page 
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definitions, Damasio’s major claims are metaphysical rather than empirical, and therefore 
in need of philosophical clarification.422, 423 
 
7.3.2. Damasio’s mechanism of emotions 
Given the philosophical complexity of the terms “representation” and “image” 
which Damasio frequently uses in the definition of emotions and feelings, these concepts 
require brief discussion. For Damasio a “representation” is synonymous with a “mental 
image”. The perception of an object generates a neural pattern, and Damasio’s concept of 
representation also includes the specific processes in the different brain regions involved in 
generating mental images (Damasio, 1999, p. 320).424 In other words, the perception of an 
object generates a mental image which also works as a representation of the neural 
processes involved in its creation.425 In Descartes’ Error Damasio claims that mental 
                                                                                                                                                    
experience of [changes in the body state] in juxtaposition to the mental images that initiated the 
cycle” (Damasio, 1994, p. 145). 
422 An example of this is Damasio’s definition of emotion (Damasio, 1994, p. 139): “In conclusion, 
emotion is the combination of a mental evaluative process, simple or complex, with dispositional 
responses to that process, mostly toward the body proper…resulting in an emotional bodily state, 
but also toward the brain itself…resulting in additional mental changes” (italics in the original). 
423 In previous chapters I have discussed the structured classification of emotions by the Stoics and 
Descartes, and I shall briefly present Damasio’s classification as an example of the contemporary 
confusion in the field of neurosciences. Initially, Damasio classified emotions into “primary” and 
“secondary” (Damasio, 1999, pp. 50-51). Primary emotions are innate and reflex-like, as the brain 
comes already “wired” to respond in an automatic way. In the case of fear, once the amygdala is 
activated, it triggers “a body state characteristic of the emotion fear” together with cognitive 
changes related to this emotional state (Damasio, 1994, p. 131). On the other hand, secondary 
emotions are the result of education, culture and social experiences. Damasio also classified 
emotions into “basic universal,” including happiness, sadness, anger, fear and disgust, and “subtle 
universal” which are a variation of the above (e.g. panic and shyness as variations of fear) 
(Damasio, 1994, p. 131). In The Feeling of What Happens Damasio presented a category of 
“background emotions” which includes feelings of well-being, tension, and calm. Damasio later 
classified emotions into the categories of “emotions proper” and “social emotions”. Fear is included 
in the category of emotions proper and considered to have an important role in “life regulation” 
(Damasio also classified fear as a “universal” emotion (Damasio, 1999, pp. 50-53). In his last book, 
Self Comes to Mind, Damasio groups all three categories of “background,” “primary”, and “social 
emotions” under the single rubric of “emotions proper”. These classifications are not conceptually 
based, nor does Damasio discuss the reason for the categorical changes across time. 
424 Damasio owes us an explanation about how a physiological process generates images in non-
extended matter. 
425 According to Damasio, “This use of representation [italics in original] is conventional and 
transparent. It simply means “pattern that is consistently related to something,” whether with 
cont. next page 
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images derive from (“are based on”) neural representations that are topographically 
organised in sensory cortices (Damasio, 1994, p. 98). Interestingly, he acknowledges that 
there is a “mystery” regarding how images emerge from neural patterns, but optimistically 
suggests this dilemma will be clarified with more empirical research.426 Damasio argues 
that the “essence” of an emotion is constituted by a number of somatic changes controlled 
by specialised brain centres responding to specific stimuli.427 Following James, he states 
that emotional behaviours are “wired in” at birth in a “preorganized fashion” (Damasio, 
1994, p. 131). Emotions are elicited by the critical detection of an “emotional competent 
stimulus” (Damasio, 2003, p. 3). This process of “detection” is unclearly conveyed as an 
“appraisal-evaluation phase” (Damasio, 2003, p. 53). Damasio defines appraisal as “the 
process leading to emotion rather than emotion itself”, and considers appraisal to be “partly 
                                                                                                                                                    
respect to a mental image or to a coherent set of neural activities within a specific brain region” 
(Damasio, 1999, p. 320). Unfortunately, things are not as ‘transparent’ as Damasio claims, as in the 
very next sentence he states that “the mental image or neural pattern represents [italics in original], 
in mind and in brain, with some degree of fidelity, the object to which the representation refers, as if 
the structure of the object were replicated in the representation.” Besides falling in the Cartesian 
trap (representing in brain and mind) that Damasio so much despises, the presence of degrees of 
fidelity for given representations, and how this putative fidelity is determined remains a puzzle. It is 
also unclear what the meaning of “replicating” an object in the representation is, unless this is a 
pleonasm for a representation ‘representing’ an object. It is true that Damasio refers to the 
“structure” of the object, but in that case, he needs to clarify the concept of ‘structure’. Perhaps the 
lack of clarity of these concepts is acknowledged by Damasio, who in the next line states “I do not 
have any idea about how faithful neural patterns and mental images are, relative to the objects to 
which they refer” (Damasio, 1999, p. 320). 
426 “How a neural pattern becomes an image is a problem that neurobiology has not yet resolved. 
When I say that images arise from neural patterns I am not slipping into inadvertent dualism. There 
is a gap between our knowledge of neural events and the mental image...I maintain two levels of 
description, one of the mind and one for the brain. This separation is a simple matter of intellectual 
hygiene and... not the result of dualism” (Damasio, 1999, p. 323). Reference to this Cartesian gap is 
also made in (Damasio, 2003, p. 198) where Damasio says, in agreement with James, that currently 
we can go as far as describing “neural maps with the help of neurophysiology, and we can describe 
images with the tools of introspection” (Damasio, 2003, p. 198). Unfortunately, all his protestations 
against dualism are in vain, as I discuss below. 
427 “I see the essence of an emotion as the collection of changes in body state that are induced by 
myriad organs by nerve cells terminals (sic), under the control of a dedicated brain system, which is 
responding to the content of thoughts relative to a particular entity or event” (Damasio, 1994, p. 
137). 
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accessible to introspection”, but he offers no further information about this strategic step in 
the mechanism of emotion.428 
 
Whatever the mechanism, the emotional competent stimulus may be an external 
event, a memory, or a product of the imagination which may be detected even before 
conscious attention (Damasio, 2003, p. 60). The perception of this stimulus produces 
“images” and “signals” that are available to specialised brain centres, such as the amygdala 
in the case of fear. The interaction between the emotional competent stimulus and brain 
physiology is described as an automated process in the fashion of a key opening a lock 
(Damasio, 2003, p. 57).429 For instance, the activation of the amygdala produces a fear 
cascade, with typical somatic changes such as increases in heart ratio, blood pressure, and 
respiratory frequency. This also results in a motor response (e.g. freezing or fleeing) 
influenced by contextual cues as well as education and culture.430  
 
Another crucial element for the mechanism of fear is Damasio’s hypothesis of the 
“somatic marker” (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). According to Damasio, dangerous events 
produce specific bodily changes which are “marked” as a neural imprint (a “marker”). 
These neural markers act as an “automated alarm signal,” guiding the selection of actions 
                                                 
428 Damasio briefly states that appraisal “has been investigated in great detail”, but the only 
reference provided is Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought (M. Nussbaum, 2001). Nussbaum 
describes appraisal as a cognitive step in the evaluation of stimuli in the Stoic tradition (see Chapter 
three). In opposition to James and Damasio, Nussbaum supports the ‘common-sense’ mechanism of 
appraising a stimulus as an important step in the production of emotions: “I shall argue that 
emotions always involve thought of an object combined with thought of the object's salience or 
importance; in that sense, they always involve appraisal or evaluation” (M. Nussbaum, 2001, p. 5). 
She is “unconvinced” by Damasio’s statement that the state of the body is the object of the emotion 
(M. Nussbaum, 2001, p. 119). Nussbaum raises interesting points (such as finding Damasio’s 
hypothesis as “strongly antireductionistic (sic)” (M. Nussbaum, 2001, p. 118) that I am unable to 
discuss in the context of this dissertation. 
429 This creates a problem for the appraisal process, which drops from consideration whenever the 
emotional competent stimulus works ‘automatically’ on the brain. In Looking for Spinoza (p. 53) 
Damasio states that the process that produces emotion “begins with an appraisal-evaluation phase, 
starting with the detection of emotional competent stimuli,” suggesting that the emotional 
competent stimulus is selected first, but this very important step is not further discussed. 
430 “There are things you fear and I do not…we are quite alike but not entirely” (Damasio, 1999, p. 
280). Damasio rarely discusses the relevance of these external factors, prioritising brain systems. 
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that may prevent the agent from falling into dangerous situations.431 This marking is carried 
out by conscious bodily changes or by subconscious mechanisms.432 The somatic markers 
do not make decisions, but “assist the deliberation by highlighting some options” 
(Damasio, 1994, p. 174). Finally, Damasio states that most somatic markers are influenced 
by education and social cues which become associated with specific somatic states under 
the control of an “internal preference system” (Damasio, 1994, p. 179). 
 
Damasio’s hypothesis of a “somatic marker” is riddled with conceptual problems. 
For a start, it is unclear how the marker system can ‘sense’ that a given event is potentially 
dangerous without falling into an infinite regress. The somatic marker is considered to be 
an “automated alarm signal” but it is doubtful how this automaticity works in a world with 
complex events. For instance, if I laugh in the midst of a fearful situation, is this event 
marked as ‘positive’ based on my behaviour, or as negative, based on the fearful context? 
Damasio states that previously “marked” mental images of danger433 are “mapped” with 
new images of potential danger, but the mechanism for such a comparison is not described. 
In other words, it is not stated which instance makes the comparisons, and on what basis, or 
how a ‘good fit’ is established. Damasio explicitly rejected the idea of a homunculus and 
proposed instead a “proto-self” which “participates in the process of knowledge without 
starting it” (Damasio, 1999, p. 79). But exchanging a homunculus for a proto-self is no 
more than switching metaphors and does not explain how appraisal works. 
 
Another contentious subject is that, according to Damasio, an individual who is 
automatically “well adapted” to social life requires “that both brain and culture be normal” 
(Damasio, 1994, p. 177). Damasio does not clarify what he means by a “normal” brain,434 
                                                 
431 “When a negative somatic marker is juxtaposed to a particular future outcome the combination 
functions as an alarm bell” (Damasio, 1994, p. 173). 
432 This marking is achieved “quite overtly, as in a gut feeling”, or “covertly, via signals occurring 
below the radar of our awareness...” (Damasio, 1994, p. xii). 
433 These images are considered to be “stored” in specialised brain regions, a proposal that has its 
own major conceptual problems (see Norman Malcolm (Malcolm, 1977) for a thorough discussion). 
434 Discussing this thorny issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is worth mentioning that 
Damasio’s generic remarks may have inadvertent sinister connotations. 
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but he provides examples of “sick cultures.”435 It seems that these biological and contextual 
factors have greater importance for decision-making than the innate mechanisms described 
for the primary emotions, as Damasio explains that “the automated somatic marker device 
of most of us lucky enough to have been reared in a relatively healthy culture has been 
accommodated by education to the standards of rationality of that culture” (emphasis 
added) (Damasio, 1994, p. 200).436 Thus, having ‘rational’ fears is in all probability limited 
to a small portion of the western world with cultures that correspond to a specific type of 
socio-economic system with high educational and ethical standards.  
 
7.3.3. The concept and mechanism of “feelings of emotions” 
 
Feelings feel the way they do because they just do… 
because that is just the nature of things. 
Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 2003, p. 124. 
 
According to Damasio, feelings are perceptions of bodily and mental changes that 
happen while humans engage in “emoting” (Damasio, 2010, p. 116).437 More specifically, 
feelings are a “composite perception” of emotions and ideas with changes in the visceral 
and musculoskeletal state (Damasio, 2010, p. 116). This perception is mediated via a “body 
                                                 
435 Damasio lists WWII Germany, the Soviet Union, the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the 
Cambodian Pol Pot regime. 
436 Damasio further adds that assuming “the brain is normal and the culture in which it develops is 
healthy, the device has been made rational relative to social convention and ethics” (Damasio, 1994, 
p. 200). Unfortunately, Damasio does not elaborate on how contextual factors may change pre-
programmed brain systems. 
437 Damasio also defines the feeling of emotions as having mental images arising from neural 
processes representing bodily and brain changes which “make up an emotion” (Damasio, 1999, p. 
282). In Damasio’s neuroscientific terms feelings are “a composite perception of (1) a particular 
state of the body during actual or simulated emotion, and (2) a state of altered cognitive resources 
and a deployment of certain mental scripts” (Damasio, 1999, p. 118). More specifically (but 
confusingly) Damasio states that “a feeling depends on the juxtaposition of an image of the body 
proper to an image of something else such as the visual image of a face or the auditory image of a 
somebody” (Damasio, 1994, p. 145). Even if we manage to understand the concepts of images of 
the “body proper” and images of “a somebody”, we are still left with the problem of how these 
mental entities are “juxtaposed.” Damasio explains this process, stating that as the two images 
remain physiologically separated there is a “combination” rather than a “blending”. Nevertheless, 
Damasio concludes that “it might be appropriate to use the term superposition for what seems to 
happen to the images of body proper and ‘something else’ in our integrated experience” (italics in 
the original) (Damasio, 1994, p. 145). 
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loop” which uses humoral and neural signals to map bodily changes in specific brain 
regions, resulting in “feeling of emotion maps” (italics in original) (Damasio, 2010, p. 116). 
Feelings of emotion may also result from changes in a putative “as-if body loop,”438 which 
occurs whenever an emotion originates in the brain. This “as-if” loop creates a 
representation of body-related changes in “body mapping regions” of the brain to reproduce 
the changes of actual emotions, albeit the feeling is “fainter” than the actual ones (Bechara 
& Damasio, 2005).  
 
 The ontological position of feelings is more comprehensively elaborated in Looking 
for Spinoza (2003), but in a similarly confusing way.439 Damasio states that feelings result 
from activity in “body-sensing brain regions”, emerging when “the sheer accumulation of 
mapped details reach a certain stage” (Damasio, 2003, p. 86). In full metaphysical vein, he 
says that feelings of emotions “are the idea of the body being in a certain way” combined 
with “the perception of thoughts with themes consonant with the emotion” (Damasio, 2003, 
p. 86). Feelings result from constructing “metarepresentations” of mental processes, in 
which “a part of the mind represents another part of the mind” (Damasio, 2003, p. 85).440 
Whereas the content of feelings is for Damasio the representation of the body being in a 
specific state,441 the “essence” of feelings consists of “thoughts that represent the body 
involved in a reactive process.” According to Damasio, if this essence is removed, “the 
notion of feeling vanishes” (Damasio, 2003, p. 67). Finally, Damasio considers feelings to 
be “always hidden, like all mental images necessarily are, unseen to everyone rather than 
                                                 
438 Damasio explains the origin of this loop as follows: “No doubt this emerged in the brain 
precisely because of the economies of time and energy it introduced, and because smart brains are 
also extremely lazy. Anytime they can do less instead of more, they will, a minimalist philosophy 
they follow religiously” (Damasio, 1999, p. 116). 
439 For instance, statements such as “feelings are based on composite representations of the state of 
life in the process of being adjusted for survival in a state of optimal operation” (Damasio, 2003, p. 
130). 
440 A line from Wittgenstein might be appropriate at this stage: “See how high the seas of language 
run here!” (Wittgenstein, 2001; 79). 
441 The content of the feeling is “the representation of a particular state of the body... we hold 
images of the body as being such and so, and, in parallel, we hold images of our own thinking style” 
(Damasio, 2003, p. 89). 
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their rightful owner” (Damasio, 2003, p. 28). I will try to clarify some of these conceptual 
knots in the discussion below. 
 
 According to Damasio fear is a useful emotion, shaped by natural selection, and 
which works automatically, that is, in a reflex way in line with James’s (original) theory.442 
Thus, if while walking home at midnight I believe I am being followed, the brain 
automatically triggers a cascade of biochemical and neural reactions to elicit fear (Damasio, 
1994, p. 226). Damasio accepts that appraisal is part of the mechanism of fear (Damasio, 
2003, p. 138) and that the context has an important role in the production of fear. In the 
case of “false alarms induced by a culture gone awry” fear may be harmful (Damasio, 
2010, p. 121), and fear may also become an agent of stress which may “destroy life” 
(Damasio, 2010, p. 121). Unfortunately, he does not further explore these important 
concepts, with their implications of cognitive functions beyond what can be described in 
terms of putative brain mechanisms alone.443   
 
 In this connection Damasio also makes several strong statements concerning the 
signal role of science in being able to reveal the definitive mechanism of emotions and 
reconcile humanism with neurosciences.444 Supporting this view, he often cites 
philosophers to show that they were either conceptually wrong (e.g. Cartesian dualism) or 
that his own empirical studies have confirmed and even surpassed propositions from other 
philosophers (e.g. James and Spinoza). I have already examined major problems with 
Damasio’s mechanism of emotions, and shall now address the main problems with 
Damasio’s concept of emotions, with a focus on fear. 
 
                                                 
442  “the emotional action program we call fear can get most human beings out of danger...with little 
or no help from reason” (Damasio, 1994, p. xi) (my italics). 
443 Damasio states that culture and experience are mediated by the brain, and therefore, ultimately 
biology can explain everything in human experience (Damasio, 2010, p. 121). Thus, fear and any 
other emotions are amenable to scientific analysis, and only empirical research will, in his opinion, 
provide answers to the problems of fear, and its social and individual import. 
444 “Placing the construction of conscious minds in the history of biology and culture opens the way 
to reconciling traditional humanism and modern science, so that when neuroscience explores human 
experience into the strange worlds of brain physiology and genetics, human dignity is not only 
retained but reaffirmed” (Damasio, 2010, p. 31). 
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7.3.4. Problems with Damasio’s concept of emotions  
 Some of the problems with Damasio’s hypotheses on emotions arise from his 
philosophical position and are amenable to meaningful discussion, whereas others arise 
from his use of obscure metaphorical descriptions or his hints towards concepts and 
arguments that he never develops in a formal way. Perhaps the main criticism, which 
extends to current cognitive neuroscience, is the tendency to reduce the concept of 
emotions, and especially fear, to its biological underpinnings, without being able to avoid 
incorporating non-biological factors. Biological and scientific understanding may be 
relevant for the fear-conditioning that can be easily elicited in rodents in experimental 
conditions, but it is not clear that it is exclusively relevant for the rich, multi-layered and 
complex terrain of human fear, which is mostly related to psychological attributes such as 
emotional dispositions, beliefs and desires. Fear responses depend on the context in which 
they occur, the psychological attributes of the agent of the emotion, and the personal 
relevance of the object of fear, which may change with time and contextual events. In their 
tendency to extrapolate from limited empirical findings, neuroscientists of emotion, of 
whom Damasio is one of the most prominent, attempt to provide an encompassing 
epistemology of emotions like fear, drifting, often unwittingly, from their empirical world 
into metaphysics.445 
 
 Damasio commits a specific type of reduction, which Bennet and Hacker term the 
“mereological fallacy” (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, pp. 68-70). This consists in taking a part 
for the whole. For Damasio, it is the brain rather than the person that feels and makes 
decisions; it is the brain rather than the whole person who is afraid and evaluates the best 
way of facing danger. The brain is obviously necessary to feel fear, but it is not sufficient, 
as fear also depends, as Damasio agrees, on contextual and psychological factors. Damasio 
reifies brain processes to the detriment of other factors such as historically changing beliefs 
(for example, fear of witches and the devil existed in pandemic proportions in the Middle 
Ages, but are much less frequent nowadays), education (for example, people educated in 
some religious faiths fear God, whereas this fear is absent in non-believers), and contextual 
events (for example, being afraid of losing one’s job in the context of financial recession). 
                                                 
445 See Bennett and Hacker for a thorough review and discussion (Bennett & Hacker, 2003). 
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Damasio makes the reductionism of his theory explicit by separating emotions from 
feelings based on a “research intention” without discussing the conceptual problems 
implicit in this artificial separation. It is striking that social communication has no role in 
Damasio’s system of emotions. Since humans have the capacity to use language and are 
able to communicate their emotions and feelings, it is incorrect to say that emotions are no 
more than bodily changes, and that feelings are always hidden. Emotions cannot be 
identified in abstraction from their context, or as Wittgenstein puts it, not “what one man is 
doing now, but the whole hurly-burly, is the background against which we see an action, 
and it determines our judgements, our concepts, and our reactions” (Wittgenstein, 1967) 
(567). Wittgenstein’s philosophy of emotions provides a useful framework against which 
Damasio’s conceptual system may be compared, and this will be addressed below. 
 
7.3.5. Neo-Jamesians or Neo-Cartesians? 
 Damasio’s model of emotions appears to be more sophisticated than James’s, but in 
fact is little more than a capitulation to Cartesian dualism.446 For example, as discussed 
already, Damasio posited that emotions begin with an emotionally competent stimulus 
activating specific brain regions, a proposal that raises two main problems. First there is the 
issue of what provides the stimulus with the attribute of being “emotionally competent”. 
James, himself, had to face the criticism that his bear would produce fear in the forest but 
not in the zoo. As we shall see in the next section Wittgenstein argues far more plausibly 
that a stimulus is made ‘emotionally competent’ when occurring in a pattern of life.  But 
neither James nor Damasio have any way of incorporating this evaluative educative process 
into their mechanistic explanations.447  
 
 The second issue is the perennial Cartesian problem of a mental entity ‘resulting’ 
from extended (brain) matter, since according to Damasio, brain activation results in a 
“flow of mental processes” which somehow trigger somatic changes (Damasio, 2003, p. 
                                                 
446 Remarks such as “...while emotions are aligned with the body, feelings [are aligned] with the 
mind” (Damasio, 2003, p. 3) may serve as a good example. Damasio dedicated Self Comes to Mind 
to addressing the question of “how does the brain construct a mind” (Damasio, 2010, p. 6), but 
which his book shows no progress in solving. 
447 It may be argued that Damasio includes a ‘common sense’ appraisal step in his mechanism of 
emotion, but I have already discussed the shortcomings of his idiosyncratic concept of appraisals. 
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67).448 Damasio has frequent recourse to the language and conceptual notion of images, and 
the notion of brain representations permeates all of his texts. As pointed out by Bennett & 
Hacker, these ideas bring back all the limitations of 18th century empirical philosophy.449 
Several examples suffice to illustrate this point. Damasio posits that the processing of 
“mental images” activates brain regions that ‘contain’ knowledge of emotional processes in 
the shape of “acquired representations” (Damasio, 1994, p. 133). And later, these 
representations are mental images or neural patterns which render an object “with some 
degree of fidelity” (Damasio, 1999, p. 12). These statements illustrate the confusing 
interweaving of mental phenomena and somatic/neural patterning that is common 
throughout Damasio’s work.  
 
 To be fair, and as already noted, Damasio cautions “that emergence of mental 
images from neuronal patterns is not a fully understood process” (Damasio, 2003, p. 88), 
and acknowledges that ‘there is a major gap in our current understanding of how neural 
patterns become mental images” (Damasio, 2003, p. 198). However, the problem is not a 
gap in empirical understanding, but the conceptual error of Cartesian mind/body dualism, 
nowadays transformed into mind/brain dualism. Damasio’s dualism is even more evident in 
statements such as his claim that whereas neural patterns are studied with the tools of 
neurophysiology, mental images are described with the tools of introspection (Damasio, 
2003, p. 198). While Damasio seems to reject dualism stating that “neural patterns are 
simultaneously mental images” (italics in the original), he also postulates a “self” who 
becomes aware of mental images (Damasio, 2010, p. 16). But Damasio seems to be 
confused by his own language. First, the ‘emergence’ of ethereal (mental) images from 
brain matter is a metaphor and therefore should not be reified to explain psychological 
phenomena; second, there is no gap in understanding mental events but straightforward 
                                                 
448 We may add statements such as “To say that the mind comes from the brain is indisputable” (my 
italics) (Damasio, 1994, p. 251), and paraphrasing Descartes, “When I started musing about how the 
brain managed to create the mind…” (Damasio, 2003, p. 4). 
449 And I may add Wittgenstein’s criticism: “A picture (mental image, memory image) of longing.” 
One thinks that one has already done everything by speaking of a picture…” (Wittgenstein, 1980b; 
726). 
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conceptual confusion as a result of dualistic thinking;450 and third, ‘introspection’ is an 
expression used to refer to the act of reflecting (for example, about how we feel) but not the 
searching and inspecting of images in the mind. In Descartes’ Error (Damasio, 1994), 
Damasio explicitly rejects dualism, embracing instead a kind of neutral monism (i.e. mental 
and neural processes are understood as two aspects of the same entity). However, most of 
Damasio’s accounts of mind/brain interaction are clear instances of Cartesian dualism, with 
mental images arising from neural patterns (Damasio, 1999, p. 282), neural patterns 
resulting from bodily changes, and feelings that “emerge…provided neural patterns become 
mental images” (italics added) (Damasio, 1999, pp. 79-80). As already noted, in Looking 
for Spinoza Damasio also acknowledges that his theory of emotions implies a separation of 
mind and brain, but rather than addressing the major implications of his philosophical 
statement, he makes the astonishing remark that “maintaining this mind/brain gap is a 
matter of intellectual hygiene” (Damasio, 2003, p. 198). 
 
 What Damasio refuses to accept is that explaining emotions is not simply a 
scientific problem, but goes to what is fully human, meaning drenched and philosophically 
significant phenomena. It might be said that there is a need for some philosophical therapy 
for Damasio’s conceptual confusions. In what follows I shall use the work of Wittgenstein 
to provide it. 
 
 
7.4. Wittgenstein’s concept of fear 
 
I’ll teach you differences 
Earl of Kent in Shakespeare’s King Lear (act 1, scene 4),  
considered by Wittgenstein as an epigraph for Philosophical Investigations.  
(Monk, 1991, p. 536) 
 
 James approached emotions in a scientific way, proposing, initially at least, a reflex 
model that reduced emotions to a concept amenable to empirical refutation. He was a 
                                                 
450 For example, Damasio describe “the emotion-feeling cycle” as the process that begins with the 
perception of the emotionally-competent stimulus in specialised brain regions, triggers an emotion 
as bodily changes, and returns to the brain “for the feeling part of the cycle” (Damasio, 2010, p. 
117).  
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philosopher and scientist who hoped that science would eventually solve the riddle of 
human psychological phenomena. It is not surprising, then, that cognitive neuroscience, as 
exemplified by Damasio’s work, adopts James’s reductionism with some adaptations. As 
might be gleaned from his criticisms of James, Wittgenstein’s concept of emotions, and 
fear in particular, could not be more different, as, unlike Descartes, James and Damasio, 
with their bear paradigm, he expanded the semantic field of fear by showing how this 
concept is used in multiple different ways in everyday life. Wittgenstein coined the term 
‘language game’ to refer to the different connotations of words, like ‘fear’, when in 
common use. I will therefore explain the meaning of ‘language game’ using a pivotal 
example of fear in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (PI; II. ix, 160e): 
 
Are the words “I am afraid” a description of a state of mind? 
I say “I am afraid”: someone else asks me: “What was that? A cry of fear, or do you want to 
tell me how you feel; or is it a reflection on your present state?”—Could I always give him 
a clear answer? Could I never give him one?  
We can imagine all sorts of things here, for example: 
“No, no! I am afraid!”  
“I am afraid, I am sorry to have to confess it.”  
“I am still a bit afraid, but no longer so much as before.” 
“At bottom I am still afraid, though I won’t confess it to myself.”  
“I torment myself with all sorts of fears.”  
“Now, just when I should be fearless, I am afraid!”  
To each of these sentences a special tone of voice is appropriate, and a different context.  
It would be possible to imagine people who as it were thought much more definitely than 
we, and used different words when we use only one. 
We ask: “What does ‘I am frightened’ really mean, what I am referring to when I say it?” 
And of course we find no answer, or one that is inadequate. The question is: “In what sort 
of context does it occur?” 
 
 And following on from this (PI, II, ix 161e): 
 
 What is fear? What does “being afraid” mean? If I wanted to define it at a single  shewing – 
 I should play-act fear. 
 
 Wittgenstein illustrates in the above examples that fear is a broad-ranging construct 
which can be used in a variety of ways. Canfield (Canfield, 2009) suggests that the question 
“what is fear?”, as raised by Wittgenstein above, has no generic answer but requires a 




7.4.1. The semantic field of ‘fear’ and its ‘language games’ 
 Wittgenstein’s term ‘language game’ refers to his understanding that words have no 
single connotation, but may be used in different ways to provide different meanings (Glock, 
1996). The meaning of a word is its use in the stream of life and as a consequence, “it is 
part of an activity, a form of life” (Wittgenstein, 2001) (23) as reflected in the overall 
practice of a linguistic community.451 There is no unique meaning of ‘being afraid’, and 
understanding its sense requires a description of the context in which fear arises, awareness 
of danger, and spontaneous reactions.452  
  
 The remarks in Philosophical Investigations 160e, quoted above, illustrate how fear 
can be manifested in multiple ways, from a simple cry to complex verbal expressions. A 
cry of fear, itself, has multiple connotations, such as being an instinctive response to a 
fearful object, for example, or a request for protection, a call of alert about a danger; or an 
expression of a mental state that can no longer be endured. A cry may be produced by a 
relatively simple brain mechanism, and yet its meaning is a constitutive manifestation of 
fear which can only be understood against a backdrop of life events including the crier’s 
beliefs, desires and characteristic emotional disposition. As Wittgenstein remarks, “the 
background is the bustle of life. And our concept points to something within this bustle” 
(Wittgenstein, 1980c; 625). 
 
 What about the verbal remarks provided in PI 160e? Shouting “I am afraid!” may 
just be the oral manifestation of a primitive cry or a way to communicate how I feel. 
Sometimes after honest reflection, I may admit to myself that my behaviour was motivated 
by fear, and I may feel relieved after confessing this emotion to others. The semantic 
complexity of fear is further illustrated in PI 160e with some additional examples. I may 
insist my interlocutors that, against their opinion, I do feel fear, or that perhaps they have to 
                                                 
451 “A language game [consists] of language and the actions in which it is woven” (Wittgenstein, 
2001) (PI 7); and the concept is used “to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of 
language is part of an activity, or a form of life” (Wittgenstein, 2001; 23). 
452 “I am afraid of him” and “I tend to fear for him.” But the expression “I tend to…” could mean 
several things here” (Wittgenstein, 1980c; 734) (italics in original). 
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insist that, even though I don’t want to recognise it, I do feel fear. In this language game the 
beliefs of agent and interlocutor as well as their interaction are of the essence. 
 
 The remark “I am still a bit afraid, but no longer so much as before” provides an 
example of the importance of context and personal history as fear changes in intensity. The 
agent feels relieved as fear lessens; she/he may even feel happy about this change, an 
example that emotions do not occur in isolation but blend with one another, as discussed 
before. In this example, the agent is very aware about her/his fear, whereas in the next 
example (i.e. “At bottom I am still afraid, though I won’t confess it to myself”) the opposite 
is the case, as the agent discovers she/he wants to hide this emotion from herself/himself. 
Perhaps the agent suffered great fears in the past, and is now afraid of a relapse. This is not 
to say that fear was until now ‘non-conscious,’ but just to acknowledge that the person is 
fighting an emotion which can no longer be covered up.  
 
 The next example (i.e. “I torment myself with all sorts of fears”) is of an individual 
whose fears may be considered ‘pathological’ if by this term we mean a persistently 
negative feeling that is not under voluntary control. This raises the interesting question of 
the threshold at which we consider that fear becomes pathological, which, in turn, opens a 
new language game relating to what determines whether an emotion is considered abnormal 
and how this determination is accomplished (see Chapter nine).453 To this end, we may 
need more information, such as the duration of the tormenting fears and the context in 
which they arise.454 The characteristics of fear become less relevant, as what is now 
important is the personality of the agent, and her/his tendency to be tormented and even 
incapacitated by feelings. In any case, the agent has been suffering with fears, unlike the 
next example (i.e. “Now, just when I should be fearless, I am afraid!”), where the agent is 
surprised to notice that fears are still present. This awareness may go with disappointment, 
sadness or even angry feelings, another example of how differing emotions become 
enmeshed.  
                                                 
453 (Wittgenstein, 1980c; 614): “Sufficient evidence passes over into insufficient without a 
borderline.” 
454 (Wittgenstein, 1980c; 624): “We judge an actor according to its (sic) background within human 
life, and this background is not monochrome, but we might picture it as a very complicated filigree 
pattern…” 
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 By use of these examples Wittgenstein shows how complex the meanings of fear 
are, given the many different language games in which the term is used. Wittgenstein is 
interested in the praxis of fear, which gets its meaning when used in the “hurly-burly” of 
human life. This is a far cry from Damasio’s “key opening a lock” system, where the key is 
both the object and the cause of fear. In Damasio’s universe where the focus is on 
accounting for the physiology of emotions, beliefs and emotional dispositions play only a 
minor role as the substrate of fear and the meanings of specific fears in a person’s life are 
not taken to be central to the mechanism, and perhaps to their therapy. Further, fear is not 
always experienced in a prototypical way, amenable to be reduced to feelings in restricted 
contexts; rather, as Wittgenstein shows, it is a nuanced emotion with a diversity of 
meanings. Therefore, it is not surprising that Wittgenstein is unable to verbalise the 
meaning of fear and would rather “play-act” this emotion in the variety of contexts in 
which it arises. For instance, he may use the facial expression and the bodily demeanour of 
somebody who is in a state of terror (Wittgenstein, 2001; 161e). But this is just a caricature 
of fear, whereas the ‘true’ experience of fear is the one that happens in life. 
 
 Fear is a dynamic emotion, changing in quality and intensity. Fear may explain our 
behaviour even when we explicitly deny acting under its influence (an illustration that, on 
occasions, behaviours may be more reliable than words). We may suffer from a disposition 
to feel fear (as in having an anxious personality) in which case the object of fear is of minor 
relevance. We may find that fear does not always have the expected duration as occurs 
when we get used to an object of fear, or we may drag our fear along with us even after its 
object has dissipated. Fear may not only explain how we feel, but may also explain our past 
behaviours, our current actions, and our future plans. For each of these variegated situations 
the language game of fear is engaged and Damasio’s focus on explaining fear mostly based 
on describing brain processes, rather than recognising its meaning and meaningful 
implications in our lives, is quite inadequate to the task of understanding the import of the 
emotion and searching for useful therapies. 
 
7.4.2. Family resemblance 
Wittgenstein rejects the idea of ‘essentialism’, which is the view that objects falling 
under a particular category, for example the category of fear, share necessary and sufficient 
conditions to belong to the category (Odeberg, 2007, p. 18). Rather, he argues that the 
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objects to which any particular word refers do not share a common essence but instead 
exhibit a “family resemblance,” whereby objects designated by a particular term or concept 
are not united by a single defining feature but by “a complex network of overlapping and 
criss-crossing similarities” (Glock, 1996, p. 121).455 
 
The concept of fear includes an extensive net of ‘objects’ or experiences as we can 
see in the list of examples quoted above.  In addition, it is possible to see why it is 
impossible to categorically distinguish fear from other terms such as terror, fright, horror, 
alarm, panic, agitation, trepidation, dread, consternation, dismay, distress, anxiety, worry, 
angst, unease, apprehension, nervousness, timidity, disquietude, unrest, foreboding, doubt, 
and suspicion, since the emotions that fall under each of these categories are not united by a 
single defining feature, either.  Each may share in part some features in common with the 
family resemblance characteristics that unite the variety of emotions commonly termed 
fear.456 An interesting example is the word ‘anxiety’, which Wittgenstein, like Kierkegaard 
(see Chapter nine), considers to indicate undirected fear (that is, fear with no discernible 
object) “in so far as its manifestations resemble or are the same as those of fear” 
(Wittgenstein, 1980c; 724). For instance, anxiety may be manifest in a bodily demeanour 
similar to fear. But if the anxiety is about soon starting my holidays, this use of the term 
‘anxiety’ is quite different from the use of ‘fear’ in the directed way Wittgenstein refers 
above, as this anxiety no longer has the negative connotation of fear, but indicates a 
positive expectation. This explains why Wittgenstein suggests “comparing fear and anxiety 
with care”, since fear always seems to have a negative connotation, whereas anxiety, may 
have either a positive or a negative one (Wittgenstein, 1980c; 731). 
 
7.4.3. Fear is not hidden 
Wittgenstein considered that words acquire meaning when shared in public use 
(Sluga, 2006). If he is right, Damasio’s suggestion that feelings are “always hidden” is 
incorrect, because hidden feelings cannot provide a shared basis for understanding the 
                                                 
455 “What holds the concept together and gives it its unity is not a ‘single thread’ running through all 
cases, but, as if were, an overlapping of different fibres, as in a rope” (Glock, 1996, p. 121). 
456 Thus, we use the term ‘panic attack’ to refer to the sudden onset of extreme fear, the adjective 
‘timid’ to depict the person who is fearful of socialising, and the term “social anxiety disorder” as 
the name of a psychiatric condition. 
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meaning of the concept. Wittgenstein reveals another problem with “hidden feelings” 
relating to the epistemological question as to how emotional words are learnt. This issue is 
illustrated by Wittgenstein’s famous remark concerning the “beetle in the box” 
(Wittgenstein, 2001; 293).457 
 
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" 
means—must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one 
case so irresponsibly? 
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! ——Suppose 
everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone 
else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. —
Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One 
might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. —But suppose the word "beetle" had 
a use in these people's language? —If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The 
thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the 
box might even be empty. —No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels 
out, whatever it is. 
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 
'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. 
 
 In this example, the name ‘beetle’ is given to an object (whatever it is) in each 
person’s box. If the object in every box is different no one could know it, since the world 
beetle that I use to denote whatever is in my box is dissociated from the public concept of 
the term ‘beetle’ (Hacker, 1990, p. 111). Therefore, if a feeling is treated like a private 
object (e.g. the beetle in my box), nobody would understand it, as each person would have 
their own idiosyncratic concept of the term.458 We learn the names of feelings and emotions 
through public language and not through introspection of private objects.459  
 
According to Wittgenstein, there is no feeling of fear which is independent of its 
‘external’ expression, since this expression is ‘constitutive’ of fear. Fear is constituted by 
                                                 
457 The ‘beetle in the box’ example provides a conceptual argument against the validity of 
introspection for the identification of emotions. Language is a public practice, and the expression of 
emotions such as fear creates the rule for using the word ‘fear’ in public communication (Hacker, 
1990, p. 111). 
458 As lucidly stated by Hacker (Hacker, 1990, p. 112), “a public language cannot be construed as 
the confluence of private languages that happen to coincide.” 
459 If the grammar of feeling and emotion is construed as an internal object which is given a name, 
then “the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant” (Wittgenstein, 2001; 293), that is, 
whatever word I decide to use, is only valid to me. 
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both ‘inner’ feelings and ‘outer’ behaviours.460 Damasio’s hypothesis that ‘hidden feelings’ 
may be examined by using introspection is a misconception with roots in the Cartesian 
concept of a body which is amenable to public examination and a ‘private’ mind which 
only the agent can access.461 On the other hand, and based on this hypothesis, since feelings 
are by definition always hidden, an individual can only surmise what others feel based on 
their ‘outer’ behaviour, which may manifest those feelings. Wittgenstein’s conceptual 
change was to invert the ‘first person/third person’ privacy argument. Since a person cannot 
be wrong about what she/he feels, he explains, that person cannot be right either. Hence, 
there is no sense to talking of knowledge in the case of first person feelings.462 Access to 
one’s feelings is direct and does not require inference. On the other hand, a person may fail 
in correctly identifying the feelings of others, as the others may just pretend to feel a given 
emotion. But the possibility of making mistakes assumes that our assumptions are correct 
most of the time. 
 
In conclusion, when a person says ‘I am afraid’ that person is expressing the 
emotion directly rather than describing an object of introspection (that is, an “inner” fear), 
and this can be neither correct nor incorrect. On the other hand, to identify the emotion in 
others we have to consider not only their behavioural expression, but the context and the 
history of their verbal and non-verbal exchanges as well. 
 
7.5. Concluding remarks 
The previous chapter discussed how Descartes started a new tradition in the 
understanding of emotions, explaining them in mechanistic and dualistic terms. According 
to Descartes, fear is a behavioural response to a dangerous object produced by a flux of 
                                                 
460 This fact explains Wittgenstein’s remark that a feeling like fear cannot be learnt ostensively by 
pointing to an object and naming it. In other words, we can teach the word ‘bear’ by pointing to a 
figure, but we do not teach the word ‘fear’ in this way. 
461 The venerable concept of “introspection”, that is, the mental process of directing one’s attention 
to items in the stream of consciousness, became widely used by Locke, Hume and especially 
Descartes (Lyons, 1986). James continued this tradition of mind-body dualism, stating that 
introspection is a valid psychological method for research (Lyons, 1986, p. 7). 
462 I may use the expression “I know I have fear!” just to appease my interlocutor in her insistence, 
but this use of the first person is not epistemological but social. 
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spirits to the brain and muscles, as well as an emotion in the soul produced by specific 
movements of the pineal gland. William James continued with the Cartesian tradition of 
explaining emotions as the result of physiological changes. In his view, fear is the feeling 
of somatic changes such as increased heart rate, shallow breathing, tremor, and visceral 
motions. The prominence of physiological changes as a relevant component of the 
mechanism of emotions in James’s theory allowed the empirical examination of emotions 
in contemporary neuroscience. Damasio followed in the steps of James by proposing that 
emotions are neural representations of somatic changes which are structured in specific 
programs that activate external behaviour or internal (visceral and hormonal) changes. 
Whereas Descartes reduced fear to movements of the pineal gland and James to the 
perception of somatic changes, Damasio reduced fear to an emotional system, mediated by 
so-called ‘somatic markers’, which results in mental images of putative bodily states 
produced by neural representations. Once the amygdala is stimulated in this fashion, the 
behavioural ‘cascade’ of fear ensues. 
 
While Cartesian dualism is strongly rejected, Damasio proposes that emotions 
consist in a mysterious mechanism by which feelings are produced through the 
transformation of neural patterns into mental images. The conceptual import of these kinds 
of statements is easily dismissed by Damasio when he (wrongly) insists that these 
(conceptual) ‘hiccups’ will be solved by further empirical study. Thus, what started as an 
understandable theory based on empirical studies, ends up in full, if implicit, metaphysical 
speculation. These criticisms, however, should not be construed as completely undermining 
the physiological study of fear, given that empirical discoveries may help in improving the 
situations of individuals struggling with severe fear and anxiety. Nevertheless, solid 
scientific work in the field of fear risks highly problematic overreach without clear 
concepts.   
 
Conceptual clarifications were brought by Wittgenstein, who provided enlightening 
criticism to the Cartesian and Jamesian approach to the emotions that may be of use for 
current neuroscientists like Damasio. Rather than reducing fear to body-soul (or more 
simply even to internal brain) interactions, Wittgenstein stressed the many ways in which 
fear can be understood in our lives, as fear, like other emotions, has no essential or 
necessary features. Thus, the ‘language game’ of fear includes various mental states and 
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behaviours ranging from simple cries to delicate confessions, with fear sometimes mixed 
with other emotions such as frustration and joy, and against a backdrop of specific contexts, 
personalities and biographies. Accordingly, fear is no longer reduced to a cybernetic 
mechanism, but becomes an important thread in the human ‘forms of life’, dynamically 
changing in quality and intensity, and a major determinant of behaviour.  
 
In conclusion, since the end of the 20th century, emotions, and especially fear, have 
been the subject of intense scientific research. This has resulted in increased knowledge of 
the brain systems engaged in very specific fear behaviours in non-human animals. 
However, when these findings are extrapolated to humans, without understanding the 
limitations of experimental conditions, or when experimental findings in humans are used 
to explain the concept of fear at large, important problems arise. This occurs when Damasio 
moves from explaining interesting research findings to reducing fear to putative visual 
images, somatic markers and metarepresentations. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, put the 
emotions back on the philosophical agenda as “it is...perfectly possible that certain 
psychological phenomena cannot be investigated physiologically, because physiologically 
nothing corresponds to them” (Wittgenstein, 1980b) (904), or at least, physiology may 
explain only partially the conceptual network of fear. Furthermore, Wittgenstein advanced 
the method of conceptual analysis, a critical philosophical tool to dispel the conceptual 
confusions of empirical studies.  
 
It can be seen that the conceptual problems brought about by dualism and 
reductionism are a major obstacle for the empirical study of emotions (Bennett & Hacker, 
2003). I have discussed in this chapter how the dualist strategy to account for the emotions, 
begun by Descartes and continued in more recent times by James and Damasio, has major 
conceptual problems that invalidate their model. On the other hand, the strong reductionist 
approach to the empirical study of fear in the field of current neurosciences ignores the 
richness and complexity of this emotion and its diffuse connections with, rather than 
definite demarcation from, other emotions with which it shares a ‘family resemblance.’ As 
I discuss in the next two chapters, this narrow approach has strongly influenced clinical 




Reductionism is manifest in another twist in the history of the thinking about the 
concept of fear during this time that is also worthy of attention. Between James’s 
publication of What is an Emotion in 1884 and Wittgenstein’s publication of the 
Philosophical Investigations in 1953, a major revolution occurred in medicine. Sigmund 
Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, published Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926), in 
which he presented a conceptualization of fear and anxiety based on psychodynamic 
theories. This work not only changed the philosophical concept of fear and anxiety but had 
a great impact on the medicalization and treatment of these emotions. This development 





Sigmund Freud and the psychoanalytical concept of fear 
and anxiety 
 
Anxiety is not so simple a matter 
Sigmund Freud, Inhibition Symptom and Anxiety, (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 132) 
 
The problem of fear is the meeting point of many important questions,  
an enigma whose complete solution would be as a flood of light upon psychic life 




In the last chapter I discussed how the Cartesian model of fear, based on a 
hydrodynamic mechanism, was continued by William James and his hypothesis that fear is 
the result of a neurological reflex arc with no cognitive intervention. Even though James 
himself revised this model and despite the strong conceptual challenges proposed by 
Wittgenstein, the model of fear has continued to be developed in mostly biological terms by 
the current field of the cognitive neurosciences.  
 
By the time William James was publishing his Principles of Psychology and 
Wittgenstein was beginning his philosophical writings, psychiatrists and neurologists were 
dealing with psychosomatic complaints that were affecting increasing numbers of the upper 
classes in Europe and America. Physicians, specialized in 'nervousness' used a variety of 
treatments ranging from hypnosis to long admissions to specialized spas (Shorter, 1992, p. 
233). It is in this social and medical context that by the beginning of the 20th century 
psychoanalysis had taken psychiatry by storm. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) became one of 
the main referents for the field of mental disorders and their treatment, with his 
development of a revolutionary conceptual framework and a novel therapeutic technique.463 
                                                 
463 Rollo May refers to Freud as “a giant who, like Marx and Einstein…set the tone for vast changes 
on our culture” (May, 1996, p. 132). He further considered Freud as “the preeminent explorer of the 
psychology of anxiety…and provided understanding to both the mechanism and therapy” (p. 134). 
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Despite the influence of James, many psychiatrists ceased looking into the brain for 
responses to the riddle of emotional problems, and adopted the Freudian framework in 
which fear and anxiety play a central role. A whole new set of psychological concepts 
(Freud's "metapsychology") was created, not only to explain the phenomenon of anxiety, 
but to provide theoretical support for psychoanalysis as a therapeutic technique as well. The 
influence of psychoanalysis also extended beyond medicine to influence diverse areas of 
human knowledge including philosophy, sociology, the arts, and psychology (Leavy, 
2010). Consequently, analysis and discussion of Freudian texts is of great relevance for this 
investigation of the concept of fear.  
 
This chapter will examine the principal Freudian concepts of fear and its 
pathology.464 I do not pretend to provide an exhaustive analysis of Freud’s texts on fear and 
related conditions such as anxiety and neurosis, but only to present his major hypotheses on 
their causes along with a critical discussion of them. I will also address, albeit briefly, 
Freud’s suggestions on the therapy for ‘anxiety neurosis’, a term and therapy created for 
and employed on a variety of extreme fears.465 
 
                                                 
464 Freud, like Kierkegaard and Heidegger, defined anxiety (Angst in the original German) as 
objectless fear, but he used the terms fear (Furcht in the original German) and anxiety 
interchangeably in his discussion of clinical examples and in his theoretical discussions. For 
instance, he used the term “anxiety neurosis” in his early writings, switching to “neurotic fear” to 
denote similar concepts in later texts. In the Appendix to On the Grounds (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 
116), James Strachey, the book’s translator, noted the overlapping connotations of the German 
words Angst, Furcht and Schreck, and considered that Freud was unable to provide a convincing 
technical connotation for Angst as distinguished with related terms (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 116). 
Furthermore, Strachey considered that Angst could be translated into English as ‘fear’, ‘fright’, 
‘alarm’ and other related terms, and regards as “unfortunate” the translation of Angst as anxiety, a 
noun he considered to have only a “remote connection” with the German Angst. Angst is usually 
translated as anguish in both Spanish (angustia) and French (angoisse), and this significant problem 
in translation has been addressed by German Berrios (Berrios, 1996, p. 265). In Freud’s work, fear 
and anxiety are conceptually distinguished when, for instance, for some people being in a train 
produces fear, whereas thinking about travelling by train produces anxiety. However, as one 
commentator on Freud’s work on anxiety states “at present, it can be said there is no consensus on 
the difference between fear and anxiety” (Nersessian, 2013, p. 180).  
465 Interestingly, Freudian writings on anxiety have, to my knowledge, never been the subject of 
philosophical scrutiny from a conceptual point of view. 
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8.2. Freud, fear and anxiety 
By the beginning of the 20th century, studies on the emotions were being pursued 
by philosophers and practitioners in the young sciences of psychology and sociology. In 
parallel, a rather dramatic change was taking place in the practice of psychiatry and 
neurology in America and Northern Europe, with strong social repercussions (Gay, 1988, p. 
593). This change had started by the end of the 19th century, when the American 
neurologist George Miller Beard published influential articles and books on “neurasthenia”, 
a term used to refer to a variety of psychosomatic symptoms such as fatigue, anxiety, 
weakness, dizziness, fainting, headaches, neuralgias and depressed mood (Beard, 1881). 
Physicians in large cities of the western hemisphere were treating an increasing number of 
individuals whose main complaint was the presence of 'nervousness' impacting on their 
daily lives. Nervousness was manifest as somatic symptoms and various fears, such as fear 
of illness ('valetudinarianism' or 'hypochondriasis'), fear of unemployment, and fear of 
impending war, and as a result of these developments the terms 'anxiety', used in an 
inclusive sense incorporating a variety of fears, and 'neurosis' become of common use in the 
20th century (Berrios, 1999). Both terms are combined by Freud into the novel syndrome 
of ‘anxiety neurosis’, a term with strong clinical implications but, as I shall argue, with 
major conceptual problems. 
 
8.3. Freud’s Angstneurose 
The Freudian analysis of fear and anxiety is classically presented in two 
chronologically separated conceptual systems, the first published as On the grounds for 
detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description 'Anxiety 
Neurosis' [Angstneurose] (On the Grounds) (Freud, 1953-1975d) in 1895, and the second 
published as Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety in 1926. In his early work, Freud 
acknowledged the clinical relevance of Beard's concept of neurasthenia, a term he 
continued to use. On the Grounds had two principal aims. The first was to distinguish from 
Beard's broad description of neurasthenia a new syndrome with a specific phenomenology 
and aetiology that Freud termed “anxiety neurosis” (Angstneurose); and the second, to 




Freud was successful in advancing the clinical syndromes of anxiety and fear that 
are still found in main psychiatric nomenclatures, but he failed to demonstrate the influence 
of putative sexual forces underlying the pathology of fear. In the following analysis of On 
the Grounds, I shall argue that Freud did not open new ground with his theory of human 
fear, but instead followed the Cartesian concept of emotions on two accounts: first, he 
followed Descartes’s hydraulic explanation of the mechanism of fear, although now 
replaced with a more modern ‘pneumatic’ system. Secondly, Freud fully abided by 
Cartesian dualism in his two theories on the mechanism of fear and anxiety. I shall also 
argue that Freud never justified his hypothesis of the sexual origin of anxiety, and that he 
also failed to suggest any conceptually sound therapeutic approach to this condition. 
  
8.3.1. Phenomenology of neurotic anxiety 
 Freud was a shrewd observer and provided excellent clinical descriptions of a 
variety of symptoms which he subsumed under the umbrella syndrome, anxiety neurosis. 
The main symptoms are briefly presented, as they are relevant to the understanding to his 
first theory of anxiety neurosis: 
(1) General irritability: This is a generic symptom, seen in a variety of anxious states. 
Freud considered general irritability as being "invariably" present in neurotic anxiety, and, 
according to Freud, the theoretical relevance of this symptom is that it "points" to an 
accumulation of sexual excitation (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 92).  
(2) Anxious expectation: Rather than providing a working definition, Freud illustrated this 
symptom with clinical examples.466 Thus “...a woman...who suffers from anxious 
expectation will think of influenza pneumonia every time her husband coughs...and, in her 
mind's eye, will see his funeral go past” (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 92). Anxious expectation is 
present in "normal anxiety",467 and in "hypochondria," mostly featuring vague somatic 
complains. Another expression of anxious expectation is "moral anxiety," described as 
"exaggerated scrupulousness and pedantry" (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 93). Freud considered 
                                                 
466 One of the problems for understanding many of Freud's phenomenological description is that he 
provides clinical examples that, while interesting, leave the concept he presents in quite ambiguous 
terms. 
467 Freud describes “normal anxiety” as having the connotation of “anxiousness” or the “tendency to 
take a pessimistic view of things” (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 93). 
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anxious expectation as the main symptom of anxiety neurosis, and speculated that somatic 
energy freely available to engage with an object of potential worry is the main mechanism 
of this anxiety (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 93). This symptom is the precursor of his later 
description of ‘free-floating anxiety.’ 
(3) Anxiety attacks: These attacks may consist of either somatic symptoms (e.g. "spasms of 
the heart", "difficulty in breathing", "sweating"), or psychological symptoms such as the 
idea of imminent death, having an acute illness, or going crazy (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 93). 
These symptoms may also present in mixed patterns, as "rudimentary anxiety attacks" or as 
"equivalents of anxiety attacks" (i.e. somatic symptoms only) with vertigo being "among 
the gravest symptom of neurosis" (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 96).468  
 
Freud's phenomenological descriptions were not original (Berrios, 1999), but 
consolidating the above symptoms into a single syndrome proved to have a strong influence 
in psychiatry, as several of these descriptions are still extant. For instance, irritability is a 
symptom of Generalized Anxiety Disorder; anxious expectation is the precursor of the 
current syndrome of anticipatory anxiety, and the same is true for Freud's "anxiety attacks" 
and the current condition of "panic attacks" (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
Freud describes phobias as the presence of anxious expectation combined with anxiety 
attacks. He described two "types" of typical phobia: first, a fear of "general physiological 
dangers" related to anxious expectation; and second, "phobias of locomotion" during 
anxiety attacks (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 96). These attacks of fear increase the human 
natural aversion to real threats (e.g. "a thunderstorm in the open"). According to Freud, 
locomotion phobias (which include agoraphobia) are usually preceded by attacks of vertigo, 
especially when the individual is in an inducing context (e.g. walking along a narrow 
street). 
 
In conclusion, it might be said that Freud followed the zeitgeist of his times as many 
practitioners were unhappy with the concept of neurasthenia given the lack of specificity of 
                                                 
468 Freud was following a consolidated tradition in psychiatry of linking anxiety to somatic 
disorders (Berrios, 1999). Freud's listing of anxiety attacks includes the forms of (1) disturbances of 
the heart, (2) disturbances of respiration, (3) attacks of sweating, (4) attacks of tremor and 
shivering, (5) attacks of ravenous hunger, (6) attacks of diarrhoea, (7) attacks of vertigo, (8) attacks 
of congestion (vasomotor neurasthenia), and (9) attacks of paraesthesias. 
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this construct (Berrios, 1999). In On the Grounds we see a young Freud devoted to 
clarifying clinical issues, providing nosological descriptions based on clinical experience. 
From a conceptual perspective, the most interesting material is Freud’s theory on the 
mechanism of the pathologies of fear.  
 
8.3.2. The mechanism of anxiety neurosis 
Freud’s first model for anxiety deserves close examination given this is an example 
of the persistence, in the late 19th century, of Descartes’s system of emotions, with the 
crucial addition in Freud’s theory of sexual forces underlying all cases of anxiety. Another 
novelty is Freud’s inclusion of a homeostatic system of biological forces based on 
Fechner's biological principle of constancy (Ellenberger, 1956), the theory that humans are 
naturally "striving to maintain excitation at a comfortable level." Freud’s theory in On the 
Grounds was labelled "economical" in the sense that the aim is keeping a balance between 
somatic and psychological forces. This is also based on Fechner’s theory that experiences 
of pleasure and displeasure depend on the stability of psychophysical forces (Yahalom, 
2014, p. 407).  
 
Freud’s main ‘discovery’ in On the Grounds is that the somatic excitation, which is 
abnormally regulated and results in anxiety, is sexual in nature. The essence of the 
mechanism of anxiety neurosis is that the constant production of somatic sexual excitation 
has to be channelled towards the psyche for adequate processing, and anxiety neurosis 
results from “a deflection of somatic sexual excitation from the psychical sphere” and the 
“abnormal employment” of this excitation (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 108).469 Later in the text 
Freud states that somatic sexual excitation is produced continuously, resulting in increased 
                                                 
469 Freud also describes additional dysfunctional processes that may occur separately or in 
combinations. These processes are the following: (1) An increase in somatic sexual energy above a 
given threshold; (2) the “deflection” of this energy away from “psychological processes” as 
described above; (3) a dearth of these psychological processes; and (4) after a prolonged deflection 
of somatic sexual excitation, the “psyche” being no longer able to process this energy. The latter is 
the mechanism for anxiety generated by physical exhaustion where, according to Freud, the libido 
“sinks” given that the somatic excitation is used “for other purposes” (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 111). 
In this condition the mechanism of anxiety is not related to sexual factors, although Freud insists 
that “a sexual mechanism is [nevertheless] engaged” (p. 111). 
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pressure within the seminal vesicles.470 When pressure reaches a given threshold, it 
overrides the resistance of an afferent pathway to the cerebral cortex, where this somatic 
energy is turned into “psychical excitation” or libido. This libido charges with energy a set 
of “sexual ideas” stored in the psyche which produce a state of “libidinal tension” and an 
urge to reduce it to preserve homeostasis. Freud considers that the “psychical unloading” of 
this tension depends on the unloading of the pressure from the seminal vesicles via a 
complex spinal reflex by a “specific or adequate action” (italics in original) (Freud, 1953-
1975d, p. 109).471 Following this process, the somatic sexual excitation is removed and the 
resistance of the afferent neural pathway is re-established.472 Anxiety arises whenever the 
libidinal tension is not “discharged” in (what Freud considers) a normal sexual act. 
 
The question now arises as to why Freud selected a sexual cause as the main 
aetiology for anxiety over the common sources of anxiety and fear discussed in previous 
chapters, such as death, poverty and disease. Are these not legitimate causes of fear and 
anxiety? Freud was adamant that anxiety was caused by sexual factors, and all other 
potential causes have to accommodate to his discovery. Thus Freud considered that non-
sexual factors such as those mentioned above (which he terms “stock noxae” (Freud, 1953-
1975d, p. 99)) are non-specific triggers of anxiety. In other words, these factors have, in 
Freud’s opinion, only a "contributory" effect and thus are neither necessary nor sufficient 
for producing anxiety.473 The necessary factor for Freud’s anxiety neurosis is the presence 
of a “specific noxa” which is the pathological deflection of sexual somatic excitation, and 
stock noxae can only increase the amount of excitation. Whenever a psychological shock of 
                                                 
470 Freud's explanation for the mechanism of anxiety neurosis applies mostly to men. He briefly 
states that women also have somatic sexual excitation, which becomes a psychical stimulus (libido), 
resulting in a "voluptuous feeling" (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 109). 
471 This adequate action is “normal coition”, whereas “less adequate” actions are masturbation or 
spontaneous seminal emission (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 109). 
472 Freud considered that a similar mechanism occurs in women, but he admitted being unable to 
elaborate on the mechanism. 
473 “I maintain that there exists a specific aetiological factor for anxiety neurosis which can be 
replaced in its operation by stock noxae in a quantitative sense, but not in a qualitative one; I 
furthermore maintain that this specific factor determines above all the form of the neurosis; whether 
a neurotic illness occurs at all depends on the total load upon the nervous system” (italics in the 
original) (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 131). 
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a non-sexual nature seems to produce anxiety neurosis, Freud is unbending in his view that 
“careful enquiry directed to that end reveals that a set of noxae and influences from sexual 
life… [are operative aetiological factors]” (italics in the original) (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 
134).  
 
To repeat, Freud’s surprising discovery is that abnormal anxiety is always related to 
a dysfunctional sexual life, a fact he believes to be demonstrated with "overwhelming 
frequency" (p. 99).474 Freud also briefly refers to a ‘normal’ type of anxiety, which he 
considers to be the result of the incapacity to deal psychologically with external dangers (p. 
121), but unfortunately he does not elaborate on this important concept.475   
 
At the end of the treatise Freud listed what he considers relevant factors in the 
aetiology of anxiety neurosis, which include: (1) a hereditary disposition, which is the most 
frequent predisposing factor although it is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce 
anxiety neurosis (p. 137); (2) a specific cause (that is, deflection of somatic sexual 
excitation from "the psychical field") which is both necessary and sufficient to produce 
anxiety neurosis, and (3) an auxiliary cause ("stock noxa") such as physical exhaustion, 
which, like the hereditary disposition, is neither a necessary nor sufficient factor (p. 135).476  
                                                 
474 The only causes of anxiety neurosis unrelated to sexual dysfunction are "exhausting exertion" 
such as occurs after a severe illness, "night-watching", and "sick nursing" (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 
102). 
475 “Normal” anxiety is summarily explained in Addendum B of Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety 
(Freud, 1953-1975a, pp. 164-168). In this important section, Freud begins by defining anxiety as 
“indefiniteness and lack of object,” whereas fear (Furcht) always has an object. He remarks that 
“the problem” of conceptually separating “realistic” from “neurotic” anxiety “awaits a thorough 
examination” (p.165). Freud defines realistic anxiety as produced by a known danger, whereas in 
neurotic anxiety the danger is unknown but probably instinctual. Once neurotic anxiety becomes 
conscious through psychoanalysis, it is not different from realistic anxiety. Nevertheless, a 
paragraph later Freud remarks that “in some cases the characteristics of realistic anxiety and 
neurotic anxiety are mingled” (p. 165). More specifically, Freud states that realistic anxiety converts 
into neurotic anxiety whenever the reaction to the danger is exaggerated.  
476 Lowenfeld (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 125), suggests against Freud's sexual aetiology of anxiety 
disorder, that a severe fright may be sufficient to cause anxiety. Freud denied what he considered a 
"post hoc ergo propter hoc", an astonishing remark given his later acknowledgment that his work 
lacked empirical confirmation (p. 128). Freud argued that those individuals with anxiety neurosis 
who report a normal sexual life are "unreliable,” and argued that “...when I add these [clinical cases] 
to the very considerable number of cases in which the aetiology shows nothing but the specific... 
[i.e. sexual] ...factor, they fit without contradiction into...[my]...theory" (p. 128). 
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8.3.3. Empirical and conceptual problems with Freud’s sexual model of anxiety 
Before addressing specific problems with Freud’s mechanism of anxiety neurosis, it 
is important to stress the interesting commonalities with Descartes’s mechanism of the 
passions. Freud’s process of anxiety neurosis provided in On the Grounds follows 
Descartes’s model of the passions as described in The Passions of the Soul, with some 
modifications. In both systems, there is a separation between res extensa (the body in 
Descartes, and “somatic sexual excitation” in Freud) and res cogitans (the soul in Descartes 
and the “psyche” in Freud). More specifically, Descartes’s ‘spirits’ become Freud’s 
‘somatic sexual excitation,’ Descartes’s ‘soul’ becomes Freud’s ‘psyche,’ and Descartes’s 
hydraulic interaction between spirits and soul becomes Freud’s ‘pneumatic’ interaction 
between sexual somatic energy and its ‘processing’ in the psyche. An important difference 
is that in Descartes’s system, fear and anxiety are produced by specific movements of the 
pineal gland, whereas Freud’s neurotic anxiety is produced by a deflection of sexual 
somatic energy from the psyche into subcortical brain regions, which Freud considered a 
wasted or “abnormal employment of that excitation” (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 108).  
 
Unfortunately, Freud’s model is riddled with conceptual problems and empirical 
questions. Firstly, there is his theory that anxiety results from a deflection of sexual somatic 
excitation from appropriate channels of “unloading” (p. 112). Such deflection occurs with 
any sexual behaviour that departs from what Freud describes as a “normal vita sexualis” 
(italics in the original) (p. 129), that is, a sexual act between a man and a woman 
culminating in mutual orgasm, and the cause of anxiety neurosis lies in these abnormal 
sexual practices. Individuals with a "normal vita sexualis" never develop anxiety neurosis, 
not even after receiving a "psychical shock" from a stock noxa as explained above. What 
about people with a normal sexual life who still develop anxiety neurosis? Freud’s answer 
to this challenge is that these people have a hereditary disposition to deflect sexual tension 
from the psychical sphere. In other words, these people (all women in Freud’s explanation) 
inherit the mechanism of an abnormal “vita sexualis.”477 
                                                 
477 “There are plenty of women who are afflicted with congenital anxiety neurosis—that is to say, 
who inherit, or who develop without any demonstrable disturbance from outside, a vita sexualis 
which is the same as the one usually acquired through coitus interruptus and similar noxae. In a 
number of these women we are able to discover a hysterical illness in their youth, since which their 
vita sexualis has been disturbed and a deflection of sexual tension from the psychical sphere has 
been established. Women with this kind of sexuality are incapable of obtaining real satisfaction 
cont. next page 
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Freud neither explains how ‘abnormal’ sexuality results in a deflection of sexual 
somatic excitation, nor what the putative deflection of this excitation consists in. These 
omissions relate to the main conceptual problem of this Freudian treatise, which amounts to 
a paraphrase of Descartes’s system of emotions and its unavoidable dualism. Sexual tension 
is the main factor in Freud’s theory, producing anxiety by being deflected from 
psychological processing. The miracle of this Cartesian jump from body to psyche is never 
addressed, but more worrisome is the lack of explanation of how sexual tension is being 
processed psychologically. We can only speculate about this putative mechanism, but even 
that is difficult. The question then arising is how and why this sexual tension is deflected. 
And what is this 'deflection' about? These are not empty questions given that we are 
discussing the crux of Freud's theory of anxiety.478 
                                                                                                                                                    
even from normal coitus, and they develop anxiety neurosis either spontaneously or after further 
operative factors have supervened” (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 129). 
478 We may add other questions, such as why does deflected somatic sexual energy result in anxiety 
neurosis and not in other psychological problems? Most of the evidence for a sexual origin of 
anxiety is based on anecdotes. For instance, Freud differentiated the mechanism of anxiety for men 
and women in their different roles in normal sexual intercourse. In women, anxiety neurosis may be 
expressed as "virginal anxiety," as demonstrated by "unambiguous observations", and anxiety "in 
the newly-married", produced by frigidity and relieved by regaining "normal sensitivity". Freud 
argued that anxiety in women mostly depends on whether they achieve orgasm, a finding based on 
"a large number of observations" (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 100). The use of condoms may not 
produce anxiety neurosis as long as the woman "is very quickly excitable and the husband very 
potent." The most common causes of anxiety neurosis in women are having sexual intercourse with 
men suffering from ejaculatio praecox (p. 100) or practising coitus interruptus, or intentional 
abstinence. In men, anxiety neurosis is due to sexual abstinence (such as practiced by "eccentrics"), 
"unconsummated excitation", coitus interruptus, masturbation, or due to becoming "climacteric” (p. 
102). 
Freud was aware that whereas the number of individuals with "sexual problems" is very large, 
anxiety neurosis is less frequent. He initially admitted that a sexual factor is necessary but not 
sufficient to produce anxiety neurosis, but later stated that "a detailed dissection of suitable cases of 
anxiety neurosis proves beyond question the importance of the sexual factor” (p. 103), and provided 
the following evidence: (1) among young married women with bouts of anxiety neurosis, these 
episodes are "...traceable to a coitus which was deficient in satisfaction" (p. 103), with the anxiety 
attack appearing within days of the failed sexual intercourse. This anxiety is tightly related to the 
efficacy of intercourse, and will not recur if the woman takes "a holiday in the mountain." 
Unfortunately, "anxiety sets in again in the mountains, as soon as the husband begins his holiday 
too" (p.104); (2) anxiety symptoms are absent during pregnancy, when there is no need for coitus 
interruptus; (3) other neuroses may precede the development of anxiety neurosis, but these are 
always triggered by a "sexual noxa" ("Observations of this sort...can be multiplied at will" (p. 104)). 
An example provided by Freud is the case of a man who suffered a heart attack and developed 
neurotic anxiety after the death of his father.  Freud claimed that this man's neurosis was unrelated 
to the death of his father, but produced by a “long engagement with coitus interruptus” (p. 106).  
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A sexual factor underlying anxiety neurosis is Freud’s main contribution, but the 
question still arises as to what the role of other traumatic factors may be. Freud easily 
dismisses their efficacy in producing anxiety by stating that "stock noxae" only reinforce 
the sexual noxa (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 103).479 But how this reinforcement occurs is never 
explained. It is at times exasperating reading statements regarding the mechanism of 
anxiety that are fully speculative but accepted without any self-criticism.480 There is no 
hypothesis being tested, and his biased observations are the only bases of his theory.  
 
In conclusion, Freud's main proposal in On the Grounds is that the only necessary 
cause of anxiety neurosis is the accumulation of libidinal excitation, with all other relevant 
factors in life playing second fiddle. From the perspective of the ancients, Montaigne and 
Wittgenstein, and indeed common understandings today, such a conclusion seems wildly 
counter-intuitive, not only because the somatic factors relate to sexual expression only, but 
because of the unsupported reliance on sexuality to the detriment of other significant 
contextual factors.  On the other hand, it is possible to trace continuities between this early 
Freudian account of anxiety and the kind of investigations into somatic brain processes that 
I discussed as the tradition of ‘Descartes-James-Damasio’, in terms of its mechanistic basis 
and body-psyche dualism. With Freud, fear and anxiety became the main expression of 
sexual pathology couched in pneumatic terms. Freud’s argument that dysfunction in sexual 
mechanisms accounts for human anxiety, and that therefore anxiety is always pathological, 
signals the origin of the medicalisation of anxiety. 
 
A final question concerns the patients’ well-being. As a physician specialising in 
'nervous' disorders we would expect Freud’s theoretical speculations to be orientated 
towards devising a better treatment for his patients. It is therefore disappointing that therapy 
is not specifically addressed in On the Grounds, except for a brief statement that the cure 
for anxiety lies in resuming a ‘normal’ sexual life. But no suggestion, let alone proof, for 
                                                 
479 “The anxiety neurosis breaks out as soon as there is added to the latent effect of the specific 
factor for the effect of another, stock noxa” (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 106). 
480 “I am justified in drawing the following conclusion: if the same specific cause can be shown to 
exist in the aetiology of all, or the great majority, of cases of anxiety neurosis, our view of the 
matter need not be shaken by the fact that the illness does not break out until one or other stock 
factor, such as emotion, has come into operation” (Freud, 1953-1975d, p. 127). 
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this assertion is provided. External factors (Freud’s ‘stock noxae’) such as the death of a 
father or suffering a heart attack (as in one of Freud’s examples), only play an accessory 
role, and the fear of death is not even considered. 
 
8.4. Freud’s early therapeutic suggestions for anxiety neurosis:  
8.4.1 Lectures 24 and 25 
Ten years after On the Grounds and before publishing Inhibition, Symptom and 
Anxiety, Freud delivered a series of lectures (1915-1917) (Freud, 1953-1975b) to clarify 
conceptual issues about psychoanalysis, and several of these lectures were devoted to 
anxiety. The relevance of this material is that Freud clarified and modified some of his 
previous concepts of fear and anxiety, and also provided provocative advice regarding the 
treatment of anxiety. 
 
In Lecture 24, entitled "Ordinary Nervousness" (pp. 328-339), Freud accepts that 
"nervous" people have a temperament characterized by incomprehensible reactions, 
irritability and uselessness. Freud here refers to his recent discovery of the unconscious and 
to the mechanism of repression of sexual instincts. A more clinically experienced Freud 
now proposes that neurosis is an incurable disorder, and yet of potential benefit to the 
patient, given that anxiety signals the resolution of an unconscious event.481 Moreover, the 
role of the physician is not to interfere with neurosis: "the physician takes the part of the 
illness he is battling against" (p. 332).482 Freud asserts that there is "incurable suffering" in 
the world. Thus, a neurotic person finds refuge in illness, which, Freud believes, may be 
justifiable. When neurosis ensues, "the physician...will retire silently and tactfully" (p. 332). 
And now, in a wildly speculative manner, Freud expands on the putative advantage of 
suffering from neurosis: exploited and abused women may "adopt the evasion of the 
                                                 
481 “There are cases where even the physician must admit that the resolution of the conflict into 
neurosis is the most harmless outcome and one most easily tolerated by society” (Freud, 1953-
1975b, p. 332). 
482 “He does not have to restrict himself to the role of the fanatic warrior for health in all situations 
of life. He knows that the world contains not only neurotic misery, but also real, incurable suffering. 
He knows that necessity may even require a human being to sacrifice his health, and he learns that 
by this sacrifice on the part of one individual untold wretchedness may be spared for many others” 
(Freud, 1953-1975b, p. 332). 
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neurosis" to avoid being brutally treated by their husbands.483 This may occur whenever 
"...the woman is too cowardly or too virtuous to seek secret solace in the arms of another” 
(p. 332); or when the woman does not separate from the husband, because "... she has no 
prospect of maintaining herself or of finding a better husband..." (p. 332). Freud’s 
misogynistic approach to the treatment of anxiety neurosis is compounded by his 
suggestion of sadomasochism in women, since a woman may elect to stay in a relationship 
“especially when her sexual emotions still bind her to this brutal man” (p. 332). The sadism 
is expressed by the woman’s “misuse” of the neurosis “for purpose of vengeance… She 
forces her inconsiderate husband to spare her, to attend to her wishes, to permit her absence 
from the house and thus free her from the oppressions of her married life” (p.332). In these 
cases, the neurosis is used for self-protection. She "...can complain of her illness..." and the 
physician "...becomes her assistant..." (p. 332). Given the considerable gain that women 
obtain from being in a neurotic state, the efficacy of psychosomatic therapy is “very slight” 
(p. 333). By considering this an ‘advantage’ of the illness, Freud seems to suggest that 
neurosis is in some instances an act of pretending by shrewd women who cheat on their 
husbands to effect a ‘cure.’  
 
Freud also proposed an additional advantage of anxiety neurosis suggesting that 
after a long time of illness, the neurosis acquires an independent life; it attains a kind of 
modus vivendi between itself and other parts of the psychic life (p. 333). The secondary 
benefit of anxiety neurosis is that the patient no longer has to work, and “learns to exploit 
his injury by begging” (p.334). The disadvantage is that “man renounces the use of his best 
and loftiest powers” (p.334). Thus, Freud’s concept of anxiety neurosis includes an implicit 
dimorphism, where women benefit from the illness indulging in vengeance or deception, 
and men are limited to begging and suffering curtailment of their powers. 
 
The concept of the sexual origin of neurosis re-emerges in this Lecture mixed with 
personal references and anecdotes. Freud recounts that he made his crucial discovery of the 
sexual basis of neurosis after he realised that the examination of nervous patients rarely 
included questions about their sexual lives (p. 335): "At that time I sacrificed my popularity 
                                                 
483 The unanswered question here is whether these women suffer a true illness, or as Freud seems to 
hint, they simulate a state of anxiety neurosis to reap some benefits. 
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among my patients to my investigations." Freud "forced” patients to "confirm" his 
suppositions, but some patients would go to other physicians rather than disclose their 
sexual lives (p. 335). During this period, Freud did not consider sexual abnormalities as the 
single cause for neurosis, but insisted that the main cause for neurosis was the poor 
handling of increasing libido and the production of "sexual toxins" which could result from 
physical or psychological sources.  
 
Lecture 25, entitled “General theory of the neuroses: fear and anxiety", makes 
explicit the divorce between psychoanalysis and biology for the understanding of these 
emotions: "...nothing [is] more indifferent...for the psychological comprehension of fear, 
than knowledge of nerves..." (p. 341). In this Lecture Freud makes the striking suggestion 
that fear is an unnecessary emotion for the guidance of rational behaviour. As opposed to 
neurotic fear, Freud states that real fear appears to be a rational response to an external 
danger, and the expression of the instinct of self-preservation, but this theory should be 
“thoroughly revised” (p. 341). He suggests in the most orthodox Stoic fashion that a 
rational response to an external danger should not be fear, but “the cool appraisal of one’s 
own strength in comparison with…the danger” (p. 341). Based on this appraisal, the agent 
is then capable deciding on the best course of action, “flight, defence, or possibly even 
attack”. In this context of Stoic virtuosity, Freud considers that fear has no positive role to 
play since it should not influence the appraisal and decision process.484 What is of 
advantage is the expectation of danger which allows, says Freud, the activation of sensory 
and motor processes preparing the individual for a fast behavioural response to the threat. 
This expectancy produces “the condition of fear” as a mere epiphenomenon (p.342). 
 
Freud also makes the puzzling statement that all emotions consist of “the perception 
of motor activities that have already taken place” which strongly resonates with James’s 
theory of emotions (see previous chapter), and yet Freud, the psychoanalyst, wants to break 
from the psychological tradition: “What psychology has to say about emotions—the James-
Lange theory, for instance—is absolutely incomprehensible for us psychoanalysts, and 
cannot be discussed” (p. 343). Fear is the key to making psychoanalysis into an 
                                                 
484 Fear may be actually counterproductive, since “if fear is too strong, it proves absolutely useless 
and paralyses every action, even flight” (Freud, 1953-1975b, p. 341). 
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independent scientific undertaking, and Freud is now ready to propose more ambitious 
hypotheses as well as novel nosological descriptions. He proposes that the category of 
“neurotic fear” include the emotion of anxiety, which he now defines as being free-floating 
or expectant fear. Freud adds that neurotically fearful people always expect the worst 
outcome from any event, and should be distinguished from the “many” people who are not 
suffering neurotic anxiety but just show a “tendency to anticipate disaster” (p. 344).485 He 
also describes phobias as a separate type of pathological fear, which he considers to be 
independent from neurotic fear.486 
 
In terms of their mechanism, the more mature Freud proposes that fear and anxiety 
are a repetition of relevant past experiences,487 primarily the trauma of birth488 and 
separation from the mother.489 He also relates neurotic anxiety to the individual’s sexual 
life, in line with his first hypothesis in On the Grounds. Neurotic anxiety occurs when 
sexual excitation “is not brought to a satisfactory conclusion” (p. 346), and anxiety is the 
clinical expression of unspent “libidinous excitement” (p. 347).490 The next step is to 
                                                 
485 Freud adds that “a striking amount of expectant fear” is characteristic of anxiety neurosis, which 
he now subsumes under the generic category of neuroses (Freud, 1953-1975b, p. 344). 
486 Freud also describes a third type of neurotic fear which is the anxiety occurring in hysteria. 
Analysing this construct is beyond the possibilities of this chapter.  
487 As already discussed, we should not expect a consistent use of the terms ‘anxiety’ and ‘fear,’ 
since Freud prefers avoiding “entering upon a discussion as to whether our language means the 
same or distinct things by the words anxiety, fear or fright” (Freud, 1953-1975b, p. 342). 
488 Freud describes this process in the following way: “the tremendous heightening of irritability 
through the interruption of the circulation…was at the time the cause of the experience of fear; the 
first fear was therefore toxic…the tendency to repetition of the first condition of fear has been so 
deeply ingrained in the organism through countless generations, that not a single individual can 
escape the emotion of fear” (Freud, 1953-1975b, p. 343). 
489 The rationale provided by Freud to substantiate his hypothesis is rather shocking. He writes: 
“Many years ago we were sitting around the dinner table—a number of young physicians—when an 
assistant in the obstetrical clinic told a jolly story of what had happened in the last examination for 
midwives. A candidate was asked what it implied if during delivery the faeces of the newborn was 
present in the discharge of waters, and she answered promptly ‘the child is afraid.’ She was laughed 
at and flunked. But I silently took her part and began to suspect that the poor woman of the people 
had, with sound perception, revealed an important connection” (Freud, 1953-1975b, p. 344). 
490 Freud has no doubts that his sexual theory of neurotic fear and anxiety is correct: “the connection 
between sexual restraint is no longer questioned even by physicians who have nothing to do with 
cont. next page 
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generalise this theory to all fears by demonstrating that this mechanism is not only valid for 
neurotic fear but for real fear, that is the typical reaction to danger (p. 350). Freud remarks 
that in children fear is common and it is difficult to know whether it is of the neurotic or the 
real type. He arrives at the conclusion that “the child (and later the adult) fears the power of 
his libido because he is anxious in the face of everything” (p. 351). In other words, children 
and adults have a neurotic disposition to respond with fear. Freud finds his explanation 
“simple and convincing,” but the fact is that it is based on the mere speculation that all 
children have fear, that this fear is anxiety about their sexual instincts, and that those 
predisposed to be anxious will develop anxiety (p. 351). 
 
In conclusion, while claiming simplicity, Freud provides in these Lectures a long 
and convoluted classification of fear and anxiety, which suggests two types: ‘neurotic fear’ 
due to “misused libido” and ‘real fear’ as the normal reaction to external danger (p. 352). 
Eventually, Freud wants to explain all fears, neurotic and real, as a libidinal problem, but 
the stumbling block in his theory is that real fear is an expression of the instinct of self-
preservation rather than a response to sexual dysfunction.491 Doing away with this 
conceptual limitation is the aim of Freud’s major work on fear and anxiety, namely 
Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety.  
                                                                                                                                                    
psychoanalysis” (Freud, 1953-1975b, p. 347). Freud accepted ignorance about the mechanism 
through which “anxiety originates from the libido” (Freud, 1953-1975b, p. 348). 
491 “We are deeply impressed with how closely the development of fear is interwoven with the fate 
of the libido and the unconscious system. There is only one disconnected point, one inconsistency 
in our hypothesis: the indisputable fact that real fear must be considered an expression of the ego’s 
instincts of self-preservation” (Freud, 1953-1975b, p. 355). 
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8.5. Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety 492  
Freud’s Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, published in 1926, presents his most 
elaborated theory on fear, anxiety and neurosis. Freud’s main aim in writing this text was to 
better address "...what anxiety really is..." and to this end he proposed to bring together “all 
the facts we know about anxiety" (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 132). The reason behind this 
renewed interest in fear and anxiety is Freud’s novel consideration that these emotions are 
the "essential" problems for psychoanalysis as a therapy. 
 
Before analysing the concept of fear, it is important to clarify Freud’s idiosyncratic 
use of the terms fear and anxiety in this text. In Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety Freud 
rarely uses the term "fear", which he now considers a mere automatic reaction to danger in 
non-humans, using the terms "normal", "natural" or "real anxiety" instead. Furthermore, 
Freud replaces the construct of “anxiety neurosis” with the new one of “fear neurosis,” and 
used the terms fear and anxiety as synonyms as I shall discuss below.  
 
Another important clarification is that in Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety Freud 
makes frequent reference to his “metapsychology”, that is, his understanding of the 
mechanism of the psyche, introducing his own concept of the unconscious, the structure of 
mental process in terms of the “ego,” the “id” and the “superego,” his concept of 
“repression” of sexual (libidinal) stimuli, and the “Oedipus complex”. 493 I shall concentrate 
on discussing Freud’s novel concept of fear and anxiety, making reference to his 
                                                 
492 The period during which Freud wrote this text was severely distressing for him. His beloved 
Vienna was in steep decline after the First World War. But more importantly, Freud suffered the 
deaths of both one of his daughters and a niece, and he was diagnosed with cancer, suffered from 
crises of anxiety and was in poor general health. In the same period Freud also suffered the deaths 
of his mentor and of his best disciple (Foresti, 2010, p. 211). 
493 Initially, the concept of ‘ego’ had two separate meanings for Freud (Akhtar, 2009): 1) the 
person's self as a whole as distinguished from other people; and 2) a particular part of the mind 
characterized by special attributes and functions. Reformulation of this concept led to an 
understanding of the ego as a "mental structure "that perceives internal and external stimuli, 
activating motility and the discharge of instinctual impulses. The ego organizes perceptions using 
intelligence and judgment," making a compromise between the demands of reality and the 
superego. The origins of the ego are intricately related to the constitutional capacities for anxiety 
tolerance, aggression, problem solving, assertiveness, and intelligence, and the ego operations are 
patterned after bodily functions. In sum, the ego has the mental capacities of a human being. The 
‘superego’ is defined as "the depository of parental injunctions and prohibitions, "being in a 
dynamic interaction with the ego” (Akhtar, 2009, p. 88). 
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metapsychology only when necessary for conceptual understanding. This is certainly not a 
minor limitation of the chapter, but I believe it is possible to bring out the important points 
Freud makes on fear and anxiety, and their therapeutic value, without the need of a full 
explanation of his metapsychology. 
 
The main departure in Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety from Freud’s previous 
writings is his new proposition that anxiety may be a useful signal of danger, and not only a 
symptom of pathology. This is not of minor importance, as I have discussed in the previous 
chapter that current neuroscientists also consider fear and anxiety as relevant in signalling 
danger. Moreover, I shall discuss in the next chapter that current writings on the sociology 
of fear also accept the Freudian concept of anxiety as a useful signal of danger. But what 
explains the radical change between Freud’s initial hypothesis of anxiety as an abnormal 
symptom produced by deflected sexual energy and the new hypothesis of anxiety as a 
useful symptom? Answering this important question is the aim of this section, which will 
begin by addressing Freud’s concept of ‘inhibition’ and ‘symptom’ for a better 
understanding of his new concept of anxiety. 
 
Freud defines inhibition as "the expression of a restriction of an ego-function" 
(Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 88), which may be clarified with a clinical example he provided. He 
presented the case of a person who developed a phobia (or extreme fear) about going on the 
street. Freud argued that this incapacity to leave home, which he describes as an 
‘inhibition’, has the positive role of allowing the person to avoid the anxiety or fear of 
going on the street (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 101). Two problems arise with this concept of 
inhibition. The first pertains to the clinical role of inhibition, considered as a psychological 
event with preventive value. But this value would only work in the very short term, for in 
the long term the inhibition implies suffering for the individual who sees her/his life 
progressively limited by fear. The second problem is that the inhibition rather than 
protecting the individual against anxiety, already includes anxiety, as the ‘inhibited’ person 
is chronically fearful or anxious about leaving the house. It seems more likely that it is fear 
which inhibits the action, not that the inhibition is a protection from fear. Therefore, 
inhibition would better be construed as a manifestation of fear or anxiety. 
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According to Freud, anxiety, the “symptom”, is the result of inhibition. For 
instance, the fear felt by an agoraphobic when on the street is a symptom of the inhibition 
against leaving home. Thus, Freud considers that a symptom has the role of removing the 
person from danger. In the case of agoraphobia, the fear of being on the street will force the 
individual to return to the safety of home. Freud also defined symptoms in mechanistic 
terms, as manifestations that replace an instinct that is supressed.494Understanding this 
concept of a symptom, requires some basic understanding of Freud’s metapsychology.495 
According to Freud, psychological defences against internal dangers are structured in a 
similar fashion to defences against external dangers. Freud considers that external dangers 
are faced by activating motor behaviours, whereas internal dangers are dealt with by the 
mechanism of "repression," which he considers to be an equivalent of the flight response 
(Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 92). To this end, sexual energy is “disengaged” from the instinct to 
be repressed, and this energy is released as anxiety (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 109). Freud 
stresses that this anxiety does not result from an automatic conversion of repressed energy, 
since “the ego is the actual seat of anxiety” (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 93).496 In other words, 
there is a psychological instance that ‘decides’ whether and how much of the sexual energy 
is converted into anxiety, and this depends on individual factors, such as the amount of 
sexual energy and the capacity of the ego for dealing with this energy. No support is 
                                                 
494 “A symptom is a sign of, and a substitute for, an instinctual satisfaction which has remained in 
abeyance; it is a consequence of the process of repression” (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 91). 
495 Freudian metapsychology is defined by Akhtar in his Comprehensive Dictionary of 
Psychoanalysis (2009) as a heuristic to include “dynamic, topographical and economic aspects of 
psychological phenomena” (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 71) (Akhtar, 2009). In other words, Freud’s 
metapsychology seeks to provide answers to the questions as to what the conscious, preconscious 
and unconscious (the topographical perspective) are; what psychological forces are at play between 
the topographical instances (the dynamic perspective); and how psychological energy is distributed 
(the economic perspective). 
496 Rollo May in his otherwise excellent rendition of Freud’s theories of anxiety tends to ‘straighten’ 
Freud’s account, in order, perhaps, to make it more accessible to the general public (May, 1996). 
For instance, May states that the ego ‘perceives’ the danger which produces anxiety. Therefore, to 
avoid greater anxiety, the ego represses the impulses that would lead the person into danger. The 
ego is “inoculated” with a small quantum of anxiety in order “to escape its full strength” (Freud, 
1953-1975a, p. 162). But May’s explanation is still muddled. May refers to an ‘ego’ preventing the 
person (to whom this ego belongs) from suffering anxiety, and the “homunculus fallacy” described 
in the previous chapter is unavoidable. May’s proposal raises additional questions such as: how 
does the ego perceive danger? Does the ego, therefore, have a full repertoire of mental functions 
and organs of perception? What is the mechanism by which the ego manages to repress impulses? 
What inoculates the ego with a little anxiety? 
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provided for this speculation, except for Freud’s remark that this is a metapsychological 
description (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 93).497  
 
Going back to Freud’s concept of a ‘symptom,’ Freud considered anxiety as a 
reaction to danger, whereas in the term “symptoms” he includes emotional manifestations 
such as phobias and obsessions, which are created to avoid a danger-situation signalled by 
the generation of anxiety, as explained above with the example of agoraphobia. In Freud’s 
view, it is the symptom that expresses a repressed sexual “impulse” rather than anxiety, 
which is construed as a “signal of unpleasure” that forewarns of a danger (Freud, 1953-
1975a, p. 100). Whatever the validity of this explanation for anxiety, Freud offers in the 
same text a different option, where anxiety is created in accordance with a mnemonic 
image, since "biological necessity demands that a situation of danger has an affective 
symbol" (Freud, 1953-1975a, pp. 93-94). These “affective symbols” are memory images of 
remote events, such as the "trauma of birth" (already hinted at in Lecture 25), but, as 
already discussed in the context of Damasio’s account of fear in the previous chapter, it is 
unclear how these putative ‘images’ ‘translate’ into the psychological and somatic aspects 
of anxiety. I shall now explain Freud’s account of this mechanism of anxiety in more 
detail498. 
 
8.5.1. “What we clearly want is to find something that will tell us what anxiety really is” 
(Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety, p. 132) 
Whereas the account above seems to have settled Freud's new theory of anxiety, a 
few pages later he argues that "anxiety is not a simple matter" (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 132). 
Freud then defines anxiety as an affective state characterized by "unpleasure" accompanied 
                                                 
497 I am unable to do justice to Freud’s complex metapsychology in a chapter focusing on his 
concept of fear and anxiety. It is necessary, here, to set aside judgement of Freud on the validity of 
his theory of Oedipal complex and concepts such as the "degradation of libido," "the super-ego 
[becoming] exceptionally severe and unkind," and an obedient ego providing behaviours of 
"conscientiousness, piety, and cleanliness" (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 115). 
498 These accounts illustrate Freud’s expertise in casting a spell on the reader, knitting together 
sequential concepts that seem to carry major explanatory weight, but which, under further analysis, 
fail to deliver what they promise. First, the symptom is said to 'emerge' from a repressed instinct, 
although no evidence is provided to support this metapsychological or rather metaphysical 
statement. Then, quite suddenly, Freud refers to "mnemonic images" as related to the production of 
anxiety. 
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by somatic symptoms such as shortness of breath and palpitations, and the perception of 
these somatic changes (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 133).499 But the question still unanswered is 
the function of anxiety, and Freud’s initial hypothesis is that “the obvious response is that 
anxiety is a reaction to a state of danger” (p.133). Freud’s hypothesis now is that after a 
traumatic experience affective states are “incorporated in the mind,” and these affective 
states may resurface whenever the traumatic situation recurs as memory images (p. 133).500  
 
Freud considers the need for binding the somatic aspects of anxiety and its 
perception, and suggests this is produced by “historical factors” in the shape of memory 
images (p. 133). Initially he considers that the “trauma” of birth is such a factor, with 
anxiety becoming the “reproduction” of this putative trauma. Freud not only suggests that 
“the trauma of birth” constitutes a "necessary" condition to produce anxiety, but that 
anxiety symptoms are a reproduction of such trauma (p. 133). In other words, any situation 
of danger that produces anxiety does so by bringing forward images of this momentous 
biographical event. Freud argues that such anxiety is “inexpedient” given that the response 
is based on early behaviours, inadequate to master external danger. In support of his theory 
Freud states that many adults exhibit puerile behaviours when facing danger, being 
overcome by infantile fears (p. 148). 
 
After further analysis, Freud decides to change the timing of the ‘historical trauma’ 
from birth to the first years of life, and suggests that anxiety is a consequence of the loss of 
a loved object during this period. He considers that in the absence of the mother, the child 
develops feelings of helplessness, which are the "key to the understanding of anxiety" (my 
italics) (p. 137). This helplessness can be either "material" (due to a real danger) or 
"psychological" (due to instinctual danger) (p. 138). In this system, anxiety becomes a 
signal triggered by the danger of helplessness, and has the positive role in assisting in 
                                                 
499 This remark immediately brings to mind James’s concept of emotion (as does Freud’s previous 
Lecture 25). 
500 Freud followed the venerable tradition, of using concepts such as memory images, akin to the 
concepts of word images or concept images used by contemporary French and German 
neuropsychiatrists. Here, a criticism of Freud’s proposal is the generic one levelled at this 
epistemological approach. I have already discussed in the last chapter Wittgenstein’s criticism of 
these pseudo-explanations. 
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activating psychological and behavioural mechanisms necessary to successfully confront 
danger (p. 138). Freud speculates that in early infancy the symptoms of anxiety play an 
important role, for instance, in bringing the mother’s attention to the baby’s needs, and later 
in life the symptoms of anxiety are expressed every time there is a state of danger. 501 Thus, 
Freud suggests it is more “expedient” that anxiety occurs early in the process of confronting 
danger, alerting the individual to the implications of this event and therefore allowing the 
preparation of appropriate responses (p. 134). Once this is achieved, anxiety is cancelled 
and the agent may proceed to face danger using “suitable measures” (p. 135). This is 
Freud’s concept of anxiety as a signal of danger, or in his words, anxiety as a “rescuing 
signal” (p.138).502  
 
To conclude, in this new theory, anxiety is no longer an automatic harmful reaction 
triggered by deflected sexual energy but it is now endowed with a positive value, with the 
“only function” of efficiently triggering defensive mechanisms (p. 138).503 Freud’s 
proposal expands the concept of anxiety, which includes a negative emotion that is the 
product of discharging instinctual energy, as well as a novel positive mechanism 
forewarning the individual about incoming danger.504 Nevertheless, the conceptual 
difference between expedient and inexpedient anxiety remains unclear. Both types of 
anxiety imply the recognition of danger, the difference being in the timing of recognition. 
The question is whether ‘early’ anxiety is always better as Freud implies, and the answer is 
                                                 
501 With this insight Freud claims that “we have the key to an understanding of anxiety” (Freud, 
1953-1975a, p. 137). 
502 And yet, confusingly, after describing his new concept of anxiety, Freud still writes that “It is 
still an undeniable fact that in sexual abstinence, in improper interference with the course of sexual 
excitation or if the latter is diverted from being worked over psychically, anxiety arises directly out 
of libido” (p. 141). 
503 Freud suggests that each life period has its characteristic type of dangerous situations: (1) Infants 
are fearful of losing their mother's love; (2) During childhood, and due to the Oedipus complex, 
boys become afraid of their fathers (i.e. fear of castration); and (3) in later life the "ego" fears the 
"superego," generating a moral conscience which is necessary to understand and follow social 
norms. This fear "will accompany people throughout their lives" (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 148). 
504 “…the ego subjects itself to anxiety as a sort of inoculation, submitting to a slight attack of the 
illness in order to escape its full strength. It vividly imagines the danger-situation, as it were, with 
the unmistakable purpose of restricting that distressing experience to a mere indication, a signal” 
(Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 162). 
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that it depends on contextual factors, which Freud frequently neglects. In fact, for Freud’s 
mechanism of anxiety to be universal, contextual factors must play a negligible role since 
they add very little to a preformed mechanism. However, this is certainly not true in the 
case of anxiety. Anxiety may be helpful when it activates the individual to be better 
prepared for an adequate (or ‘expedient’) response to danger, but this is a matter of degree 
since excessive anxiety may paralyse the individual with the response becoming 
‘inexpedient.’ The timing is not as crucial as Freud remarks. Moreover, in some cases an 
early state of anxiety may create an unnecessary burden. Finally, not every event in life 
generating anxiety can be acted upon in a preventative way. For instance, living in the 
context of a financial recession carries a high risk of losing one’s job no matter how 
‘efficient’ the response produced by anxiety may be. In these cases, being anxious could 
result in making mistakes at work and increasing the chance of being laid off. In the end, 
Freud’s timing of inexpedient and expedient anxiety is merely based on the chronological 
factor that the former is related to the trauma of birth, whereas the latter is related to 
separation from the mother during the first few years of life.505 It is unclear how this 
chronological difference makes one type of anxiety more “efficient” than the other, let 
alone why the moment of birth should leave an indelible mark of trauma.506 However, more 
important than this is the question as to how adult responses to danger are shaped by the 
early trauma of feeling abandoned and helpless. How is anxiety triggered as a signal of 
danger based on this early trauma? How do early traumas help in recognizing present 
dangers, especially when not every potentially dangerous event produces an anxiety 
response? How traumas ‘produce’ memory images, and how memory images produce 
anxiety, let alone efficient and inefficient ones, remains explicable only in Freud’s 
metapsychological terms. Finally, fear of death is simply dismissed as fear of the ‘super-
ego’ “projected on to the powers of destiny” (Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 140). 
                                                 
505 Freud includes the fear of castration (a result of the Oedipal complex) as another important cause 
of anxiety, but discussion of this factor is not relevant to the conceptual discussion of the 
mechanism of anxiety. 
506 Freud enigmatically remarks that whereas birth is a danger to life, this danger is devoid of 
psychological content given that the foetus "has no knowledge about the meaning of life" (Freud, 
1953-1975a, p. 135). Freud also speculated that for birth to be a crucial historical factor, a child 
should feel at ease in the dark due to the similitude between darkness and the intra-uterine life. 
However, he stressed that this is not the case, as the usual reaction to darkness is fear. 
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Freud asks the important question about why is it that relatively few people develop 
anxiety neurosis given that external dangers are universal and common to all human beings. 
It is here that we should expect proper consideration of contextual factors, and yet, this is 
not only absent, but Freud’s response to this challenge to his theory is answered in the most 
pedestrian way. His answer comes in the form of obscure reference to defective organic and 
mental apparatus. More specifically he identifies biological, phylogenetic, and 
psychological causes accounting for anxiety neurosis. The biological factor is based on "a 
defect of our mental apparatus" which in Freud’s opinion results from a relatively short 
pregnancy period: [humans] "...are sent into the world in a less finished state." This may 
explain, according to Freud, the child's great dependence on the mother, the feelings of 
helplessness when she is away, and "the need to be loved" (p. 154). The phylogenetic factor 
is based on differences in sexual evolution between humans and non-human animals. 
According to Freud, somewhere along the path of human evolution sexual instincts become 
identified as dangerous, and consequently repressed, the mechanism of repression being 
"...the most direct aetiology of the neurosis” (p. 155). Finally, the psychological factor is 
also based on a human mental defect. The ego, says Freud, being unable to protect itself 
from instinctual dangers responds by transforming sexual instincts into neurotic symptoms 
such as phobias and obsessions (p. 155). On the first count, we may argue that though the 
duration of infant and juvenile dependency is longer than that of most other primates, it is 
unclear why this would produce more anxiety in humans. On the second and third, Freud’s 
theory that sexual repression may produce neurosis has never been substantiated; and the 
same is true for the putative transformation of sexual instincts into anxiety symptoms. 
 
The section devoted to the therapy of anxiety neurosis, relegated to the Addenda of 
the text, is brief and enmeshed in Freud’s metaphysical system. Freud states that the 
treatment begins by overcoming the resistance of the ego in dealing with objects of anxiety, 
which have been repressed in the unconscious. Once these objects are brought to 
consciousness, the psychoanalyst argues against those ideas using logical arguments 
(Freud, 1953-1975a, p. 159). The therapy has to be continued, given the power of 
compulsions to repeat the unconscious objects (“the resistance of the unconscious,” (p. 
159)). Freud concludes that the therapist has to confront several types of resistance which 
arise from the ego, the id and the superego. The ego’s resistance is produced by the ‘benefit 
of the illness;’ the resistance of the id is produced by unconscious compulsions; and the 
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resistance of the superego is related to a “need for punishment” (p. 160) which antagonises 
the patient’s own therapy.507 
 
In conclusion, Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety is an impressive exercise in using 
different theoretical approaches to explain the phenomenon of anxiety. And yet, Freud’s 
main proposal amounts to little more than changing the old pneumatic model of anxiety, as 
a manifestation of deflected sexual excitation, into a system of infantile traumas generating 
images that produce effective or ineffective anxiety. The innovation in this text is Freud’s 
proposal that anxiety may be on occasions a successful signal of danger, but surprisingly, 
there is no consideration of the suffering produced by severe anxiety and fear. The 
specificities of the agent’s context are almost completely ignored in order to support a rigid 
theory that should fit all. Even less is said regarding therapy for those with fear neurosis or 
anxiety neurosis. Freud is a precursor of the move that separates theory from the practice of 
helping people suffering from fear, a trend that, as we saw in the last chapter, is still extant. 
In Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety Freud's aim was "to find something that would tell us 
what anxiety really is" (p. 132), but in light of his confusing remarks it is clear that 
something important eluded him.508 
                                                 
507 Given the complexity of Freud’s metaphysical system, a critical analysis of this therapeutic 
technique is beyond the scope of this dissertation. I may point, as an example, to the controversial 
aspects of Freud’s concept of the “unconscious,” which is critically discussed by Bouveresse 
(Bouveresse, 1995, p. 75). 
508 Freud published a set of New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis in 1933 (Freud, 1953-
1975c), about eight years after the publication of Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety. One of these 
lectures was entitled “Anxiety and Instincts” and is the final text written by Freud addressing the 
concept and mechanism of anxiety. This lecture is not given specific analysis here since it is 
basically a revision of the concepts conveyed in Lecture 25 and in Inhibition, Symptoms and 
Anxiety. In this later Lecture Freud reviews the concepts of “neurotic” and “realistic” anxiety. He 
defines neurotic anxiety as unconscious and with an internal object of fear, and presents three 
subtypes of neurotic anxiety, namely free-floating anxiety, produced by “unconsummated 
excitation” which “changes” into anxiety; phobias, also produced by a transformation of libido into 
anxiety; and “severe neurosis,” produced by the mechanism of repression of sexual ideas (Freud, 
1953-1975c, p. 82). Realistic anxiety is always conscious and related to external dangers, and is 
construed as a signal of anxiety triggering appropriate responses of flight or fight. However, 
realistic anxiety may be the outcome of repeating a primitive trauma, thus resulting in an 
“inexpedient” state of paralysis, with anxiety repeating the pattern of primitive reactions in a 
stereotyped way. Whenever the magnitude of the danger surpasses the individual's capacity to deal 
with it, helplessness is generated and a "traumatic situation" ensues. Freud also describes the 
category of moral anxiety, related to the super-ego, and which Freud considered indispensable for 
social interaction. Realistic anxiety should not be construed as ‘normal’ or ‘non-pathological’ 
anxiety, since, according to Freud, in both realistic and neurotic anxiety the individual is afraid of 
cont. next page 
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What eluded Freud was pointed out by Wittgenstein in his brief remarks. 
Wittgenstein considered that, although Freud’s theory of anxiety as the repetition of an 
early trauma cannot be empirically substantiated, it is “an idea which has marked 
attraction” (Barrett, 1967, p. 43). This is not the attraction of solid conceptual thinking or 
impressive empirical findings, but that of mythological explanations, that “all is a repetition 
of something that has happened before” (Barrett, 1967, p. 43). Once such explanations are 
accepted, emotions such as anxiety may become clearer and easier for people to accept. 
What was also repugnant to Wittgenstein was Freud’s reductionism; for instance, that all 
fears and anxieties have the same explanation and treatment. In a premonitory remark at a 
time when psychoanalysis was flourishing, Wittgenstein’s perspicuous intuition was that 
“Freud’s work died with him. No one today can do psychoanalysis in the way he did,” 
implying that the construction of psychoanalysis was mainly based on a charismatic leader 
(Bouveresse, 1995, p. 4). 
 
8.6. Conclusion 
Freud has been regarded as one of the most original thinkers of the 20th century, and 
psychoanalysis, the therapy he developed, as one of the most influential treatments for 
neurosis, a concept which includes various manifestations of anxiety.509 Freud produced an 
original and innovative concept of anxiety, which he initially considered to originate in 
sexual dysfunction in the context of a ‘canonical’ approach to sexuality. As we have seen, 
Freud’s first theory takes the process by which fear develops to be akin to a pneumatic 
system, in which an excess of sexual energy that is not elaborated properly by putative 
psychological systems is discharged as anxiety. This understanding left Freud with the 
problem of death, not a minor cause of fear and one without any sexual connotations. 
Difficulties with the sexual energy explanation led Freud to a second theory of anxiety, 
                                                                                                                                                    
“his own libido” (p. 84). Moreover, depending on factors external and internal to the individual, 
realistic anxiety may ‘convert’ into neurotic anxiety, and vice versa. 
509 It may be remarked that the discussion on Freud’s therapy of fear is disproportionately briefer in 
comparison with the discussion of his conceptual apparatus. The reason for this discrepancy is that 
Freud very seldom discusses therapeutic aspects in his texts on anxiety. I have presented his early, 
rather simplistic suggestions in On the Grounds and in Lecture 24, which were later superseded by 
the far more intricate technique of psychoanalysis, some of which Freud briefly describes in 
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. 
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now embedded in an intricate metapsychology which proposed that anxiety remits to 
infantile traumas. This in turn developed into his proposal of an expedient anxiety which 
produces a signal of danger, useful in preparing an adequate response to that danger, and an 
inexpedient anxiety, which becomes a symptom of psychopathology. Fear of death, no 
longer a theoretical obstacle for an encompassing sexual theory of anxiety, has been 
removed from Freud’s metapsychological system.  
 
Without questioning its originality, the main problem with Freud’s model of anxiety 
is that it has to be taken on his word without plausible argument or evidence. In other 
words, we have to accept the pneumatic system of deflected energy, and that this energy is 
always sexual. We also have to accept that birth is a trauma and that anxiety is the 
unconscious recollection of the fear of separation from the mother. We have to accept a 
model of humans who do not fear the (Epicurean) gods, death, poverty or sickness, but 
rather the memory images of an early trauma. Freud’s interesting clinical descriptions of his 
patients are not used as valuable material to examine the varieties of fears and anxieties, 
such as Montaigne provided when describing his own fears, but are reduced to fit a pre-
elaborated theory. In his relatively rigid, dogmatic and reductive approach, Freud’s concept 
of fear has similar limitations to Descartes’s and James’s theories. And finally, we have to 
accept that there are no fears or anxieties that could be the expected consequence of living 
in a social environment, since according to Freud, all fears and anxieties are in the end 
pathological. With Freud, the medicalization of fear started in full earnest because his 
identification of anxiety neurosis laid the ground for a pathological understanding of fear 
that required a medical approach and a specific therapy, and how this has developed up to 







The medicalization and social construction of fear in the age of anxiety 
 
9.1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, I discussed Freud’s identification of a syndrome he termed 
“anxiety neurosis” within the nebulous world of the neuroses. This syndrome was used to 
diagnose individuals with either common or unusual fears, sometimes acute and severe, or 
sometimes evolving into a chronic state of nervousness. Freud also created the technique of 
psychoanalysis primarily as a treatment for anxiety neurosis. This “talking cure” was an 
original approach to the treatment of emotional disorders, aimed at relieving the 
individual’s fears by uncovering the ‘unconscious roots’ of anxiety. Thus, the loose 
categories of ‘neuroses’ and ‘neurasthenia’, previously managed by neurologists, became 
by the 1930’s the therapeutic territory of psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysts 
considered anxiety as “the central problem in psychotherapy” (May, 1996, p. ix), given 
that, in their opinion, a healthy personality depends on successfully dealing with 
unconscious fears.  
 
During the mid-20th century the concept of anxiety became bifurcated into two 
different streams: the first elaborated by dynamic psychoanalysts510, philosophers and 
sociologists, who conceptualised anxiety as resulting from either major changes of libidinal 
or social forces affecting the individual; and a second stream, mostly consisting of the 
increasing trend of biological psychiatry, which considers emotional problems such as 
anxiety to be the consequence of brain dysfunction amenable to treatment with 
psychoactive drugs. Whatever its origin, by 2001 anxiety was recognised as the most 
common mental health problem in the United States, whereas in 2002 anxiety was found by 
                                                 
510 Dynamic psychoanalysis or psychotherapy developed as a branch of orthodox psychoanalysis 
during the early 20th century, and is based on interpreting events in the ‘unconscious’ (in accord 
with Freud’s metapsychology, see previous chapter) as they manifest in therapeutic relationships, to 
alleviate psychic tensions (Shedler, 2010). 
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the World Mental Health Survey to be the most prevalent mental health problem worldwide 
(Dowbiggin, 2009). 
 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to discuss the medicalization of fear and 
anxiety, from its origin in Freud’s psychoanalysis to the current concept of anxiety as a 
psychiatric disorder due to brain dysfunction. Medicalization is usually conceptualised as 
the process of defining a problem in medical terms, such as an illness or disorder, or 
treating the problem using medical intervention (Conrad, 2005). In a competing but, as we 
shall see, also something of a parallel vein, thinkers in the fields of philosophy and 
sociology have conceptualised anxiety as a “social construction,” that is, as being the result 
of social practices which surround the development and use of specific terms such as 
anxiety.511 This view of anxiety as the result of social and institutional practices, is 
connected with arguments in favour of managing anxiety by modifying the social context, 
and empowering the individual to deal more successfully with life pressures. I will discuss 
these contrasting views and conclude with a critical discussion of both the medicalization 
and the social construction of anxiety. 
 
9.2. Psychoanalysis and the medicalization of anxiety 
Between 1950 and 1970, psychoanalysis had a prominent role in the treatment of 
anxiety and extreme fears (‘phobias’ in the psychoanalytical nomenclature) (Mayes & 
Horwitz, 2005). Initially developed for use by practitioners trained in the psychoanalytical 
technique, psychoanalysis soon pervaded many aspects of social life, and the term 
‘neurotic’ became increasingly used to refer to individuals suffering from excessive worry 
and major stress (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005).512  
                                                 
511 Rollo May, a prominent psychoanalyst and thinker of the 20th century states in The Meaning of 
Anxiety that “If one penetrates below the surface of political, economic, business, professional or 
domestic crises to discover their psychological causes…one runs athwart the problem of anxiety at 
almost every turn. The ordinary stresses and strains of life in the changing world of today are such 
that few if any escape the need to confront anxiety and to deal with it in some manner” (May, 1996, 
p. ix). 
512 The Historical thesaurus of the Oxford English dictionary (Kay, 2009) (OED) has an entry for 
1932, when the term ‘neurotic’ was used for a character in a play, considered to be 
“definitely neurotic. He ought to be analysed.” 
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In parallel with the growth of psychoanalysis, since the beginning of the 20th 
century ‘alienists’513 were leaving their reclusive jobs in mental asylums to join the ranks of 
academic psychiatry, which was modelled upon medical specialties such as neurology. This 
trend in psychiatry was dramatically boosted (and psychoanalysis virtually demolished) by 
the discovery of drugs capable of reducing or eliminating anxiety in a matter of weeks, as 
compared to the years a ‘neurotic’ had to spend on psychoanalysis, with uncertain results. 
The new trend of somatic treatments in psychiatry required a new nosology of “mental 
disorders,” which was based on a biological framework. I shall first discuss how the 
Freudian concept of neurosis became the kernel of the future medicalization of fear and 
anxiety, and then address the shift into biological psychiatry.514 
 
When Freud distinguished within the overarching concept of the neuroses a specific 
cluster of symptoms that constituted what he termed “anxiety neurosis”, he not only 
proposed a mechanism for this novel construct (see previous chapter), but, as already 
mentioned, also created the technique of psychoanalysis to treat this condition. The process 
of medicalization of anxiety got started with the classification of a cluster of symptoms as a 
specific psychological disorder with a specific therapy. The definitive move into 
medicalization took place in the 50’s in the USA through the restriction of the practice of 
                                                 
513 ‘Alienists’ were those physicians that took care of individuals with mental illness living in 
“lunatic asylums”. Alienists had a low reputation among physicians, as they were rarely seen 
outside mental institutions (Rollin, 2003). 
514 While the term ‘medicalization’ has been extensively used with negative connotations, implying 
that non-medical conditions have been illegitimately conceptualised and managed as medical 
conditions, it may also be considered in its positive connotations of new medical discoveries that 
provide better quality of life to humans. Peter Conrad (Conrad, 2005), a major researcher in the 
field of medical sociology, suggests that the process of medicalization is based on three main 
factors, namely, the increasing social power of the medical profession, the promotion of the validity 
of medical diagnoses, and the promulgation of medicalization within the medical profession. 
Conrad considers that psychiatry has been at the forefront of medicalization where power shifted in 
three decades from psychoanalysis to psychopharmacology, genetics and neuroscience (Conrad, 
2005). Erik Parens, a sociologist investigating the ethical and social implications of using 
psychoactive drugs makes the important point that to investigate the problem of medicalization the 
sociologist must be able to distinguish, a priori, medical diagnoses that are ‘true’ health problems 
from those that are not (Parens, 2013). However, Parens considers this is a conceptually impossible 
task, as the ‘essence’ of what a medical condition is has not been defined (and, I would add that it 
may be impossible to define, that is, to come up with the necessary and sufficient factors for 
something to be called a ‘mental disorder’). 
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psychoanalysis to professionally qualified psychiatrists, and by the contemporary discovery 
of anti-anxiety medications.  
 
To recapitulate, intrinsic to the concept of medicalization is, first, that habitual 
emotional responses are considered abnormal emotions or full-blown mental disorders 
based on their severity and the social inadequacy they bring about, and second, that a 
specific treatment should be available and delivered by medical specialists. Psychoanalysis 
became the main therapy for anxiety neurosis in cosmopolitan cities, and scores of 
individuals were regularly assisted in their 50-minute sessions for months or years. In the 
dialectic relationship between analyst and patient, the former was progressively invested 
with powerful attributes, and the ‘oracular’ therapy which consisted in ‘interpreting the 
unconscious’ frequently generated increasing dependency of the patient on the analyst to 
solve even minor conflicts of daily life. On the other hand, psychoanalysis provided a place 
where, beyond the technical shortcomings of the treatment, patients could regularly relate 
their fears and anxieties in a nonjudgmental environment, and where they were cared for by 
a compassionate professional.515 In parallel, another revolution, of a different sort, in the 
treatment of anxiety was silently brewing. In 1955 the American Food & Drug 
Administration approved the first ‘minor tranquilizer’, a step that would lead to a dramatic 
shift in the concepts of fear and anxiety, and the practice of psychiatry for decades to come 
(Tone, 2009). 
 
9.3. Anxiety in the age of biological psychiatry: The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
During the mid-20th century, when psychoanalysis was the most popular therapy for 
anxiety in the USA, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) began the compilation of 
a new nosology of “mental disorders” that would change the practice of psychiatry (Mayes 
& Horwitz, 2005). The early efforts of the APA at defining and classifying mental disorders 
were triggered by the sudden need to manage frequent and complex emotional disorders 
afflicting members of the armed forces returning from World War II. The first edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-I) was compiled by the APA in 1952 mainly 
                                                 
515 This is akin to the technique of ‘confession’ which I discussed in Chapter two. Those in need of 
philosophical solace could attend the Epicurean Garden and ‘confess’ their emotional problems to a 
caring master. 
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to provide “an accurate account of the emotional morbidity among the armed forces, as 
well as to provide a suitable diagnosis for every case seen by the psychiatrist, a situation 
not faced in civilian life” (American Psychiatric Association, 1952, p. vi). Therefore, there 
was a need for a new classification of neuroses, and the first modern nosology of anxiety 
was developed to suit soldiers exposed to traumatic war experiences, rather than the daily 
fears and anxieties of civilians.516  
 
One of the principal categories in the DSM-I was “Psychoneurotic Disorders” 
which, following the Freudian tradition, were considered as disorders of “psychogenic 
origin” (American Psychiatric Association, 1952, p. 6). This category included anxiety as 
the main symptom,517 as well as dissociation, conversion, phobias, depression and 
obsessive-compulsive reactions.518 The Freudian influence on the DSM-I concept of 
anxiety was evident in definitions that are almost literal copies from Freud’s work 
Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety, such as “anxiety…is a danger signal felt and perceived by 
the conscious personality…and produced by a threat from within the personality” (Freud, 
1953-1975a, p. 167) (see also Chapter seven). The DSM-I defined anxiety as a “diffuse” 
reaction not related to specific situations and objects, and as a state of expectation 
associated with somatic symptoms such as insomnia, muscle tension, and fatigue.519 This 
                                                 
516 The definition of what should be counted as a ‘mental disorder’ has a telling history which 
unfortunately lies beyond the scope of this chapter. The main problem behind the urgent need to 
classify psychiatric disorders was that only 10% of the armed forces seen in public mental hospitals 
received a definite psychiatric diagnosis, and these diagnoses were confusing. For instance, “minor” 
personality disorder was classified as “psychopathic personality”, whereas psychosomatic disorders 
were classified as an organic condition (for instance, palpitations due to anxiety would be classified 
as a cardiology problem, as was the case with the first nosologies of the 18th centuries (Boissier de 
Sauvages, 1772)). 
517 Anxiety was regarded, in the Freudian sense, as “directly felt” or “automatically controlled” by 
the unconscious defence mechanisms of repression, conversion, dissociation, displacement, phobic 
formation, and repetitive behaviour (American Psychiatric Association, 1952). 
518 The concept of phobia or extreme fear of a specific object was also conveyed in Freudian terms. 
The DSM-I stated that phobias resulted from the displacement of the anxiety of daily events onto an 
object that becomes the reason for the fear. According to this theory, the benefit for the patients is 
that they are now able to manage their anxiety by avoiding the phobic object. 
519 Quite amazingly, this definition has remained almost unchanged in the recent DSM-5 (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013), 60 years later and after 6 revisions, suggesting the practical 
usefulness of the Freudian nosology of anxiety. 
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section on anxiety concluded with the warning that an “anxiety state” should be 
differentiated from the “normal apprehensiveness of fear”, although the manual nowhere 
provides a definition of anxiety or clarifies how a “pathological anxiety state” should be 
differentiated from daily life anxiousness or fear (American Psychiatric Association, 1952, 
p. 32). As I shall discuss below, this critical demarcation is not an empirical but a major 
conceptual problem. Based on the DSM framework, the classification of anxiety as a 
disorder or an illness requires the setting of a threshold to distinguish ‘pathological’ from 
‘everyday’ anxiety, but this strategy overlooks the ‘grey areas’ characteristic of anxious 
people who do not qualify for a definite diagnosis of psychoneurosis and yet suffer from 
the emotional condition of anxiousness, or the different trajectories of anxiety, sometimes a 
constant burden but many times fluctuating in time. 
 
The second edition of the DSM was published in 1968, and while still under 
Freudian influence, its main aim was to “facilitate maximum communication within the 
profession” (American Psychiatric Association, 1968, p. viii), while avoiding the use of 
terms that may relate a psychiatric condition to specific mechanisms. The reason behind 
this decision is that the creators of the DSM wanted this instrument to remain ‘agnostic’ 
regarding the cause (psychological or biological) of any specific psychiatric condition.520 
The DSM-II included a section entitled “Neuroses” (p. 39), with anxiety as the main 
symptom.  The Freudian category of “Anxiety Neurosis,” characterised by worrying or 
“anxious over-concern” and frequent somatic symptoms, was preserved in full (p. 39). 
Another relevant category included in the ‘Neuroses’ section was “Phobic neurosis”, used 
to indicate severe and specific fears. 
 
The third edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), however, 
marked a definite departure from psychoanalysis and a strong alignment with biological 
psychiatry (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005).521 This edition was compiled by psychiatrists who 
                                                 
520 The production of the DSM-II was a rather convoluted process. A draft was circulated to 120 
psychiatrists for criticism and suggestions. This information was collated by an ad-hoc committee, 
which submitted a revised draft to the APA Executive Committee, which in turn submitted the final 
draft for approval to the APA Council. 
521 Biological psychiatry is based on the premise that most psychiatric disorders are caused by brain 
dysfunction. 
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mostly believed in the biogenesis rather than the psychogenesis of mental disorders 
(Frances, 2013). Following an “atheoretical” approach,522 the DSM-III provided descriptive 
diagnoses without discussing potential mechanisms. One of the major changes in this 
edition was that the Freudian category of “anxiety neurosis” was broken into several 
syndromes, each with their own specific diagnostic criteria.523 Thus, the DSM-III illustrates 
another aspect of the process of medicalization, which is the fragmentation of a syndrome 
into several sub-entities. Such a strategy ends up increasing the number of individuals who 
meet the criteria for a “mental disorder”, opening the door for ‘specific’ treatments for 
these newly created conditions.  
 
The fourth edition of the DSM lamented, in the Introduction, the distinction 
between mental and physical disorders, considered as a “reductionist anachronism of 
mind/body dualism” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. xxi). The section on 
“Anxiety Disorders” eliminated the category of “anxiety states” and included several new 
syndromes.524 An interesting consideration in the DSM-IV is the difference between 
pathological and “unpathological [sic] anxiety” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 
p. 411). Pathological anxiety is described as being difficult to control and interfering with 
daily life activities, whereas “unpathological” anxiety is considered more controllable, less 
likely to be accompanied by physical symptoms, and “able to be put off until later” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 411).  
 
The latest edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) (i.e. the 
DSM-5), defines anxiety disorders rather tautologically as characterized by excessive fear 
                                                 
522 The editors of the DSM-III were well aware of the conceptual difference between the DSM-III 
and the previous editions. They stated that drafting the DSM-III was not only followed with great 
interest, but also with “alarm, despair, excitement, joy” (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, p. 
1).  
523 These syndromes include phobic disorders, agoraphobia, social phobia, simple phobia, and 
anxiety states (comprising panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive 
disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder). 
524 These are the new categories of acute stress disorder, anxiety disorder due to a general medical 
condition, substance-induced anxiety disorder, and anxiety disorder not otherwise specified. 
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and anxiety.525 Fear is considered an “emotional response to real or perceived imminent 
threat,” and to be related to flight/fight responses, immediate danger, and escape 
behaviours. Anxiety is defined as the anticipation of future threats associated with muscle 
tension and cautious and avoidant behaviours.526 Whereas the text acknowledges major 
symptom overlap between fear and anxiety, it nevertheless states that on “close 
examination” fear and anxiety may be differentiated by “the types of situations that are 
feared or avoided and the content of the associated thoughts or beliefs” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 189). It is unfortunate that these differences are not 
further elaborated in the text. Furthermore, the rationale for modifying the diagnostic 
criteria of a given anxiety disorder or including specific anxiety syndromes is also unclear.  
 
It is intriguing that the concept and diagnostic criteria for an “anxiety disorder” 
remained unchanged in the DSM-5, after major changes had been considered for inclusion 
in the new manual. In the preparation stages for the DSM-5, the committee responsible for 
the entries included in anxiety disorders considered the following changes: (1) that any 
severity of worrying (not just those that are “difficult to control”, as in the DSM-IV) should 
be considered for diagnosis; (2) to reduce the number of somatic and psychological 
symptoms necessary to meet diagnostic criteria, and (3) to reduce the duration of anxiety 
symptoms from 6 months to 3 months (Andrews, Charney, Sirovatka, & Regier, 2009).  
 
Starcevic, Portman and Beck consider that these proposed changes had the aim of 
reducing the number of “false negatives”, that is, failures to diagnose an anxiety disorder 
based on diagnostic criteria among individuals that have ‘true” anxiety.527 Unfortunately, in 
contemporary psychiatry there is no definitive concept of what anxiety truly is, as it is 
circularly defined by using the DSM diagnostic criteria. This is certainly not a limitation 
                                                 
525 “Anxiety disorders include disorders that share features of excessive fear and anxiety and related 
behavioural disturbances” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 189). 
526 The DSM-5 added to “Anxiety Disorders” the syndromes of Separation Anxiety Disorder, 
Selective Mutism, and Substance/Medication-Induced Anxiety Disorder, and removed Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Acute Stress Disorder. 
527 Starcevic et al (Starcevic, Portman, & Beck, 2012) also suggest that the proposed changes in 
diagnostic criteria (even if informed by empirical data) have the danger of increasing the prevalence 
of anxiety to “epidemic levels” which “will further damage the credibility of psychiatry and 
undermine its scientific standing” (p.665).  
 253 
only with the DSM, as anxiety is a permeable diagnostic category that shifts in different 
contexts. I have discussed how anxiety came to be used in the medical nomenclature as a 
bodily symptom, how Freud used fear and anxiety interchangeably, and how Wittgenstein 
expanded the concept of fear and anxiety, so that anxiety could indicate a rational state of 
mind or a pathological one. 528 
 
In conclusion, the concept of anxiety suffered a second ‘wave’ of medicalization 
when psychiatrists left the psychoanalytical school to adopt a more biological approach, 
looking for the cause of mental disorders in brain dysfunction. The practice of psychiatry 
became more constricted due to time and budgetary limitations, as well as the need to come 
up with a definition of pathological anxiety that could receive readily made 
pharmacological treatment (as discussed in the next section) and that could be accepted for 
patients’ reimbursement by medical insurances and state agencies (Mayes & Horwitz, 
2005). I have explained in this section the major difficulties in reaching a unitary concept of 
pathological anxiety and the changes in diagnostic criteria that have plagued the major 
medical nosologies until current times. This problem is at the heart of the medicalization 
approach and one of its central difficulties. It must rely on definitions and reification of 
concepts, which remains an impossible task. As Wittgenstein remarked: “The classification 
of philosophers and psychologists: they classify clouds by their shape” (Wittgenstein, 
1967) (462). The emotions and pathologies of fear, anxiety, distress, phobias and similar 
others are such clouds, and psychiatrists have the expected problem of placing them in neat 
nosological boxes. I shall now discuss the main conceptual limitations of the DSM 
approach to fear and anxiety. 
 
9.3.1. A critical analysis of the concepts of fear and anxiety in the DSM tradition 
 There is a vast amount of critical literature on the DSM classification of ‘mental 
disorders’, but my interest in this chapter is to restrict the discussion to conceptual 
                                                 
528 As Wittgenstein wrote in Zettel “Your concept is wrong. —However, I cannot illumine the 
matter by fighting against your words, but only by trying to turn your attention away from certain 
expressions, illustrations, images, and towards the employment of words.” (Wittgenstein, 1967) 
(463), (italics in the original). 
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problems within the category of “anxiety disorders.”529 The first of these problems is with 
the concept of  “mental disorder,” which the DSM-5 defines as “a syndrome characterised 
by clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or 
behaviour that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental 
processes underlying mental  functioning” (p. 20) (my italics). Unfortunately, this 
definition is circular since ‘mental disorder’ is defined as the dysfunction of mental 
functioning. But beyond this minor conceptual remark, the DSM-5 does not provide a 
definition of ‘mental functioning;’ it does not specify what is needed for a putative mental 
disorder to achieve “clinical significance;” it does not explain the meaning of metaphors 
such as “emotional regulation” and “dysfunction in psychological, biological or 
developmental processes” (let alone how this putative dysfunction is “reflected” in 
behaviour); 530 and it does not explain the mechanisms by which the above processes 
“underlie” mental functioning. These questions may be all dismissed as mere pedantic 
remarks, but they all pertain to the crucial concept of what is considered a mental pathology 
in need of treatment, a concept that lies at the core of the medicalization of anxiety.531  In 
addition, the DSM-5 is misleading in its statement that it is “atheoretical” in the 
formulation of nosological categories. Such a stance is not possible given that the manual is 
compiled by professionals with definite opinions about the potential mechanism of mental 
disorders. There was nothing inherently wrong when the preparation of DSM-III was 
                                                 
529 Past recent editions of the DSM are criticized by the editors of the latest edition in a radical way. 
Kupfer and Regier, editors of the DSM-5, consider that the categorical system used in the DSM-IV 
does not reflect the “clinical realities” of the patients seen by clinicians on a daily basis (Kupfer & 
Regier, 2010). They further claim that the identification of neural substrates as well as 
environmental and genetic factors may lead to a better understanding of psychiatric pathology, and 
improve the organization of diagnostic categories in the DSM-5. They find this advance to be 
“particularly compelling among anxiety- and fear-based mental illness” (p. 1975). Interestingly, and 
despite these claims, the diagnostic criteria for fear disorders (e.g. agoraphobia, panic disorder, 
simple phobias) as well as generalised anxiety disorder have not changed in the DSM-5 from those 
of the DSM-IV. 
530 This could change if Kupfer and Regier’s prognosis is correct (Kupfer & Regier, 2011). These 
editors of the DSM-5 consider that recent studies in human and animal models of anxiety suggest a 
“stress-induced and fear circuitry spectrum which is conceptually and clinical distinct from other 
anxiety disorders,” and that these findings will provide a “metastructure” for a novel clinical 
conceptualisation of anxiety.  
531 This problem is the current subject of numerous publications in specialised psychiatric journals 
as well as book by experts in the field (First & Wakefield, 2013; Horwitz, 2002; Stein & Williams, 
2002). 
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entrusted to biological psychiatrists, with a firm belief that a better understanding of the 
workings of the brain could unravel the pathogenesis of mental disorders. In fact, the 
narrative of both the DSM-III and the current DSM-5, with their standardised diagnostic 
categories and rigid clinical criteria, are most conducive to the empirical testing of 
biological correlations and treatments. What is incorrect, however, is to insist, that since 
1980 and after three editions, the DSM is ideologically ‘agnostic’ when in fact the tendency 
in psychiatry is moving towards a radicalised biological approach.532 
 
 In an effort to move beyond the conceptual limitations of the DSM tradition, 
Wakefield and First (Wakefield & First, 2013) have analysed the problem as to when 
anxiety should be considered a mental disorder.533 They argue that anxiety, like other 
emotion, is a normal response to life events, and have suggested that there is a major 
overlap between the symptoms of anxiety due to life events and the symptoms of anxiety 
due a mental disorder, an overlap which may result in many “false” positive cases of mental 
disorder. In their opinion, the problem with diagnosing anxiety relates to this significant 
blurring of the ‘boundaries’ of normal and abnormal anxiety. Wakefield and First argue that 
                                                 
532 There is a new influential development that may displace the DSM tradition towards an even 
more reductionist approach in psychiatry. The National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH) is 
preparing its own diagnostic criteria for psychiatric disorders (the “Research Domain Criteria 
project” (RDoC)) which will provide a novel approach to classifying mental disorders. The Director 
of the NIMH, Robert Insel, recently suggested that psychiatry is undergoing a “tectonic shift” due 
to the inclusion of biology and the neurosciences in the discipline (Insel & Cuthbert, 2015, p. 499). 
He believes that these sciences yield new perspectives into the “neural basis of normal and 
abnormal behaviour.” Therefore, in Insel’s opinion, syndromes considered “mental” are being 
reconsidered as “brain” disorders. Thus, he proposes to remove linguistic accounts of mental 
disorders and instead refer only to “nervous circuit disorders” as he believes new therapies will 
allow the “tuning” of these circuits.  Insel also hopes this tectonic shift will allow “objective means 
of psychopathology.” In a full Cartesian leap, Insel suggests that psychotherapy may help to use 
“the brain intrinsic plasticity to alter neural circuits and consequently, deleterious thoughts and 
behaviour” (p. 500). Psychiatry will hopefully provide standardized therapy for “specific neural 
pathology…for people with disorders previously known as mental disorders” (p. 500). In another 
publication Insel states that the RDoC will not consider clinical descriptions of mental disorders any 
longer, but the approach will consist of two steps (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013). The first is “to inventory 
the fundamental primary behavioural functions that the brain has evolved to carry out”, and second, 
to consider psychopathology as dysfunction in specific brain circuits. He believes that “what we 
now call ‘anxiety disorder” will be supplemented (or hopefully replaced) by neuroimaging and 
genetic data, and evaluation of behaviour in rodents. Insel does not fully neglect contextual factors, 
but considers they act by affecting “both the biology and psychology of mental illness” (p. 126).  
533 Michael First was the Editor-in-Chief for the DSM-IV. 
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their “harmful dysfunction approach” theory is helpful in setting the threshold to 
distinguish normal from pathological anxieties. Their approach to defining anxiety as a 
“disorder” requires two judgements: first, that there is an “internal dysfunction” which they 
define as “a failure of some psychological mechanism to perform its biologically designed 
function” (p. 601), and second, that this dysfunction causes “distress or impairment.” They 
conclude that anxiety disorders are “pathologies of biologically designed psychological 
systems,” but acknowledge that the biological foundations of pathological anxiety remain 
poorly known (p. 604).534  
 
 First and Wakefield consider that the strategy to determine what constitutes a 
mental disorder involves looking for “pathosuggestive” (sic) symptoms (First & Wakefield, 
2013, p. 665). For instance, according to these authors, auditory hallucinations are highly 
pathosuggestive given that this symptom is rarely present in normal individuals. On the 
other hand, they consider fear and anxiety to have low “pathosuggestiveness” (p. 665) 
given the ubiquity of these emotions in ordinary life. First and Wakefield consider that the 
best strategy for increasing the accuracy of the ‘normal-disordered boundary’535 is to 
increase the degree of pathosuggestiveness (p. 665). To this end, they propose several 
strategies. The first is the “duration and persistence” strategy (p. 666) which entails that a 
relatively long duration of anxiety is suggestive of dysfunction. They acknowledge that 
setting a threshold for duration requires the assumption that the anxiety should be out of 
proportion to the trigger.536 The second strategy involves consideration of the intensity and 
frequency of anxiety;537 and the third is considering its “disproportionality” (p. 666), that is, 
                                                 
534 Wakefield and First have failed to discuss the circularity in this reasoning, given that searching 
for the biological mechanism of anxiety as a disorder requires having a concept for the disorder to 
be empirically characterised. 
535 In other words, a boundary with the highest sensitivity (that is, the percentage of people with a 
mental disorder who are correctly identified as having the condition), and specificity (that is, the 
percentage of healthy people who are correctly identified as not having a mental disorder). 
536 This is another assumption, given that whether anxiety ‘corresponds’ to a given trigger in terms 
of intensity or duration is a discretionary judgment. 
537 First and Wakefield make the circular statement that “to contribute to validity, the frequency and 
duration requirements must be sufficient to indicate not merely that a symptom occurs regularly or 
is problematic, but that it occurs often enough to suggest that it is due to dysfunction rather than 
being explainable in terms of normal causes” (First & Wakefield, 2013, p. 666). In other words, the 
cont. next page 
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similarly to the case of the “duration and persistence” strategy, that the intensity of the 
symptom is out of proportion to the trigger. For instance, in the case of Generalised 
Anxiety Disorder, the DSM-5 requires excessive worry and anxiety. The problem is, again, 
how to determine when worrying and anxiety are excessive. The last strategy is the 
“pervasiveness” of anxiety, that is, that anxiety as a disorder should be manifest in a variety 
of contexts (p. 667).  
 
 First and Wakefield’s efforts to distinguish ‘normal’ from ‘pathological’ anxiety is 
laudable, but fraught with conceptual limitations. Besides the problem of circularity, their 
‘strategies’ are a euphemism for a more severe anxiety. In other words, they propose that 
anxieties that are of long duration, have a high frequency and intensity, are disproportionate 
to the stimulus, and pervasive across contexts are more suggestive of pathology (they have 
higher “pathosuggestiveness”) that anxieties that are short, rare and of low intensity, 
adequate to the trigger, and present in a specific context. This is not an empirical 
formulation, but a pleonastic description of qualities that are internally related to the 
concept of pathological anxiety.  
 
 In conclusion, rather than chasing an evasive ‘magical threshold’ that indicates 
disorder, it may be more parsimonious to accept that fear and anxiety occur in life in 
various severities and frequencies, and that the need for treatment depends not only on a 
threshold, but on a host of contingent factors such as the personality and biographical 
attributes of individuals, contextual and cultural factors, hopes and desires, and some such, 
as well as the experience, knowledge and empathy of the therapist. 
 
9.4. The age of anxiolytics 
 The concept of anxiety, understood from a psychiatric perspective, has been 
dramatically influenced by the irruption of medications with high efficacy to reduce anxiety 
states.538 The advent of these ‘anxiolytics’, diluted the already porous division between the 
                                                                                                                                                    
frequency and duration should be of such a magnitude to indicate that they are caused by a disorder, 
but these qualities are simultaneously used to indicate a disorder. 
538 The story of this development is well narrated by Andrea Tone in The Age of Anxiety (2009). 
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DSM classification of pathological and “unpathological” anxiety. In the USA, where the 
first anxiolytics such as Valium were discovered, these drugs were not only advertised for 
individuals meeting the DSM criteria for “Anxiety Disorder”, but also marketed for the 
businessman after a tense day, as well as for the housewife stressed by minor problems at 
home.539 With the discovery of these medications the process of medicalization of fear and 
anxiety has increased exponentially. Valium was approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration in 1963 and became the most widely prescribed medication in the Western 
world between the 60’s and 80’s (Tone, 2005).540 In The Age of Anxiety Tone wonders 
whether the rising consumption of anxiolytics was related to a true increase in the 
prevalence of anxiety, or whether daily life anxieties were medicalized by the availability 
of such medications. She concludes that in the 50’s and 60’s the concept of “excessive” 
anxiety was mostly driven by the extraordinary consumption of anxiolytics rather than by 
the consensus of professional committees.541 Furthermore, Tone raises the question as to 
whether the widespread use of anxiolytics in the 60’s and 70’s may have influenced the 
inclusion of the category of “Anxiety Disorders” as a separate syndrome in the DSM-III.  
 
 The use of anxiolytics is still strong in the 21st century. A large epidemiological 
study published in 2014 shows that 5% of adults in the USA filled a benzodiazepine 
prescription during the course of one year (Olfson, King, & Schoenbaum, 2015). It has 
even been suggested by social scientists and sociologists that the use of anxiolytics is 
tantamount to a form of social control, since it is the unfavourable socio-economic 
conditions of most humans, rather than “inner” psychological issues, that is at the root of 
anxiety (Koumjian, 1981). This control is exerted in a non-coercive fashion, because 
usually it is the anxious individual that decides in consultation with a physician for a 
                                                 
539 There is a vast literature on gender issues and consumption of psychopharmacological agents 
which is beyond the scope of consideration in this thesis (Koumjian, 1981; Tone, 2005, 2007). 
540 In 1978 alone the pharmaceutical company producing Valium sold 2.3 billion tablets, “enough to 
medicate half the globe” (Tone, 2009, p. ii). By 1957 Americans had filled 36 million prescriptions 
of a single anxiolytic, and these medications accounted for one third of all prescriptions (Tone, 
2009, p. ii).  
541 Tone claims that the medicalization of anxiety was a ‘patient-driven’ phenomenon, congruent 
with “the American tendency to seek individual solutions” to conflicts that have a social origin (p. 
6), a political and social phenomenon rather than a medical one (p. 8). I discuss the implications of 
these interesting remarks in the section on sociology below. 
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medication to alleviate anxiety. Koumjian et al blame the drug companies, whose interest is 
financial profit; the physicians, who have in the anxiolytics a simple treatment tool; and 
even anxious people themselves, who demand medication, whereas the structural social 
conflicts that produce anxiety are left unchanged (Koumjian, 1981). These criticisms 
mainly originate among sociologists who believe that the origin of psychiatry is not 
explained by a biological deficit, but in social forces strongly working on the peace of mind 
of individuals. This social construction of anxiety will be examined next. 
 
9.5. Existential Angst and Anxiety 
 Rollo May published in 1950 an influential work entitled The Meaning of Anxiety, 
in which he examined the phenomenon of anxiety from cultural, historical and 
psychological perspectives. In the Foreword to the revised edition of the work, published 
27 years later, May admits that despite the “thousands” of studies and dissertations 
published since the first edition of his book, “our knowledge [about the causes of anxiety] 
has increased but we have not learned how to deal with anxiety” (p. xiii). He claims that a 
healthy mind bereft of anxiety reveals “a radical misperception of reality”, given that some 
amount of anxiety is needed to fight boredom, to become more sensitive to life events, and 
to help in keeping oneself safe. May was among the first thinkers to discuss Kierkegaard’s 
concept of anxiety and its relevance to understanding the complexities of this emotion. 
Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety (Kierkegaard, 1980) not only shaped the views of 
existentialist philosophers such as Sartre, Camus and Heidegger on the relevance of anxiety 
for human life, but also influenced social constructionism and the contemporary sociology 
of anxiety.542 I will therefore make a brief excursus into this major philosophical work 
before moving on to discuss contemporary sociological perspectives.   
 
 
                                                 
542 The concept of fear and anxiety are of particular importance to existentialist philosophy, from 
Kierkegaard to Heidegger, Sartre and Camus. It is impossible to do justice to this vast field in this 
thesis. It is worth noting, however, the rich depiction of fear and anxiety in the fullest range of 
human behaviour, found in Camus’s The Plague. This work has much to contribute to a descriptive 
account of fear. Fear and Trembling (1843), and Sickness unto Death (1849) are other relevant 
texts by Kierkegaard offering a theological view of fear and anxiety. I have decided to discuss The 
Concept of Anxiety given that this is the text where Kierkegaard presents his most elaborated 
conceptualisation of this emotion.  
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9.6. Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety 
Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety, first published in 1844 under the 
pseudonym, Vigilius Haufniensis, and originally translated into English in 1944 with the 
title The Concept of Dread, is a philosophical work mostly dealing with the topic of 
‘original sin’ and human guilt, but it is also a major study into the phenomenology of 
anxiety.543 Already in its Introduction Kierkegaard emphasises the importance of making 
conceptual distinctions when discussing psychological concepts such as anxiety. He was 
pessimistic (like Wittgenstein a century later) about the success of teaching conceptual 
differences in an age in which psychological phenomena were being reduced to simple 
constructs amenable to scientific study.544 Against the zeitgeist, Kierkegaard embarked on a 
major didactic work to explain different phenomenological attributes of anxiety. He traced 
a radical distinction between fear and anxiety, the former having a definite object, and the 
latter being not attached to any object or circumstance. This separation of fear from anxiety 
based on the presence of an object was accepted as veridical by many other thinkers from 






                                                 
543 Kierkegaard certainly did not lack in personal anxiety. In his diary on May 17, 1839, he writes: 
“All existence makes me anxious, from the smallest fly to the mysteries of Incarnation…My 
distress is enormous, boundless; no one knows it except God in heaven…” (Kierkegaard, 1996). 
544 “The age of making distinctions is past, it has been vanquished by the system. In our day, 
whoever loves to make distinctions is regarded as an eccentric whose soul clings to something that 
has long since vanished” (p. 4). During Kierkegaard’s lifetime, there were major changes in the 
field of psychiatry (a term coined by Reil in 1808). This was the period when phrenology was the 
dominating medical influence on mental disorders. Phrenology proposed that by observing and 
feeling the skull it was possible to determine an individual’s psychological attributes. William 
James was born a few years before Kierkegaard’s death, and Freud was born one year later. 
545 I have discussed in the Introduction the limitations of this distinction (see also May (May, 1996), 
and Svendsen (Svendsen, 2008)). Solomon (Solomon, 2007) is a critic of describing anxiety as 
lacking an object and considers that for Kierkegaard. God is the ultimate object of anxiety. Solomon 
also considers Heidegger’s remark that the object of anxiety is “Nothingness” (Solomon, 2007, p. 
41) to be “a metaphysical evasion”, and claims, as does Konstan when discussing Epicurean ethics 
(Konstan, 2006a) that the foundation of all fears is the fear of death (Solomon, 2007, p. 41). 
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9.6.1. A religious point of view: anxiety as fate or faith 
 
Kierkegaard considered anxiety to result from the human capacity to choose,546 
becoming “the possibility of possibility” (p. 41). Later in The Concept of Anxiety 
Kierkegaard identifies fate as another important aspect of anxiety, stating that anxiety has 
“nothing” for an object and that “fate…is the nothing of anxiety” (p. 97).  In other words, 
the possibility of choosing creates anxiety, given that the outcomes of choices are often 
unknown; while fate is the ‘true’ object of anxiety as it determines the outcome of choices. 
Thus, in a rather indirect way, unknown but all knowing fate becomes a cause of anxiety 
and anxiety becomes central (existential) to what it is to be human. Kierkegaard’s concept 
of anxiety is permeated by religious connotations. He argues that being anxious about one’s 
fate is characteristic of non-believers, whereas having Christian faith is a protective factor 
against anxiety, as a person with faith is no longer at the mercy of fate. In this connection, 
Kierkegaard, despite his view that anxiety is objectless, also separates anxiety into a 
‘vulgar’ type having for its object “something external,” and an “inner” and more spiritual 
type, which is the product of faith (p. 155). Whereas vulgar anxiety lures humans to desire 
terrestrial objects, inner anxiety educates humans about the dangers of being deceived by 
those objects.  
 
 Although Kierkegaard articulates a distinction between anxiety and fear, the text 
does not offer a straightforward concept of anxiety that enables it to be readily 
distinguished from fear. He initially conceptualises what he terms “anxiety” in the Stoic 
fashion, that is, as an exercise in premeditation to prepare oneself for future mishaps (see 
Chapter three). For Kierkegaard there are two ways to be anxious: one, consistent with 
following the wrong path in life, where anxiety is related to external factors only, and a 
second in which there is understanding that anxiety is produced by the fact that nothing can 
be demanded from life, and that anxiety lies solely with oneself, directing one towards faith 
(Marino, 1998, p. 325).547 Anxiety works for Kierkegaard like a spiritual cathartic, an 
                                                 
546 “Anxiety is not found in the beast” (Kierkegaard, 1980, p. 41). All subsequent references to this 
work will be given by page number only. 
547 “Whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate” (p. 155). 
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anxiety that “takes fate away” by bringing faith (p. 159).548 In this contrast between faith 
and fate, where faith brings joyful reconciliation with uncertainty and fate conjures the 
possibility of adverse uncertainty, we can appreciate Kierkegaard’s dialectical approach to 
anxiety.549  
 
According to Kierkegaard, anxiety has either positive or negative connotations 
depending on whether the person suffering anxiety has the gift of faith (that is, the second 
path described above), or is a prisoner of fate (that is, the first path, with anxiety related to 
externals). The person with faith will still suffer, but will be recompensed with peace of 
mind in the midst of the most serious troubles.550 On the other hand, those that rely on fate 
are condemned to perpetual anxiety.551 To conclude, Kierkegaard understands anxiety as an 
existential condition and places it within a religious context, as a useful tool for spiritual 
education, rather than being a mental disorder in need of medical treatment (Marino, 1998, 
p. 308). 
 
 Kierkegaard considered that the state of anxiety is not fixed in time, but evolves as 
an intermediate step between the possibility of choosing freely and the “actuality” of 
expecting the outcome of the choice.552,553 Anxiety (‘vulgar’ anxiety) may sometimes refer 
to past events, but only because a past misfortune may happen again (p. 91). Kierkegaard 
also claims that anxiety about a past deed results from the incapacity of staying in the 
present due to the lack of repentance regarding past faults (p. 91). Consequently, 
                                                 
548 “With the help of faith, anxiety brings up the individuality to the rest of providence” (p. 160). 
549 The person who has learned to live in the anxiety of faith “will dance when the anxieties of 
finitude strike up the music”, whereas the believers in fate will “lose their minds and courage” (p. 
161). 
550 “Anxiety is the most terrible kind of spiritual trial before the point is reached where the same 
man is disciplined in faith…[remaining]…full of hope and confidence when something happens 
which previously almost made him faint and expire with anxiety…” (p. 172). 
551 “The hypochondriac is anxious about every insignificant thing”, but he/she will “breathe more 
easily” after he/she discovers faith and fights “actuality” (p. 161). 
552 “In the individual life, anxiety is the moment” (p. 81). 
553 We may say that possibility is intrinsically related to choosing, or in Kierkegaard’s own words 
“anxiety is the dizziness of freedom” (p. 60). 
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Kierkegaard’s therapeutic advice is to repent of past errors and to carry on with life by 
staying in the present moment, thus avoiding the “dialectical” (p. 91), or in other words, the 
return of anxiety attached to a past fault. In this analysis sin and guilt have a crucial role in 
producing anxiety, as Kierkegaard relates anxiety to Adam’s freedom to choose to sin. 
Therefore, acts of repentance should be understood against this religious framework. They 
are highly significant, being “in a dialectical relation to the offense” (p. 91). In other words, 
we may be caught between accepting punishment for a past fault and, if we do not repent, 
being condemned being constantly dragged along with the anxiety of the past deed. But it is 
important to note that Kierkegaard’s advice applies to terrestrial life, since the act of 
repenting implies forgiving oneself, accepting the deed and its consequences, and acquiring 
the freedom to choose how to live. 
 
9.6.2. The phenomenology of Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety 
 According to Kierkegaard, anxiety has a positive role in human life, helping to 
navigate the “adventure of life” as an expression of human freedom (p. 155).554 Anxiety is 
inherent in being alive, and learning how to manage anxiety may allow a person to walk the 
middle path between dying due to poor foresight and being crushed by paralysing fears. 
Kierkegaard broadens the field of anxiety by noting that this emotion can be “strange,” 
“bashful” or even “pleasing” (p. 41). By using the derivative term “anxiousness”, he 
stresses the temporal attributes of anxiety, ranging from acute anxiety to a pervasive state 
of anxiousness. Thus, “pleasing anxiousness” (p. 42) is a state of being in enthusiastic 
“eagerness” for a positive outcome. Kierkegaard considers this type of spirited anxiety to 
be common in children, especially when they are engaged in a task of discovery, and claims 
that what he describes as “childlike” anxiety is a culturally relevant phenomenon, whereas 
seeking for the “enigmatic” and “spiritual” produces the most profound and constructive 
anxiety. Owing to ‘spiritual’ anxiety, however, humans may discover “the monstrous” as 
well as the pleasure of deep knowledge (p. 42).555 This knowledge is constituted in a 
dialectic opposition between anxiety as a vehicle of pleasure and as a depressing force, due 
                                                 
554 “Life is an adventure that every human being must go through” (p. 155). 
555 Anxiety is the key to self-knowledge, and “only a prosaic stupidity maintains that this is 
disorganization” (p. 42). Anxiety is a search with a clear aim, not a disorganized one or a mental 
disorder. 
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to the realisation of the unavoidable fate of death.556 Anxiety may also act as a motivator, 
allowing the possibility “to be able” to achieve one’s goals once actualised by faith (p. 49). 
Kierkegaard’s dialectical approach to anxiety is further illustrated by his view that anxiety 
emerges as a continuous dialogue between prohibitions and desires.557 
 
 For Kierkegaard, the concept of anxiety will sound like “foolish talk”558 (p. 156) to 
those that have never experienced anxiety. On the other hand, those in the grip of anxiety 
should follow Kierkegaard’s therapy of accepting the anguish produced by this emotion. 
Acceptance implies that anxiety educates an individual’s understanding of “freedom’s 
possibility” (p. 155), that is, the exhilarating possibility of choice. According to 
Kierkegaard, the only way of achieving the solace of this stage is by following a spiritual 
path. The person who is “educated” in faith does not escape from even the most terrifying 
anxiety (p. 158) but instead ‘welcomes’ it, being ready to suffer pain.559 Once the pain of 
anxiety is accepted, that pain will be erased.560  
 
 In conclusion, Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety demonstrates a variety of ways 
in which anxiety may be conceptualised. In contrast to the current reductionist approach in 
psychiatry, anxiety is for Kierkegaard a state with either negative or positive connotations, 
depending on the individual’s beliefs and situations in life. Like Wittgenstein with his 
‘philosophical therapy’, Kierkegaard provides a profound philosophical analysis of the 
attributes of anxiety in relation to different life situations and perspectives. Like 
Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard is teaching differences. Anxiety is created through the freedom 
                                                 
556 “This terror is simply anxiety” (p. 45). 
557 Kierkegaard employs the term “prohibition” in the Biblical sense of a limit that awakens desire. 
The Biblical prohibition, says Kierkegaard, produced anxiety in Adam, “the anxious possibility of 
being able” (p. 44). 
558 “If…the speaker maintains that the great thing about him is that he has never been in anxiety, I 
will gladly provide him with my explanation: ‘because he is very spiritless” (p. 156). 
559 ‘Penitence’ might be a more appropriate word, given the religious structure of Kierkegaard’s 
discussion. 
560 “When the individual through anxiety is educated unto faith, anxiety will eradicate precisely 
what it brings forth itself” (p. 159).  
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to choose as well as being itself the result of choosing. Anxiety is the torture of the 
spiritually ignorant and the joy of the enlightened. In a word, excessive or not, anxiety is 
for Kierkegaard the sign of being human. 
 
9.7. The social construction of anxiety 
 Kierkegaard is frequently cited in the texts of dynamic psychologists who address 
the 20th century as the “age of anxiety” and sociologists analysing the socioeconomic and 
cultural bases of anxiety (for example, May, 1996; Wilkinson, 2001). For the past forty 
years the so-called “social constructionist” model of disease has embraced the theory that 
pathology is produced by culturally specific processes (Conrad, 2005), and more recently, 
an eclectic sociological approach to human fear has moved towards a synthesis between 
social construction, Freudian theories and, perhaps counter-intuitively in light of the 
previous discussion, Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety (Wilkinson, 2001). An important 
caveat, here, is that the religious connotations in Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety have 
been translated into a social emphasis on safety (Mythen, 2004), a step far removed from 
Kierkegaard’s high spiritual and ethical standards. The eminent sociologists Ulrich Beck 
and Anthony Giddens have written extensively on the fact that the 20th century witnessed 
the emergence of what is called the “age of risk,” a harbinger of increasing anxiety (Beck, 
2009; Giddens, 1990, 1991).561 Far from Kierkegaard’s understanding of the anxiety of 
being human (inner dread), though as part of a sociological movement that frequently 
references it, these authors conceptualise anxiety as being determined by powerful 
socioeconomic factors acting on the individual, an understanding commonly referred to 
under the more generic term, the ‘social construction of emotions’. 
 
 Boiger and Mesquita define the “social construction of emotions” as the 
understanding that emotions are primarily constituted, shaped and defined by social 
contexts (Boiger & Mesquita, 2012). They also suggest that the social construction of 
emotions depends on three primary situations. The first, termed “moment-to-moment 
interactions”, refers to the fact that emotions are constructed at the time of social exchange, 
for instance, when I develop anxiety after a friend tells me about future job cuts in my work 
                                                 
561 There is a vast literature on this subject, far beyond the scope of the thesis. However, for a 
different view, see Frank Furedi’s works (Furedi, 2013). 
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place. Accordingly, anxiety is shaped by present social exchanges and their future 
implications for the individual. The second kind of situation occurs when social interactions 
directly produce anxiety, and the emotion impacts, in a circular way, upon the social 
interaction. For instance, this occurs when my boss’s actions and words make me feel 
continuously anxious, and my anxiety further shapes interactions with my boss. The third 
situation relates to specific socio-cultural contexts. Based on this perspective, social norms 
are the framework on which emotions are constructed and interpreted, and the defining 
characteristics of mental illness depend on cultural rules concerning what is normal or 
abnormal (Averill, 2012). For instance, anxiety may be more frequent in developing 
countries, where the job situation is more precarious than in developed countries. In 
conclusion, the social construction of emotions is considered as a dynamic process of social 
interaction in given socio-cultural contexts.562 Within this framework, the increasing use of 
anti-anxiety medications such as Valium is symptomatic of social construction and 
medicalization given that in the opinion of some sociologists this treatment only provides a 
temporary emotional relief without addressing the social forces that cause anxiety, such as 
work, family and social isolation (Koumjian, 1981). 
 
 Ian Wilkinson’s comprehensive sociological study of anxiety, Anxiety in a Risk 
Society (Wilkinson, 2001), brings together the work of other sociologists into a thorough 
social constructionist approach that includes views from psychoanalysis and philosophy. 
Wilkinson proposes that modern societies produce feelings of insecurity about one’s own 
identity and purpose in life, with anxiety becoming a symbol of this uncertainty.563 He 
remarks that, following Kierkegaard, anxiety results from the impossibility of escaping 
                                                 
562 Others explain the high prevalence of anxiety in the 21st century as the result of the main social 
institutions, such as the education system, governments, the medical bureaucracy and the media, 
producing the understanding that anxiety is a socially accepted emotional response to the stresses of 
contemporary times (Dowbiggin, 2009). In other words, social institutions produce the social rules 
that normalise anxiety as an acceptable response in certain circumstances. Importantly, they also 
may produce ‘rules’ determining abnormalities, for example, economic institutions may produce 
understandings that it is abnormal for the unemployed to be anxious when unemployment rates are 
below 5% in developed nations, or medical institutions may induce parents of very excitable 
children to regard their children’s behaviour as abnormal and requiring medical treatment. 
563 In Wilkinson’s terms (sometimes imitating the style of Freud and Kierkegaard), anxiety is “a 
symbolic form of control representing a state of mind and emotion by which we are made to be 
convinced that we are in a situation of threatening uncertainty” (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 17). 
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from the expected “course of our fate” (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 17). In other words, individuals 
feel that they are at the mercy of whatever happens in their life, without the possibility of 
changing their situation.564 Wilkinson considers that one of the functions of anxiety is to 
alert humans of the fact that they are in danger.565 Following Freud, Wilkinson construes 
anxiety to be a consequence of the difficulty of knowing the cause of an “anticipated 
danger,” and hence, the inability to effectively deal with potential dangers (Wilkinson, 
2001, p. 18).  
 
 Following Kierkegaard’s distinction, Wilkinson conceives of fear as directed to a 
definite object, and anxiety as due to the unknown outcome of a feared situation. He 
accepts that it is difficult to separate the concepts of fear and anxiety,566 but in line with 
Freud’s position, he suggests that action towards self-preservation depends on converting 
the uncertainty of anxiety into the certainty of fear.567 Thus, once the object of fear is 
known, anxiety is relieved.568 In Wilkinson’s view, the sociological causes of anxiety are 
frequent changes in the contexts in which humans live and in their changing social 
relationships, increased social pressure to decide about one’s future, and the loss of 
communal social bonds and traditions, with the concomitant dissolution of support 
networks provided by traditional ways of community organization.  
 
 While the question as to whether life in pre-modern societies produced less anxiety 
than in contemporary western societies is anachronistic, given that feelings of insecurity 
have always accompanied human civilisation, nevertheless Wilkinson suggests that the 
                                                 
564 Wilkinson considers anxiety to be a burden but also to be part of being human and, following 
Kierkegaard, he suggests that anxiety may have positive attributes, such as educating an individual 
into becoming a deeper person and as “the inspiration for artists and great thinkers” (Wilkinson, 
2001, p. 66).  
565 Anxiety “alerts us to the fact that something is dangerously wrong with our world” (Wilkinson, 
2001, p. 65). 
566 This is evident in his confusing definition of anxiety, given that if the situation whose outcome is 
unknown is feared, the object of the feared situation should be known by definition. 
567 Wilkinson cites Rollo May “One cannot fight what one does not know” (May, 1996, p. 21). 
568 “Where knowledge frees us from anxiety it may only bring us so far as to realise the proper 
identity of our fears” (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 20). 
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increasing use of the term ‘anxiety’ in contemporary times denotes a new conception of this 
emotion, not present in earlier societies. On this basis, Wilkinson believes that there is more 
anxiety in contemporary society than in preceding times. He suggests that one of the main 
reasons for this phenomenon is that individuals in earlier societies were much more prone 
to display their emotions, whereas currently, emotions are more repressed, and, this 
repression (with a nod to Freud) results in increased anxiety. He further suggests that the 
impoverishment of community bonds and family relations, as well as the poor quality of 
social ties plays a major role in producing anxiety. Wilkinson considers the conditions of 
employment to be another important source of anxiety given that the stressful working 
conditions in contemporary societies, where, he believes, there is less opportunity to make 
choices about one’s future, impose additional disruption on communal support. Finally, 
Wilkinson considers that the contemporary culture of “economic individualism” 
(Wilkinson, 2001, p. 37), where people primarily consider their own interests, rather than 
those of others or of the community as a whole, is another source of anxiety. He notes, 
however, that this social framework is quite heterogeneous in its impacts as different 
socioeconomic groups have different social problems. For instance, the anxiety of the 
middle classes is mostly related to competition in the workplace, whereas anxiety in the 
working classes is associated to an increased risk of violence, poverty, and unemployment.  
 
 Based on empirical sociological studies Wilkinson concludes that high 
unemployment, decreased access to health care, increased job insecurity, and the increasing 
rate of divorce make people vulnerable to anxiety. He summarises by saying that anxiety is 
primarily a result of social conflicts and cultural factors, whereas problems at the individual 
level (such as personality traits) have a secondary role. In his opinion, anxiety construed as 
a psychiatric disorder only captures a fraction of those who are suffering from this emotion. 
Consequently, anxiety should not be conceptualised simply as an individual psychiatric 
condition given that this strategy is unable to encompass the social experience of distress. 
Arguing that social processes are critical in producing anxiety, Wilkinson suggests that the 
solution to anxiety does not lie in attending solely to individual personalities but in 
“questioning society” for appropriate socioeconomic solutions (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 66).569 
                                                 
569 Wilkinson argues that anxiety is not merely related to human pathology but is a consequence of 
“the [socioeconomic and cultural] condition of our social world” (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 137). 
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Thus, Wilkinson only accepts medical treatment of anxiety as a matter of “practical 
necessity” (p. 66), since the real causes of anxiety to be attended to are cultural and societal 
conflicts.  
 
 Wilkinson discusses empirical studies in the sociological literature showing that 
coping behaviours depend on an individual’s socioeconomic status and type of social role. 
Accordingly, the capacity for coping is lowest in the lower classes and in women, who are 
subjected to worse quality of employment than men (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 71). The 
significant association between economic deprivation and higher “psychosocial distress” 
(Wilkinson, 2001, p. 71) suggests that interventions to alleviate anxiety should be aimed at 
changing socioeconomic policies. I shall now address the conceptual limitations of 
Wilkinson’s approach to the social construct of fear and anxiety. 
 
9.7.1. Conceptual limitations of sociological models of anxiety 
 Several of the arguments raised by Wilkinson to explain anxiety in contemporary 
times, such as socioeconomic inequalities, are conceptually sound and do not require 
critical discussion. There is no need for empirical studies to establish that limited access to 
health care, employment uncertainty and family crises are important causes of fear and 
anxiety. As previously proposed by Beck, Furedi and other sociologists, living in a society 
of increasing risks may also play a relevant role in causing anxiety. What is difficult to 
accept is his view that psychological attributes should be only of minor relevance. The 
correlation between anxiety and social factors is not absolute, and much of the ‘noise’ in 
this association may be explained by different ‘thresholds’ for developing anxiety 
depending on individual factors. Thus, Wilkinson is in danger of committing the same sort 
of error as that of the biological psychiatrists. While the latter reduce the cause of anxiety to 
biological mechanisms, Wilkinson largely reduces the cause of anxiety to social and 
cultural variables.  
 
 Radical postures on the social construction of anxiety have been criticised by other 
sociologists such as Williams (S. J. Williams, 2000, 2003) and Francis (Francis, 2007) who 
have warned against the extremes of the “organismic” approach of complete acceptance of 
the biomedical model of emotional disorders as well as the radical social construction of 
emotions which considers that the biomedical model of labelling moral emotions is used as 
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a tool of social control. Francis has argued in favour of a model transcending current 
divisions of biological positivism versus social constructionism of emotions (Francis, 2007, 
p. 594).  
 
 The challenge to Williams and Francis’s otherwise sound proposal, however, is how 
this wider approach can be applied to real life. One main obstacle to this endeavour is the 
so-called continuous “redefinition” of anxiety (Koumjian, 1981). The idea of “redefinition” 
is based on the fact that the concept of anxiety encompasses a range or states, from an 
emotion that the vast majority of people experience relatively frequently in their lives, to 
severe states of anxiety, in which this emotion has a profound negative impact upon 
individuals’ lives. As already discussed, what becomes important is the vast territory lying 
between these extremes of anxiety and the consequent lack of a clear point of demarcation 
for the pathological state. “Redefinition” of anxiety occurs when people with anxieties 
related to daily life consult with doctors to access a pharmacological solution. Thus, day-to-
day social problems are ‘redefined’ in terms of medical problems. As stated by Parens 
(Parens, 2013), “It would be lovely if we could look to nature and discern the line between 
species-atypical and species-typical functioning, between the categories of disease and 
health” (p. 4). In this ideal scenario, we would “point to nature” to indicate the adequate 
timing for medical intervention.570 
                                                 
570 Horwitz has suggested a potential solution to this dilemma, stating that ‘true’ mental disorders 
are produced by abnormal emotions arising from “internal dysfunctions” (Horwitz, 2002, p. 11), 
which are considered socially inappropriate (this is based on Wakefield’s concept of ‘mental 
disorders discussed above (Wakefield & First, 2013)). On the other hand, individuals whose 
emotional symptoms fluctuate depending on socially stressful circumstances are psychologically 
“normal”, since they lack the putative “internal dysfunction.” The problem with this proposal is that 
it begs the question, given that Horwitz never explains the meaning of “internal dysfunction,” and 
what the criteria are for emotional behaviours to be considered inappropriate. Even his concept of 
psychological normality is problematic, since people may react in different ways to stressful social 
situations. In other words, some social events may be stressful to some individuals but not to others, 
and there is no canonical response to social adversities. Not surprisingly, Horwitz ends up defining 
mental illness as “whatever conditions a particular social group defines as such” (p. 14). In a 
circular way, Horwitz defines “inexplicable anxiety” as a valid mental disorder given that it 
“indicates” dysfunctional psychological mechanisms that are considered socially inappropriate, 
whereas generic anxiety has no “specific indicators of an underlying disease” (p. 13). Regardless of 
being explicable in terms of social norms or not, what is missing from Horwitz’s analysis is the fact 
that many of these anxieties produce intense suffering that require treatment, regardless of whether 
they are labelled “explicable” or “inexplicable.” The same is true for Horwitz and Wakefield’s 
(Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007, p. 27) concept of “normal sadness,” which is characterised by 
including “three essential components,” namely a sadness with a severity proportional to the 
cont. next page 
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 Another limitation with Wilkinson’s account, which extends to other sociologists 
such as Rollo May, is the apparently forced use of philosophical and psychoanalytical 
concepts on which his analysis is based. Wilkinson cites the works of Freud and 
Kierkegaard as providing the conceptual framework for the social construction of anxiety, 
but he provides no clear explanation as to how Freud’s and Kierkegaard’s very different 
frameworks ‘blend’ with his sociological conception of anxiety.571 In fact, Freud’s concept 
of anxiety is ambiguous: he considers anxiety to be a protective factor while also 
medicalizing the emotion by describing anxiety neurosis as a frequent emotional disorder. 
Freud did not take up any social factors beyond the family circle for his account of anxiety 
neurosis. Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety, on the other hand, is framed within the 
religious concepts of sin, guilt and faith, and as discussed above, he mostly limits his 
analysis of anxiety to the personal existential level. Most striking is that, for Kierkegaard, it 
is acceptance and faith what redeems anxiety, and not ameliorative social factors572. 
 
9.8. Conclusion 
The main aim of this chapter was to describe the process of medicalization of fear 
and anxiety which took off in the early 20th century and continues today. As a postscript to 
the previous chapter, I have discussed how Freud began medicalizing anxiety, with his 
description of a specific type of anxiety and the invention of a therapy for this condition. In 
the early 1950’s the decision as to what counted as pathological fear and anxiety was taken 
                                                                                                                                                    
triggering event, a proportional reduction of the intensity of sadness as the cause of sadness abates, 
and decreasing sadness once coping mechanisms help the individual adjusting to the problematic 
situation. Nevertheless, even if this sadness is considered “normal,” it will require intervention if its 
severity has a strong negative impact upon the life of the individual. 
571 Let alone any examination of some of their conceptual limitations, such as those I discussed in 
Chapter eight. 
572 The philosopher Ian Hacking suggests a novel approach to social construction of psychiatric 
disorders which is not committed to either full social construction or full biological reductionism 
(Hacking, 1999, p. 107). He advanced the concept of “interactive kinds,” according to which human 
activity may change the context in which they are engaged, which in turn changes the way humans 
behave. This is contrasted with “natural kinds,” a concept that includes homogeneous classes of 
inanimate objects. Thus, classifications in psychiatry may “change the way in which individuals 
experience themselves” (Hacking, 1999, p. 104), which may itself change future psychiatric 
classifications. 
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over by committees of expert psychiatrists, and the age of the DSM was begun. Freud’s 
notion of anxiety neurosis was disassembled into a variety of sub-syndromes on weak 
conceptual and empirical bases. The reduction of conceptions of fear and anxiety to a new 
nosology consisting of a restricted set of criteria was accompanied by the design of 
biological models to explain their mechanism and treatment.  
 
In parallel with the process of medicalization, sociologists and dynamic 
psychologists introduced more wide-ranging categories with their concepts of the “age of 
anxiety” and the “social construction of anxiety.” But here again, extreme social 
construction falls into the same sort of mistake that is attributed to biological psychiatrists 
and neuroscientists, that is, the reduction of fear and anxiety to by-products of socio-
cultural forces (as opposed to reduction to biological factors) while dismissing the role of 
personality attributes, the complex variability of contexts (internal and external), and 
idiosyncratic emotional responses. Sociologists have also minimised the potential of the 
psychopharmacological revolution, which is able to control mild to severe anxieties without 
the need to change social structures.  
 
In conclusion, the radical biological approach to fear and anxiety promoted by 
contemporary psychiatry results in a fundamentalist approach to emotional disorders, which 
are all considered to be due to dysfunction of brain circuitry and genetic anomalies, with 
only lip service paid to contextual factors. A similar fundamentalism applies to extreme 
social constructionist approaches, which consider anxiety to be merely a result of socio-
cultural factors, thereby ignoring personality issues. Thus, the so-called “age of risk” and 
“age of anxiety” give rise to therapeutic solutions that might be better characterised as part 







When the dust settles, if we have done our work properly, it should be possible to better 
describe and understand our psychological predicament 
Daniel Hutto, New Ideas in Psychology, 2009 (Hutto, 2009) 
 
I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous view of 
the foundations of possible buildings 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 7 (Wittgenstein, 1980a) 
 
  
This dissertation has examined understandings of fear through the work of western 
philosophers and thinkers selected based on their overall contributions to the concept and 
therapy of this emotion. I have discussed different perspectives, ranging from Greek 
Hellenistic philosophy to current neuroscience-informed biological psychiatry. The aim has 
not been to produce an historical review of fear, but to provide ‘perspicuous presentations’ 
from selected philosophers as well as from current psychology, the neurosciences, 
sociology and psychiatry. This strategy allows for fruitful comparisons of different 
conceptualisations of fear and how this rich variety of concepts translates into different 
therapeutic techniques.  
 
A brief review of the highlights of this investigation will bring the range of different 
perspectives back into view. 
 
For the hedonistic philosopher Epicurus, fear was one of the main obstacles to 
obtaining ataraxia. As we have seen the Epicurean treatment for fear requires living 
unnoticed, curbing human ambitions, understanding that death is the mere dissolution of 
atoms, and that living among friends is the best antidote against life misfortunes. Honest 
‘confession’ of one’s fears and worries to the philosopher-therapist, who will teach the 
techniques of concentrating on the present, avoiding thinking about the future, and in times 
of suffering, finding refuge in sweet memories, is central to Epicurean therapy. It is 
delivered through simple aphorisms to memorise, rehearse, and repeat in times of hardship. 
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Fear and distress were also identified by Cicero as the most damaging and “bitter” 
of human passions. What is most important in Cicero’s work is his systematic therapeutic 
approach to fear and distress. The philosopher becomes the physician of the soul, and both 
philosophy and rhetoric provide the proper remedies. Philosophy teaches that fear has deep 
roots, and for effecting a cure, all fears, one by one, must be turned over and investigated. 
Once the causes of fear are understood, rhetoric will furnish expertise in using words as 
potent drugs. Rhetoric will inform the philosopher which words to choose, how to best 
convey the message, and, most importantly, to select the proper time (kairos) to deliver the 
treatment. The final aim of the Ciceronian philosophical therapy is to empower individuals 
to become their own therapists in managing fear and distress. 
 
A century later, Seneca borrows from both Epicurus and Cicero for his broad 
approach to fear. As a Stoic, Seneca promotes a virtuous lifestyle and self-examination as 
the main remedies against fear. The Stoic sage has no fear, only caution. But Seneca 
understands that the Stoic remedy is for the very few, and for most humans he recommends 
an eclectic and non-dogmatic selection of remedies, from the sheltered Epicurean life to the 
Cyrenaic dampening of fear by pre-rehearsing misfortunes. Even more important is the fact 
that Seneca’s writings are already therapeutic in that the letters are directed to readers, who 
have the opportunity to identify their own fears with those discussed by Seneca, and 
thereby to benefit from his therapeutic advice. This technique of therapeutic writing and 
reading reached its pinnacle with Michel de Montaigne, who made himself and his many 
fears, the main object of study. Nothing is hidden in his Essays; all sorts of fears criss-cross 
the text, and Montaigne presents different therapies he has tried on others but especially on 
himself. Montaigne’s fears were unmoved by even the best Ciceronian remedies, and after 
sampling remedies from different Hellenistic schools, Montaigne embarked in a dialectical 
exploration that allowed the design of his own therapy. This included understanding the 
limitations of the Stoic eradication of emotions to be practiced in life; the difficulty of 
suppressing the fear of death based on the Epicurean concept of death as dissolution into 
atoms; and assenting to the Sceptic stance that there may be no ‘definite’ therapy for fears. 
These understandings provided Montaigne with the necessary freedom to implement those 
remedies that suited him best, such as accepting that misfortunes of life are intrinsic to 
being human, understanding and accepting one’s limitations to face fear, and enjoy what is 
at hand. 
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Montaigne’s renaissance humanism is followed by the materialism of the 17th 
century, based on significant discoveries in human physiology and the need for political 
guidance to states at risk of social dissolution. It is in the context of social turmoil that 
Hobbes proposes a political system based on fear. Hobbes considers that enforcing social 
fear is the best ‘therapy’ to strengthen a sovereign. There is no better emotion than fear to 
subdue individuals under a powerful ruler. In parallel, Descartes developed a mechanism 
for the emotions that, after several iterations, would interest physicians and scientists during 
the latest two centuries. Common to both Hobbes and Descartes are reductive accounts of 
human fear: in the case of Hobbes, fear becomes a generic emotion amenable to political 
manipulation; for Descartes, it becomes a secondary emotion resulting from a dualist 
mechanism amenable to physiological experimentation. 
 
The 20th century witnessed major changes in the conceptualisation of fear. 
Reductive accounts were overwhelmingly accepted, undermining the complexity and depth 
of fear and related emotions, and understandings of their specificity in different contexts 
and individuals, to the detriment of their therapy. In line with Descartes’s mechanistic 
approach to the emotions, William James argued that fear was a reflex response to the 
perception of visceral changes, thereby paving the way for the endeavours of the 
contemporary cognitive neuroscience focus on finding a brain circuitry mediating fear. 
Following James, fear became primarily reduced to a fight/flight response, identifiable in 
the brain, and this sort of understanding is later generalised to account for a generic type of 
human fear. Major conceptual problems with this strategy are overlooked, but this 
empirical approach continues to be the predominant paradigm in current psychiatric 
endeavours, which aim at treating fear by ‘tuning’ a malfunctioning ‘fear brain circuit’. 
 
A second reduction, influential the 20th century, was Freud’s conceptualisation of 
fear and anxiety as products of inadequately processed libidinal impulses, or later, from a 
return to primitive experiences of abandonment. Freud’s psychoanalytical therapy consisted 
in a technique of bringing unconscious fears (about libidinal repression or infant memories) 
to consciousness for proper processing. As we have seen, Freud’s theories of fear and 
anxiety are also marred by serious conceptual shortcomings. Further, the discovery of 
medications that could relieve fear and anxiety in a matter of days, and the predominance of 
biological psychiatry in current nosologies, signalled the demise of psychoanalysis. From a 
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different angle, a third reductive development, according to which fear is understood as 
resulting from social forces acting on the individual emerged. The ‘social construction’ of 
emotions, mainly proposed by sociologists, is directly opposed to the biological reduction 
of psychiatry. Whereas social factors are certainly relevant, they cannot fully account for all 
fear-related behaviours and feelings because different people respond to social triggers in 
their own idiosyncratic ways, influenced by the myriad of factors that shape their 
personalities. 
 
Against these relentless reductions of fear in the last few centuries, not only have 
the insights of the humanistic tradition been overlooked, but the more elaborated, 
comprehensive and didactic concepts of fear proposed by Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein 
have been given scant attention. Kierkegaard described anxiety as both oppressive and 
liberating. Oppressive fear arises from our attitudes to externals and vulnerability to fate, 
whereas liberating fear relates to faith, elevating the individual to a state that transcends 
earthly misfortunes. Wittgenstein provided a therapeutic “prelude” (Hutto, 2009, p. 207) by 
clarifying conceptual knots in the understanding of fear, showing, against Freud that 
emotions are not purely inner hidden phenomena, but that fear is interwoven with human 
life, an emotion in constant flux, manifested in severities that range from almost 
inconspicuous states to paralysing terror. Wittgenstein teaches differences in the subtleties 
of motivations, contexts and personalities that shape fear, also stressing that fear relates to a 
variety of emotions connected by ‘family resemblance.’ These efforts notwithstanding, the 
dominant contemporary concept of fear navigates between the Scylla of biological 
psychiatry and the Charybdis of social construction. It is paradoxical that after all the 
progress in the neurosciences and social sciences of fear in the last century, we are often 
seen to be living in a “risk society” in an “age of stress and anxiety” (Beck, 2009; Dunant 
& Porter, 1996; M. Jackson, 2013), and that research on the brain mechanisms of fear and 
anxiety “have been disappointing as a source for novel treatments” (J. E. LeDoux & Pine, 
2016). 
 
The oversight provided by these different understandings of fear and its therapies 
reflects my preference for a broad perspective on different aspects of fear and for 
empowering individuals in active participation in their own therapeutic process. This kind 
of understanding was variously argued for by the Hellenistic philosophers, Montaigne, 
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Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. However, I do not advocate for an anachronistic return to 
ancient remedies; that would contradict the insights relating to the careful consideration of 
changing differences, times and contexts that they championed. Rather, by setting out these 
different understandings it is possible to see how their concepts may be philosophically re-
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